British COIN (merged thread)

[JMA]

Fancy kit starts with SF generally because it is more expensive and specialised and then percolates out as it comes down in price and or its wider utility is more experienced. Laser Light Modules started off as an SF only piece of equipment. Likewise Night Vision Devices - SF get the good stuff first and then slowly everyone else gets it. Where the SF has had a significant impact on 'green army operations' is in the targeting cycle at company and battalion level. The SF are used for tasks which match their training and capabilties - a good example of this can be seen in the Wardak CH47 Investigation Report

We need at this point to refer to Fd Marshall Slim an his thoughts on Special Forces (page 546 in my book):

Special Forces

The British Army in the last war spawned a surprising number of special units and formations, that is forces of varying sizes, each trained, equipped, and prepared for some particular type of operation. We had commandos, assault brigades, amphibious division, mountain divisions, long-range penetration forces, airborne formations, desert groups, and an extraordinary variety of cloak and dagger parties. The equipment of the special units was more generous than that of normal formations, and many of them went so far as to have their own bases in administrative organisations. We employed most of them in Burma, and some, notably the Chindits, gave splendid examples of courage and hardihood. Yet I came firmly to the conclusion that such formations, trained, equipped, and mentally adjusted for one kind of operation only, were wasteful. They did not give, militarily, a worthwhile return for the resources in men, material and time that they absorbed. To begin with they were usually formed by attracting the best men from normal units by better conditions, promises of excitement, and not a little propaganda. Even on the rare occasions when normal units were converted into special ones without the option of volunteering, the same process went on in reverse. Men thought to be below the standards set or over an arbitrary age limit were weeded out to less favourable corps. The result of these methods was undoubtedly to lower the quality of the rest of the Army, especially the infantry, not only by skimming the cream off it, but by encouraging the idea that certain of the normal operations of war were so difficult that only specially equipped corps d’elite could be expected to undertake them. ...

That said we see the cap fits today as much as it did then.

The Rhodesian SAS did magnificent work during the war especially in the last two years. However, if one reads their Op Log one will note that 95% of the type of work they did prior to the end of 1977 would by the end of the war be routinely done by the RLI and even by elements of some of the Territorial Units (Reserves).

So when one looks at the work the 'black army' does its probably better we don't hear publicly what they are doing because if we did we would probably identify much of it as being work properly trained normal infantry should be or could be doing.

Compared to my day it makes sense to conduct night operations because the night vision equipment and thermal imaging gives the troops such a massive advantage over the enemy. Again how special is an operation where troops are inserted by chopper into an LZ at night and from there they fan out to take on an objective while being covered by Apache and Spector gunships? In my book that is a normal infantry operation for well trained troops. There are relatively few of these opportunities going around so (as I mentioned above) the special forces and their hangers on (SAS, Seals, Rangers, Paras) will hold onto those tasks as if only they could possibly succeed. The mindset needs to change.

[Red Rat]

The Rhodesian SAS did magnificent work during the war especially in the last two years. However, if one reads their Op Log one will note that 95% of the type of work they did prior to the end of 1977 would by the end of the war be routinely done by the RLI and even by elements of some of the Territorial Units (Reserves).

We see the same sort of process happening in some respects. However, as in N Ireland, I suspect that what we will see as Afghanistan enters drawdown is that many of the missions currently undertaken by regular soldiers will be once more undertaken by Special Forces. This is simply because that as 2015 approaches political appetite for risk will sharply decrease.

Compared to my day it makes sense to conduct night operations because the night vision equipment and thermal imaging gives the troops such a massive advantage over the enemy. Again how special is an operation where troops are inserted by chopper into an LZ at night and from there they san out to take on an objective while being covered by Apache and Spector gunships? In my book that is a normal infantry operation for well trained troops. There are relatively few of these opportunities going around so (as I mentioned above) the special forces and their hangers on (SAS, Seals, Rangers, Paras) will hold onto those tasks as if only they could possibly succeed. The mindset needs to change.

Properly trained troops can take on that task, but the added value is in the backroom functions and processes that the SF have. if we resourced and trained everyone to the same level as the SF then we might not need the SF so much, but part of the reason they are so effective is because they are so well resourced and certainly the UK cannot afford to resource everyone the same.

As for night ops it - there are advantages and disadvantages to operating at night.

[JMA]

We see the same sort of process happening in some respects. However, as in N Ireland, I suspect that what we will see as Afghanistan enters drawdown is that many of the missions currently undertaken by regular soldiers will be once more undertaken by Special Forces. This is simply because that as 2015 approaches political appetite for risk will sharply decrease.

Simply the problem in using the rotated line regiments for such work is that they are not there long enough to get fed into the type of operations carefully and then to allow them to grow and flourish. Its the 'C' word again (continuity) and it is that which will keep the SAS busy doing basic infantry work or force the Brits to suck in another Para Bn into the 'Black Army'.

