British COIN (merged thread)

[Red Rat]

Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present and Future" by Andrew Mumford, University of Nottingham. Published by the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

LINK

Do not believe this has been posted or discussed here. I note that, like some here including me, he believes mostly bad lessons derive from the Malayan experience.

Pity.

Puncturing the Counterinsurgency Myth: Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present and Future.

Ostensibly this monograph is about debunking 10 myths of British Counterinsurgency. I found it a poor read, incoherent, biased and in places just plain wrong. Arguments were both specious and spurious and the good points made were more then overshadowed by the poor quality of the overall piece.

The author lists 10 myths and analyses each in turn. I have to admit that most of the myths I had never heard of so I am not sure how widespread a belief they represent.

Myth 1: The British Military Is An Effective Learning Institution. This is a myth peddled in Nagl’s Learning To Eat Soup With A Knife. The British Army is not renowned as a learning organisation, far from it. It has never regarded itself as a learning organisation (it regards itself as a pragmatic, adaptable organisation) and has never been historically regarded as a learning organisation. Speed is also relative and I would suggest that 2 years to adapt in a dynamic environment is not necessarily slow (Malaya).

Myth 2: British Civil Military Coin Planning is Strategically Perceptive. I found this analysis of this element confused, not least because the author seems to confuse strategy with tactics. The Malayan strategy was not “Detention without trial, the forced relocation of elements of the local populace…”, these were tactical and operational methods; but they were not the strategy. While the author makes some good points about a lack of British strategy in Iraq the overall tenor of this section is to confuse strategy, civil-mil command and control and understanding of the context of a campaign to no clear result.

Myth 3: The British Military Has Flexibly Adapted To The Demands Of COIN. Again we see confusion here between Strategy and Tactics; the author citing the British Army Field Manual Vol 1 Part 10, Countering Insurgency as strategic guidance – it was not. He also seems to think that this guidance was first produced in 2009; it was not. AFM Vol 1 Part 10 has been around since I joined the army in 1988 (and probably longer), the latest iteration was issued in 2009. Overall however I rated this as the best of the sections with some very perceptive points on British Army culture and the ebb and flow of ‘high intensity v low intensity’ demands on the army.

Myth 4: The British Military Has An Ingrained Educational Approach To COIN. Anyone who knows the British Army knows that it is a non-intellectual institution; ‘doers’ are favoured over ‘thinkers’. This applies across the board, not just to COIN. The section makes some good points about the educational requirements of COIN, but the author’s assertion that a reliance on training manoeuvre is largely irrelevant is in need of supporting evidence; I would question this. One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

Myth 5: Iraq Represented The Zenith Of 60 Years Worth Of Modern COIN Thinking. Utter tosh! I do not know anyone who thinks that. Iraq represented the nadir of British Strategic thinking; no more no less. The British failure in Iraq was more because of strategy then it was because of COIN practice. Furthermore the author in this section ignores the impact of the Iraqi Government on the conduct of operations against Shia elements until 2008. I would also dispute that the insurgent campaign in Iraq was sui generis, totally alien to British historical experience; the British having fought insurgencies in Iraq, Iran, Waziristan and Oman previously.

Myth 6: the British Can Do COIN Alone. Again, I do not know where this ‘myth’ has arisen from. It has been accepted in the UK since the early 1990s that the UK is highly unlikely to undertake any sort of military operation in isolation.

Myth 7: The British ‘Don’t Talk To Terrorists’. There is a myth that the British don’t talk to terrorists, but it is a myth held only by the more gullible members of the public. UK Governments have always talked, and done deals, with whoever they have to. Conflict is political in nature and political processes always run parallel to conflict processes and to facilitate this lines of communication are always maintained.

Myth 8: “Hearts and Minds” and “Minimum Force” Are Sacrosanct Elements Of The British Way Of COIN. The author seems to confuse minimum force with minimal force in his argument. A great deal of force can be applied and it is still the minimum amount of force required to achieve the required effect. This section I found the worst of all. The author cites “the ill-treatment of detainees becoming an all-too frequent event”, yet with no evidence to support this. He fails to raise the issue that the British application of minimal force after the death of six military policemen at Major Al Kabir in 2003 lead to a loss of prestige and influence in the area from which they never really recovered; different societies have different expectations and norms regarding the use of force. Lastly the UK Armed forces have been historically pragmatic in their use of force, it is only recently with the entrenchment of liberal western values regarding human rights and the use of force in the West that a more idealistic stance has been taken; until then little was sacrosanct.

