Netfires - Tube Artillery - MLRS

[SethB]

Doctrinally ECR is twice the radius at which you can expect one shell fragment per meter. There are other measures of lethality now.

As for ammunition choice, I'm not entirely sure what is current for the M119/105MM. Saw some stuff on the Denel ammunition that was very, very impressive.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the M118 is just separate loading version the M119? And it looks like a longer tube...

The V2C2 is also an impressive piece of hardware (usual qualifiers about things that aren't finished yet apply) and it should be noted that none of the current 105MM shells are rated for the high MVs, which means new and hopefully improved rounds would have to be part of the package.

DPICM has pros and cons, but I think there is a lot of need for standard HE. The decision to prohibit DPICM use in Iraq and Afghanistan was apparently made not long after the wars started.

What did you think of the LAV III with a howitzer attached?

[Ken White]

Doctrinally ECR is twice the radius at which you can expect one shell fragment per meter. There are other measures of lethality now.

Number of fragments is a poor indicator of lethality; too many other variables. The old bursting radius criteria was obtained by popping off rounds in the center of concentric circles of silhouettes and estimating potential kills versus potential wounds. All such estimates are just that; munition effects are too unpredictable to be precisely stated. Not a prob, really, the estimates are adequate for planning purposes.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the M118 is just separate loading version the M119? And it looks like a longer tube...

Longer tube, different shell, greater range, British (original) version. We insisted on the shorter tube and the old chamber due to vast stocks of older 105mm Ammo on hand. Economic choice versus combat effectiveness choice. Logical on the surface but could have been better worked around IMO.

...but I think there is a lot of need for standard HE.

Agree.

What did you think of the LAV III with a howitzer attached?

Yes with the Denel 105 (or similar) in a turret, no for the M777 piggy back. Though I'm not a fan of the LAV. It was a stopgap purchase of the cheapest available system due to the US Army's failure to develop wheeled vehicles after WW II.

Our northwest Europe experience in 1944-45 left the Army with many bad legacies...

[kaur]

(Experimental) Light Mechanized Infantry Regiment.

Order of Battle

Regimental Admin and Logistics Center

Battalion HQ

Light Mechanized Infantry Company
6x 8x8 ATV w/QJZ8912.7mm HMG
3x 8x8 ATV w/W87 35mm AGL
3x 8x8 ATV w/PP93 60mm Mortar
9x 4x4 ATV

Heavy Mechanized Infantry Company
3x Type 96 Main Battle Tank
3x Type 86 Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV)
3x ZBD97 IFV

Fire Support Company
1x Company HQ FAV
1x FAV w/Minigun
1x FAV w/HJ-8 ATGM FAV
3x FAV w/W99 82mm Automortar
3x FAV w/Type 87 25mm/SAM
3x FAV w/QJZ8912.7mm HMG
3x FAV w/W87 35mm
1x 4x4 ATV w/JS 12.7mm Sniper Rifle

Artillery Battery
Battery HQ/Fire Direction Center
3x 82mm Mortar
3x PTL02 105mm Wheeled Anti-Tank Gun
3x 107mm Multiple Rocket Launcher ATVs

Recon Platoon
1x Command Jeep with 2x HN-5 MANPADS
2x Dune Buggy Jeeps w/Heavy Machinegun/HJ-73 ATGM
1x 4x4 ATV with PF98 120mm Recoilless Rifle
1x 4x4 ATV

Electronic Warfare Detachment

UAV Detachment

Medical Detachment (at least two 4x4 ATV ambulances)

http://www.china-defense.com/pla/lmr/lmr-6.html

http://www.china-defense.com/pla/lmr/lmr-3.html

[Fuchs]

A wheeled motorised infantry battle group with the greatest possible diversity of calibres and a large diversity of vehicles. Whoever invented this scheme didn't grasp the idea of commonality, standardization.

The small quantities of specialist vehicles also points at a lacking understanding of the effects of attrition and friction on army formations.

The "Recon" Plt doesn't seem to be one.
There's no R&R vehicle.


The whole thing looks like a bad idea of an airmobile infantry BG for swampy terrain.

[kaur]

The mix of heavy and light units that make up the experimental LMR raises many questions regarding the training and supportability of such a dissimilar force. It is unclear if the LMIC, HMIC, and FSC are each placeholders for a full maneuver battalion within a complete LMR, or if each maneuver battalion would have the mix of units seen in the experimental LMR. It may even be that each of the various types of units within the LMR represents a competing organizational design.

http://www.china-defense.com/pla/lmr/lmr-3.html

If Israeli engineers can mount Lahat missile containers to those ATV platforms, I think that those pieceses can make some serious damage against opponent. I recall French general Beaufre's Territorial Militia Organisation from the beginning of 1970's and those 21th century NLOS solutions could really extend the small units firepower to new level

[Fuchs]

It depends.

