British COIN (merged thread)

[Bob's World]

I wouldn't be too hard on the Brits. The fact is, I can't really think of any example of effective military COIN.

The problem with applying the military to COIN is that they tend to think of it as warfare; when in fact, COIN is just internal politics gone very bad.

When the military is applied simply as additional resources and capacity to assist the civil government in regaining a handle on the situation and that same civil government takes to heart that the populace is in an uproar for a reason and seeks to address those failures, you have good COIN.

If you are a foreign army in a foreign land, you are not doing COIN.

If you are an army foreign or domestic, and you believe you have the lead for resolving an insurgency, you are not conducting smart COIN.

British "COIN", like American "COIN" are and were far more about maintaining national interests in foreign lands which creates a natural bias of perspective going in that is virually an "intellectual force field" to getting to "Good COIN."

So whether one is "threat centric" and out to kill all the insurgents to neutralize the threats to ones national interests abroad, of if one is "Populationc-centric" and out to put so much sugar on the government that you have carefully crafted to protect your interests so that the populace does not compain too much or too violently; you are still not conducting COIN in either case.

No, I just can't think of any examples of good military COIN. I can find plenty of examples of military forces being employed against foreign populaces either in support of, or opposition to, their sitting governments in order to either preserve or create opportnities for the national interests of the nations that provided that force. But that is not COIN.

At least not in Bob's World.

[Woland]

Well.

The slides for one are more or less incomprehensible, but as for the overall content I really think this 'if only we could do what we did in Northern Ireland' implication is very unhelpful. Between Northern Ireland and Helmand Province there are scant significant parallels which ought to be guiding our practices.

No-one reads the doctrine. If my official capacity I have never even seen the doctrine, and would make a tentative estimate that no-one on the ground has either, or if they have, they've dismissed it as overly complicated, completely unreadable and largely irrelevant at the ground level in a Helmand village. It is hardly revelatory that a fundamental part of a COIN campaign is good J2, but perhaps another complicated Powerpoint presentation could set about explaining the UK's J2 shortfalls.

The whole implication of the slides is that the doctrine is sound but the carrying out of it is not. But there is nothing to say why not - bugger the doctrine, why are we not as good at it as we used to be? Resources? Complicated command structures? Bureaucracy? Poor use of J2? Inadequate funding or CIVMIL relations? Inadequate traning in the first place? Too kinetically minded? Mission creep? Poor quality commanders? All of the above and more, most likely. Yet identifying these things is not at the crux of this presentation. It more looks at what mistakes have been made, rather than a proper introspective look at why. I very much doubt that the answer is in the official doctrine.

[Red Rat]

The UK is busy re-writing its COIN doctrine, which will (in the hierarchy of doctrine) slip in under the Stabilisation doctrine. The UK had pretty good COIN doctrine, it is just that few read it, even fewer understood it and there were bugger all resources to resource any of it!

The new doctrine stresses that the nature of insurgency has changed while its essential character has not. Different ways and means, same ends and purposes.

The new doctrine lists 10 Principles, and increase from the extant 6. For comparison (I have highlighted the new or significantly changed):

New

Primacy of Political Purpose
Unity of Effort
Understand the Human Terrain
Secure the population
Neutralise the Insurgent
Gain and Maintain Popular Support
Operate in Accordance with the Law
Integrate Intelligence
Prepare for the longer term
Learn and Adapt

Old extant since 2007

Political Primacy and Political AIm
Coordinated Government Machinery
Intelligence and Information
Separate the Insurgent from his Support.
Neutralise the Insurgent
Plan for the Longer Term



What is interesting is that as 'Principles', briefings on them tend to encourage their use as a point for discussion and discussion. A welcome change in an organisation known to cherish the orthodoxy.

Some points raised:

Primacy of political purpose - whose? In AFG would that be the IRGoA, NATO, US or ?

Unity of effort in a coalition environment (as well as pan government)

Operate in accordance with the law - whose law?


