British COIN (merged thread)

[Ken White]

Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present and Future" by Andrew Mumford, University of Nottingham. Published by the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

LINK

Do not believe this has been posted or discussed here. I note that, like some here including me, he believes mostly bad lessons derive from the Malayan experience.

I don't think he discussed one area of deficiency by the British that is not to some extent shared by the US. The problem in both nations is, I suspect, a combination of a risk averse political establishment (in total but party dependent with respect to bellicosity as the 'out' party will generally object to anything the government of the day decides... ) and an also risk averse and very bureaucratic military and Defence / Defense establishments (important distinction there, both the military folks and their civilian masters are at fault)...

Pity.

[davidbfpo]

Ken,

A good catch this paper. On my first reading the arguments appear to be similar to Frank Ledwidge's, in his book 'Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan', which has been discussed on 'The UK In Afghanistan' thread (post 816 is first, debate 840-850).

It would be interesting if the traditional place for military discussion and learning, RUSI, invited both authors to present their arguments in Whitehall. Alas I fear such is the strength of inertia and fear no-one serving would publicly say anything.

[Red Rat]

It would be interesting if the traditional place for military discussion and learning, RUSI, invited both authors to present their arguments in Whitehall. Alas I fear such is the strength of inertia and fear no-one serving would publicly say anything.

Ooh I don't know; I can think of several serving officers who would love to have a pop, even if only from our cheap seats!

[JMA]

Ooh I don't know; I can think of several serving officers who would love to have a pop, even if only from our cheap seats!

and what would they say?

[Red Rat]

[I]
very bureaucratic military and Defence / Defense establishments

Extremely bureacratic. The UK has just formed up a Joint Force Command that at first glance looks like adding another stovepiped staffing chain to an already complex structure. Every time that I mention the increasingly bureacratic nature of the Army I am told that it is because things are more complex now. My riposte is that ultimately the problems are not more complex but the structures we use to solve them are. In the UK Army we have gone from a profession of generalists with a few specialists, to a profession of specialists with a few generalists.

(important distinction there, both the military folks and their civilian masters are at fault)...

Pity.

Definitely. Although in the chattering classes there is a feeling that our Generals got many things wrong in Iraq and Afganistan but we see no public acknowledgement from uniformed chiefs that mistakes were made by the military; and certainly not mistakes at the operational and strategic levels. It is a line that is wearing increasingly thin with politicans, pundits and junior officers alike.

[JMA]

Definitely. Although in the chattering classes there is a feeling that our Generals got many things wrong in Iraq and Afganistan but we see no public acknowledgement from uniformed chiefs that mistakes were made by the military; and certainly not mistakes at the operational and strategic levels. It is a line that is wearing increasingly thin with politicans, pundits and junior officers alike.

Its not as if the junior officers have been operationally savvy down at the sharp end. Watch the videos, read the books (Dead Men Risen etc etc) and note that not all the problems can be laid at the door of the generals.

Part of the problem is that 'six month wonders' have now become experts because so few have any real experience of how the war has and is evolving. This is not good for the military as a whole. But... it must be said that six months in Helmand is better overall experience than a few hours at the Iranian Embassy or on Op Barras (in Sierra Leone).

Now given the fact (as reported by you a while ago) that the Brit troops have no problem with the rules of engagement then even more so those down at the sharp end have less to blame on outside factors.

The question must be asked why do the Brits put their best troops into Afghanistan if there is no intention to close with and kill the enemy. Time for a major rethink I suggest.

[Red Rat]

Its not as if the junior officers have been operationally savvy down at the sharp end. Watch the videos, read the books (Dead Men Risen etc etc) and note that not all the problems can be laid at the door of the generals.

Quite right, but the operational and strategic level mistakes can be laid at the Generals' door. At the tactical level there are examples of good and bad practice, like every other army iin every other conflict.

Part of the problem is that 'six month wonders' have now become experts because so few have any real experience of how the war has and is evolving.

But the army as a whole has a very sophisticated and nuanced feel for how the conflict is evolving.

