British COIN (merged thread)

[Red Rat]

As stated before it was the caution bred in NI which emasculated and all but destroyed the Brit military as a fighting force.

The NI experience did not seem to hamper the UK in the Falklands, Gulf War 1 or Iraq 2003...

The SAS are able to take on these varied tasks because of the experience they have in doing all these tasks when they come up. Very experienced and competent soldiers but look again at Slim's comments on special forces and question why the cream of the military are being used on some of the basic - line infantry - type operations they are?

The SF take the cream, but they do not take all the cream. One of the problems they have had since 2005 is recruiting.

If you take a look at their organisation structure you will note that they are rank heavy as they have more officers and SNCOs in a troop than in a line infantry company (and not only for pay purposes).

I do not know enough about troop structure to comment. But I know that the Military Police have a heavier rank structure then a line infantry company. I think it depends on the level of independence you intend to give them. SF and RMP work in smaller discrete groupings, we do not expect our infantry to do so.

And as you rightly say they have longer service per man than in most line-infantry units but this should rather demand that they are only used on operations and tasks which are really strategic and/or are really beyond the ability of line infantry units.

I suspect that the SF would say that they are only used on high end tasks. That is not to say that these are necessarily beyond the abilities of line infantry, certainly not appropriately trained infantry, but they are the high end tasks.

What is a strategic task? Surely a raid within the current AO is not really strategic? OBL's hit, yes, but a raid on your local common or garden variety Taliban leader, no.

Depends on risk involved and effect achieved and must be placed within the campaign context. AT the moment the SF are being used to pursue a Counter-Terrorism campaign and the remainder a COIN campaign as part of an overarching campaign plan.

That said they really have to do these tasks don't they? Because of the 'short tours' and lack of continuity and experience in the rapidly rotated units the line units are really not up to the job are they? Read Slim again.

I disagree. My fundamental issue with short tours in a COIN context is that it does not allow the relationships to be built up and proper understanding to be gained. It is more inefficient then ineffective. Units deploying in to theatre are well equipped, trained and have a very good feel for the ground. They are not entering blind and they do have residual experience of the Theatre. Even 14 Army and Slimn rotated units in and out of the line.

So if a unit commander on a quick rotation were to form up and 'demand' that he be given such tasks when in his AO he quite rightly could be asked when he would be ready to assume such duties when effectively his unit will:

Except his unit will have been training for 9 months prior to deployment, will have pax in theatre on deployment (advance elements go 6-8 weeks ahead of main body) and the request will have been made 12 months in advance when unit tasks are allocated and CONOPS looked at.

There is no secret that they have to do these tasks as there is plainly no one else to do them. My guess is that you will see the SFSG (special forces support group) continue to grow and grow as the comparatively few numbers of actual operators (not the parade ground strength) exhaust themselves doing all the work (they should be doing plus that which the line infantry should be doing in their respective AOs).

If this was to happen it would have happened in 2004-2008 in Iraq; but it didn't. Line infantry were given the skill set (which until then only the SF had possessed) to enable them to carry out the tasks at the tactical level; they still retain this skill set and still carry out these tasks at a tactical level in Afghanistan. You seem to think that line infantry do not carry out tactical level raids, strikes, arrest operations etc - but they do.

[JMA]

The NI experience did not seem to hamper the UK in the Falklands, Gulf War 1 or Iraq 2003...

If you say so

The SF take the cream, but they do not take all the cream. One of the problems they have had since 2005 is recruiting.

There would have been a time when soldiers went in search of action and joined the SAS. From 2006 (or so) onwards they got action on their rotations with their respective units so that motivation would have fallen away.

I agree that not all the cream goes to the SAS as they are really quite a small unit in terms of operators. There are soldiers who are excellent who are not suited to 'cloak and dagger' operations but excel in more conventional settings (like proven in the Falklands).