Myth 9: The Malayan Emergency Is The Archetypical COIN Campaign. There is no such thing as an archetypical COIN campaign. The section reads as a ‘Beat the Brits’ diatribe. An example: “A counter-insurgency campaign taking 12 years to eradicate an isolated insurgent group is not a glowing achievement…”. Why not? 12 years to maintain the isolation of a group, transition to independence and lay the foundations for a successful and stable state seems a pretty good result to me. 12 years in terms of societal change is not long. Furthermore the insurgent campaign was defeated long before it ended. The author states that context is everything in his analysis of the Malayan campaign, but then ignores much of the context of the Iraq campaign.

Myth 10: The British Military Are The Ultimate COIN Practicioners. The British Army, and indeed Britain, was guilty of hubris in the period 2003-2005. But again the author is skewed in his analysis. His comments on the insurgents in Iraq as being “well organized, strategically driven, tactically brutal and well supported from within and outside…” could easily apply to the PIRA. One does not however need to fight the ‘A Team’ of insurgencies in order to prove one’s worth as a counter-insurgent; the trick is to stop an insurgency from ever developing to the point that it has masses of support (internal and external) and becomes a ‘Grade A’ insurgency. That said there are some good points about the lack of intelligence capabilities at the beginning of any insurgency (a reflection on liberal values where the State spies by exception) and a good point always worth re-iterating that "If the military cannot succeed in reducing insurgent violence, then no manner of political measures will arrest the worsening security situation”.

All in all a disappointing read.

[Ken White]

Interestingly, perhaps, I could apply your answers to the US Army with minimal change...

This from you:

One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

Is one of the most important, prescient and I believe correct statements on the issue in recent years. Hopefully it will be heeded by both our nations.

[Red Rat]

Interestingly, perhaps, I could apply your answers to the US Army with minimal change...

Most armies are more alike then they feel comfortable with...

This from you:Is one of the most important, prescient and I believe correct statements on the issue in recent years. Hopefully it will be heeded by both our nations.

I shout loudly from the cheap seats in the British Army - but I am not sure that anyone listens

[Ken White]

Most armies are more alike then they feel comfortable with...

I shout loudly from the cheap seats in the British Army - but I am not sure that anyone listens

Yes, to the first. On the second, some failures but some successes also, most after much time when they could become someone else's idea. That was and is okay...

So do not stop...

[carl]

This from you:

One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

Is one of the most important, prescient and I believe correct statements on the issue in recent years. Hopefully it will be heeded by both our nations.

I enthusiastically second that.

[JMA]

Myth 4: The British Military Has An Ingrained Educational Approach To COIN. Anyone who knows the British Army knows that it is a non-intellectual institution; ‘doers’ are favoured over ‘thinkers’. This applies across the board, not just to COIN. The section makes some good points about the educational requirements of COIN, but the author’s assertion that a reliance on training manoeuvre is largely irrelevant is in need of supporting evidence; I would question this. One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

Mumford (the author is obviously a civvie) and as such tends to make broad statements about the military which obviously do not apply to all parts of the spectrum from Field Marshall all the way down to the private soldier.

To train your average line infantry platoon members in COIN tactics is pretty simple... but to expect them (down to private soldier level) to develop all the cultural, civil and psyops skills (which may comprise a successful COIN strategy) is plain insanity. The soldiers (in the main) were not selected for their intellectual and analytical skills but rather to be a trigger man in a killing machine (which is what an infantry platoon should be).

Certainly the sections/squads and platoons must be drilled in COIN tactics as much (if not more) than in conventional warfare but it is the officers and (to a lesser extent) the senior NCOs who need to be educated in the complexity of COIN strategy implementation (to gain an understanding of their part in the 'big picture'). The higher up the rank structure you go the more detailed the training in these aspects should be.

So perhaps if Mumford is suggesting that all the training in the world is irrelevant if the strategic context is wrong or inappropriate or (if the strategy is effective) not fully understood with its tactical adaption requirements at battalion, company and platoon level then I support what he says. We are dealing on a number of levels here that must be taken into consideration.

(The levels are the command progression officers must pass through (being platoon/company/battalion/brigade/division) and experience command at each level. Where officers have not had sufficient experience in command at any of the levels (which should be three years at platoon and eighteen months to two years at each of the other levels) this limitation will become apparent the higher up the command structure he progresses (especially if his exposure at platoon level has been superficial).)