It also looks like we will adopt a Shape Secure Develop model.

RR

[marct]

Interesting.... Well, the UK Culture Doctrine (JDN 1/09) was really good. Is the new COIN doctrine available online?

Cheers,

Marc

[Ken White]

Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present and Future" by Andrew Mumford, University of Nottingham. Published by the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

LINK

Do not believe this has been posted or discussed here. I note that, like some here including me, he believes mostly bad lessons derive from the Malayan experience.

I don't think he discussed one area of deficiency by the British that is not to some extent shared by the US. The problem in both nations is, I suspect, a combination of a risk averse political establishment (in total but party dependent with respect to bellicosity as the 'out' party will generally object to anything the government of the day decides... ) and an also risk averse and very bureaucratic military and Defence / Defense establishments (important distinction there, both the military folks and their civilian masters are at fault)...

Pity.

[davidbfpo]

Ken,

A good catch this paper. On my first reading the arguments appear to be similar to Frank Ledwidge's, in his book 'Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan', which has been discussed on 'The UK In Afghanistan' thread (post 816 is first, debate 840-850).

It would be interesting if the traditional place for military discussion and learning, RUSI, invited both authors to present their arguments in Whitehall. Alas I fear such is the strength of inertia and fear no-one serving would publicly say anything.

[Red Rat]

It would be interesting if the traditional place for military discussion and learning, RUSI, invited both authors to present their arguments in Whitehall. Alas I fear such is the strength of inertia and fear no-one serving would publicly say anything.

Ooh I don't know; I can think of several serving officers who would love to have a pop, even if only from our cheap seats!

[JMA]

Ooh I don't know; I can think of several serving officers who would love to have a pop, even if only from our cheap seats!

and what would they say?

[Red Rat]

[I]
very bureaucratic military and Defence / Defense establishments

Extremely bureacratic. The UK has just formed up a Joint Force Command that at first glance looks like adding another stovepiped staffing chain to an already complex structure. Every time that I mention the increasingly bureacratic nature of the Army I am told that it is because things are more complex now. My riposte is that ultimately the problems are not more complex but the structures we use to solve them are. In the UK Army we have gone from a profession of generalists with a few specialists, to a profession of specialists with a few generalists.

(important distinction there, both the military folks and their civilian masters are at fault)...

Pity.

Definitely. Although in the chattering classes there is a feeling that our Generals got many things wrong in Iraq and Afganistan but we see no public acknowledgement from uniformed chiefs that mistakes were made by the military; and certainly not mistakes at the operational and strategic levels. It is a line that is wearing increasingly thin with politicans, pundits and junior officers alike.

[JMA]

Definitely. Although in the chattering classes there is a feeling that our Generals got many things wrong in Iraq and Afganistan but we see no public acknowledgement from uniformed chiefs that mistakes were made by the military; and certainly not mistakes at the operational and strategic levels. It is a line that is wearing increasingly thin with politicans, pundits and junior officers alike.

Its not as if the junior officers have been operationally savvy down at the sharp end. Watch the videos, read the books (Dead Men Risen etc etc) and note that not all the problems can be laid at the door of the generals.

Part of the problem is that 'six month wonders' have now become experts because so few have any real experience of how the war has and is evolving. This is not good for the military as a whole. But... it must be said that six months in Helmand is better overall experience than a few hours at the Iranian Embassy or on Op Barras (in Sierra Leone).

Now given the fact (as reported by you a while ago) that the Brit troops have no problem with the rules of engagement then even more so those down at the sharp end have less to blame on outside factors.

The question must be asked why do the Brits put their best troops into Afghanistan if there is no intention to close with and kill the enemy. Time for a major rethink I suggest.

[Red Rat]

Its not as if the junior officers have been operationally savvy down at the sharp end. Watch the videos, read the books (Dead Men Risen etc etc) and note that not all the problems can be laid at the door of the generals.

Quite right, but the operational and strategic level mistakes can be laid at the Generals' door. At the tactical level there are examples of good and bad practice, like every other army iin every other conflict.

