General Petraeus: collection

[Adrienne]

Why should he publicly weigh in? Do we really need every 4-star in the chain of command joining the public debate before senior leadership has clearly articulated our strategy?

It seems like it's probably more a unity of command issue. The war is in the capable hands of GEN McChrystal; what is the benefit of CENTCOM publicly contradicting anything coming from either CJCS or theater?

[Ken White]

Hacksaw: Accurately and regrettably...

Adrienne: Accurately and sensibly.

[Eden]

Why should he publicly weigh in? Do we really need every 4-star in the chain of command joining the public debate before senior leadership has clearly articulated our strategy?

It seems like it's probably more a unity of command issue. The war is in the capable hands of GEN McChrystal; what is the benefit of CENTCOM publicly contradicting anything coming from either CJCS or theater?

That's sort of my point. McChrystal works for Petraeus - technically - at least when he's not wearing his NATO hat. And Petraeus is the strategic commander, while McChrystal is working at the operational level. If anybody should be articulating the military strategy for Afghanistan, it should be Petraeus. It's as if Omar Bradley was spokesman for our strategy to beat the Nazis in 1944.

I mean, Petraeus was front man for the Surge in Iraq. By most accounts he performed well in that role. Has he been cut out of the picture because the current administration wants McChrystal to be the poster child for Afghan strategy? Or because he is too closely associated in the public mind with Iraq and/or the Bush administration? Or because we've completely lost the bubble on the difference between strategy, operations, and tactics? Or because he doesn't fully agree with the proposed solutions?

Really, I'm just curious, because it seems odd that he has fallen so completely off the radar scope.

[MikeF]

Really, I'm just curious, because it seems odd that he has fallen so completely off the radar scope.

Does Patraeus have a Facebook page yet? If so, we can ask him.

v/r

Mike

[John T. Fishel]

question.
Going back to Iraq, Petraeus "worked for" CENTCOM but really never did. When Fallon tried to impose the chain of command he was asked to retire. Today, Odierno works for Petraeus - probably more so than the latter worked for Fallon - but Petraeus is letting odierno run his show, at least in public.
Afghanistan is more complex. On the one hand CENTCOM is the higher HQ; on the other SACEUR. Managing the Petraeus - Stavridis relationship must be interesting to say the least. I'm not even going into the commander/ambassador relationship - we've done that before Suffice that Petraeus is consistent in his public treatment of his two "subordinates."
My personal view is that the UCP does not serve us well when we set up a 4 star command in a theater. The theater commander is operating above the operational level and is analogous to a GCC with political as well as military responsibilities. We should,I think, treat him as if he were a GCCand make all the GCCs supporting commanders. What we call it is less important than how we do it,

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

My personal view is that the UCP does not serve us well when we set up a 4 star command in a theater. The theater commander is operating above the operational level and is analogous to a GCC with political as well as military responsibilities. We should, I think, treat him as if he were a GCCand make all the GCCs supporting commanders. What we call it is less important than how we do it. (emphasis added / kw)

As you know, I'm not a Goldwater Nichols fan though I do acknowledge it did some things that needed doing. Just think like many US Laws, it overdid what it was trying to do.

That said, I despaired of ever getting it changed but your suggestion placed in bold is mindbogglingy brilliant -- and doable...

We can work out how to deal with the Stormin' Normans...

Hmm. Mayhap some Specified Commands as well...

[Eden]

My personal view is that the UCP does not serve us well when we set up a 4 star command in a theater. The theater commander is operating above the operational level and is analogous to a GCC with political as well as military responsibilities. We should,I think, treat him as if he were a GCCand make all the GCCs supporting commanders. What we call it is less important than how we do it,

Cheers

JohnT

I've seen it happen again and again. When a commander has to deal with two or three levels of war (strategy, operations, and tactics), he becomes less effective. Invariably, his attention and energy is drawn upward, and the lower levels suffer because of it. This is especially true in Afghanistan, a problem exacerbated by the dysfunctional C2 set-up. In the ideal world, McChrystal would be afforded some top-cover by the guy who is actually responsible for strategy within the region - which leads me to my original question posed at the start of the thread.

[Adrienne]

That's sort of my point. McChrystal works for Petraeus - technically - at least when he's not wearing his NATO hat. And Petraeus is the strategic commander, while McChrystal is working at the operational level. If anybody should be articulating the military strategy for Afghanistan, it should be Petraeus. It's as if Omar Bradley was spokesman for our strategy to beat the Nazis in 1944.