What Mumford does get absolutely correct is that COIN:

... demands of military commanders a set of characteristics and leadership skills different than regular warfare, ...

So I for one don't quite understand what you mean by:

One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

... in the context of the various levels within the force deployed in a COIN war.

[Red Rat]

To train your average line infantry platoon members in COIN tactics is pretty simple... but to expect them (down to private soldier level) to develop all the cultural, civil and psyops skills (which may comprise a successful COIN strategy) is plain insanity. The soldiers (in the main) were not selected for their intellectual and analytical skills but rather to be a trigger man in a killing machine (which is what an infantry platoon should be).

Agreed.

Certainly the sections/squads and platoons must be drilled in COIN tactics as much (if not more) than in conventional warfare but it is the officers and (to a lesser extent) the senior NCOs who need to be educated in the complexity of COIN strategy implementation (to gain an understanding of their part in the 'big picture'). The higher up the rank structure you go the more detailed the training in these aspects should be.

Agreed. And the tactics will be different and evolve for each conflict.

So perhaps if Mumford is suggesting that all the training in the world is irrelevant if the strategic context is wrong or inappropriate or (if the strategy is effective) not fully understood with its tactical adaption requirements at battalion, company and platoon level then I support what he says.

I don't think this is what he is saying. My reading of this was that he was disagreeing with the UK Army's wish to retain the ability to fight combined arms manoeuvre warfare at battlegroup and brigade level; an ability that has been severely degraded by the focus on Afghanistan. This capability he sees as not required for COIN. My argument is:

What is required is a technical mastery of your trade (gained through combined arms manoeuvre training) combined with an education system for our officers and SNCOs that is both broad and deep so that they have the knowledge set to apply their technical skills in a COIN environment. Training enables you to do what you do, education enables you to understand the context in which you are operating and therefore to better understand how to apply your technical skills in that environment.

It is also very difficult to train for COIN generically, especially commanders, int staff and civil affairs. This is because COIN progresses relatively slowly compared to combined arms manoeuvre (you are unlikely to win a COIN campaign in a two or even four week exercise) and because you need to understand the human terrain and interact with it. This latter element is difficult to replicate generically and in training. Technical skills (platoon attacks, patrolling, C-IED, using a military decision making process, conducting company attacks) are much easier to train and provide a transferrable skill set to COIN campaigns. Educating for COIN is however is a relatively simple matter. The aim here is to give individuals a broad based theoretical and historical knowledge of COIN together with a working knowedge of the social sciences in order that they can understand the context in which they may have to operate and deliver new solutions (quickly) to new problems.

Combined Arms Manoeuvre is a very difficult technical ability to master and it becomes exponentially more difficult to master as you progress in size from company to battalion to brigade to division to corps. If you lose it it is very difficult to get it back. As a capability it is required at sub-unit, battalion and possibly brigade level in a COIN environment. Even at a higher level in Iraq we (the Brits) noted that the ability of the US to comprehend and execute Corps level operations, flexing combat power across Iraq was highly effective. More salutory for us was that because in part we no longer operate at that level in the British Army we could not tap into that ability to flex assets to us; it was beyond the comprehension of our staff. So there is still a requirement to train for Combined Arms Manoeuvre because it is pertinent to COIN campaigns, let alone the fact that if we lose it it is very difficult to regain.

So train for Combined Arms Manoeuvre and educate for COIN.


As for Mumfords assertion that COIN demands a different set of characteristics and leadership skills from regular warfare I would go further. Every conflict has different characteristics and will demand different characteristics from its commanders and so every conflict will either see commanders adapt or fail. It is not a COIN versus Combined Arms Manoeuvre issue, it is a 'this conflict' versus 'that conflict' issue.

[JMA]

I don't think this is what he is saying. My reading of this was that he was disagreeing with the UK Army's wish to retain the ability to fight combined arms manoeuvre warfare at battlegroup and brigade level; an ability that has been severely degraded by the focus on Afghanistan. This capability he sees as not required for COIN.

OK, when in doubt revert to the text in question.

Consequently, a reliance on training maneuvers is rendered largely irrelevant.

OK, so back in the good old bad days of the 70s I studied from the Brit Infantry Battalion in Battle - 1964. Nowhere in there did the term maneuver appear as it was an Americanism which only appeared on the Brit scene later (probably via NATO). Training maneuvers were what we termed large scale exercises, remember? Before your time?

