British COIN (merged thread)

[JMA]

Definitely. Although in the chattering classes there is a feeling that our Generals got many things wrong in Iraq and Afganistan but we see no public acknowledgement from uniformed chiefs that mistakes were made by the military; and certainly not mistakes at the operational and strategic levels. It is a line that is wearing increasingly thin with politicans, pundits and junior officers alike.

Its not as if the junior officers have been operationally savvy down at the sharp end. Watch the videos, read the books (Dead Men Risen etc etc) and note that not all the problems can be laid at the door of the generals.

Part of the problem is that 'six month wonders' have now become experts because so few have any real experience of how the war has and is evolving. This is not good for the military as a whole. But... it must be said that six months in Helmand is better overall experience than a few hours at the Iranian Embassy or on Op Barras (in Sierra Leone).

Now given the fact (as reported by you a while ago) that the Brit troops have no problem with the rules of engagement then even more so those down at the sharp end have less to blame on outside factors.

The question must be asked why do the Brits put their best troops into Afghanistan if there is no intention to close with and kill the enemy. Time for a major rethink I suggest.

[Red Rat]

Its not as if the junior officers have been operationally savvy down at the sharp end. Watch the videos, read the books (Dead Men Risen etc etc) and note that not all the problems can be laid at the door of the generals.

Quite right, but the operational and strategic level mistakes can be laid at the Generals' door. At the tactical level there are examples of good and bad practice, like every other army iin every other conflict.

Part of the problem is that 'six month wonders' have now become experts because so few have any real experience of how the war has and is evolving.

But the army as a whole has a very sophisticated and nuanced feel for how the conflict is evolving.

Now given the fact (as reported by you a while ago) that the Brit troops have no problem with the rules of engagement then even more so those down at the sharp end have less to blame on outside factors.

The ROE are robust. Some will always want more leeway and some less, but the consensus (not just British) is that the ROE are good and workable.

The question must be asked why do the Brits put their best troops into Afghanistan if there is no intention to close with and kill the enemy. Time for a major rethink I suggest.

Some would say it is a flawed policy and a flawed strategy. The army still seeks to close with and kill the enemy but only in so far as this will further the aims of the strategy. Of course if the strategy is flawed...

The view among senior officers at the moment appears to be that:


Decisive engagement in maritime, land or air environments is no longer an
effective means of achieving desired political outcomes.

The ascendancy of non-traditional domains of warfare: particulary cyber,
information and perception. The view that the outcome of most operations
is as much a matter of perception as fact.

I do not necessarily agree with the prevailing view.

[JMA]

Quite right, but the operational and strategic level mistakes can be laid at the Generals' door. At the tactical level there are examples of good and bad practice, like every other army iin every other conflict.

To be brutally honest other than the special forces ops not seen much evidence of good practice from the line infantry (even the Marines and the paras). Slow to learn, slow to adapt, slow to evolve. And it all returns to the single most important weakness in the Brit approach - that of short tours. The indictment of "one spends two months learning the job, two months doing it and two months counting the days until you go home for tea and medals" still holds good and effectively precludes the build up of tactical efficiency on the ground. One needs to recognise this fatal flaw in the approach and address it and not (as the Brits are famous for) continue to muddle on.

But the army as a whole has a very sophisticated and nuanced feel for how the conflict is evolving.

That sound like a yank spin doctor speaking I interpret that to mean in effect the Brits (and probably the yanks) don't have a f***ing clue what is going on on the ground.

The ROE are robust. Some will always want more leeway and some less, but the consensus (not just British) is that the ROE are good and workable.

OK but when a yank troopie notes to the journalist that he cant fire unless fired upon when does the robust fit into that?

Some would say it is a flawed policy and a flawed strategy. The army still seeks to close with and kill the enemy but only in so far as this will further the aims of the strategy. Of course if the strategy is flawed...

Well if you are not going to take on the Taliban and kill them why not just use low grade militia to do the defensive work and guarding duties. Like with NI the institutional lack of aggressive action starts to eat away at the heart of fighting units like a cancer.

The view among senior officers at the moment appears to be that:

Decisive engagement in maritime, land or air environments is no longer an
effective means of achieving desired political outcomes.

The ascendancy of non-traditional domains of warfare: particulary cyber,
information and perception. The view that the outcome of most operations
is as much a matter of perception as fact.

I do not necessarily agree with the prevailing view.