I do not know enough about troop structure to comment. But I know that the Military Police have a heavier rank structure then a line infantry company. I think it depends on the level of independence you intend to give them. SF and RMP work in smaller discrete groupings, we do not expect our infantry to do so.

You can take my word for it (with the exaggeration on the number of officers in an SAS troop) they are what we would term 'top-heavy' in terms of NCOs (which they will say is warranted by the work they do).

Back to Sydney Jary (in 18 Platoon) who when sent on patrol would take his sgt, a corporal and if necessary a bren gun team. It is true that seldom a gash troopie would be taken on a recce, standing or fighting patrol when the numbers were small.

But as we have seen the numbers for these Afghanistan ops are not always small (like at Wardak). It is these ops where larger numbers are employed that I question the use of the SAS in the role of bayonets.

For example At Chimoio (Op Dingo) the SAS called up everyone they could to fill four Daks (96 men) and the RLI made up the numbers with 88 on the target by parachute or heliborne and a mortar section and others at the helicopter admin area (meaning effectively more RLI on the op than SAS). It had to be seen as a SAS op you see because they were in a pissing contest with the Selous Scouts (who had pulled off the wildly successful Nyadzonya raid where the first 1,000 kill count had been achieved) and they wanted to better it. It needs to be said that the SAS were well equipped for these operations but should they not have been locating targets for an Air Force / RLI strike-force to take out? And been concentrating (as they did later) on going after the external leadership in Lusaka and Maputo? The difference though was that unlike in Afghanistan there was a battalion of infantry who were permanently deployed on operations and probably more combat experienced than the SAS themselves - being the RLI.

I suspect that the SF would say that they are only used on high end tasks. That is not to say that these are necessarily beyond the abilities of line infantry, certainly not appropriately trained infantry, but they are the high end tasks.

They would say that wouldn't they (apologies to Mandy Rice Davies)

Fish and chip units looking up at the SAS tend to be left in awe at whatever they do and hang onto every word they say. It is not for the SAS to decide what is a high end task (whatever that means) but rather to find itself tasked to carry out specific tasks... but then you will find they don't fall under the local Bde for operations.

Depends on risk involved and effect achieved and must be placed within the campaign context. AT the moment the SF are being used to pursue a Counter-Terrorism campaign and the remainder a COIN campaign as part of an overarching campaign plan.

That risk word again. The question must be asked why the risk on carrying out these type of operations is so great that only the SAS can attempt them. I doubt it is based on operational complexity but rather more on unavailability of units capable of carrying out reasonably standard operations by day or night with the competence arising from experience.

I disagree. My fundamental issue with short tours in a COIN context is that it does not allow the relationships to be built up and proper understanding to be gained. It is more inefficient then ineffective. Units deploying in to theatre are well equipped, trained and have a very good feel for the ground. They are not entering blind and they do have residual experience of the Theatre. Even 14 Army and Slimn rotated units in and out of the line.

You are attempting to defend the indefensible now. Six months on operations every two years with personnel changes thrown in offers minimal continuity.

Every level needs continuity. Currently with the short tours Brit forces are always playing catch-up to the Taliban (especially as it appears so few Taliban are being killed thesedays). It is quite possible that in years to come the Brit forces will be mentored by the ANA and not the other way around.

Except his unit will have been training for 9 months prior to deployment, will have pax in theatre on deployment (advance elements go 6-8 weeks ahead of main body) and the request will have been made 12 months in advance when unit tasks are allocated and CONOPS looked at.

Out of theatre training is better than a poke in the eye with a sharp stick but quite honestly pretty close to valueless especially if it requires the unit to deploy away from home base in the process. Advance parties during a two yearly six month rotation is like the man with one eye being king in the land of the blind. Better than a kick in the ass but not significant enough to allow the whole unit to hit the ground running on arrival in theatre.

