The combat shotgun

[Ken White]

Insurgency may be warfare, but COIN is not. COIN is dealing with a civil emergency... but we have not given them new tools designed for what they were told to do.

Maybe we're using the wrong tools for the job.

I totally agree that 'COIN' is a civil emergency and not 'warfare -- thus war fighters are an inappropriate tool selection.

Now, we too can debate the orders, but that will not change the orders or the fact that the soldiers need better tools to execute them.

Why will that not change? Is that a lock? Should it be?

All of those who insist on calling FID "COIN"; and those who insist on approaching COIN as warfare are, IMO, sadly off the mark...

We can agree on that.

So, question is, if this operation was being conducted in Frankfurt (or London, or Kansas City?) instead of Kandahar would you want your soldiers to have effective non-lethal weapons? Is this somehow different because we are in someone elses country?

Uh, yes it is different. If the operation was being conducted in Frankfurt, London or K.C. we probably would avoid using the Army...

Back to the thread:

Uboat509 and Rifleman are both correct -- so are you -- there's a need for less than lethal; Most soldiers should NOT be issued such weapons; they should be clearly and colorfully identified as less than lethal and they should be dedicated to that purpose and used by specially trained guys or gals, probably MPs and never issued to combat infantry units. Ees not their yob...

Doing THAT would be an invitation to the problems you seek to avoid...

[Chris jM]

BW, I set everything off on the tangent. My bad. The idea that we are policing, not soldiering in the purest sense of the term, interests me and leads directly into the following...

Uboat509 and Rifleman are both correct -- so are you -- there's a need for less than lethal; Most soldiers should NOT be issued such weapons; they should be clearly and colorfully identified as less than lethal and they should be dedicated to that purpose and used by specially trained guys or gals, probably MPs and never issued to combat infantry units. Ees not their yob...

Doing THAT would be an invitation to the problems you seek to avoid...

In an ideal world, yes. The ideal world being where the infantry are deployed to the higher-intensity areas where the mission sees the close-with, seek-out, sieze-and-hold sorta stuff. Unfortunately the west lacks the quantity of expeditionary police forces and military police forces to be able to specialise in such a way. Thus infantry and, and most likely will continue to be, on the checkpoints and on stability (presence?!?) patrols through populated areas. Do we create a specialised 'less lethal' position in each patrol, or just factor the less lethal capability into our existing infantry tool-kit?

From my army's experience it (less lethal) has to be an infantry task through necessity. Alternatives, short of radical re-rolling of forces and ToEs, just don't exist.

What we can do is clearly define the less lethal weapons/ ammo natures, train the users and commanders and then rely on proper judgement and employment by the operators.

[Ken White]

In an ideal world, yes. The ideal world being where the infantry are deployed to the higher-intensity areas where the mission sees the close-with, seek-out, sieze-and-hold sorta stuff. Unfortunately the west lacks the quantity of expeditionary police forces and military police forces to be able to specialise in such a way. Thus infantry and, and most likely will continue to be, on the checkpoints and on stability (presence?!?) patrols through populated areas. Do we create a specialised 'less lethal' position in each patrol, or just factor the less lethal capability into our existing infantry tool-kit?

If we lack the right tools for the job due to cost, personnel strengths or other shortfalls, we probably should acquire the proper toools OR not undertake the job at all...

I suggest we in the west really need to ask ourselves exactly what we think we're doing in our interventions?

Most such interventions by general purpose western forces are undertaken due to a small 'l' liberal desire to make things better -- those same people then turn around and criticize such interventions as militaristic neo-colonialism etc. etc. and cry for them to end prematurely. That makes no sense. Not only is it not ideal -- doesn't need to be, BTW -- it's dumb.

Right off the top of my head, I cannot think of a single such intervention by western forces that was truly worth the cost and effort. Do you know any?

Do not take that as saying the west should not get involved, that's not what I said, not at all. I believe there should be more involvement. It should be undertaken earlier, should be intelligence driven (we do that fairly well, we just don't act on the intel at all well); involve aid, diplomatic efforts and limited special forces-like military assistance -- anything to avoid committing the GPF who will never do it well (nor should they be able to do so)...