Now given the fact (as reported by you a while ago) that the Brit troops have no problem with the rules of engagement then even more so those down at the sharp end have less to blame on outside factors.

The ROE are robust. Some will always want more leeway and some less, but the consensus (not just British) is that the ROE are good and workable.

The question must be asked why do the Brits put their best troops into Afghanistan if there is no intention to close with and kill the enemy. Time for a major rethink I suggest.

Some would say it is a flawed policy and a flawed strategy. The army still seeks to close with and kill the enemy but only in so far as this will further the aims of the strategy. Of course if the strategy is flawed...

The view among senior officers at the moment appears to be that:


Decisive engagement in maritime, land or air environments is no longer an
effective means of achieving desired political outcomes.

The ascendancy of non-traditional domains of warfare: particulary cyber,
information and perception. The view that the outcome of most operations
is as much a matter of perception as fact.

I do not necessarily agree with the prevailing view.

[JMA]

Quite right, but the operational and strategic level mistakes can be laid at the Generals' door. At the tactical level there are examples of good and bad practice, like every other army iin every other conflict.

To be brutally honest other than the special forces ops not seen much evidence of good practice from the line infantry (even the Marines and the paras). Slow to learn, slow to adapt, slow to evolve. And it all returns to the single most important weakness in the Brit approach - that of short tours. The indictment of "one spends two months learning the job, two months doing it and two months counting the days until you go home for tea and medals" still holds good and effectively precludes the build up of tactical efficiency on the ground. One needs to recognise this fatal flaw in the approach and address it and not (as the Brits are famous for) continue to muddle on.

But the army as a whole has a very sophisticated and nuanced feel for how the conflict is evolving.

That sound like a yank spin doctor speaking I interpret that to mean in effect the Brits (and probably the yanks) don't have a f***ing clue what is going on on the ground.

The ROE are robust. Some will always want more leeway and some less, but the consensus (not just British) is that the ROE are good and workable.

OK but when a yank troopie notes to the journalist that he cant fire unless fired upon when does the robust fit into that?

Some would say it is a flawed policy and a flawed strategy. The army still seeks to close with and kill the enemy but only in so far as this will further the aims of the strategy. Of course if the strategy is flawed...

Well if you are not going to take on the Taliban and kill them why not just use low grade militia to do the defensive work and guarding duties. Like with NI the institutional lack of aggressive action starts to eat away at the heart of fighting units like a cancer.

The view among senior officers at the moment appears to be that:

Decisive engagement in maritime, land or air environments is no longer an
effective means of achieving desired political outcomes.

The ascendancy of non-traditional domains of warfare: particulary cyber,
information and perception. The view that the outcome of most operations
is as much a matter of perception as fact.

I do not necessarily agree with the prevailing view.

And how, dare I ask, does this apply to the troops currently deployed in Helmand? It seems like the military powers that be are starting to mentally detach themselves from the war in Afghanistan. Seen that before in people who have realised that they have no answers and they just shut the problem out.

One needs to remember that Rhodesia comprised 80% plus Brits most of whom had come out after WW2 and (speaking as a South African) they proved to be exceptionally intuitive, innovative and adaptable and achieved much with very little. So one really needs to put ones finger on where it has gone wrong in the UK since then and fix it. Something has happened to reduce the ability of the Brits to think and act using their initiative and this applies not only to the military (as you would well know).

[Ken White]

The Red Rat needs no help from me but the sideswipes merit my limited intrusion.

To be brutally honest other than the special forces ops not seen much evidence of good practice from the line infantry...that of short tours...One needs to recognise this fatal flaw in the approach and address it and not (as the Brits are famous for) continue to muddle on.

What if one recognizes those things, would change them if within ones powers -- but they are not?

In short, once again your ire is justified but your aim is atrocious.

That sound like a yank spin doctor speaking I interpret that to mean in effect the Brits (and probably the yanks) don't have a f***ing clue what is going on on the ground.

Yank Spin doctor, South African Prescriptive doctor, takes all kinds...