If this was to happen it would have happened in 2004-2008 in Iraq; but it didn't. Line infantry were given the skill set (which until then only the SF had possessed) to enable them to carry out the tasks at the tactical level; they still retain this skill set and still carry out these tasks at a tactical level in Afghanistan. You seem to think that line infantry do not carry out tactical level raids, strikes, arrest operations etc - but they do.

You are starting to resort to jargon. There is no question that there is a weakness in operations at platoon level among Brit forces in Afghanistan as the majority lack the operational continuity and recent experience to acquit themselves with distinction. Their frame of reference is a comparison with other '6-month wonder units' and this is why they are in jaw dropping awe of what the SAS do. I am not going on about what they currently do but rather what the SAS currently do that they (the line infantry) should be doing as a standard part of a COIN company/platoon/section/fire-team skill set. You will never get the rotating line infantry up to the required standard as long as the tours are short.

[Red Rat]

If you say so
But as we have seen the numbers for these Afghanistan ops are not always small (like at Wardak). It is these ops where larger numbers are employed that I question the use of the SAS in the role of bayonets.

But the SF raised this issue themselves in 2002 which resulted in the raising of the SFSG. The SFSG are not SF, but operate in direct support of and under command of the SF.

It is not for the SAS to decide what is a high end task (whatever that means) but rather to find itself tasked to carry out specific tasks...

Which is what happens.

That risk word again. The question must be asked why the risk on carrying out these type of operations is so great that only the SAS can attempt them. I doubt it is based on operational complexity but rather more on unavailability of units capable of carrying out reasonably standard operations by day or night with the competence arising from experience.

No. Risk is not just risk to the soldiers carrying out the op, it is the impact of the op going right or wrong, the sensitivity of the operation, the sensitivity of the intelligence involved, the value of the target, the tempo of the operation and a multitude of other factors. Could other units do it if they had the competence arising from experience - quite possibly yes. But the other units are busy doing other things - not least of which is carrying out similar operations in size and complexity but against tactical level targets.

You are attempting to defend the indefensible now. Six months on operations every two years with personnel changes thrown in offers minimal continuity.

Rabbit hole alert. We've both decided to agree that short tours are bad in the context of this type of campaign, disagree in parts as to the vaidity for the rationale that got us to there (I agree on the charge of militarism, but few others), disagree in places on the impact of it and what can be done about it.

Every level needs continuity. Currently with the short tours Brit forces are always playing catch-up to the Taliban (especially as it appears so few Taliban are being killed thesedays).

Hmm. Where is your evidence on this? In Helmand the evidence would tend to support the counter-proposition; the the Taleban are playing catch-up to ISAF at the tactical and operational level. They are heavily attrited, have comprehensively lost influence, lost control of ground, and their ability to prosecute successful attacks has declined markedly as well. We have now seen over 12 months of steady decline in violence in Helmand, no summer campaign season in the traditional sense and winter season which has seen ISAF move from consolidation to offence. Part of the reason that so few insurgents are being killed now is that there are far fewer of them left - attrition still plays a role in campaigning

You are starting to resort to jargon. There is no question that there is a weakness in operations at platoon level among Brit forces in Afghanistan as the majority lack the operational continuity and recent experience to acquit themselves with distinction.

Every corporal (section commander) will have 12 months operational experience, in Iraq or Afghanistan, every sergeant 24-36. In terms of frontline experience that is a level of experience comparable to the 8th Army in 1944 or the Chindits in 1945, or indeed 14th Army in early 1945 (by the end of the war experience levels had dropped considerably as the government insisted on releasing soldiers for UK leave if they had been away from the UK for 5 or more years - that gutted entire officer and SNCO cohorts). Again, where is the proof for the weakness in platoon operations?

As to jargon sorry. Many of the tasks done by the SF early on in Iraq were done because the field army lacked the training to do them, especially in the area of house assault. This was a standard skillset in the US Army but an SF skillset in the British Army (SF did it as it was regarded as a Counter-Terrorism skillset). Now, like the US Army, it is a basic skillset that we all do.

