In Vietnam we only negotiated for a "decent interval" in an effort to save our own pride, while abandoning the people (the government had abandoned us long before) of South Vietnam who had trusted us the most to an inevitable conclusion as that insurgency entered phase III conventional operatoins and unified the country.

In Afghanistan we have the opportunity learn from those mistakes and attempt to negotiate a better deal for those, such as the villages in the VSO program, who have trusted us the most and who will suffer the most when we withdraw. Our loyalty should be to the people this time, and not the government.

Uzbek and Hazara elements of the Northern Allinace rightfully fear reconcilliation and are obstacles to seeking political balance. I fear they too will lose it all in their effort to keep it all.

First, however, we must re-frame the problem. Our current framing is an unsustainable disaster. Most generals just don't get it, it is too far outside their training and experience, and certainly outside the mission they have been asked to perform and the parameters of what their commands are trained, organized and equipped to do. There are some exceptions obviously, certainly Nick Carter on the UK side is one, but even still, this is not a military mission and to make it one dooms us to failure.