What we can do is clearly define the less lethal weapons/ ammo natures, train the users and commanders and then rely on proper judgement and employment by the operators.

Umm, are these the same Commanders who cannot be trusted to properly conduct patrol and show presence in such interventions?

Seriously, I understand and you're regrettably correct given current realities but it is a slippery slope and best avoided -- and the non-lethal weapons should never be the only weapon issued and should be clearly identifiable as non-lethal -- just as the bearer's other weapon(s) should be lethal and clearly identifiable as such.

[William F. Owen]

There a whole range of "Less than Lethal" munitions of the 40mm GL. Back in the day, most patrols in Ulster carried a 37mm "Baton" gun, for just that reason - and you can fire a 37mm baton round out of an M-203!! - oh yes! I've done it.

[Chris jM]

I suggest we in the west really need to ask ourselves exactly what we think we're doing in our interventions?

Being a good servant of my Queen and country, I'm doing what's asked of me. And, following my commander's intent, we do it with as little harm as is possible.

I'm skipping the majority of your question with this answer - sorry, but it is true from my perspective.

In undertaking these tasks, until we are told to refocus our main effort on 'pure' warfighting rather than the armed constabulary/ warfighting combination, there is an obvious capability gap.

I'm not arguing against you given your acknowledgement of 'current realities'. It's not a slippery slope ahead of us - it's one were already well into.

So the capability cap exists, and the tasks required of us are unavoidable. I see the question of 'avoidability' as completely academic and theoretical and agree with BW that 'this is a major shortfall for our troops currently'.

Rifleman - I side with those who are against using both less lethal and lethal ammo in the same gun at different times.

From my perspective this isn't an issue - we can't afford the diamond-studded solution different weapon systems for 12 ga lethal, less lethal and breaching so my defence force has to make do with what we've got. There are pros and cons to the 12-ga-everything approach - flexibility and ease of logistics/ training vs the necessity for robust C2 and TTPs.

Ken White - they should be dedicated to that purpose and used by specially trained guys or gals, probably MPs and never issued to combat infantry units. Ees not their yob...

Unfortunately it is our job, now, so we'll do what we've always done... we'll make do with our own issued kit, and once deployed around our allies we'll find what expensive piece of kit of yours does it best, and we'll steal it

[Ken White]

Being a good servant of my Queen and country, I'm doing what's asked of me. And, following my commander's intent, we do it with as little harm as is possible.

I'm skipping the majority of your question with this answer - sorry, but it is true from my perspective.

for the bulk of the questions I asked. That's always been considered a stock answer by many who serve...

Though I would suggest consideration of the fact that an Army deciding to do its job "with as little harm as possible" is itself on a slippery slope and may very well have an adaptation problem if confronted with heavy combat.

I'm not arguing against you given your acknowledgement of 'current realities'. It's not a slippery slope ahead of us - it's one were already well into.

So the capability cap exists, and the tasks required of us are unavoidable. I see the question of 'avoidability' as completely academic and theoretical and agree with BW that 'this is a major shortfall for our troops currently'.

We can disagree on that -- if you and Bob's World said perceived shortfall, I'd agree while pointing out that IMO you're both looking for a technical solution to a problem of poor training.

"Avoidability" may academic and theoretical at your level; it is not at all academic for the politicians who make decisions on actions. They need to be a bit smarter -- and it is the job of serving Soldiers to make them smarter...

That said and while I certainly accept your answer to most of my comment, I don't believe that answer addresses this question:

"Umm, are these the same Commanders who cannot be trusted to properly conduct patrol and show presence in such interventions?"

[Chris jM]

Though I would suggest consideration of the fact that an Army deciding to do its job "with as little harm as possible" is itself on a slippery slope and may very well have an adaptation problem if confronted with heavy combat.

You have 100%, whole-hearted endorsement from me in this. As with everything in life, opportunity costs accompany every decision. The route to pop-centric COIN has come at a cost, either consciously made or unwittingly, and the effects will be felt into the future. How much this affects your Army I can only guess at, but my army has effectively shunned anything over low-intensity combat in favor of high-end policing.

