The risk aversion started at the strategic level and percolated down.
The slowness to take decisions has always been apparent in British military history but has I think been exacerbated by an unduely complex Defence Crisis Management Organisation which has seen overlap and duplication between the Ministry of Defence (which as well as a department of state is also an operational HQ...), our Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) and the single service HQs and Chains of Command (where again there is overlap and complexity. Overlay an ineffective (until 2009) ISAF command system and you have a recipe for mismanagement.
The inability to enforce decisions on subordinate HQs has been a hallmark of many British Generals since the 19th century. A confusion over Mission Command (what not how) leading to a marked reluctance to get involved in what is happening lower down - witness the Gallipoli Suvla Bay fiasco.
Faults at many levels, but primarily I would point at 3 star and above over the period 2003-9. I hasten to add that these views are my own and most certainly do not reflect those of Her Majesty's Government or Her Majesty's Armed Forces!
As for retirements - lots expected but that as part of an overdue pruning of senior ranks and nothing to do with performance (or not) on operations. Sadly even fewer promotion opportunities for this old and bold major!
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