Properly trained troops can take on that task, but the added value is in the backroom functions and processes that the SF have. if we resourced and trained everyone to the same level as the SF then we might not need the SF so much, but part of the reason they are so effective is because they are so well resourced and certainly the UK cannot afford to resource everyone the same.

Ah the backroom boys... I have heard a cynic refer to them (not me this time) as being like a baby... self focussed, demands attention, eats a lot, makes a lot of noise, grows fast... and produces piles of shyte in return.

I think you want to research special forces training a little. I would suggest that training on specialist equipment and special drills is first class. I would look into how much standard infantry tactical training a person who joined as a corporal (for example) and who is now a sergeant has had since joining. Do they send people to the Infantry Battle School in Brecon for example?

Maybe its time to be more specific on what their tasks are to be. Strategic stuff at short notice (like targeting in Libya) rather than a standard infantry tasks such as an airborne raid (day or night). Once the relevant tasks have been defined then you force them to share the kit. Might have to fire a few officers to force sanity onto the current situation.

If any of this work is too much for any of the existing regiments I guess it makes the decision on which to disband a lot easier.

As for night ops it - there are advantages and disadvantages to operating at night.

Appreciated, but many of the disadvantages are as a result of legacy issues caused by bad decision making back then.

[Red Rat]

Simply the problem in using the rotated line regiments for such work is that they are not there long enough to get fed into the type of operations carefully and then to allow them to grow and flourish. Its the 'C' word again (continuity) and it is that which will keep the SAS busy doing basic infantry work or force the Brits to suck in another Para Bn into the 'Black Army'.

I think I am following your thought here in that if there was more continuity there would be better preparation and therefore less Risk? That is not my experience of it. In N Ireland tasks which were line infantry tasks were given to Special Forces because sensitivities and therefore (political) Risk increased. The risk was mitigated by the use of SF. No matter how well trained the line infantry are if the operation is sensitive and carries strategic or operational risk then it will be allocated to the SF - that is what they are there for (a strategic asset for strategic tasks).

I think you want to research special forces training a little. I would suggest that training on specialist equipment and special drills is first class.

It is. The SF is a higher grade of soldier - no doubt about it. Like any unit that has gone through a demanding selection process you will get a higher grade soldier. They also tend to be experienced soldiers when they join. This, plus the extensive and intensive training and specialist equipment they receive makes them a highly capable asset. We can and do offer aspects of what used to be SF training and equipment to line infantry now, but that still will not give us the calibre of soldier, nor the level of training that the SF have.

Maybe its time to be more specific on what their tasks are to be. Strategic stuff at short notice (like targeting in Libya) rather than a standard infantry tasks such as an airborne raid (day or night). Once the relevant tasks have been defined then you force them to share the kit.

As a strategic asset they get used on strategic tasks. What that means in the ground I do not know less that they get used for High Value Targets. If I said anything else it would be pure speculation!!

[JMA]

I think I am following your thought here in that if there was more continuity there would be better preparation and therefore less Risk? That is not my experience of it. In N Ireland tasks which were line infantry tasks were given to Special Forces because sensitivities and therefore (political) Risk increased. The risk was mitigated by the use of SF. No matter how well trained the line infantry are if the operation is sensitive and carries strategic or operational risk then it will be allocated to the SF - that is what they are there for (a strategic asset for strategic tasks).

As stated before it was the caution bred in NI which emasculated and all but destroyed the Brit military as a fighting force.

The SAS are able to take on these varied tasks because of the experience they have in doing all these tasks when they come up. Very experienced and competent soldiers but look again at Slim's comments on special forces and question why the cream of the military are being used on some of the basic - line infantry - type operations they are?

I highlighted the last sentence of the Slim piece I quoted and quote it again because of how true it has turned out to be right now in 2011.

The result of these methods was undoubtedly to lower the quality of the rest of the Army, especially the infantry, not only by skimming the cream off it, but by encouraging the idea that certain of the normal operations of war were so difficult that only specially equipped corps d’elite could be expected to undertake them.

It is. The SF is a higher grade of soldier - no doubt about it. Like any unit that has gone through a demanding selection process you will get a higher grade soldier. They also tend to be experienced soldiers when they join. This, plus the extensive and intensive training and specialist equipment they receive makes them a highly capable asset. We can and do offer aspects of what used to be SF training and equipment to line infantry now, but that still will not give us the calibre of soldier, nor the level of training that the SF have.

If you take a look at their organisation structure you will note that they are rank heavy as they have more officers and SNCOs in a troop than in a line infantry company (and not only for pay purposes). And as you rightly say they have longer service per man than in most line-infantry units but this should rather demand that they are only used on operations and tasks which are really strategic and/or are really beyond the ability of line infantry units.