And how, dare I ask, does this apply to the troops currently deployed in Helmand? It seems like the military powers that be are starting to mentally detach themselves from the war in Afghanistan. Seen that before in people who have realised that they have no answers and they just shut the problem out.

One needs to remember that Rhodesia comprised 80% plus Brits most of whom had come out after WW2 and (speaking as a South African) they proved to be exceptionally intuitive, innovative and adaptable and achieved much with very little. So one really needs to put ones finger on where it has gone wrong in the UK since then and fix it. Something has happened to reduce the ability of the Brits to think and act using their initiative and this applies not only to the military (as you would well know).

[Ken White]

The Red Rat needs no help from me but the sideswipes merit my limited intrusion.

To be brutally honest other than the special forces ops not seen much evidence of good practice from the line infantry...that of short tours...One needs to recognise this fatal flaw in the approach and address it and not (as the Brits are famous for) continue to muddle on.

What if one recognizes those things, would change them if within ones powers -- but they are not?

In short, once again your ire is justified but your aim is atrocious.

That sound like a yank spin doctor speaking I interpret that to mean in effect the Brits (and probably the yanks) don't have a f***ing clue what is going on on the ground.

Yank Spin doctor, South African Prescriptive doctor, takes all kinds...

There are British and Americans there with no clue and there are more who fully understand the issues. They aren't the problem -- the problem is not in Afghanistan, it's in the places shown below. Everything, including recruiting, retaining and sending the clueless to Afghanistan, support, whatever and particularly what both the highly clued and the unclued can do starts there...

Everyone seem to understand that but you.

OK but when a yank troopie notes to the journalist that he cant fire unless fired upon when does the robust fit into that?

I know this will amaze you but some of those clueless who shouldn't be there are senior, LTCs and even higher and can give commands and those types are often prone to tell troops that work for them that regardless of the ROE, "My ROE are designed to protect my career, so listen to me, not what you read..." That happens all too often. It did in Viet Nam and was usually ignored by most units -- the kids today can't do that due to Drones, Blue force Tracker, giant eyes high in the sky and so forth. Recall the White House Situation Room with a USAF BG running the video feed during the OBL raid. The Micromanagers have won -- this time...

... the institutional lack of aggressive action starts to eat away at the heart of fighting units like a cancer.

That's true and good Commanders know and try to guard against that. Poor Commanders and Politicians encourage less aggressiveness -- easier to control. Not right or even sensible but it is reality in every modern democracy. recall also that the law of averages in Armies that emphasize egalitarianism first and merit second says half the Commanders are good, the other half less so...

[JMA]

The Red Rat needs no help from me but the sideswipes merit my limited intrusion.

You are correct he needs no help from anyone but go ahead... jump in.

What if one recognizes those things, would change them if within ones powers -- but they are not?

In short, once again your ire is justified but your aim is atrocious. Yank Spin doctor, South African Prescriptive doctor, takes all kinds...

'Short tours' is the biggest remaining problem for the Brits. It can be changed - easier now that the tempo of operations has slowed - and that must be stated no matter how much it irritates.

There are British and Americans there with no clue and there are more who fully understand the issues. They aren't the problem -- the problem is not in Afghanistan, it's in the places shown below. Everything, including recruiting, retaining and sending the clueless to Afghanistan, support, whatever and particularly what both the highly clued and the unclued can do starts there...

Yes there are sure to be a number smart 'six month wonders' who have figured it out (to some extent) but what's the point if they have finished their tour and are now sitting back at home?

Is it not important to try to identify the problems wherever they may be? Home or abroad.

Everyone seem to understand that but you. I know this will amaze you but some of those clueless who shouldn't be there are senior, LTCs and even higher and can give commands and those types are often prone to tell troops that work for them that regardless of the ROE, "My ROE are designed to protect my career, so listen to me, not what you read..." That happens all too often. It did in Viet Nam and was usually ignored by most units -- the kids today can't do that due to Drones, Blue force Tracker, giant eyes high in the sky and so forth. Recall the White House Situation Room with a USAF BG running the video feed during the OBL raid. The Micromanagers have won -- this time...That's true and good Commanders know and try to guard against that. Poor Commanders and Politicians encourage less aggressiveness -- easier to control. Not right or even sensible but it is reality in every modern democracy. recall also that the law of averages in Armies that emphasize egalitarianism first and merit second says half the Commanders are good, the other half less so...