We can disagree on that -- if you and Bob's World said perceived shortfall, I'd agree while pointing out that IMO you're both looking for a technical solution to a problem of poor training.

It's a technical solution to a problem of poor training and poor policy. However, due to the shortfalls, there is a capability gap requiring an immediate solution. Fixing training is certainly a worthy course of action, but won't alleviate the immediate need for our soldier's to be able to deploy less lethal effects. Fixing poor policy is another question altogether... I think we're as likely to fix that as a beauty queen is as likely to achieve world peace.

That said and while I certainly accept your answer to most of my comment, I don't believe that answer addresses this question:

"Umm, are these the same Commanders who cannot be trusted to properly conduct patrol and show presence in such interventions?"

I'm trying out this whole manoeuvre warfare thing, targeting your strengths and avoiding your weaknesses. Turns out MW is great on paper but falls apart when employed against an adaptive opponent (this doubles as a response to Slapout's comment, as well!)

[slapout9]

Unfortunately it is our job, now, so we'll do what we've always done... we'll make do with our own issued kit, and once deployed around our allies we'll find what expensive piece of kit of yours does it best, and we'll steal it

See that Maneuver Warfare stuff does work sometimes

[JMA]

Being a good servant of my Queen and country, I'm doing what's asked of me. And, following my commander's intent, we do it with as little harm as is possible.

If you are talking about harm to own forces then I can agree.

However, if you are talking about the enemy I can't agree.

I would be interested to know if you can remember the circumstances this indoctrination was forced upon you?

[Chris jM]

However, if you are talking about the enemy I can't agree.

I would be interested to know if you can remember the circumstances this indoctrination was forced upon you?

I'm talking about harm, full stop, enemy/ civ/ FF inclusive. I perceive it to be cultural so I see the indoctrinate is total and all-encompassing. Perhaps I'm wrong - I rather hope that I am...

I would say this is a luxury born of NZ's position and boutique recent strategic involvement/ military history.

Example - I sat in a lecture yesterday on our approach to irregular activity, given by one of our instrumental HQ/ leadership types. It lumped our recent 'successes' in Bouganville, Bosnia, East Timor, Solomon Islands and Bamiyan (Afghanistan) to the application of a competent 'hearts and minds' approach. Assumed and explicitly stated as a conclusion was the fact that 'hearts and minds' kiwi-style was our way of the future to operational success.

A further case in point - we have our defence review (new government white paper) due it in a few months. Public reporting indicates that our MinDefence will elevate 'humanitarian disaster relief' to being a core defence function, and we will reallocate procurement and training accordingly.

Don't shoot the messenger - I don't believe that playing soccer with kids in Timor and handing out blankets in Bamiyan helps our cause - but this view is institutionalised. I held this view when I first participated on this board, and that learning experience was a rather brutal way of undermining my organisational upbringing.

In academic defence of a 'do minimal harm' policy, it's not that bad a concept. After all we need to win the peace - what better way to do that than ensure your avoid destruction and killing wherever possible? It won't work against a competent or conventional army that requires defeat, but against a threat group that is relatively weak, the policy holds up. Knowing when NOT to apply it will be the trouble, and the consequences of misapplication will be very, very painful.

Now, where were we? Shotguns?

[JMA]

I'm talking about harm, full stop, enemy/ civ/ FF inclusive. I perceive it to be cultural so I see the indoctrinate is total and all-encompassing. Perhaps I'm wrong - I rather hope that I am...

When an army spends its time on peacekeeping and humanitarian missions and is most unlikely to ever allow itself to get sucked into a real shooting war to any significant degree then it can indulge in the luxury a doctrine of low harm military operations. Perhaps even be proud they they never fired a shot in anger during the deployment to such-and-such a country. (This is not work for an army)

Perhaps this should evolve into another thread where perhaps the necessity of small countries to even train with say armour which they will probably never ever use can be debated.

Countries in Africa maintain large militaries (for their size) to suppress their own people and prey on their neighbours rather than defence of their own nomeland.

For instance what are the realistic prospects of an invasion of the NZ islands?