There are British and Americans there with no clue and there are more who fully understand the issues. They aren't the problem -- the problem is not in Afghanistan, it's in the places shown below. Everything, including recruiting, retaining and sending the clueless to Afghanistan, support, whatever and particularly what both the highly clued and the unclued can do starts there...

Everyone seem to understand that but you.

OK but when a yank troopie notes to the journalist that he cant fire unless fired upon when does the robust fit into that?

I know this will amaze you but some of those clueless who shouldn't be there are senior, LTCs and even higher and can give commands and those types are often prone to tell troops that work for them that regardless of the ROE, "My ROE are designed to protect my career, so listen to me, not what you read..." That happens all too often. It did in Viet Nam and was usually ignored by most units -- the kids today can't do that due to Drones, Blue force Tracker, giant eyes high in the sky and so forth. Recall the White House Situation Room with a USAF BG running the video feed during the OBL raid. The Micromanagers have won -- this time...

... the institutional lack of aggressive action starts to eat away at the heart of fighting units like a cancer.

That's true and good Commanders know and try to guard against that. Poor Commanders and Politicians encourage less aggressiveness -- easier to control. Not right or even sensible but it is reality in every modern democracy. recall also that the law of averages in Armies that emphasize egalitarianism first and merit second says half the Commanders are good, the other half less so...

[JMA]

The Red Rat needs no help from me but the sideswipes merit my limited intrusion.

You are correct he needs no help from anyone but go ahead... jump in.

What if one recognizes those things, would change them if within ones powers -- but they are not?

In short, once again your ire is justified but your aim is atrocious. Yank Spin doctor, South African Prescriptive doctor, takes all kinds...

'Short tours' is the biggest remaining problem for the Brits. It can be changed - easier now that the tempo of operations has slowed - and that must be stated no matter how much it irritates.

There are British and Americans there with no clue and there are more who fully understand the issues. They aren't the problem -- the problem is not in Afghanistan, it's in the places shown below. Everything, including recruiting, retaining and sending the clueless to Afghanistan, support, whatever and particularly what both the highly clued and the unclued can do starts there...

Yes there are sure to be a number smart 'six month wonders' who have figured it out (to some extent) but what's the point if they have finished their tour and are now sitting back at home?

Is it not important to try to identify the problems wherever they may be? Home or abroad.

Everyone seem to understand that but you. I know this will amaze you but some of those clueless who shouldn't be there are senior, LTCs and even higher and can give commands and those types are often prone to tell troops that work for them that regardless of the ROE, "My ROE are designed to protect my career, so listen to me, not what you read..." That happens all too often. It did in Viet Nam and was usually ignored by most units -- the kids today can't do that due to Drones, Blue force Tracker, giant eyes high in the sky and so forth. Recall the White House Situation Room with a USAF BG running the video feed during the OBL raid. The Micromanagers have won -- this time...That's true and good Commanders know and try to guard against that. Poor Commanders and Politicians encourage less aggressiveness -- easier to control. Not right or even sensible but it is reality in every modern democracy. recall also that the law of averages in Armies that emphasize egalitarianism first and merit second says half the Commanders are good, the other half less so...

I have noticed that the primary response from serving soldiers these days is a shrug of the shoulders as a submissive acceptance that things can't be changed and they just have to muddle on. This is very sad.

[JMA]

The Red Rat needs no help from me but the sideswipes merit my limited intrusion.

Ken, for an old soldier you are remarkably sensitive to perceived sideswipes.

Reminds of the story out of John Masters' wonderful book The Road Past Mandalay. Here is the extract from page 139 in my paperback:

… And I lured Bill out and to his tent. He collapsed on his camp bed and glared moodily at me. ‘You're all the same,’ he said. ‘Goddam British. Worse than Goldwyn. US, for Christ's sake.’

My own head was firm on my shoulders, but the little muzzy. ‘What?’ I asked.

‘US,’he repeated. ‘No goddam good. I ought to puch you all in the nose'.