I have noticed that the primary response from serving soldiers these days is a shrug of the shoulders as a submissive acceptance that things can't be changed and they just have to muddle on. This is very sad.

[Ken White]

'Short tours' is the biggest remaining problem for the Brits. It can be changed - easier now that the tempo of operations has slowed - and that must be stated no matter how much it irritates.

It doesn't irritate, longer tours are militarily sound but politically infeasible given current organization and training -- and family matters... -- that simple.

Yes there are sure to be a number smart 'six month wonders' who have figured it out (to some extent) but what's the point if they have finished their tour and are now sitting back at home?

It doesn't take all of 'em that long to scope it out but the tour length's a problem, no question -- it, however, is not going to change.

Is it not important to try to identify the problems wherever they may be? Home or abroad.

Been identified, long before anyone here heard from you or me. Also been fought and lost so you're in effect preaching to the old choir. You continue to surface it and continue to be told (not just by me...) that you're right -- but! Politics hold sway. One can view little of what happens on these kinds of deployments today through the lens of other wars just one generation ago. The changes in the last forty years have been huge and few have been beneficial. Today's focus is not military, it's political, pure and simple.

I have noticed that the primary response from serving soldiers these days is a shrug of the shoulders as a submissive acceptance that things can't be changed and they just have to muddle on. This is very sad.

Yes, it is sad.

It is also acceptance of unpleasant reality; military knowledge and awareness in the civilian population in the UK or US is microscopic. Misperceptions in the political and chattering classes are endemic. The forces today are too small to have any political clout at all. Far different world than it was 30 years ago...

May I suggest your view might be colored by serving in an existential war, where the rules are vastly different (and will be again for anyone involved in such). Having served in a couple of far from existential efforts, the focus is different for everyone involved. Perhaps it should not be but it is. You see deterioration in many areas from your war and day to these expeditions. So do I -- but I'm a bit more sanguine because I'm quite confident that an existential effort, should one come, will cure a lot of current ills real quickly.

Until it's over, then everyone will go back to business as usual...

[Steve Blair]

It is also acceptance of unpleasant reality; military knowledge and awareness in the civilian population in the UK or US is microscopic. Misperceptions in the political and chattering classes are endemic. The forces today are too small to have any political clout at all. Far different world than it was 30 years ago...

Yet it is really the historical norm in both the US and UK. Pining for the days of a massive draft-based force is really silly (note that I'm not saying you are, Ken). Prior to World War II the military had precious little clout, and when they did it was by making use of internal pressures (Indian wars) to motivate specific state delegations (Texas for one). Military experience from the Civil War didn't help them, either, as most of the legislators with experience had been Volunteers and remained quite hostile to a standing, professional military (John Logan is but one example).

[JMA]

The Red Rat needs no help from me but the sideswipes merit my limited intrusion.

Ken, for an old soldier you are remarkably sensitive to perceived sideswipes.

Reminds of the story out of John Masters' wonderful book The Road Past Mandalay. Here is the extract from page 139 in my paperback:

… And I lured Bill out and to his tent. He collapsed on his camp bed and glared moodily at me. ‘You're all the same,’ he said. ‘Goddam British. Worse than Goldwyn. US, for Christ's sake.’

My own head was firm on my shoulders, but the little muzzy. ‘What?’ I asked.

‘US,’he repeated. ‘No goddam good. I ought to puch you all in the nose'.

At last I understood. Bill had been with us about two months. All that time he had been brooding about our army's habit of describing any article of equipment that had become useless as US. That's what it sounded like though in fact it was written u/s and stood for unserviceable. I had no time to explain. …

OK, so don't pull a 'Bill' on me now please.

I came from a unit which had; pommies (Brits), Aussies (Australians), Kiwis (New Zealanders), yanks (Americans), Cannucks (Canadians), porras (Portuguese), slopies (South Africans), frogs (French), krauts (Germans) etc etc... and of course 2/3 Rhodesians.

Each nationality displayed some or other obvious national characteristic which was seized upon by the rest and used to rib them. Boys will be boys.

[Ken White]

Ken, for an old soldier you are remarkably sensitive to perceived sideswipes.

Sideswipes, mis statements, erroneous assumptions, casual asides -- all deserve correction if in error. All part of the service, no thanks necessary...