It's just a piece of hardware. Not all will be fired, not all fired missiles will hit. Not all terrains are suitable for their employment. Hardware-based protection is just as possible as tactics-based protection.
It's really just a piece of kit.


On the other hand - I already proved my inability to cure your extreme weakness for guided missiles, leaving little sense in a renewed attempt.

[SethB]

Technically all missiles (and some rockets) are guided.

Somehow he is on the topic of direct fire systems, which is very different from where this thread started.

[Fuchs]

I remember that even sling, bow, catapult and crossbow projectiles are typically called "missiles" in literature...

[SethB]

Probably an American thing.

I'm a huge fan of the guided stuff, but they take a lot more work. You have to have a small target location error which required a mensurated grid, or you have to uses a laser, of which there might be one per Company.

Then add that grid seekers (and the Army has only one laser guided surface to surface projectile) can't hit moving targets and take some time to get downrange, as well as requiring airspace deconfliction because Excalibur is fired high angle...

Dumb shells have a future. How much of one is more related to the fate of artillery in general rather than the shells in particular.

Now, PGK is cheap enough that it might be fired without the same care, and is fired low angle. It solves four of the five requirements for accurate predicted fire, the only remaining one being accurate target location. The hope is that greater accuracy will reduce consumption rates.

[kaur]

Fuchs said:

On the other hand - I already proved my inability to cure your extreme weakness for guided missiles.

For me it's pure fun to test my stupid ideas against your rational approach

About PGM. I do remember that after receiving "Stingers" from US, the mujahideens achieved considerable military success against Soviets. If Taliban etc irregulars could have today similar allies, that can supply 21th century top notch AT's, SAM's, radios, training etc and every missile attack is "one shot, one kill" instead of those "stupid" RPG, Chinese missile etc attacks and instead of "there was attack against US airbase with Chinese missiles. No casualties." there are headlines "Spike attack against base. 5 C-17 lost" how could the war look like since 2001?

I'm really sad that Finnish guerilla tactics thinking stopped in the end of 1980's, right before the new wave of portable PGM's

It's all about METT of course

[Fuchs]

The actual count of "Stinger" kills in AFG was rather moderate, especially if seen in context of the county's size and the time period. Their effect was almost entirely a repulsion effect. The Soviets restricted their repertoire because of fear.

Whenever you begin to write about PGMs, I have a different interpretation of what you think about: You seem to think in terms of attrition - actual destruction, not tactical (psychological) effect.


An armour brigade on the attack can be shot at with PGMs, but the most promising approach is to consider PGMs as a niche component of the combined arms approach to defence (or offence, there's no law that forbids offence vs. offence). You cannot completely prevent/deter that a hostile ARM Bde goes on the attack - especially not if you keep pounding them as well if it's not attacking. At some point, the attack becomes the lesser evil - PGMs or not. There's therefore not much repulsing/deterring effect to be achieved with PGMs.

I can instantly provide you a rather long list of effective countermeasures to every kind of battlefield missile - even to hypervelocity missiles. And let's be honest - the hostiles will have at least as many ideas as I would have in a matter of minutes, likely many times as many.

Have fun.

[SethB]

Guided missiles in direct fire are very different from indirect fire...

We need not bounce back and forth between different kinds.

[Fuchs]

Who did it?

kaur and I discussed tactical indirect fire missiles such as Netfires, Lahat or Nimrod.

The employment of LAHAT in a direct fire role from this kind of vulnerable vehicle would be stupid, especially considering the availability of fire&forget missiles for that role..

[William F. Owen]

The employment of LAHAT in a direct fire role from this kind of vulnerable vehicle would be stupid, especially considering the availability of fire&forget missiles for that role..

LAHAT was developed to be low cost and give MBTs long range accurate fires. Having proved it could do that, it was then developed into a similarly low cost ATGM for use from helicopters, light vehicles and even boats.
It's just smaller, cheaper, more versatile and simpler Hellfire.

[kaur]

About Lahat.

Similar to the force protection Lahat concept, the 'trigger' will be activated by the supported unit, where the infantry calling for support will command the launch and designate the target to be attacked. Each vehicle could support units beyond line of sight, at ranges of up to eight kilometers, using anti-tank or multi-purpose missiles depending on the effect required. The missile unit could also attack targets within line- of -sight autonomously using its own sensors.

http://defense-update.com/products/l/lahat.htm

Fuchs said:

The Soviets restricted their repertoire because of fear.