Part of the problem is that 'six month wonders' have now become experts because so few have any real experience of how the war has and is evolving.

But the army as a whole has a very sophisticated and nuanced feel for how the conflict is evolving.

Now given the fact (as reported by you a while ago) that the Brit troops have no problem with the rules of engagement then even more so those down at the sharp end have less to blame on outside factors.

The ROE are robust. Some will always want more leeway and some less, but the consensus (not just British) is that the ROE are good and workable.

The question must be asked why do the Brits put their best troops into Afghanistan if there is no intention to close with and kill the enemy. Time for a major rethink I suggest.

Some would say it is a flawed policy and a flawed strategy. The army still seeks to close with and kill the enemy but only in so far as this will further the aims of the strategy. Of course if the strategy is flawed...

The view among senior officers at the moment appears to be that:


Decisive engagement in maritime, land or air environments is no longer an
effective means of achieving desired political outcomes.

The ascendancy of non-traditional domains of warfare: particulary cyber,
information and perception. The view that the outcome of most operations
is as much a matter of perception as fact.

I do not necessarily agree with the prevailing view.

[Red Rat]

Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present and Future" by Andrew Mumford, University of Nottingham. Published by the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

LINK

Do not believe this has been posted or discussed here. I note that, like some here including me, he believes mostly bad lessons derive from the Malayan experience.

Pity.

Puncturing the Counterinsurgency Myth: Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present and Future.

Ostensibly this monograph is about debunking 10 myths of British Counterinsurgency. I found it a poor read, incoherent, biased and in places just plain wrong. Arguments were both specious and spurious and the good points made were more then overshadowed by the poor quality of the overall piece.

The author lists 10 myths and analyses each in turn. I have to admit that most of the myths I had never heard of so I am not sure how widespread a belief they represent.

Myth 1: The British Military Is An Effective Learning Institution. This is a myth peddled in Nagl’s Learning To Eat Soup With A Knife. The British Army is not renowned as a learning organisation, far from it. It has never regarded itself as a learning organisation (it regards itself as a pragmatic, adaptable organisation) and has never been historically regarded as a learning organisation. Speed is also relative and I would suggest that 2 years to adapt in a dynamic environment is not necessarily slow (Malaya).

Myth 2: British Civil Military Coin Planning is Strategically Perceptive. I found this analysis of this element confused, not least because the author seems to confuse strategy with tactics. The Malayan strategy was not “Detention without trial, the forced relocation of elements of the local populace…”, these were tactical and operational methods; but they were not the strategy. While the author makes some good points about a lack of British strategy in Iraq the overall tenor of this section is to confuse strategy, civil-mil command and control and understanding of the context of a campaign to no clear result.

Myth 3: The British Military Has Flexibly Adapted To The Demands Of COIN. Again we see confusion here between Strategy and Tactics; the author citing the British Army Field Manual Vol 1 Part 10, Countering Insurgency as strategic guidance – it was not. He also seems to think that this guidance was first produced in 2009; it was not. AFM Vol 1 Part 10 has been around since I joined the army in 1988 (and probably longer), the latest iteration was issued in 2009. Overall however I rated this as the best of the sections with some very perceptive points on British Army culture and the ebb and flow of ‘high intensity v low intensity’ demands on the army.

Myth 4: The British Military Has An Ingrained Educational Approach To COIN. Anyone who knows the British Army knows that it is a non-intellectual institution; ‘doers’ are favoured over ‘thinkers’. This applies across the board, not just to COIN. The section makes some good points about the educational requirements of COIN, but the author’s assertion that a reliance on training manoeuvre is largely irrelevant is in need of supporting evidence; I would question this. One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

Myth 5: Iraq Represented The Zenith Of 60 Years Worth Of Modern COIN Thinking. Utter tosh! I do not know anyone who thinks that. Iraq represented the nadir of British Strategic thinking; no more no less. The British failure in Iraq was more because of strategy then it was because of COIN practice. Furthermore the author in this section ignores the impact of the Iraqi Government on the conduct of operations against Shia elements until 2008. I would also dispute that the insurgent campaign in Iraq was sui generis, totally alien to British historical experience; the British having fought insurgencies in Iraq, Iran, Waziristan and Oman previously.