At last I understood. Bill had been with us about two months. All that time he had been brooding about our army's habit of describing any article of equipment that had become useless as US. That's what it sounded like though in fact it was written u/s and stood for unserviceable. I had no time to explain. …

OK, so don't pull a 'Bill' on me now please.

I came from a unit which had; pommies (Brits), Aussies (Australians), Kiwis (New Zealanders), yanks (Americans), Cannucks (Canadians), porras (Portuguese), slopies (South Africans), frogs (French), krauts (Germans) etc etc... and of course 2/3 Rhodesians.

Each nationality displayed some or other obvious national characteristic which was seized upon by the rest and used to rib them. Boys will be boys.

[Red Rat]

To be brutally honest other than the special forces ops not seen much evidence of good practice from the line infantry (even the Marines and the paras). Slow to learn, slow to adapt, slow to evolve. And it all returns to the single most important weakness in the Brit approach - that of short tours. The indictment of "one spends two months learning the job, two months doing it and two months counting the days until you go home for tea and medals" still holds good and effectively precludes the build up of tactical efficiency on the ground. One needs to recognise this fatal flaw in the approach and address it and not (as the Brits are famous for) continue to muddle on.

TTPs evolve week by week, month by month and are different according to which AO you are in and the threat faced. What is seen on TV is a combination of tactical good practice and bad practice. Details on UKSF Ops are extremely hard to come by so it is hard to state how effectively they have evolved. The use of SF has evolved considerably - but that was not necessarily an SF decision.
What most media coverage cannot show is the whole picture; the planning, the ISTAR coverage, the intelligence. I am not saying that mistakes have not been made, they have, especially in the early years, but the army now is different from the army then. The equipment and TTPs have changed out of all recognition.

There are problems with short tours and I agree that we should be on longer tours. Ledwidges comment (Losing Small Wars) on 'militarism' is both accurate and damning. Should we change things? Yes? Can we? No; it is not politically possible; we are already in drawdown.

That sound like a yank spin doctor speaking I interpret that to mean in effect the Brits (and probably the yanks) don't have a f***ing clue what is going on on the ground.

Au contraire my South African sparring partner! Our key intelligence and civilian affairs staff are on 12 month tours. Within our patch we generally know who the key players are, their families, their enemies, their friends, their rivals, their business partners, their business interests, their schools, what they thought yesterday, last week, and last year. What their aspirations are in public and quite possibly what their aspirations are in private; it is a very sophisticated knowledge of the human terrain. We know what weapons are favoured in what areas and at what times. Our knowledge of the terrain, human and physical is, I suspect, as good in many ways as what we had in N Ireland.

OK but when a yank troopie notes to the journalist that he cant fire unless fired upon when does the robust fit into that?

Well British troops don't have that problem. There are always people who do not understand the ROE; this sounds like one of them.

Well if you are not going to take on the Taliban and kill them why not just use low grade militia to do the defensive work and guarding duties. Like with NI the institutional lack of aggressive action starts to eat away at the heart of fighting units like a cancer.

NI was policing for most of the campaign. We enabled the police to carry out their duties and provided niche capabilities; N Ireland at its worst is probably what we would like Afghanistan to become. We realised in N Ireland that everytime we killed someone we were exacerbating the political problem, it caused a greater sense of political grievance, made martyrs out of volunteers and resulted in more even more volunteers; that is why from the mid to late 1980s we tried very hard to capture and not kill. Capturing them and sending them to prison stopped attacks, criminalised the struggle and discouraged others. Very few volunteers who served time in prion re-offended. Mark Urban's book Big Boys' Rules is a good account of the nuanced use of force in N Ireland while Kevin Toolis' book
Rebel Hearts: Journeys Within The IRA's Soul is a very good look at the impact of violence and how it fed the struggle.

And how, dare I ask, does this apply to the troops currently deployed in Helmand? It seems like the military powers that be are starting to mentally detach themselves from the war in Afghanistan. Seen that before in people who have realised that they have no answers and they just shut the problem out.

