Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Red Rat]

Hmmmm, I'm not so sure. Sure, we have greater firepower and more or less complete dominance in the air, but there are a number of factors, both inherent and self-imposed, that limit our ability to apply firepower or exploit our air power. We are also, for the most part, better at fire and maneuver. But even with those advantages we cannot always impose our tactical will on the enemy. The terrain is often the insurgent's friend, from mountains to the corrugated fields around Kandahar that offer cover, concealment, and numerous avenues of approach or withdrawal to the bad guys.

More important, though, is our lack of mobility. Our inability to pursue in any meaningful sense (due to poor off road ability, too few helicopters, heavily burdened infantry, and a reluctance to accept the inherent risks of pursuit) means that we can rarely exploit the tactical dominance we enjoy. In other words, the enemy normally enjoys the initiative and freedom to maneuver...and in my experience this tends to cancel out our dominance in precision application of firepower

Hmm yes and no. I agree with what you have said , but in the overwhelming majority of tactical engagements Coalition forces still come off the better. The issue is our perceived inablility to tie these tactical successes into anything more meaningful. Our lack of tactical mobility linked to lack of resources (manpower) and risk aversion (self-constraining our ability to manoeuvre effectively what we have) does mean that we are tied to a slow process of securing areas by lots of FOBs in order to generate stability in order to gain support.

However:

1) The tactics we are using are very troop intensive - the one thing we lack above all else. With our lack of troops we should be manoeuvering more (not less) and taking the fight to the enemy. It is a matter of balance and I am not convinced that we have the balance right.
2) The strategy of stabilising at district level in order to win support for the Government of Afghanistan IMHO appears flawed because I am not too sure if the Afghan Government is very interested in many of the districts in an altruistic manner.
3) The successes and gains we do have are not perceived as such, quite possibly because intuitively people (the media) recognise that stabilising at district level is not going to lead to conflict resolution without change at national level.