Myth 6: the British Can Do COIN Alone. Again, I do not know where this ‘myth’ has arisen from. It has been accepted in the UK since the early 1990s that the UK is highly unlikely to undertake any sort of military operation in isolation.

Myth 7: The British ‘Don’t Talk To Terrorists’. There is a myth that the British don’t talk to terrorists, but it is a myth held only by the more gullible members of the public. UK Governments have always talked, and done deals, with whoever they have to. Conflict is political in nature and political processes always run parallel to conflict processes and to facilitate this lines of communication are always maintained.

Myth 8: “Hearts and Minds” and “Minimum Force” Are Sacrosanct Elements Of The British Way Of COIN. The author seems to confuse minimum force with minimal force in his argument. A great deal of force can be applied and it is still the minimum amount of force required to achieve the required effect. This section I found the worst of all. The author cites “the ill-treatment of detainees becoming an all-too frequent event”, yet with no evidence to support this. He fails to raise the issue that the British application of minimal force after the death of six military policemen at Major Al Kabir in 2003 lead to a loss of prestige and influence in the area from which they never really recovered; different societies have different expectations and norms regarding the use of force. Lastly the UK Armed forces have been historically pragmatic in their use of force, it is only recently with the entrenchment of liberal western values regarding human rights and the use of force in the West that a more idealistic stance has been taken; until then little was sacrosanct.

Myth 9: The Malayan Emergency Is The Archetypical COIN Campaign. There is no such thing as an archetypical COIN campaign. The section reads as a ‘Beat the Brits’ diatribe. An example: “A counter-insurgency campaign taking 12 years to eradicate an isolated insurgent group is not a glowing achievement…”. Why not? 12 years to maintain the isolation of a group, transition to independence and lay the foundations for a successful and stable state seems a pretty good result to me. 12 years in terms of societal change is not long. Furthermore the insurgent campaign was defeated long before it ended. The author states that context is everything in his analysis of the Malayan campaign, but then ignores much of the context of the Iraq campaign.

Myth 10: The British Military Are The Ultimate COIN Practicioners. The British Army, and indeed Britain, was guilty of hubris in the period 2003-2005. But again the author is skewed in his analysis. His comments on the insurgents in Iraq as being “well organized, strategically driven, tactically brutal and well supported from within and outside…” could easily apply to the PIRA. One does not however need to fight the ‘A Team’ of insurgencies in order to prove one’s worth as a counter-insurgent; the trick is to stop an insurgency from ever developing to the point that it has masses of support (internal and external) and becomes a ‘Grade A’ insurgency. That said there are some good points about the lack of intelligence capabilities at the beginning of any insurgency (a reflection on liberal values where the State spies by exception) and a good point always worth re-iterating that "If the military cannot succeed in reducing insurgent violence, then no manner of political measures will arrest the worsening security situation”.

All in all a disappointing read.

[Ken White]

Interestingly, perhaps, I could apply your answers to the US Army with minimal change...

This from you:

One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

Is one of the most important, prescient and I believe correct statements on the issue in recent years. Hopefully it will be heeded by both our nations.

[Red Rat]

Interestingly, perhaps, I could apply your answers to the US Army with minimal change...

Most armies are more alike then they feel comfortable with...

This from you:Is one of the most important, prescient and I believe correct statements on the issue in recent years. Hopefully it will be heeded by both our nations.

I shout loudly from the cheap seats in the British Army - but I am not sure that anyone listens

[carl]

This from you:

One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

Is one of the most important, prescient and I believe correct statements on the issue in recent years. Hopefully it will be heeded by both our nations.