Already at the strategic level the army is planning for life 2015+. The size and shape of the army in 2020 will be decided in the next 12 months or else 2020 will be come 2021, 2022, 2023...

As to having no answers, no country is prepared to pay the price in blood and treasure to win the conflict in Afghanistan; I suspect they never were. Early on in the UK's engagement in Afghanistan the MOD stated that the engagement would have to be at least 25 years in order to achieve what the stated aims were; 10 years in and we are leaving.

One needs to remember that Rhodesia comprised 80% plus Brits most of whom had come out after WW2 and (speaking as a South African) they proved to be exceptionally intuitive, innovative and adaptable and achieved much with very little. So one really needs to put ones finger on where it has gone wrong in the UK since then and fix it. Something has happened to reduce the ability of the Brits to think and act using their initiative and this applies not only to the military (as you would well know).

WW2 and the Rhodesian Conflict were both existentialist conflicts where there is eveything to play for. In such circumstances it is adapt or survive. Iraq and Afghanistan were discretionary wars of choice where the imperative is to evolve so as not to be seen to

a) Fail
or
b) Be culpable

Plus society has changed considerably; we are softer and more liberal now.

[Red Rat]

Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present and Future" by Andrew Mumford, University of Nottingham. Published by the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

LINK

Do not believe this has been posted or discussed here. I note that, like some here including me, he believes mostly bad lessons derive from the Malayan experience.

Pity.

Puncturing the Counterinsurgency Myth: Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present and Future.

Ostensibly this monograph is about debunking 10 myths of British Counterinsurgency. I found it a poor read, incoherent, biased and in places just plain wrong. Arguments were both specious and spurious and the good points made were more then overshadowed by the poor quality of the overall piece.

The author lists 10 myths and analyses each in turn. I have to admit that most of the myths I had never heard of so I am not sure how widespread a belief they represent.

Myth 1: The British Military Is An Effective Learning Institution. This is a myth peddled in Nagl’s Learning To Eat Soup With A Knife. The British Army is not renowned as a learning organisation, far from it. It has never regarded itself as a learning organisation (it regards itself as a pragmatic, adaptable organisation) and has never been historically regarded as a learning organisation. Speed is also relative and I would suggest that 2 years to adapt in a dynamic environment is not necessarily slow (Malaya).

Myth 2: British Civil Military Coin Planning is Strategically Perceptive. I found this analysis of this element confused, not least because the author seems to confuse strategy with tactics. The Malayan strategy was not “Detention without trial, the forced relocation of elements of the local populace…”, these were tactical and operational methods; but they were not the strategy. While the author makes some good points about a lack of British strategy in Iraq the overall tenor of this section is to confuse strategy, civil-mil command and control and understanding of the context of a campaign to no clear result.

Myth 3: The British Military Has Flexibly Adapted To The Demands Of COIN. Again we see confusion here between Strategy and Tactics; the author citing the British Army Field Manual Vol 1 Part 10, Countering Insurgency as strategic guidance – it was not. He also seems to think that this guidance was first produced in 2009; it was not. AFM Vol 1 Part 10 has been around since I joined the army in 1988 (and probably longer), the latest iteration was issued in 2009. Overall however I rated this as the best of the sections with some very perceptive points on British Army culture and the ebb and flow of ‘high intensity v low intensity’ demands on the army.

Myth 4: The British Military Has An Ingrained Educational Approach To COIN. Anyone who knows the British Army knows that it is a non-intellectual institution; ‘doers’ are favoured over ‘thinkers’. This applies across the board, not just to COIN. The section makes some good points about the educational requirements of COIN, but the author’s assertion that a reliance on training manoeuvre is largely irrelevant is in need of supporting evidence; I would question this. One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

Myth 5: Iraq Represented The Zenith Of 60 Years Worth Of Modern COIN Thinking. Utter tosh! I do not know anyone who thinks that. Iraq represented the nadir of British Strategic thinking; no more no less. The British failure in Iraq was more because of strategy then it was because of COIN practice. Furthermore the author in this section ignores the impact of the Iraqi Government on the conduct of operations against Shia elements until 2008. I would also dispute that the insurgent campaign in Iraq was sui generis, totally alien to British historical experience; the British having fought insurgencies in Iraq, Iran, Waziristan and Oman previously.

