British COIN (merged thread)

[Tom Odom]

RTK

Thanks for this:

We're doing a good job of capturing battalion and brigade lessons learned through CALL after deployments. As most of us will acknowledge, however, COIN is a tactical, small unit fight. The lessons learned of battalions and larger, however important to capture, simply won't help the strategic corporal talking to the sheik in the province.

I have been singing that song as loudly as possibe for nearly 6 years. Please join me in another chorus.

Seriously, it is hard for brigade and battalion commanders to accept they in essence facilitate the fight. Some get it. Many don't.

Best
Tom

[Steve Blair]

And this will continue to be a problem, I'm afraid. The Army never quite figured it out during 10+ years in Vietnam.

[James Alexander]

Hi everyone

I've been reading this forum with great interest recently, and thought it was time to sign up and post!

I'm currently doing my politics undergrad dissertation at Manchester Uni, which is under the working title of "What does it mean to promote a British school of counterinsurgency?"

This is based largely around the report prepared on Operation Banner that stated the 'model' from NI had successfully been exported to other COIN operations, and been adopted by the US army etc. I realise there has been a lot of criticism for the report online and elsewhere, so wanted to look at what promoting this NI model really means.

I'm interested in looking at it from the following angles:

-What actors within the army are promoting this model (ie those in charge now that were engaged in clandestine operations during the conflict etc.)
-How Operation Banner is portrayed by the British Judicial system and it's reaction
-Changes in military doctrine and the post-cold war need to redefine the role of the army (and whether this is blurring the lines between the traditional role of the army and police enforcement, crowd control etc.)
-The effect the 'War on Terror' has had on discourses on COIN, whether its making it more acceptable to discuss these things, whereas before it was seen in not-so-great a light, and whether it is just a rediscovery of what Frank Kitson suggested 30-odd years ago.

I apologise for the lengthy post, but I'm finding myself lost in a sea of literature on COIN, and would be grateful for any opinions/suggested readings etc.!

Many thanks

James

[William F. Owen]

This is based largely around the report prepared on Operation Banner that stated the 'model' from NI had successfully been exported to other COIN operations, and been adopted by the US army etc. I realise there has been a lot of criticism for the report online and elsewhere, so wanted to look at what promoting this NI model really means.

Do you mean Army Code Publication 71842? If so I know the author and I am sure he would be happy to talk to you.

The report does not assert that the 'model' from NI had successfully been exported to other COIN operations, and been adopted by the US army etc. The Forward makes some claims about the NI experience, but does not say what you say it does. The forward was written by the then CGS, and not the author of the report.

-What actors within the army are promoting this model (ie those in charge now that were engaged in clandestine operations during the conflict etc.)

Not sure any are. The report does not develop a "model" that I am aware of. It shows what worked and what did not, in the context it was applied.

-How Operation Banner is portrayed by the British Judicial system and it's reaction

That's all in the statute books, and ROE.

-Changes in military doctrine and the post-cold war need to redefine the role of the army (and whether this is blurring the lines between the traditional role of the army and police enforcement, crowd control etc.)

I doubt the accuracy of that statement. The British Army has been doing "crowd control" (without bayonets) for 50-60 years.

-The effect the 'War on Terror' has had on discourses on COIN, whether its making it more acceptable to discuss these things, whereas before it was seen in not-so-great a light, and whether it is just a rediscovery of what Frank Kitson suggested 30-odd years ago.

No one in the British Army "rediscovered" Frank Kitson. He was always well up in the discussions. Yes, COIN has become a fashion fad of late, probably because of the US involvement, but it has always been at the centre of non-US military thought and debate. Many many books were written on COIN prior to 911.

[davidbfpo]

Then two books on COIN: 'Counterinsurgency in Crisis: Britain and the the challenges of modern warfare' by David Ucko & Robert Egnell and 'Counterinsurgency: Exposing the myths of the new way of war' by Douglas Porch.

Both are excellent and very, very critical of the pursuit of counter-insurgency school of thought and practice. Ucko focusses on the UK and Porch has a wider outlook.

From Ucko two quotes:

The case of Afghanistan thereby points to the significant problems inthe British way of preparing for and prosecuting modern wars: the failure to properly formulate and resource strategy; the failure of civil-military coordination at both the strategic and oerational levels; the limitations of military improvisation and of 'muddling through' in the absence of a plan; and the dangers of letting strategic intent and operational approach develop independently (pg. 108)

...there is no fig leaf large enough here to cover the deep flaws in the British government's own approach and conduct in these counterinsurgency campaigns.

Porch is incredibly direct in his criticism, based on his historical knowledge and watching the last decade plus. I doubt if anyone in an official military education post in the UK could have written such a book.

[SWJ Blog]

British Counterinsurgency: Returning Discriminate Coercion to COIN

Entry Excerpt:



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