I enthusiastically second that.

[JMA]

Myth 4: The British Military Has An Ingrained Educational Approach To COIN. Anyone who knows the British Army knows that it is a non-intellectual institution; ‘doers’ are favoured over ‘thinkers’. This applies across the board, not just to COIN. The section makes some good points about the educational requirements of COIN, but the author’s assertion that a reliance on training manoeuvre is largely irrelevant is in need of supporting evidence; I would question this. One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

Mumford (the author is obviously a civvie) and as such tends to make broad statements about the military which obviously do not apply to all parts of the spectrum from Field Marshall all the way down to the private soldier.

To train your average line infantry platoon members in COIN tactics is pretty simple... but to expect them (down to private soldier level) to develop all the cultural, civil and psyops skills (which may comprise a successful COIN strategy) is plain insanity. The soldiers (in the main) were not selected for their intellectual and analytical skills but rather to be a trigger man in a killing machine (which is what an infantry platoon should be).

Certainly the sections/squads and platoons must be drilled in COIN tactics as much (if not more) than in conventional warfare but it is the officers and (to a lesser extent) the senior NCOs who need to be educated in the complexity of COIN strategy implementation (to gain an understanding of their part in the 'big picture'). The higher up the rank structure you go the more detailed the training in these aspects should be.

So perhaps if Mumford is suggesting that all the training in the world is irrelevant if the strategic context is wrong or inappropriate or (if the strategy is effective) not fully understood with its tactical adaption requirements at battalion, company and platoon level then I support what he says. We are dealing on a number of levels here that must be taken into consideration.

(The levels are the command progression officers must pass through (being platoon/company/battalion/brigade/division) and experience command at each level. Where officers have not had sufficient experience in command at any of the levels (which should be three years at platoon and eighteen months to two years at each of the other levels) this limitation will become apparent the higher up the command structure he progresses (especially if his exposure at platoon level has been superficial).)

What Mumford does get absolutely correct is that COIN:

... demands of military commanders a set of characteristics and leadership skills different than regular warfare, ...

So I for one don't quite understand what you mean by:

One should train for manoeuvre and educate for COIN.

... in the context of the various levels within the force deployed in a COIN war.

[Red Rat]

To train your average line infantry platoon members in COIN tactics is pretty simple... but to expect them (down to private soldier level) to develop all the cultural, civil and psyops skills (which may comprise a successful COIN strategy) is plain insanity. The soldiers (in the main) were not selected for their intellectual and analytical skills but rather to be a trigger man in a killing machine (which is what an infantry platoon should be).

Agreed.

Certainly the sections/squads and platoons must be drilled in COIN tactics as much (if not more) than in conventional warfare but it is the officers and (to a lesser extent) the senior NCOs who need to be educated in the complexity of COIN strategy implementation (to gain an understanding of their part in the 'big picture'). The higher up the rank structure you go the more detailed the training in these aspects should be.

Agreed. And the tactics will be different and evolve for each conflict.

So perhaps if Mumford is suggesting that all the training in the world is irrelevant if the strategic context is wrong or inappropriate or (if the strategy is effective) not fully understood with its tactical adaption requirements at battalion, company and platoon level then I support what he says.

I don't think this is what he is saying. My reading of this was that he was disagreeing with the UK Army's wish to retain the ability to fight combined arms manoeuvre warfare at battlegroup and brigade level; an ability that has been severely degraded by the focus on Afghanistan. This capability he sees as not required for COIN. My argument is:

What is required is a technical mastery of your trade (gained through combined arms manoeuvre training) combined with an education system for our officers and SNCOs that is both broad and deep so that they have the knowledge set to apply their technical skills in a COIN environment. Training enables you to do what you do, education enables you to understand the context in which you are operating and therefore to better understand how to apply your technical skills in that environment.