[Red Rat]

To be brutally honest other than the special forces ops not seen much evidence of good practice from the line infantry (even the Marines and the paras). Slow to learn, slow to adapt, slow to evolve. And it all returns to the single most important weakness in the Brit approach - that of short tours. The indictment of "one spends two months learning the job, two months doing it and two months counting the days until you go home for tea and medals" still holds good and effectively precludes the build up of tactical efficiency on the ground. One needs to recognise this fatal flaw in the approach and address it and not (as the Brits are famous for) continue to muddle on.

TTPs evolve week by week, month by month and are different according to which AO you are in and the threat faced. What is seen on TV is a combination of tactical good practice and bad practice. Details on UKSF Ops are extremely hard to come by so it is hard to state how effectively they have evolved. The use of SF has evolved considerably - but that was not necessarily an SF decision.
What most media coverage cannot show is the whole picture; the planning, the ISTAR coverage, the intelligence. I am not saying that mistakes have not been made, they have, especially in the early years, but the army now is different from the army then. The equipment and TTPs have changed out of all recognition.

There are problems with short tours and I agree that we should be on longer tours. Ledwidges comment (Losing Small Wars) on 'militarism' is both accurate and damning. Should we change things? Yes? Can we? No; it is not politically possible; we are already in drawdown.

That sound like a yank spin doctor speaking I interpret that to mean in effect the Brits (and probably the yanks) don't have a f***ing clue what is going on on the ground.

Au contraire my South African sparring partner! Our key intelligence and civilian affairs staff are on 12 month tours. Within our patch we generally know who the key players are, their families, their enemies, their friends, their rivals, their business partners, their business interests, their schools, what they thought yesterday, last week, and last year. What their aspirations are in public and quite possibly what their aspirations are in private; it is a very sophisticated knowledge of the human terrain. We know what weapons are favoured in what areas and at what times. Our knowledge of the terrain, human and physical is, I suspect, as good in many ways as what we had in N Ireland.

OK but when a yank troopie notes to the journalist that he cant fire unless fired upon when does the robust fit into that?

Well British troops don't have that problem. There are always people who do not understand the ROE; this sounds like one of them.

Well if you are not going to take on the Taliban and kill them why not just use low grade militia to do the defensive work and guarding duties. Like with NI the institutional lack of aggressive action starts to eat away at the heart of fighting units like a cancer.

NI was policing for most of the campaign. We enabled the police to carry out their duties and provided niche capabilities; N Ireland at its worst is probably what we would like Afghanistan to become. We realised in N Ireland that everytime we killed someone we were exacerbating the political problem, it caused a greater sense of political grievance, made martyrs out of volunteers and resulted in more even more volunteers; that is why from the mid to late 1980s we tried very hard to capture and not kill. Capturing them and sending them to prison stopped attacks, criminalised the struggle and discouraged others. Very few volunteers who served time in prion re-offended. Mark Urban's book Big Boys' Rules is a good account of the nuanced use of force in N Ireland while Kevin Toolis' book
Rebel Hearts: Journeys Within The IRA's Soul is a very good look at the impact of violence and how it fed the struggle.

And how, dare I ask, does this apply to the troops currently deployed in Helmand? It seems like the military powers that be are starting to mentally detach themselves from the war in Afghanistan. Seen that before in people who have realised that they have no answers and they just shut the problem out.

Already at the strategic level the army is planning for life 2015+. The size and shape of the army in 2020 will be decided in the next 12 months or else 2020 will be come 2021, 2022, 2023...

As to having no answers, no country is prepared to pay the price in blood and treasure to win the conflict in Afghanistan; I suspect they never were. Early on in the UK's engagement in Afghanistan the MOD stated that the engagement would have to be at least 25 years in order to achieve what the stated aims were; 10 years in and we are leaving.

One needs to remember that Rhodesia comprised 80% plus Brits most of whom had come out after WW2 and (speaking as a South African) they proved to be exceptionally intuitive, innovative and adaptable and achieved much with very little. So one really needs to put ones finger on where it has gone wrong in the UK since then and fix it. Something has happened to reduce the ability of the Brits to think and act using their initiative and this applies not only to the military (as you would well know).

WW2 and the Rhodesian Conflict were both existentialist conflicts where there is eveything to play for. In such circumstances it is adapt or survive. Iraq and Afghanistan were discretionary wars of choice where the imperative is to evolve so as not to be seen to

a) Fail
or
b) Be culpable

Plus society has changed considerably; we are softer and more liberal now.