I mean, Petraeus was front man for the Surge in Iraq. By most accounts he performed well in that role. Has he been cut out of the picture because the current administration wants McChrystal to be the poster child for Afghan strategy? Or because he is too closely associated in the public mind with Iraq and/or the Bush administration? Or because we've completely lost the bubble on the difference between strategy, operations, and tactics? Or because he doesn't fully agree with the proposed solutions?

Really, I'm just curious, because it seems odd that he has fallen so completely off the radar scope.

The way I understand it, GEN McChrystal was directly tasked by the Pentagon/White House to prepare his report on the situation in Afghanistan. It went through CENTCOM then to the Pentagon, where his resource requests will be reviewed. I would imagine if there are any significant disagreements between Petraeus/McChrystal they're being worked out before anything is submitted.

I'm sure GEN Petraeus knows there is nothing to be gained by standing in the way of communications between the administration and its theater commander. It's been that way since at least 2007, when Bush stopped trusting what he was hearing from the Pentagon/Tampa and wanted to speak directly to the CG in Iraq. The theater commanders were essentially functioning as GCCs, with direct communications between Baghdad and the Pentagon/White House. When Admiral Fallon got involved it only complicated things, pissed everyone off and made it harder for Petraeus to do his job.

Add to that reports/rumors of tension with the Obama administration during its early days over Odierno and Petraeus's attempt to talk Obama out of the 16-month withdrawal plan for Iraq, and he's probably smart to keep his head down right now.

It's consistent with the way he's treating Iraq, as well. When is the last time you have seen him say anything about Iraq since the aforementioned discussions on withdrawal timelines? Exactly. He trusts his generals and recognizes there's nothing to be gained by taking a public role in these discusisons.

[Pol-Mil FSO]

From a bureaucratic perspective, I think one of GEN Petraeus' roles would be to provide support for GEN McChrystal when the latter has a policy difference with his civilian counterpart (Ambassador Eikenberry) that has to be kicked up to the next level. The CENTCOM Commander is the logical counterpart to SRAP Holbrooke although I sometimes think that it might even require CJCS or SecDef involvement if preparing for bureaucratic combat with Ambassador Holbrooke.

[John T. Fishel]

Got a couple of questions for you:
What authority was given to super ambassadors like Holbrooke and how was it given?
Do you know if the President has given clear authority to either Eikenberry or McChrystal in Afghanistan? (I doubt he has...)

Cheers

JohnT

[Pol-Mil FSO]

Dr. Fishel:

Ambassador Holbrooke is the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP). If asked the Special Representative of whom? I assume (although am not 100 percent sure) that the answer is the President of the United States. Regardless, it is clear to everyone that I have talked to at the State Department (and the NSC) that Ambassador Holbrooke is in charge of civilian decisionmaking regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan. As far as I know, the only persons that Ambassador Holbrooke answers to are Secretary Clinton and President Obama.

In the case of Afghanistan, I think there is an explicit line of authority from POTUS to Ambassador Eikenberry and to GEN McChrystal. As Chief of Mission, Ambassador Eikenberry has a direct line to the President (at least theoretically) as the President's representative to the Government of Afghanistan and has authority over all USG executive branch civilians in Afghanistan (except those directly assigned to CENTCOM). And when wearing his Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan hat GEN McChrystal's chain of command goes up through GEN Petraeus and Secretary Gates to POTUS.

What I find interesting is the new "Integrated Civilian-Military Decisionmaking Structure" in Afghanistan. This structure has five levels and at the top is the "Principals Group" which consists of two persons, Ambassador Eikenberry and GEN McChrystal. (This group seems to me to be an effort to institutionalize the relationship enjoyed by GEN Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker in Iraq.) In addition, the middle level of this structure is the "Regional Integrated Team" (IT-R). This IT-R now exists in RC-East and RC-South and consists of the ISAF Commander and the Senior Civilian Representative. I do not think that it has registered with a lot of people that the RC-East and RC-South Commanders now have civilian U.S. counterparts.

[John T. Fishel]

That is more or less what I expected at the top. But I find the Holbrooke - Eichenberry "relationship" confusing in theory because, in theory, it doesn't exist. In fact, personalities will drive it.