Their frame of reference is a comparison with other '6-month wonder units' and this is why they are in jaw dropping awe of what the SAS do. I am not going on about what they currently do but rather what the SAS currently do that they (the line infantry) should be doing as a standard part of a COIN company/platoon/section/fire-team skill set. You will never get the rotating line infantry up to the required standard as long as the tours are short.

But what are the SF doing that the line units aren't? In types of operation there is no difference that I can see.

[JMA]

But the SF raised this issue themselves in 2002 which resulted in the raising of the SFSG. The SFSG are not SF, but operate in direct support of and under command of the SF.

Well I put it to you that when a given operation requires additional 'support' from non special forces then (in the context of Afghanistan) it ceases to be a 'special operation' commanded by the SAS (or what-have-you) and control should pass to the numerically predominant unit.

We finally got to this in operations into Zambia against dug-in conventionally trained ZIPRA units. Command passed to the unit which had supplied the most troops being the RLI and those SAS involved were under command. Now compare that to Op Barras where the A Coy 1 Para (120-140 men with attachments) made up the numbers with the 60 man SAS squadron. (Understandably because at the time there was virtually no combat experience in the Para company and the reported average age was 19)

Which is what happens.

And with this we return to the problem of who other than the SAS to task for these ops. I have mentioned line infantry to illustrate a point but do acknowledge that there are two tiers involved here and that the Paras and the Royal Marines by virtue of their selection process place them at the head of the infantry list as first tier units being the obvious first choice for such tasks after the SAS (this said wondering why the SAS were considered for these non-recce and non-small team tasks in the first place).

I will say again (at the risk of touching a nerve) that the use of the SAS (special forces) to carry out otherwise pretty standard infantry raid operations is a barometer as to the declining operational ability of line infantry units in the British army. As long as the SAS are the only real option for these tasks it remains a poor reflection on the rest of the army.

Given that the Cold War period nonsense has been dropped from training (or should have been) I continue to wonder what these units do during the 18 months of 'real' soldiering between the 'distracting' tours in Afghanistan? Surely between guarding palaces and ceremonial duties and parades there is time to do some real training or is there no budget to fund anything other than merely going through the motions?

No. Risk is not just risk to the soldiers carrying out the op, it is the impact of the op going right or wrong, the sensitivity of the operation, the sensitivity of the intelligence involved, the value of the target, the tempo of the operation and a multitude of other factors. Could other units do it if they had the competence arising from experience - quite possibly yes. But the other units are busy doing other things - not least of which is carrying out similar operations in size and complexity but against tactical level targets.

What ops are you talking about? Some the locally deployed units seem to be able to do themselves but others seem to need the SAS with 1 Para (SFSG) support.

We have turned full circle and back to unit operational capability and which units are capable of conducting certain types of operations. We get to another grey area now. A few years ago I suggested that for continuity purposes (for example) the Royal Marine Commandos (... note the word commando) be instructed to have a full strength commando (battalion) in Afghanistan (at all times) to be able to take on any commando type (specialized raiding tasks) as required. That's too simple a proposition and the Brits prefer to fiddle and fart around with short tours with long breaks with the subsequent serious negative operational outcomes.

Rabbit hole alert. We've both decided to agree that short tours are bad in the context of this type of campaign, disagree in parts as to the vaidity for the rationale that got us to there (I agree on the charge of militarism, but few others), disagree in places on the impact of it and what can be done about it.

Yes I know we can go on and on about this and I understand that for you to accept the catastrophic outcome of this approach on operational efficiency is difficult (to say the least) because that would indicate an acceptance that the Brit performance in Afghanistan has been sub-optimal (to say the least). Once again the ineptitude of Brit generals has been exposed and that I appreciate is humiliating and hard to bear.

Hmm. Where is your evidence on this?