Myth 6: the British Can Do COIN Alone. Again, I do not know where this ‘myth’ has arisen from. It has been accepted in the UK since the early 1990s that the UK is highly unlikely to undertake any sort of military operation in isolation.

Myth 7: The British ‘Don’t Talk To Terrorists’. There is a myth that the British don’t talk to terrorists, but it is a myth held only by the more gullible members of the public. UK Governments have always talked, and done deals, with whoever they have to. Conflict is political in nature and political processes always run parallel to conflict processes and to facilitate this lines of communication are always maintained.

Myth 8: “Hearts and Minds” and “Minimum Force” Are Sacrosanct Elements Of The British Way Of COIN. The author seems to confuse minimum force with minimal force in his argument. A great deal of force can be applied and it is still the minimum amount of force required to achieve the required effect. This section I found the worst of all. The author cites “the ill-treatment of detainees becoming an all-too frequent event”, yet with no evidence to support this. He fails to raise the issue that the British application of minimal force after the death of six military policemen at Major Al Kabir in 2003 lead to a loss of prestige and influence in the area from which they never really recovered; different societies have different expectations and norms regarding the use of force. Lastly the UK Armed forces have been historically pragmatic in their use of force, it is only recently with the entrenchment of liberal western values regarding human rights and the use of force in the West that a more idealistic stance has been taken; until then little was sacrosanct.

Myth 9: The Malayan Emergency Is The Archetypical COIN Campaign. There is no such thing as an archetypical COIN campaign. The section reads as a ‘Beat the Brits’ diatribe. An example: “A counter-insurgency campaign taking 12 years to eradicate an isolated insurgent group is not a glowing achievement…”. Why not? 12 years to maintain the isolation of a group, transition to independence and lay the foundations for a successful and stable state seems a pretty good result to me. 12 years in terms of societal change is not long. Furthermore the insurgent campaign was defeated long before it ended. The author states that context is everything in his analysis of the Malayan campaign, but then ignores much of the context of the Iraq campaign.

Myth 10: The British Military Are The Ultimate COIN Practicioners. The British Army, and indeed Britain, was guilty of hubris in the period 2003-2005. But again the author is skewed in his analysis. His comments on the insurgents in Iraq as being “well organized, strategically driven, tactically brutal and well supported from within and outside…” could easily apply to the PIRA. One does not however need to fight the ‘A Team’ of insurgencies in order to prove one’s worth as a counter-insurgent; the trick is to stop an insurgency from ever developing to the point that it has masses of support (internal and external) and becomes a ‘Grade A’ insurgency. That said there are some good points about the lack of intelligence capabilities at the beginning of any insurgency (a reflection on liberal values where the State spies by exception) and a good point always worth re-iterating that "If the military cannot succeed in reducing insurgent violence, then no manner of political measures will arrest the worsening security situation”.

All in all a disappointing read.

[Ken White]

Interestingly, perhaps, I could apply your answers to the US Army with minimal change...

This from you:

One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

Is one of the most important, prescient and I believe correct statements on the issue in recent years. Hopefully it will be heeded by both our nations.

[Red Rat]

Interestingly, perhaps, I could apply your answers to the US Army with minimal change...

Most armies are more alike then they feel comfortable with...

This from you:Is one of the most important, prescient and I believe correct statements on the issue in recent years. Hopefully it will be heeded by both our nations.

I shout loudly from the cheap seats in the British Army - but I am not sure that anyone listens

[Ken White]

Most armies are more alike then they feel comfortable with...

I shout loudly from the cheap seats in the British Army - but I am not sure that anyone listens

Yes, to the first. On the second, some failures but some successes also, most after much time when they could become someone else's idea. That was and is okay...

