Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Ray]

My take is that the top drives the bottom; the Revolution drives the Resistance; not the other way around. To attempt to resolve the resistance movement in an effort to resolve the overall insurgency is therefore an act in futility. One's very presence to execute such engagement adds fuel to the resistance even if executed in a very "population-centric" way. Far more so when executed in a "Threat-Centric" or "counter-guerrilla" way. IMO, this is the principle flaw with our current operational design in Afghanistan, is that we do not recognize this dichotomy for what it is, and we do not appreciate the futility of leveraging heavy engagement of any nature against the resistance while leaving the revolution and the issues driving the revolution intact.

This is an interesting take that is very pertinent in attempting to solve insurgencies.

However, as far as Afghanistan is concerned, as far as I understand, it is not a homogeneous 'revolution'. While the core issue may be common, the tribal interests of each region or even sub region, possibly takes predominance within the structure of the 'core interest'.

Therefore, not only the core issue has to be addressed, but also alongside this, the tribal 'interests' of each region or sub region has to be addressed so that a more cogent response can be structured. I would not know if you all would understand, but each tribal leader has this 'Khalifa' mindset; in simpler terms it means that the world revolves around him wherein the temporal supersedes the spiritual!

This, possibly, is what makes the approach to the campaign complex and difficult.

To add to the problem is the interest of neighbouring nations, on both sides, who because of regional and religious or sectarian affinity regularly churns sentiments that appeal to the regional and religious or sectarian interests.

As to Griffith's assessment on the Revolution I am less pessimistic than he is. Certainly if one is committed to preserving the status quo of governance and defeating the illegal revolutionary challenger, I believe he is right. Liberty can be delayed, but not denied. (Recognizing that the leaders of the "liberation" may well, and often do, deny liberty in their own way to the very populace who carried them to victory. Malign actors exploit such events, but they do not cause them.)

I believe, and historic examples bear this out, that if the government commits itself to true change on the actual issues driving the insurgency, the government can win the competition for the support of the populace and the revolution will fade to where it is no longer a threat. Today we see many Arab governments attempting this very maneuver. Most, however, are merely throwing expensive bribes at their people and pointedly avoiding the types of substantive reforms that could quell the rebellions and save their regimes. This is what the Saudis are doing, and I predict they will fall if they do not seriously consider and adopt substantive reforms.

One wonders how far one can compare Afghanistan with the Arab countries, where some sort of a revolution is underway.

While the Arab countries have modern infrastructure, are more educated and are aware of the happenings in the outside world, I wonder if the Afghans have the same advantage. Therefore, to expect a people who are basically illiterate and have never has experienced the instruments of modernity and hence having little need of 'creature comforts' to emulate the Arab revolution, maybe a trifle too early in the day.

A people who have history no idea of 'liberty' in the western sense of the word, would hardly be concerned about liberty (in the western sense of the word) coming instantaneously or being delayed.

Just to explain with a simple example.

While the world laments that a vast majority of those living in third world countries work and live under $2 a day and are horrified. However, the flipside is that it really is not horrifying in real terms. $2 may fetch little in the US, but it is somewhat adequate (with a pinch) for for a person from the the third world. And if the family works and each fetches $2 at the end of the day, it sort of works out. This also explains why there family planning exercises flounder and why child labour, much that it is distasteful to the West, flourishes.

In short, to address Afghanistan, one has to think like an Afghan to fight an Afghan, rather than superimposing western modes to combat the situation.