The Taliban collection (2006 onwards)

[anna]

The fact is:
the Talian IS winning!
Taliban fighter have more support in the public that ISAF.
Under the Taliban, there was order, now there is chaos caused by western forces.
You do the math!

You guys can post any interview or article with this Gen. or that politician.
All are liars, all trump their pro-invasion view and dismiss reality.

Soon, the west will run out of money and steam. Just look at Europe right now, at time of this posting.

The us and a is bankrupt, prints money at time of this post.

"Allies" departing from Afghanistan, Canada will stop fighting in a few month (will keep approx. 1000 personal there, most ast trainers).

There is a new war on the horizon.
Nobody will have the time, resources and money to keep going in Afghanistan.

[JMA]

There is a new war on the horizon.

OK, so who will it be this time?

[davidbfpo]

A short briefing paper by the London-based Quilliam Foundation, starts well IMHO, but tails off in the recommendations:http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/im...,2Q5RQ7,WFU2,1

[Jedburgh]

SWP, 23 Dec 10: Escalation in the Kunduz Region: Who Are the Insurgents in Northeastern Afghanistan?

Although approximately 5,000 US soldiers were transferred into Northern Afghanistan in the first half of 2010 and there have been initial military successes, the intensity of the insurgency in the Kunduz region has not diminished. Instead, there has been a continuing escalation of violence there in recent months. The unabated strength of the insurgency is based primarily on highly diversified leadership and logistical structures. The insurgency in the northeast consists of several groups, which follow different strategic objectives, but maintain close tactical cooperation. The main groups are the Afghan Taliban, the Islamic Party of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Additional groups include the Haqqani Network and al-Qaeda. It is important to assemble precise information about the ideological and strategic characteristics of these groups as only then can effective military action be taken and only then can decisions be made about which groups must be approached as negotiation partners.

[carl]

Jed:

This may be off topic but that photo of Santa's demise is GREAT!

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip (again) to Circling the Lion's Den for a pointer to an article on tribal dynamics, money and the Taliban:

...the incident has embarrassed the Quetta Shura’s leadership and humiliated its military council’s chief." It has also led to serious tensions between the Noorzai and the Taliban leadership which will not easily be swept under the carpet. Somewhere in the background of all this is the growing realisation amongst many Afghans that the insurgency is deteriorating into a warlord-led free-for-all, prompting memories of the terrible period in the early 90s. Then, Afghan turned on Afghan and much of Kabul was destroyed.

The Afghan tribes have always proved to be the undoing of wannabe rulers of the country. Once again it looks like the same old same old.

Link to original article:http://www.thedailybeast.com/article...s-taliban.html

Link to pointer:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot....fluential.html

[davidbfpo]

My title. Hat tip to FP Blog on Mullah Omar's latest epistle, which starts with:

In a lengthy message on the occasion of the Eid al-Fitr holiday released last week under Mullah Mohammad Omar's name, the fugitive Taliban leader used a mix of "jihad-light" bravado and toned-down political rhetoric to express his group's position on key issues, as part of a push to influence public opinion that has garnered a variety of reactions from different Western and South Asian quarters.

Yet despite the hype among AfPak watchers, the message is more a reflection of an emerging dual-track strategy that promotes Omar as a credible interlocutor while masking his flaws, and is directly tied to the NATO decision to end its military engagement in Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

The new narrative, most certainly inspired by the various covert layers of mentoring (including non-Afghan) enjoyed by Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura, not only provides insight into Mullah Omar's public-relations strategy, but also aims to deflect attention from Taliban weaknesses, all while trying to bolster the group's possible future negotiating position.

Ends with;

Given the Afghan experiences of the last three decades, it will take a lot more than just an adjustment in tone and rhetoric on the part of Mullah Omar to move the so-called reconciliation process forward, and end the current round of conflict in Afghanistan.

Ah yes, the author is a former Afghan diplomat.