What is a strategic task? Surely a raid within the current AO is not really strategic? OBL's hit, yes, but a raid on your local common or garden variety Taliban leader, no.

That said they really have to do these tasks don't they? Because of the 'short tours' and lack of continuity and experience in the rapidly rotated units the line units are really not up to the job are they? Read Slim again.

So if a unit commander on a quick rotation were to form up and 'demand' that he be given such tasks when in his AO he quite rightly could be asked when he would be ready to assume such duties when effectively his unit will:

... spend two months learning the job, two months doing it and then two months counting the day until they go home for 'tea and medals'.

As a strategic asset they get used on strategic tasks. What that means in the ground I do not know less that they get used for High Value Targets. If I said anything else it would be pure speculation!!

Here we would need to define 'strategic' and also how 'high' are the Taliban leader 'high value targets' they take out.

There is no secret that they have to do these tasks as there is plainly no one else to do them. My guess is that you will see the SFSG (special forces support group) continue to grow and grow as the comparatively few numbers of actual operators (not the parade ground strength) exhaust themselves doing all the work (they should be doing plus that which the line infantry should be doing in their respective AOs).

The problem, this problem is a self inflicted wound.

[Red Rat]

As stated before it was the caution bred in NI which emasculated and all but destroyed the Brit military as a fighting force.

The NI experience did not seem to hamper the UK in the Falklands, Gulf War 1 or Iraq 2003...

The SAS are able to take on these varied tasks because of the experience they have in doing all these tasks when they come up. Very experienced and competent soldiers but look again at Slim's comments on special forces and question why the cream of the military are being used on some of the basic - line infantry - type operations they are?

The SF take the cream, but they do not take all the cream. One of the problems they have had since 2005 is recruiting.

If you take a look at their organisation structure you will note that they are rank heavy as they have more officers and SNCOs in a troop than in a line infantry company (and not only for pay purposes).

I do not know enough about troop structure to comment. But I know that the Military Police have a heavier rank structure then a line infantry company. I think it depends on the level of independence you intend to give them. SF and RMP work in smaller discrete groupings, we do not expect our infantry to do so.

And as you rightly say they have longer service per man than in most line-infantry units but this should rather demand that they are only used on operations and tasks which are really strategic and/or are really beyond the ability of line infantry units.

I suspect that the SF would say that they are only used on high end tasks. That is not to say that these are necessarily beyond the abilities of line infantry, certainly not appropriately trained infantry, but they are the high end tasks.

What is a strategic task? Surely a raid within the current AO is not really strategic? OBL's hit, yes, but a raid on your local common or garden variety Taliban leader, no.

Depends on risk involved and effect achieved and must be placed within the campaign context. AT the moment the SF are being used to pursue a Counter-Terrorism campaign and the remainder a COIN campaign as part of an overarching campaign plan.

That said they really have to do these tasks don't they? Because of the 'short tours' and lack of continuity and experience in the rapidly rotated units the line units are really not up to the job are they? Read Slim again.

I disagree. My fundamental issue with short tours in a COIN context is that it does not allow the relationships to be built up and proper understanding to be gained. It is more inefficient then ineffective. Units deploying in to theatre are well equipped, trained and have a very good feel for the ground. They are not entering blind and they do have residual experience of the Theatre. Even 14 Army and Slimn rotated units in and out of the line.

So if a unit commander on a quick rotation were to form up and 'demand' that he be given such tasks when in his AO he quite rightly could be asked when he would be ready to assume such duties when effectively his unit will:

Except his unit will have been training for 9 months prior to deployment, will have pax in theatre on deployment (advance elements go 6-8 weeks ahead of main body) and the request will have been made 12 months in advance when unit tasks are allocated and CONOPS looked at.

There is no secret that they have to do these tasks as there is plainly no one else to do them. My guess is that you will see the SFSG (special forces support group) continue to grow and grow as the comparatively few numbers of actual operators (not the parade ground strength) exhaust themselves doing all the work (they should be doing plus that which the line infantry should be doing in their respective AOs).

If this was to happen it would have happened in 2004-2008 in Iraq; but it didn't. Line infantry were given the skill set (which until then only the SF had possessed) to enable them to carry out the tasks at the tactical level; they still retain this skill set and still carry out these tasks at a tactical level in Afghanistan. You seem to think that line infantry do not carry out tactical level raids, strikes, arrest operations etc - but they do.

[JMA]

The NI experience did not seem to hamper the UK in the Falklands, Gulf War 1 or Iraq 2003...

If you say so

The SF take the cream, but they do not take all the cream. One of the problems they have had since 2005 is recruiting.

There would have been a time when soldiers went in search of action and joined the SAS. From 2006 (or so) onwards they got action on their rotations with their respective units so that motivation would have fallen away.