So given all that I stick by my interpretation.

All this said I do believe that you cant mix COIN with other training and expect unit to switch on demand.

This is why I suggested that in the US they take 250,000 each from active and reserves and focus them on small wars and insurgencies. Leave the rest to drive around the deserts and plains to make dust and prepare for the next big war. This allows for focus and specialisation and accepts that there are indeed a different set of skills required for the two types of warfare.

If you take Afghanistan for example there is little point in deploying armour and mechanised troops on a rotation as this over time will just confuse them.

Fuchs is correct (in his blog post) that warfare against poor/incompetent enemies leads to a loss of skills which will be paid for in blood if they ever come up against a competent enemy. But then again all raw units learn the hard way when they are inserted into a war. Think of those raw US divisions fed into the Pacific and Europe in WW2 who had to adapt along the way. And they learned quickly.

I am back to continuity, tour lengths, specialisation, and focus.

The problem with the Brits is that whenever the solution is obvious they spend more time figuring out why the problem can't be solved than fixing it. Have you noticed (and this is not a sideswipe at the yanks) how the once "can do" nation, the Americans, are also moving in that direction. They increasingly accept the status quo with a shrug. Man it is such a pity.

What the war in Afghanistan has shown IMHO is that apart from the special forces (who have been magnificent) the rest of the forces have proved unable to adapt effectively to the type of warfare required. It is not that the individuals are incapable it is that there is a combination of misguided political direction (aka interference), doctrine weakness and inept generalship.

Where is a Cromwell when you need him?

[Red Rat]

OK, when in doubt revert to the text in question.

OK, so back in the good old bad days of the 70s I studied from the Brit Infantry Battalion in Battle - 1964. Nowhere in there did the term maneuver appear as it was an Americanism which only appeared on the Brit scene later (probably via NATO). Training maneuvers were what we termed large scale exercises, remember? Before your time?

So given all that I stick by my interpretation.

Okay, you stick to yours and I will stick to mine. The term manoeuvres as you describe it has not been in use by the Army since at least 1989 (and we were still doing Divisional and brigade exercises when I joined).

But to use your interpretation of 'large scale exercises' what exercises is he referring to? A brigade has not deployed in the field on manoeuvres since 2002; so it is not as if we are relying on it...

This is why I suggested that in the US they take 250,000 each from active and reserves and focus them on small wars and insurgencies. Leave the rest to drive around the deserts and plains to make dust and prepare for the next big war. This allows for focus and specialisation and accepts that there are indeed a different set of skills required for the two types of warfare.

Works for big armies.

If you take Afghanistan for example there is little point in deploying armour and mechanised troops on a rotation as this over time will just confuse them.

Is the issue deploying armour and mechanised troops or deploying on rotation?

I am back to continuity, tour lengths, specialisation, and focus.

Sigh.. I know!

The problem with the Brits is that whenever the solution is obvious they spend more time figuring out why the problem can't be solved than fixing it. Have you noticed (and this is not a sideswipe at the yanks) how the once "can do" nation, the Americans, are also moving in that direction. They increasingly accept the status quo with a shrug. Man it is such a pity.

Not at all. The argument has never been why the problem can't be solved, but why the problem hasn't been solved (for which there are good and bad reasons).

What the war in Afghanistan has shown IMHO is that apart from the special forces (who have been magnificent) the rest of the forces have proved unable to adapt effectively to the type of warfare required.

Hmm. I don't know how the SF have evolved in Afghanistan and Iraq so I cannot comment. I do know that the green army (non-SF) now uses TTPs and equipment that were SF only capabilities until fairly recently.

The use of the SF has evolved but that was not necessarily an SF decision, but made at Theatre Command level.

It is not that the individuals are incapable it is that there is a combination of misguided political direction (aka interference), doctrine weakness and inept generalship.

Plus lack of accountability and apathy. I suspect that this applies to the US as well, but for both Iraq and Afghanistan it was a case for the UK of an army at war but not a nation at war; that is very constraining.

[JMA]

Okay, you stick to yours and I will stick to mine.

Agreed

The term manoeuvres as you describe it has not been in use by the Army since at least 1989 (and we were still doing Divisional and brigade exercises when I joined).

But to use your interpretation of 'large scale exercises' what exercises is he referring to? A brigade has not deployed in the field on manoeuvres since 2002; so it is not as if we are relying on it...