I'll show you mine, if you'll show me yours

In Helmand the evidence would tend to support the counter-proposition; the the Taleban are playing catch-up to ISAF at the tactical and operational level. They are heavily attrited, have comprehensively lost influence, lost control of ground, and their ability to prosecute successful attacks has declined markedly as well. We have now seen over 12 months of steady decline in violence in Helmand, no summer campaign season in the traditional sense and winter season which has seen ISAF move from consolidation to offence. Part of the reason that so few insurgents are being killed now is that there are far fewer of them left - attrition still plays a role in campaigning

No, the Taliban having absorbed the surge in troops into Helmand (from 9,500 to around 30,000) have reverted to type and are watching and planning and adapting (remember what Skeen wrote about them from experiences back then). When the 'poppy money' comes in this year being estimated at more than ever before they will be in a position to spend it wisely on operations producing the maximum psychological and propaganda effect (like the raid in Kabul and the Panjshir Valley attack). Remember they have the time.

Thanks to the surge and with pockets full of money (thanks to the acceptance of the Afghan drug trade as being beyond the ability of ISAF and hangers-on to control) the Taliban will have to learn to operate more cleverly and have pots of money to do just that. Good for them, not so good for Karzai and ISAF.

Every corporal (section commander) will have 12 months operational experience, in Iraq or Afghanistan, every sergeant 24-36. In terms of frontline experience that is a level of experience comparable to the 8th Army in 1944 or the Chindits in 1945, or indeed 14th Army in early 1945 (by the end of the war experience levels had dropped considerably as the government insisted on releasing soldiers for UK leave if they had been away from the UK for 5 or more years - that gutted entire officer and SNCO cohorts). Again, where is the proof for the weakness in platoon operations?

Clutching at straws? I accept that having experienced NCOs in a platoon (with experienced officers at battalion level) looking after raw and inexperienced troops is way ahead of feeding in whole raw units into the field (read up on the Australian Forces on the Kokoda Track in New Guinea and the difference in performance between the 39th and 53rd battalions). I quote:

“In August 1942 the 39th and 53rd Battalions of the Australian Militia, composed of 18 year old conscripts, collided with a Japanese brigade advancing south across Papua New Guinea’s Kokoda Trail. The 53rd battalion turned and ran. The 39th battalion, which a few weeks earlier had received an influx of experienced officers and NCO’s, stood its ground and over the next month fought the Japanese to a standstill. This action is regarded as a test in laboratory conditions of the impact of leadership on fighting performance.” - Serve to Lead

... so as I say having experienced NCOs is better than deploying the blind school (apologies to the PC police) but nowhere near what can be classed as a lean, mean, fighting machine which is quite frankly what the spin doctors at the MoD want the country and the world to believe is happening. Pretty sad really.

As to jargon sorry. Many of the tasks done by the SF early on in Iraq were done because the field army lacked the training to do them, especially in the area of house assault. This was a standard skillset in the US Army but an SF skillset in the British Army (SF did it as it was regarded as a Counter-Terrorism skillset). Now, like the US Army, it is a basic skillset that we all do.

I wonder how many operational house assaults up to that point the SAS had done in combat up to that point? Or was it a case that the line-infantry had merely just gone through the motions during FIBUA (fighting in built up areas) training? And that out of the whole British Army at that time only a few hundred soldiers were considered capable of carrying out a house assault? So what, it should be asked, filled the year of these units if basic FIBUA training was not covered? I need to dig out my copy of the Brit Infantry Platoon in Battle and refresh myself on what is contained therein. I ask myself how long it would take to take sections through FIBUA house clearing training. Dangerous work, yes, rocket science, no.

What else I wonder (of what I would consider to be basic soldiering skills) are not being covered these days in section and platoon training? In my own experience because of constant operations we battled to find the time required for training in aspects we did not do everyday. With 18 months between tours the Brit Army has no excuses.

But what are the SF doing that the line units aren't? In types of operation there is no difference that I can see.

Then why are the SAS still doing those types of operations?