I agree that not all the cream goes to the SAS as they are really quite a small unit in terms of operators. There are soldiers who are excellent who are not suited to 'cloak and dagger' operations but excel in more conventional settings (like proven in the Falklands).

I do not know enough about troop structure to comment. But I know that the Military Police have a heavier rank structure then a line infantry company. I think it depends on the level of independence you intend to give them. SF and RMP work in smaller discrete groupings, we do not expect our infantry to do so.

You can take my word for it (with the exaggeration on the number of officers in an SAS troop) they are what we would term 'top-heavy' in terms of NCOs (which they will say is warranted by the work they do).

Back to Sydney Jary (in 18 Platoon) who when sent on patrol would take his sgt, a corporal and if necessary a bren gun team. It is true that seldom a gash troopie would be taken on a recce, standing or fighting patrol when the numbers were small.

But as we have seen the numbers for these Afghanistan ops are not always small (like at Wardak). It is these ops where larger numbers are employed that I question the use of the SAS in the role of bayonets.

For example At Chimoio (Op Dingo) the SAS called up everyone they could to fill four Daks (96 men) and the RLI made up the numbers with 88 on the target by parachute or heliborne and a mortar section and others at the helicopter admin area (meaning effectively more RLI on the op than SAS). It had to be seen as a SAS op you see because they were in a pissing contest with the Selous Scouts (who had pulled off the wildly successful Nyadzonya raid where the first 1,000 kill count had been achieved) and they wanted to better it. It needs to be said that the SAS were well equipped for these operations but should they not have been locating targets for an Air Force / RLI strike-force to take out? And been concentrating (as they did later) on going after the external leadership in Lusaka and Maputo? The difference though was that unlike in Afghanistan there was a battalion of infantry who were permanently deployed on operations and probably more combat experienced than the SAS themselves - being the RLI.

I suspect that the SF would say that they are only used on high end tasks. That is not to say that these are necessarily beyond the abilities of line infantry, certainly not appropriately trained infantry, but they are the high end tasks.

They would say that wouldn't they (apologies to Mandy Rice Davies)

Fish and chip units looking up at the SAS tend to be left in awe at whatever they do and hang onto every word they say. It is not for the SAS to decide what is a high end task (whatever that means) but rather to find itself tasked to carry out specific tasks... but then you will find they don't fall under the local Bde for operations.

Depends on risk involved and effect achieved and must be placed within the campaign context. AT the moment the SF are being used to pursue a Counter-Terrorism campaign and the remainder a COIN campaign as part of an overarching campaign plan.

That risk word again. The question must be asked why the risk on carrying out these type of operations is so great that only the SAS can attempt them. I doubt it is based on operational complexity but rather more on unavailability of units capable of carrying out reasonably standard operations by day or night with the competence arising from experience.

I disagree. My fundamental issue with short tours in a COIN context is that it does not allow the relationships to be built up and proper understanding to be gained. It is more inefficient then ineffective. Units deploying in to theatre are well equipped, trained and have a very good feel for the ground. They are not entering blind and they do have residual experience of the Theatre. Even 14 Army and Slimn rotated units in and out of the line.

You are attempting to defend the indefensible now. Six months on operations every two years with personnel changes thrown in offers minimal continuity.

Every level needs continuity. Currently with the short tours Brit forces are always playing catch-up to the Taliban (especially as it appears so few Taliban are being killed thesedays). It is quite possible that in years to come the Brit forces will be mentored by the ANA and not the other way around.

Except his unit will have been training for 9 months prior to deployment, will have pax in theatre on deployment (advance elements go 6-8 weeks ahead of main body) and the request will have been made 12 months in advance when unit tasks are allocated and CONOPS looked at.

Out of theatre training is better than a poke in the eye with a sharp stick but quite honestly pretty close to valueless especially if it requires the unit to deploy away from home base in the process. Advance parties during a two yearly six month rotation is like the man with one eye being king in the land of the blind. Better than a kick in the ass but not significant enough to allow the whole unit to hit the ground running on arrival in theatre.

If this was to happen it would have happened in 2004-2008 in Iraq; but it didn't. Line infantry were given the skill set (which until then only the SF had possessed) to enable them to carry out the tasks at the tactical level; they still retain this skill set and still carry out these tasks at a tactical level in Afghanistan. You seem to think that line infantry do not carry out tactical level raids, strikes, arrest operations etc - but they do.

You are starting to resort to jargon. There is no question that there is a weakness in operations at platoon level among Brit forces in Afghanistan as the majority lack the operational continuity and recent experience to acquit themselves with distinction. Their frame of reference is a comparison with other '6-month wonder units' and this is why they are in jaw dropping awe of what the SAS do. I am not going on about what they currently do but rather what the SAS currently do that they (the line infantry) should be doing as a standard part of a COIN company/platoon/section/fire-team skill set. You will never get the rotating line infantry up to the required standard as long as the tours are short.