Remember Mumford is a civvie (or at least talks like one).

So the difference (not so subtle to us) between large scale exercises and field training like 'battle camps' is probably lost on him.

With COIN the training works upwards from the individual skills level to the stick (or what every the smallest operating call-sign will be) and on to sections and platoons. (What would you use a platoon for? Maybe a long term ambush and follow-up (tracking) operations and the like.)

Works for big armies.

True. And for smaller armies it requires smart thinking to make a little go a long way.

Is the issue deploying armour and mechanised troops or deploying on rotation?

Rotation? You mean we are back to short tours again? I suppose if they insist on taking part (to get the campaign medals and so forth) you can allocate them to road block/checkpoint duty, installation and route security and other crappy work like that

Sigh.. I know!

Well yes so I say again... it is all about continuity, tour lengths, specialisation, and focus... did you copy over?

Not at all. The argument has never been why the problem can't be solved, but why the problem hasn't been solved (for which there are good and bad reasons).

Well that is bound to take sufficient time to effectively kick the problem into next year.

Hmm. I don't know how the SF have evolved in Afghanistan and Iraq so I cannot comment. I do know that the green army (non-SF) now uses TTPs and equipment that were SF only capabilities until fairly recently.

Oh goodie.. you mean they now operate in three and four man teams? No? Well then what's the point in getting them all the fancy kit like the black army? This of course brings us to another point and that is the deleterious influence the black army (SAS and hangers on) is having on the rest of the army. The stock question should be how and why should line infantry operating in platoon strength (or at least more than ten men) need the same TTPs and kit as special forces who operate in three or four man teams? If the answer is that the 'black army' does operate in more than ten men call-signs then the question should be asked if those tasks are indeed for special forces or should they be carried out by line infantry. (Hint: read Slim's comments on special forces at the back of his classic book - Defeat into Victory)

For example the new Fieldcraft pamphlet introduces 'break contact drills' for sections. This as we know is a small team recce type of drill and is necessary when in Indian country on a recce on bumping into the enemy. Its a get out of Dodge move. How often will this apply to a line infantry patrol of section strength? As I have said before if a full section is caught out in the open then yes they need to pull back. But once its over you reduce the section commander to the ranks and then jail him for good measure... then take the rest of the section (now with a new commander) through the basics again explaining why when you move (through vulnerable terrain) you always keep one leg on the ground when the other is in the air. (Basic stuff really)

I could go on...

The use of the SF has evolved but that was not necessarily an SF decision, but made at Theatre Command level.

It is well known that Patreus and McChrystal pushed kill-or-capture ops and they have been wildly successful. Dropped off recently for whatever reason. (Probably the new commander believes the Taliban commanders also have a right to life.)

But the bottom line why can't these kind of ops be carried out in their AOs by the line infantry already deployed there? The night is the time to do it as the night vision equipment (especially now with the fourth generation stuff) gives such an advantage it probably takes the fun out of it.

Plus lack of accountability and apathy. I suspect that this applies to the US as well, but for both Iraq and Afghanistan it was a case for the UK of an army at war but not a nation at war; that is very constraining.

Oh dear, just when I thought it could not get worse. Now don't try to rope the yanks in on this (they have their own problems with those clowns in their congress) which makes your Brit problems seem like a mere sideshow.

Well you know the Brits have now lost the equivalent of three battalions killed or maimed in Afghanistan (400 KIA and 1,800 seriously wounded) and yet (the mind positively boggles) don't take the war seriously. I saw this mentality in South Africa where the war was a sideshow which distracted from the real business of peacetime soldiering. You fix this by firing the 'garatroopers'. (actually firing them is altogether a too gentle a process)

[Red Rat]

With COIN the training works upwards from the individual skills level to the stick (or what every the smallest operating call-sign will be) and on to sections and platoons. (What would you use a platoon for? Maybe a long term ambush and follow-up (tracking) operations and the like.)

The size of grouping very much depends on the size of enemy you are fighting. In the early years it was rare to go out in less then platoon plus strength because the insurgents were operating in platoon plus strength. Now they operate in smaller groups and so do we.

Rotation? You mean we are back to short tours again? I suppose if they insist on taking part (to get the campaign medals and so forth) you can allocate them to road block/checkpoint duty, installation and route security and other crappy work like that

Armour and Mech both have their use in Afghanistan. The only reason the UK has not deployed them is that generally the Canadians and now the Americans had enough to go round (heavy armour). Warthog and Jackal in terms of firepower, mobility and protection are effectively a mech capability.

