Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
Its not as if the junior officers have been operationally savvy down at the sharp end. Watch the videos, read the books (Dead Men Risen etc etc) and note that not all the problems can be laid at the door of the generals.
Quite right, but the operational and strategic level mistakes can be laid at the Generals' door. At the tactical level there are examples of good and bad practice, like every other army iin every other conflict.
Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
Part of the problem is that 'six month wonders' have now become experts because so few have any real experience of how the war has and is evolving.
But the army as a whole has a very sophisticated and nuanced feel for how the conflict is evolving.

Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
Now given the fact (as reported by you a while ago) that the Brit troops have no problem with the rules of engagement then even more so those down at the sharp end have less to blame on outside factors.
The ROE are robust. Some will always want more leeway and some less, but the consensus (not just British) is that the ROE are good and workable.

Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
The question must be asked why do the Brits put their best troops into Afghanistan if there is no intention to close with and kill the enemy. Time for a major rethink I suggest.
Some would say it is a flawed policy and a flawed strategy. The army still seeks to close with and kill the enemy but only in so far as this will further the aims of the strategy. Of course if the strategy is flawed...

The view among senior officers at the moment appears to be that:


Decisive engagement in maritime, land or air environments is no longer an
effective means of achieving desired political outcomes.

The ascendancy of non-traditional domains of warfare: particulary cyber,
information and perception. The view that the outcome of most operations
is as much a matter of perception as fact.

I do not necessarily agree with the prevailing view.