So do not stop...

[carl]

This from you:

One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

Is one of the most important, prescient and I believe correct statements on the issue in recent years. Hopefully it will be heeded by both our nations.

I enthusiastically second that.

[JMA]

Myth 4: The British Military Has An Ingrained Educational Approach To COIN. Anyone who knows the British Army knows that it is a non-intellectual institution; ‘doers’ are favoured over ‘thinkers’. This applies across the board, not just to COIN. The section makes some good points about the educational requirements of COIN, but the author’s assertion that a reliance on training manoeuvre is largely irrelevant is in need of supporting evidence; I would question this. One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

Mumford (the author is obviously a civvie) and as such tends to make broad statements about the military which obviously do not apply to all parts of the spectrum from Field Marshall all the way down to the private soldier.

To train your average line infantry platoon members in COIN tactics is pretty simple... but to expect them (down to private soldier level) to develop all the cultural, civil and psyops skills (which may comprise a successful COIN strategy) is plain insanity. The soldiers (in the main) were not selected for their intellectual and analytical skills but rather to be a trigger man in a killing machine (which is what an infantry platoon should be).

Certainly the sections/squads and platoons must be drilled in COIN tactics as much (if not more) than in conventional warfare but it is the officers and (to a lesser extent) the senior NCOs who need to be educated in the complexity of COIN strategy implementation (to gain an understanding of their part in the 'big picture'). The higher up the rank structure you go the more detailed the training in these aspects should be.

So perhaps if Mumford is suggesting that all the training in the world is irrelevant if the strategic context is wrong or inappropriate or (if the strategy is effective) not fully understood with its tactical adaption requirements at battalion, company and platoon level then I support what he says. We are dealing on a number of levels here that must be taken into consideration.

(The levels are the command progression officers must pass through (being platoon/company/battalion/brigade/division) and experience command at each level. Where officers have not had sufficient experience in command at any of the levels (which should be three years at platoon and eighteen months to two years at each of the other levels) this limitation will become apparent the higher up the command structure he progresses (especially if his exposure at platoon level has been superficial).)

What Mumford does get absolutely correct is that COIN:

... demands of military commanders a set of characteristics and leadership skills different than regular warfare, ...

So I for one don't quite understand what you mean by:

One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

... in the context of the various levels within the force deployed in a COIN war.

[Red Rat]

To train your average line infantry platoon members in COIN tactics is pretty simple... but to expect them (down to private soldier level) to develop all the cultural, civil and psyops skills (which may comprise a successful COIN strategy) is plain insanity. The soldiers (in the main) were not selected for their intellectual and analytical skills but rather to be a trigger man in a killing machine (which is what an infantry platoon should be).

Agreed.

Certainly the sections/squads and platoons must be drilled in COIN tactics as much (if not more) than in conventional warfare but it is the officers and (to a lesser extent) the senior NCOs who need to be educated in the complexity of COIN strategy implementation (to gain an understanding of their part in the 'big picture'). The higher up the rank structure you go the more detailed the training in these aspects should be.

Agreed. And the tactics will be different and evolve for each conflict.

So perhaps if Mumford is suggesting that all the training in the world is irrelevant if the strategic context is wrong or inappropriate or (if the strategy is effective) not fully understood with its tactical adaption requirements at battalion, company and platoon level then I support what he says.

I don't think this is what he is saying. My reading of this was that he was disagreeing with the UK Army's wish to retain the ability to fight combined arms manoeuvre warfare at battlegroup and brigade level; an ability that has been severely degraded by the focus on Afghanistan. This capability he sees as not required for COIN. My argument is:

What is required is a technical mastery of your trade (gained through combined arms manoeuvre training) combined with an education system for our officers and SNCOs that is both broad and deep so that they have the knowledge set to apply their technical skills in a COIN environment. Training enables you to do what you do, education enables you to understand the context in which you are operating and therefore to better understand how to apply your technical skills in that environment.

