Pakistani Army commentary

[carl]

Historically, taking one's eye off of external threats to deal with internal discontent is the trip before the fall...

Far better for the Pak government to address the concerns of the Pashtu and Baluch populace, and for the military to stay focused on the military matters of national defense.

Bob's World:

The paper was interesting. The primary thesis being that after a bad start the Pakistan Army has very quickly learned to be more effective in a small war conducted within its' national borders. It has mostly learned on the fly and is incorporating what is has learned into unit training and various schools. Kind of interesting too when you think of it as indicating the organizations ability to learn like Nagl covered in his book.

I got the sense from the paper this concern with small war is especially evident at the lower levels of the army because all the casualties they've suffered in the past few years have been suffered in FATA and Swat. Fear not though, the senior generals are keeping their steely gaze fixed on the Hindu hordes to the east.

Since we are on the subject of the Pak Army and in the correct thread, I wish to ask about your following comment.

I believe that Pakistan's position is reasonable, as is their position in regards to the Durrand line. Most military professionals doing a basic assessment of the terrain and the threat would probably come to the same conclusion. If Pakistan is reduced down to just the Indus river valley a quick push by India could foreseeably take their entire country. They would cease to exist as a nation. A fearful, nuclear armed state with its back up against the Hindu Kush and a rival nuclear state to their front is NOT a healthy situation for anyone. I think there are workable solutions, but before the US can get to sitting down and discussing workable solutions we to first be willing to recognize their reasonable perspective in regards to what their national interests are and how highly they prioritize them.

Second, to rephrase your question a bit: Is sustaining a set of conditions that supported a workable situation of deterrence between India and Pakistan one that I think is more important than disrupting that balance to grant India a clear advantage? I have to go with sustaining the status quo. Like our own Cold War with the Soviets, it was sometimes a bit dicey, but it worked. I can't imagine if some external power would have come along and ceded Canada into the Warsaw Pact, allowing the Russians to positions military forces all along our northern border, that we would have said "oh, ok."

First off, you say above most military professionals would say that Pakistan needs territory east of the Indus valley to fall back on to preclude defeat by a quick Indian push, the implication being that territory includes Afghanistan. So my question is this, what is the defeated army going to fall back on? There is nothing much in those mountains and there is nothing much in Afghanistan. What are they going to use to resupply and build up troop strength? It seems to this forever civilian that even if they used this sovereign country as their fallback, it wouldn't do them any good. There is nothing there for them to use. If they got pushed to the west of the Indus valley, it would be over regardless. I may be reading this wrong and if I am, please tell me but it seems to me that unless you have some kind of resource base to fall back on, you may as well be falling back into the ocean.

As to your second paragraph quoted above, I think I prefer you answer my question as I originally stated it. Your rephrasing changes the sense of my original question. Or you maybe could answer your rephrased question if you swapped the words "India" for "Pakistan" and vice versa. But I would prefer you answer my original question as originally stated-is the Pak Army/ISI's desire to exert control over Afghanistan one we should honor any more than India's desire that they don't?

Also you state above you believe the Pak Army/ISIs position is reasonable, yet in the past you stated that you didn't believe they had a right (or something like that, I will get lost if I go retrieve the quote, but I can if you want) to exert control over Afghanistan. Those two statements seem contradictory.