The institutionalization of the Petraeus/Crocker relationship by replicating the Washington interagency process strikes me as better than what we have had before but much less than it could be. (Back to that in a moment.) I'm glad to see that we have tried to develop coordination mechanisms below the level of Kabul. It should help providing the personalities don't get in the way. What I would really liketo see is a single chain of command in country - I really don't care much if the Ambassador or military commander is in charge but one of them should be. won't solve all problems - pesky personalities again - but if things got too bad the one in charge could send the other one home which might help.

Thanks again.

Cheers

JohnT

[yamiyugikun]

Hi,

I managed to find the complete webcast of the interview Gen. Petraeus had with MSNBC's Brian Williams on Oct. 1st. Centcom's facebook page had a link to the Atlantic's page with segments of the webcast but not the entirely.

http://www.videonewslive.com/view/37...david_petraeus

Naomi

[Garett]

This video is about 60 minutes long, it focuses on Afghanistan and Canadian-American relations.

http://www.cpac.ca/forms/index.asp?d...=e&clipID=3704

[SWJ Blog]

How Petraeus Has Changed the Afghanistan War; What Happened in Khost?

Entry Excerpt:

How Petraeus Has Changed the Afghanistan War by Anna Mulrine at the Christian Science Monitor. "Gen. David Petraeus replaced Gen. Stanley McChrystal as head of U.S. forces in the Afghanistan war this year. One change he's made represents something of a gamble to some in the Pentagon."

Afghanistan War: How a Model Province Tumbled into Violence by Anna Mulrine at the Christian Science Monitor. "Khost Province had been a U.S. success story in the Afghanistan war. But poor local leadership, an influx of insurgents fleeing U.S. pressure elsewhere, and the proximity to Pakistan are stubborn challenges."



--------
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[AdamG]

Op-Eds are proto-blogs, right?
So what's the Peanut Gallery think about this?


A Fifth Star for David Petraeus
By Pete Hegseth & Wade Zirkle
The Wall Street Journal
Thursday, January 13, 2011

On a cold December evening in 1783 at Fraunces Tavern in lower Manhattan, Gen. George Washington bade farewell to his staff and resigned his command of the Continental Army. One hundred ninety three years later, on America’s Bicentennial, Congress posthumously promoted Washington to five-star “General of the Armies of the United States.”

Washington led the Continental Army against the British for eight years, the longest tenure for a combatant (wartime) commander in our history to be awarded a fifth star. But David Petraeus, who begins his eighth year as a combatant commander (presently as theatre commander in Afghanistan), will soon eclipse Washington’s tenure. In appropriate recognition of his long and extraordinary wartime service, the new Congress should authorize a fifth star for Gen. Petraeus, thereby promoting him to “General of the Army”—just below Washington’s rank of “General of the Armies” (plural).

After George Washington, the only other five-star “General of the Armies of the United States” was John Pershing, who was promoted to the rank after commanding U.S. forces in World War I. The nine remaining five star generals in our history were branch-specific commanders during World War II: Gens. Dwight Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, George Marshall, Omar Bradley and Henry Arnold were each “General of the Army.” Navy Adms. Chester Nimitz, William Halsey, Ernest King and William Leahy served as five-star “Fleet Admirals.” Each of these officers received the honor during wartime, with the exception of Halsey, who was awarded the fifth star three months after World War II ended, and Bradley, who was awarded his fifth star in 1950.

Like these great leaders, Gen. Petraeus’s breath of experience and outstanding results deserve to be recognized and honored. His wartime tenure began as the Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division, responsible for over 10,000 combat troops during the initial invasion of Iraq. He led the 101st in an airborne assault into northern Iraq and then quieted the city of Mosul.

Gen. Petraeus then oversaw the creation and training of the new Iraqi Army, a Herculean task that was accomplished amid a rapidly deteriorating security situation. By the time he was through, he had stood up, equipped and trained over 100,000 Iraqi soldiers. They would be crucial in winning the peace in the years to follow.

In 2005, Gen. Petraeus led the Army’s command responsible for education and doctrine at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. There he wrote the Army’s manual on counterinsurgency operations. His COIN manual was the blueprint for the upcoming troop “surge,” which saved Iraq from the brink of calamity.

