How do we say the Afghan Surge is not just mil when civilians are not participating?

[Surferbeetle]

Iraq was dangerous work, the long dog paddle to safety/home was too far to seriously bank on, and so instead every day I would sally forth and do my best to learn how things worked in the public works and utilities arena in my little corner of the world. My hope was that once I built up my assessments/understanding of the physical and human terrain the leverage points would reveal themselves and either I or my successor would be able to dig in and effect positive change.

After a while I too came to understand that the regional system was in thrall to the national system…veteran regional managers, who were tough, bright, and technically competent, would not budge without the blessing from Baghdad. Once this became clear to me I would regularly wander down to Baghdad seeking guidance, resourcing for projects, and stamped approvals (what amazing power a rubber stamp can have)…Baghdad however was in administrative chaos and no one was going to stick their neck out too far, rather government decision-makers were wisely watching and waiting for an indication of how things would play out.

Then local population morale was hit hard when the decision was made to privatize SOE’s, hit hard when the military was disbanded, and hit hard again when the de-Bathification order came through. Security and hope began to wane as the heat of the summer came on and local attitudes began to harden.

So, instead of the remaining shell of a government fulfilling its assigned role, we/the coalition stepped in and provided enough in CERP to help the regional government folks more or less hold things together with spit, duct tape, and bailing wire. Prior economic sanctions had already honed these skills to an impressive edge but chaos levels were steadily rising...

IMHO force ratios were key to much of the tactical civil affairs effort, and we/the coalition worked to augment ours with local technocrats, security, etc. whenever possible. Integrated civil information management, rigorous systems analysis, assignments of defined portfolios to administrators held accountable for benchmarks/metrics are tried and true methodologies needed for both the operational and strategic civil affairs effort as well as for the effective functioning of any government. No mystery here, however the record is clear on our choice to employ/not employ these methodologies.

So what’s the answer?

Team members should be limited to those with language skills, SME skills, networking skills, diplomatic skills, tactical skills, and a no bull#### understanding that one must work with the locals in order to effect change. There are simply not enough coalition people to effect change without working with the local population. Rookies need to be trained, but experienced hands need to be in the majority.

We do indeed have the people with the requisite skills, however we have not yet chosen to adequately resource an organization within the DOS or DOD umbrella to accomplish this mission. This organization(s) could be used to positive effect in America and other locations after this particular skirmish ends. Our skirmish is just a blip in the long history of humanity’s never ending wars and since we are indeed hard wired for war why not use this experience to build something positive?

Steve ---the civil engineer, soldier, & sometime ca-bubba.