British COIN (merged thread)

[davidbfpo]

Excellent find. A light reading over breakfast and maybe read again later - when printed. Interesting that this article by a British Army officer, studying in the USA and published in the USA. I wonder if it will be re-printed here, perhaps in British Army Review?

I cannot think of an equivalent review of the British experience in counter-terrorism, where the police / law enforcement / intelligence agencies have primacy. An experience with several different strands: Northern Ireland, domestic or mainland (not exclusively Irish) and overseas (e.g. Greece).

Perhaps others (Slap ?) know of a review of the American (inc. Canadian) CT experience?

From my armchair and not being a soldier I cannot comment on whether the military will gain from this. Not that the lessons of Basra will influence readers.

davidbfpo

PS Not sure if Wagram still visits SWC, so will email him to look again.

[wm]

Good find.
I am somewhat concerned with Norfolk's synopsis of premise 7. Rigden does not limit learning to the start of the campaign. He notes the need for continuous reassessment as the campaign continues. As Rigden, rightly, notes, learning is not a "done once and over" process.

A corollary to premise 7, by the way, is that the fact that one does not make mistakes early on does not preclude the possibility of making mistakes as the campaign progesses.

[slapout9]

Hi david, contrary to popular belief the Phoneix program was based primaraly on law enforcement. It is a good example of a LE how to do it approach.

The other was COINTELPRO of the 1960's of domestic spying of the US govt. on US population, good example of what you should not do!!!


more later busy at my day job.

[William F. Owen]

a.) The British Army Review is an excellent publication. It is the sole bastion of real military thought in the UK.. but it's restricted, thus not on the internet. This is real spoiler for those of us who write for it, and a complete choker for everyone else as very few folks get to read it, and the print run in minute. I urge those of you who can write, to submit articles. PM me for the Editors contact details.

b.) British COIN TTPs (unlike our very mediocre platoon tactics manual) are not generally written down, or stay the same for very long, and are very often forgotten, and have to be re-learnt. However, their main strength is that they change very rapidly to adapt to the conditions and threats and get disseminated in detailed pre-deployment training. Thus copying, or mimicking the British Army can lead to disaster unless, you have some deeper context.. and if you're smart then it's not a problem.

[slapout9]

Hi david, contrary to popular belief the Phoenix program was based primarily on law enforcement. It is a good example of a LE how to do it approach.

The other was COINTELPRO of the 1960's of domestic spying of the US govt. on US population, good example of what you should not do!!!


more later busy at my day job.

To continue The Phoenix Adviser handbook has been posted on here several times and on the front page it designates the SVN National Police as the ones primarily responsible and as I said it was primarily a LE project which was part of CORDS program. During the same time the evil opposite was the COINTELPRO program being run at nearly the same time, supposedly to stop subversion,espionage,etc. in our country.

These two projects are the only ones that I personally know of and have read and or talked to people involved with these programs. One area that I did want to research was the now defunct School of the Americas. All top secret hush,hush so there is probably some good studies stored away somewhere.

Our own John T. Fishel has written(I love all his stuff having been south of the border a couple of times) and been involved with this in the Central/South American AO so when he reads this I hope he may respond. Do a search on back issues of Military Review and his name will pop up with some really good articles.


There used to be an International Police Academy run out of Washington,D.C. that did some good studies on LE in COIN type situations. Ken White will remember this one. Later Slap

[Norfolk]

Good find.
I am somewhat concerned with Norfolk's synopsis of premise 7. Rigden does not limit learning to the start of the campaign. He notes the need for continuous reassessment as the campaign continues. As Rigden, rightly, notes, learning is not a "done once and over" process.

A corollary to premise 7, by the way, is that the fact that one does not make mistakes early on does not preclude the possibility of making mistakes as the campaign progesses.

Sorry wm, I did not intend to misrepresent Col. Rigden's 7th Premise; I simply cut-and-pasted the first few lines of each of the 16 Premises in order to save space while providing a rough-and-ready overview of said premises. My apologies.

[wm]

Sorry wm, I did not intend to misrepresent Col. Rigden's 7th Premise; I simply cut-and-pasted the first few lines of each of the 16 Premises in order to save space while providing a rough-and-ready overview of said premises. My apologies.

"No harm, no foul," as we used to say on the basketball court.

[MattC86]

Not that the lessons of Basra will influence readers.

I sense there's a strong revisionist current in the US "COIN community" (for abject lack of a better term) claiming the British aren't so good at COIN after all - and pointing to Basra as the proof. Abu Muqawama was talking about that a few weeks ago. That's part of the whole "patting ourselves on the back" phenomenon I find so aggravating among many American commentators.

To me the key is, as always, proper context. The Northern Ireland policing/stability ops did not prepare the British Army as well for Basra or Helmand as they thought. But one needn't look very hard to see the influence of Robert Thompson types in US doctrine, nor even British influence in how we've handled sectarian relations in Iraq. . .

Definitely an interesting read, Norfolk. Thanks.

Regards,

Matt

[William F. Owen]

To me the key is, as always, proper context. The Northern Ireland policing/stability ops did not prepare the British Army as well for Basra or Helmand as they thought. But one needn't look very hard to see the influence of Robert Thompson types in US doctrine, nor even British influence in how we've handled sectarian relations in Iraq. . .

You are so right. The first 3-5 years of Northern where chaotic and counter productive. It was only 30 years of hard knocks, that made us any good, and the colonial experience was mostly irrelevant. Basra ran less than 5 years.

- but some Northern Ireland stuff has been very successfully applied in Helmand.

...if you know anything that Thompson said that was either original, insightful and useful, please point me at it.

[slapout9]

Wilf,I think Kitson had a lot more to do with Ireland than Thompson. They also had the great advantage of speaking English.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf,I think Kitson had a lot more to do with Ireland than Thompson. They also had the great advantage of speaking English.

Kitson is useful and from my Regiment. Regardless of the theatre, I never understand why Thompson is deemed such an expert.

[Mark O'Neill]

Kitson is useful and from my Regiment. Regardless of the theatre, I never understand why Thompson is deemed such an expert.

I suspect that you are being rhetorical, but for what its worth:

1. his performance as a practioner in Malaysia;
2. his observations from SVN; and
3. Defeating Communist Insurgency(you may argue that there is 'nothing new or original' in it, that does not detract from the usefulness of the text as a succint analysis and description of an insurgency phenomena).

Cheers

Mark

[William F. Owen]

I suspect that you are being rhetorical, but for what its worth:

1. his performance as a practioner in Malaysia;
2. his observations from SVN; and
3. Defeating Communist Insurgency(you may argue that there is 'nothing new or original' in it, that does not detract from the usefulness of the text as a succint analysis and description of an insurgency phenomena).

Not rhetorical in any way. I am well aware of Thompson's reputation, and his written work, some of which I have read. I see both Julian Paget and Frank Kitson as being better writers, practioners and more useful, but based on your advice I may give him another look.