Isn't this more safe when Su-25 and Mi-24 can't attack your unit from 50-500m? They have to go much more higher and their efficency drops considerably.

I have a different interpretation of what you think about: You seem to think in terms of attrition - actual destruction, not tactical (psychological) effect.

Idea about possible destruction is the basis of deterrence. If you don't have strategic depth, safe heavens, armoured back up, artillery formations, very limited resupply possibilities (dumb munition vs smart munition) etc; you just need to pack the power to small units and consider weight per kill variable.

I can instantly provide you a rather long list of effective countermeasures to every kind of battlefield missile - even to hypervelocity missiles.

It is about learning curve, TTP's etc. You just have to be flexible and find gaps

SethB said:

Dumb shells have a future. How much of one is more related to the fate of artillery in general rather than the shells in particular.

It depends on METT. If you manage to ask from Taliban, would they like to change their RPG's to NLAW's and Javelins and Chinese missiles to Spikes, Lahats, Nimrods, what they would say? Would you carry across mountains 1000 kg of iron or 1000 kg of gold?

[Fuchs]

It is about learning curve, TTP's etc. You just have to be flexible and find gaps

Almost incapable insurgents may provide years for trial & error, but modern land war is quick. Days or weeks suffice to break a medium-sized army. It has been like that for centuries, actually.


And you didn't get my point about the Su-25 and Stinger. The AFG scenario led to careful Soviets.
The Israelis and Argentinians did not become that careful when faced with a comparable battlefield air defence threat.

The Israelis had the guts to attack SA-6 batteries with A-4s despite 23mm AAA.
The Argentinians had the guts to attack the RN with low-level bomb runs.

A heavy Bde which faces one or two LAHAT-armed infantry battle groups will simply attack, behave like Israelis and Argentinians did - not like the Soviets did.

kaur, I actually wrote about this problem in January.

[kaur]

Fuchs, moderators will interupt us soon , but ...

Almost incapable insurgents may provide years for trial & error, but modern land war is quick. Days or weeks suffice to break a medium-sized army. It has been like that for centuries, actually.

My opionon is that that's why you should pack the best punchers to small unit level. They maintain punching power after first breakthrough and regrouping.

And you didn't get my point about the Su-25 and Stinger. The AFG scenario led to careful Soviets.
The Israelis and Argentinians did not become that careful when faced with a comparable battlefield air defence threat.

If we consider geography, then at least Israelis were much more better situation. They didn't have to control Afganistan-sized area and build the state. Mission duration was much more predictable and task was vital. The second variable makes biggest wonders of course "Stingers" pushed planes and chopters higher and if there were modern ATGM's available, I belive that Soviet columns would retreat to Uzbekistan earlier than 1989.

A heavy Bde which faces one or two LAHAT-armed infantry battle groups will simply attack, behave like Israelis and Argentinians did - not like the Soviets did.

I don't want to say that Lahat is remedy against all possible scenarios. I just push the idea that this kind of weapon gives better chances to resist against superior armoured opponent in very small theater of war. I stress the concealment and logistical variables. After emptying Lahat module, then enemy airborne units can even land directly on platform and capture it, but 5 km away there is already another platform ready to carry out fire mission. If this Lahat/Nebelwerfer Hummer carries 12 rockets and even half hit the target, this is 2 tank platoons. Good job! I suspect that even your light skirmishers concept can use those weapons

In my little homeland there were rumors that Estonian military will buy tank batallion and IFV's for 1 infantry brigade (the EDF's only one) for 250 000 000 EUR's. One argument that was used in discussion was that even Chechens had one batallion in the first war. The sad fact is that those tanks didn't achieve much. I just speculate if Chechens had to decide to buy tank batallion and IFV's or 12 000 SAAB's NLAW AT weapons, then they decided to buy the latter. They couldn't do this kind of choice because they just had to fight with weapons that Russians traded them. Georgian Army made decision to follow big army's model. And we saw the result in the beginning of August 2008.

For US military this is maybe out of context discussion, but for small armies with very limited budget, this may be vital. Sorry for spoiling the thread

[kaur]

APKWS II: Laser-Guided Hydra Rockets in Production At Last

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/...d-phase-02193/

plus

http://www.combatreform.org/groundrockets.htm

[SethB]

While APKWS is a great idea, it is not indirect fire. It is very different than the systems that this thread was created to discuss.

[kaur]

It is very different than the systems that this thread was created to discuss.

SethB, after reading first page, thank you for your attention

Anyway, does anyone know if this is possible to launch those APKWS rockets from ground based MRLS launchers and direct them with laser designator on the ground? Do those rockets work like ground launched PGM or they must have constant contact with laser beam?