General Petraeus: collection

[Dayuhan]

The "predictability" we carefully crafted over the past few generations in the Middle East arguably is the principal motivation for young men from a wide range of Muslim countries to act out violently against the US, but that on 9/11 or to travel to Iraq to fight us there, etc.

The extent to which despotism is predictable is debatable: many despots (Saddam Hussein for one) have been less than predictable, and the time and manner of their inevitable fall is often less than predictable.

The extend to which "we crafted" the pattern of despotism in the Middle East is also highly debatable. Most of these governments were not installed by us and their form is dictated less by us than by local habit and tradition. We've been quite willing to deal with it (not that we could do anything about it in most cases) but "crafted by us" is a huge overstatement. I realize that some may perceive it that way, but managing a perception is very different from managing a reality. If we believe that the stats quo was "crafted by us" when in fact it was not, we are tempted to try to re-craft it to suit our current beliefs. That's a recipe for trouble.

The extent to which foreign fighters are trying to "act out" against US control in the homeland is highly debatable and not fully consistent with evidence. Foreign fighters are regularly recruited from countries such as Libya and Syria, where no US control or even influence exist. Foreign fighters are not limited to fights against the US: they have been very successfully recruited for fights against other powers that have no influence in home countries (the Soviet Union in Afghanistan). Evidence and Occam's razor suggest that the driver for foreign fighter recruitment is the simple "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful" narrative, and that this is not US-specific or a reaction to US action in source countries.

This study of foreign foghter recruitment and motivations:

http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/...2/ISEC_a_00023

does not cite desire to diminish US influence in the homeland as a significant motivator.

It's dangerous and inappropriate to assume that the US is simply an innocent victim of terrorism and that evebts have nothing to do with our past. It is equally dangerous and inappropriate to assume that it's all about us, and that everything that happens is a reaction to something we did or are doing. Even where our history is a causative factor, we can't always correct it with assertive action: the antidote to dumb intervention isn't smart intervention, it's less intervention.

It's all to easy to assume that now we understand all the mistakes we made before, and now we can correct them because now we know what everybody wants and needs. Worth remembering that our conviction was every bit as strong back when we were making all those messes. hen you think you know what's best for others it's a good time to be think again and be very careful. When you know you know what's best for others it's a good time to lock yourself up until sanity returns.

Reconciliation that incorporates all Afghans equitably in the governance and opportunity of their country is best

Best for us, no doubt. Burt can we dictate - and impose - what we think is "best" for Afghanistan? What if the various Afghan factions don't trust each other, don't think joint governance sufficiently protects them, and don't trust the US to determine what's "best"?

but otherwise a homegrown solution that excludes either side is preferable to a US forced solution that excludes the Taliban side. A homegrown solution will achieve a stability that is maintained by that side

The last "homegrown solution" didn't work out all that well, certainly not for us. Why should we think the next will do better? Just because we aren't there doesn't mean a solution is "homegrown", either: the Pakistani Army and ISI will still be backing their chosen side.

Even if the Taliban gain control of Afghanistan and are willing to openly (which is highly unlikely) support AQ it will be a simple matter to launch strategic raids against such targets as they develop.

Didn't we try that before, with all that cruise missile drive-by shooting stuff? Did it accomplish the purpose? Will it if we do it again?

Our fears have launched us on some fools errands. Time to stop taking counsel of our fears and to start focusing on what is really important. Pak-India stability is important. An improved US-Iranian relationship is important. Getting our military re-postured so as to be a more effective deterrent of state activity that is counter to our interests is important. Defeating the Taliban or denying any particular piece of dirt to AQ? Not so much.

I agree. It wasn't just our fears, though, it was also our domestic need to translate punitive action into something benevolent, hence the efforts to "install" democracies in places where we have no business meddling in governance at all.

Unfortunately we have largely committed ourselves to a course we never should have taken. If you fire off an effective punitive raid and leave while you're on top and everyone fears you, you've accomplished a purpose and delivered a message: people will remember and be deterred. If you stay around until your vulnerabilities are clear and the other side is ascendant, leaving becomes defeat, and that delivers a message too. Unfortunately we selected goals that we haven't the capacity to achieve, and that makes failure, with all the perception-related baggage that goes with it, a very likely possibility. As far as I'm concerned we should never have tried to govern Afghanistan or to dictate how it will be governed, because these are things we haven't the capacity to do.

It would be lovely if we could bring all the competing factions into a functioning inclusive government with balanced powers and constitutional protections respected by all... but it's a pipe dream. Afghanistan is not the 51st state and we cannot impose an American solution to an Afghan problem.