It is also very difficult to train for COIN generically, especially commanders, int staff and civil affairs. This is because COIN progresses relatively slowly compared to combined arms manoeuvre (you are unlikely to win a COIN campaign in a two or even four week exercise) and because you need to understand the human terrain and interact with it. This latter element is difficult to replicate generically and in training. Technical skills (platoon attacks, patrolling, C-IED, using a military decision making process, conducting company attacks) are much easier to train and provide a transferrable skill set to COIN campaigns. Educating for COIN is however is a relatively simple matter. The aim here is to give individuals a broad based theoretical and historical knowledge of COIN together with a working knowedge of the social sciences in order that they can understand the context in which they may have to operate and deliver new solutions (quickly) to new problems.

Combined Arms Manoeuvre is a very difficult technical ability to master and it becomes exponentially more difficult to master as you progress in size from company to battalion to brigade to division to corps. If you lose it it is very difficult to get it back. As a capability it is required at sub-unit, battalion and possibly brigade level in a COIN environment. Even at a higher level in Iraq we (the Brits) noted that the ability of the US to comprehend and execute Corps level operations, flexing combat power across Iraq was highly effective. More salutory for us was that because in part we no longer operate at that level in the British Army we could not tap into that ability to flex assets to us; it was beyond the comprehension of our staff. So there is still a requirement to train for Combined Arms Manoeuvre because it is pertinent to COIN campaigns, let alone the fact that if we lose it it is very difficult to regain.

So train for Combined Arms Manoeuvre and educate for COIN.


As for Mumfords assertion that COIN demands a different set of characteristics and leadership skills from regular warfare I would go further. Every conflict has different characteristics and will demand different characteristics from its commanders and so every conflict will either see commanders adapt or fail. It is not a COIN versus Combined Arms Manoeuvre issue, it is a 'this conflict' versus 'that conflict' issue.

[CR6]

I read this with much interest, and I found Aylwin-Foster's criticism to be accurate and credible, given his time with coalition. We are still grappling with the problems of centralized control of operations, separating ourselves from the population we seek to aid, and the woes of a shallow bench when it comes to personnel. He is also dead-on with his criticism that the Army's ethos of "can-do" sometimes overshadows critical thinking and judgement regarding situations in theater. Somehow I don't think that is what Powell had in mind when he wrote "optimism is a force multiplier." Great article!

[SSG Rock]

We sit back here and see the changes that should occur in order to acheive any measure of success and I don't know about you guys but I am extremely frustrated at the almost pondering manner in which we seem to move in reaction to the adversary in Iraq. We know what we need to do, the changes that we need to make but we don't. Now, I know that there isn't much we can do to initiate change on the political side of the equation, but on the military/tactical where is the bottleneck? Why do we seem to insist on being predictable? Why are we still using pretty much the same playbook? Or, are we dramtically changing our TTP and I'm just not aware of it? Certainly, the news coming out of Iraq doesn't seem to do anything but get worse. Is it really worse? Rock confused.....

[RTK]

From my turret there is significant resistance to change in war prosecution at the Bn and above level. Obvious examples to the contrary are evident in the past three years, but if you look at Ann Scott Tyson's article in the Washington Post this morning, there are shining examples of BN level leadership that just doesn't get it.

Fighting COIN is a tactial, small unit endeavor. This takes Majors and Lieutenant Colonels out of the common, everyday decision making posture and they don't like it. It certainly isn't the same as a large, Bn sized frontal attack.

Changes are made daily in theater but they're made at the lowest levels. We are very good at tactically adapting to the enemy. We are very poor at capturing tactical keys to success through our professional development periodicals. We're having tough times finding anyone to even submit articles to professional magazines. Why? Because the guys and gals smartest on the subject right now are getting deployed and redeployed every 14 months or so. The last thing most of them want to do is write a bloody article on redeployment.

We're doing a good job of capturing battalion and brigade lessons learned through CALL after deployments. As most of us will acknowledge, however, COIN is a tactical, small unit fight. The lessons learned of battalions and larger, however important to capture, simply won't help the strategic corporal talking to the sheik in the province.