Gen. Petraeus left Fort Leavenworth in 2007 to take his new playbook to Iraq, where he became commander of coalition forces. He engineered one of the most stunning turnarounds in the history of modern warfare. Within 18 months, the general and his troops defeated al Qaeda in Anbar, ended a civil war in Baghdad, sealed porous borders with Iran and Syria, and created a sense of normalcy in Iraq.

After succeeding in the face of near-unanimous doubt, Gen. Petraeus was promoted to commander of Central Command (Centcom) in 2008, where he would oversee a two-front war in Iraq and Afghanistan. His tour at Centcom was cut short, however, when President Barack Obama asked him to replace the dismissed Gen. Stanley McCrystal in Afghanistan. It was a step down on the career ladder for Gen. Petraeus—but he was the president’s last hope to turn around Afghanistan. Demonstrating classic statesmanship, Gen. Petraeus relinquished his more prestigious post at Centcom.

The U.S. war against terrorism is now the longest war in U.S. history, and Gen. Petraeus has clearly distinguished himself as a leader worthy of joining the ranks of Gens. MacArthur, Marshall and Nimitz. A promotion would properly honor his service—and it would also honor the troops he leads and has led. Today’s soldiers have fought as valiantly as any in American history, and they deserve recognition of their leaders. Congressional approval of a fifth star would demonstrate the nation’s commitment to their mission.

David Petraeus is also a soldier-statesmen who works with foreign diplomats and generals in hotspots across the globe. The prestige that would come with a fifth star would also likely help the U.S. in its negotiations with neighboring states—and show the enemies of freedom that we are fully committed to the war against terrorism.

It has been more than half a century since a U.S. general was awarded a fifth star. David Petraeus’s generalship has spanned 11 years, three presidents and seven Congresses. It is time to promote him to “General of the Army” and award him a fifth star. Our military deserves it, and he has certainly earned it.

-- Messrs. Hegseth and Zirkle are directors at Vets for Freedom. Mr. Hegseth served in Iraq with the 101st Airborne Division, and will deploy to Afghanistan in 2011. Mr. Zirkle served two deployments to Iraq as a Marine infantry officer, and is a recipient of the Purple Heart.

Article link: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000...514563178.html

[Infanteer]

Although I don't agree with some of the flowery statements and would argue that others have put just as much time and effort into these wars, I can't fault the argument of recognizing the stature that Petraeus has achieved - history will likely stick him up there with the other five stars.

[zenpundit]

Is General Petraeus going to also be simultaneously appointed as the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Or will the rank become official upon his retirement?

Because Petraeus will outrank him and/or the Army Chief of Staff otherwise. And all the combatant commanders. Won't that be awkward unless Petraeus is outside the normal chain of command?

Five star ranks were given during WWII partly for protocol reasons as Marshall, Eisenhower, Nimitz and MacArthur had to interact with and command foreign counterparts of higher rank than the prewar Army and American tradition had permitted, excepting General Pershing's special status as General of the Armies ( which he dispalyed as four gold stars) which gave him seniority even above the newly created five star ranks. Or six, had that rank been created, which was discussed but never came to pass.

Another reason was the magnitude of the conflict of WWII where 12 million Americans served in the armed forces. That was war on an epic scale.

Should five star ranks be handed out to dominant commanding generals or admirals in a war who have great successes? Probably, but very sparingly. If Petraeus manages a "win" (i.e. stabilizing ) in Afghanistan, I'd say that he has earned it but some thought needs to be given as to what assignment he will do next once he holds such a rare and exalted rank.

[Cliff]

If I recall correctly 5 stars were also discussed for General Schwarzkopf. Would the same criteria apply to him? Definitely commanded more troops, although not for the same duration... What should the criteria be?

V/R,

Cliff

[William F. Owen]

Although I don't agree with some of the flowery statements and would argue that others have put just as much time and effort into these wars, I can't fault the argument of recognizing the stature that Petraeus has achieved - history will likely stick him up there with the other five stars.

I can fault it. It's nonsense. Patraeus is in no measure even close to military achievements of men who like Abrams, or even the highly dubious George Patton who never got five-stars. To elevate him to the same rank and status as William T. Sherman, and MacArthur, would be a travesty.

If nothing else, Iraq and Afghanistan are minute conflicts compared to the Civil and Second World Wars, so what has he done to deserve even being discussed?