Oh goodie.. you mean they now operate in three and four man teams? No?

No, but neither does the SF out there for the most part...

Well then what's the point in getting them all the fancy kit like the black army? This of course brings us to another point and that is the deleterious influence the black army (SAS and hangers on) is having on the rest of the army. The stock question should be how and why should line infantry operating in platoon strength (or at least more than ten men) need the same TTPs and kit as special forces who operate in three or four man teams? If the answer is that the 'black army' does operate in more than ten men call-signs then the question should be asked if those tasks are indeed for special forces or should they be carried out by line infantry. (Hint: read Slim's comments on special forces at the back of his classic book - Defeat into Victory)

Fancy kit starts with SF generally because it is more expensive and specialised and then percolates out as it comes down in price and or its wider utility is more experienced. Laser Light Modules started off as an SF only piece of equipment. Likewise Night Vision Devices - SF get the good stuff first and then slowly everyone else gets it. Where the SF has had a significant impact on 'green army operations' is in the targeting cycle at company and battalion level. The SF are used for tasks which match their training and capabilties - a good example of this can be seen in the Wardak CH47 Investigation Report

For example the new Fieldcraft pamphlet introduces 'break contact drills' for sections. This as we know is a small team recce type of drill and is necessary when in Indian country on a recce on bumping into the enemy. Its a get out of Dodge move. How often will this apply to a line infantry patrol of section strength? As I have said before if a full section is caught out in the open then yes they need to pull back. But once its over you reduce the section commander to the ranks and then jail him for good measure... then take the rest of the section (now with a new commander) through the basics again explaining why when you move (through vulnerable terrain) you always keep one leg on the ground when the other is in the air. (Basic stuff really)

But the unexpected always happens. It might not be vulnerable ground, the other leg might be armed persistent air surveillance or another section (in the context of a platoon move). Meeting engagements happen and sometimes the other side is better (and yes, sometimes our commanders are wrong). We were taught those basic break contact drills when I was a troopie for use in woods and jungles or for when we got caught with our pants down; they have not come from SF. But it is used very rarely.

It is well known that Patreus and McChrystal pushed kill-or-capture ops and they have been wildly successful. Dropped off recently for whatever reason. (Probably the new commander believes the Taliban commanders also have a right to life.)

It is reported as having dropped off, to be honest I do not know if that is the case and if it is, why.

But the bottom line why can't these kind of ops be carried out in their AOs by the line infantry already deployed there? The night is the time to do it as the night vision equipment (especially now with the fourth generation stuff) gives such an advantage it probably takes the fun out of it.

They are.

Well you know the Brits have now lost the equivalent of three battalions killed or maimed in Afghanistan (400 KIA and 1,800 seriously wounded) and yet (the mind positively boggles) don't take the war seriously. I saw this mentality in South Africa where the war was a sideshow which distracted from the real business of peacetime soldiering. You fix this by firing the 'garatroopers'. (actually firing them is altogether a too gentle a process)

No! No! No! The military take it very seriously, the government takes it seriously, the nation takes it seriously, but it is not a nation at war. The nation's priority and focus is probably: the economy, the health service, the education system and then who is winning on X Factor. The war in Afghanistan just is not an issue; it is background noise. The UK has a population of 60.2 million and an Armed Forces of less then 200,000 (.3%). By the time you take immediate family involved you are lucky if 2% of the population knows someone who has been to Afghanistan. It is less to do with peacetime soldiering and more to do with the fact that most people just do not care. Because of this it gets the political and capital resources you would expect - minimal.

[Fuchs]

OK, so back in the good old bad days of the 70s I studied from the Brit Infantry Battalion in Battle - 1964. Nowhere in there did the term maneuver appear as it was an Americanism which only appeared on the Brit scene later (probably via NATO).

British English is "manoeuvre", and that was prominent in French military literature even a hundred years ago already.

[JMA]

British English is "manoeuvre", and that was prominent in French military literature even a hundred years ago already.

Yes, I should have made it more clear. The American led warfighting concept of maneuver warfare in its current form is relatively new. The term certainly was not in use (with its current meaning) in Brit doctrine back in the 60s and 70s.

[Fuchs]

The current form basically goes back to the Lind gang of the 80's. See Maneuver Warfare Handbook.