It is also very difficult to train for COIN generically, especially commanders, int staff and civil affairs. This is because COIN progresses relatively slowly compared to combined arms manoeuvre (you are unlikely to win a COIN campaign in a two or even four week exercise) and because you need to understand the human terrain and interact with it. This latter element is difficult to replicate generically and in training. Technical skills (platoon attacks, patrolling, C-IED, using a military decision making process, conducting company attacks) are much easier to train and provide a transferrable skill set to COIN campaigns. Educating for COIN is however is a relatively simple matter. The aim here is to give individuals a broad based theoretical and historical knowledge of COIN together with a working knowedge of the social sciences in order that they can understand the context in which they may have to operate and deliver new solutions (quickly) to new problems.

Combined Arms Manoeuvre is a very difficult technical ability to master and it becomes exponentially more difficult to master as you progress in size from company to battalion to brigade to division to corps. If you lose it it is very difficult to get it back. As a capability it is required at sub-unit, battalion and possibly brigade level in a COIN environment. Even at a higher level in Iraq we (the Brits) noted that the ability of the US to comprehend and execute Corps level operations, flexing combat power across Iraq was highly effective. More salutory for us was that because in part we no longer operate at that level in the British Army we could not tap into that ability to flex assets to us; it was beyond the comprehension of our staff. So there is still a requirement to train for Combined Arms Manoeuvre because it is pertinent to COIN campaigns, let alone the fact that if we lose it it is very difficult to regain.

So train for Combined Arms Manoeuvre and educate for COIN.


As for Mumfords assertion that COIN demands a different set of characteristics and leadership skills from regular warfare I would go further. Every conflict has different characteristics and will demand different characteristics from its commanders and so every conflict will either see commanders adapt or fail. It is not a COIN versus Combined Arms Manoeuvre issue, it is a 'this conflict' versus 'that conflict' issue.

[JMA]

I don't think this is what he is saying. My reading of this was that he was disagreeing with the UK Army's wish to retain the ability to fight combined arms manoeuvre warfare at battlegroup and brigade level; an ability that has been severely degraded by the focus on Afghanistan. This capability he sees as not required for COIN.

OK, when in doubt revert to the text in question.

Consequently, a reliance on training maneuvers is rendered largely irrelevant.

OK, so back in the good old bad days of the 70s I studied from the Brit Infantry Battalion in Battle - 1964. Nowhere in there did the term maneuver appear as it was an Americanism which only appeared on the Brit scene later (probably via NATO). Training maneuvers were what we termed large scale exercises, remember? Before your time?

So given all that I stick by my interpretation.

All this said I do believe that you cant mix COIN with other training and expect unit to switch on demand.

This is why I suggested that in the US they take 250,000 each from active and reserves and focus them on small wars and insurgencies. Leave the rest to drive around the deserts and plains to make dust and prepare for the next big war. This allows for focus and specialisation and accepts that there are indeed a different set of skills required for the two types of warfare.

If you take Afghanistan for example there is little point in deploying armour and mechanised troops on a rotation as this over time will just confuse them.

Fuchs is correct (in his blog post) that warfare against poor/incompetent enemies leads to a loss of skills which will be paid for in blood if they ever come up against a competent enemy. But then again all raw units learn the hard way when they are inserted into a war. Think of those raw US divisions fed into the Pacific and Europe in WW2 who had to adapt along the way. And they learned quickly.

I am back to continuity, tour lengths, specialisation, and focus.

The problem with the Brits is that whenever the solution is obvious they spend more time figuring out why the problem can't be solved than fixing it. Have you noticed (and this is not a sideswipe at the yanks) how the once "can do" nation, the Americans, are also moving in that direction. They increasingly accept the status quo with a shrug. Man it is such a pity.

What the war in Afghanistan has shown IMHO is that apart from the special forces (who have been magnificent) the rest of the forces have proved unable to adapt effectively to the type of warfare required. It is not that the individuals are incapable it is that there is a combination of misguided political direction (aka interference), doctrine weakness and inept generalship.

Where is a Cromwell when you need him?