And Libya goes on...

[AdamG]

Chivers on Libyan MANPADs

Friday’s New York Times covered fears that looted Libyan arms could find their way into terrorists’ hands. The article’s emphasis is on heat-seeking, shoulder-fired, anti-aircraft missiles and the threats they pose to civilian aircraft.

But it is worth noting on this blog, which discusses military small arms from many different perspectives, that the looting of the stockpiles of traditional infantry arms raises serious long-term security concerns, too. Once machine guns, assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades slip from state arsenals, they invariably travel. Their migration to other users and other wars is all but certain. Their grim effects can last decades.

http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/...er=rss&emc=rss

[Bob's World]

In 1987, the year the first SU-17 was shot down by a stinger missile over Afghanistan, some 30 Soviet aircraft were shot down.

It would be a very different operation if a similar year were had by the Taliban against the current coalition.

Yet one more reason to side with the populace in Libya. Cut AQ out of the picture, or at least be in position to compete to buy up such missiles as they enter the marketplace. Also small states are easily deterred from employing such systems or selling such systems to our opponents. Individuals and non-state actors are largely immune to our current family of deterrence tools.

Many states that the US sells arms to could easily follow this same path that Libya is on in the near future. Makes one look at the $60 B arms deal with the Saudis announced a few months back in a new light. Hopefully there weren't any shoulder fired missiles in with the F-15s, Longbows and Blackhawks...

[Fuchs]

The old shoulder-fired ManPADS systems should both be susceptible to standard countermeasures (flares, IR dazzlers) and have a weak punch (later Russian-made ManPADS have a substantially enlarged warhead).

They would pose a problem, but only an old one.


Btw, Pakistan is a ManPADS producer and the ISI could easily have slipped some of them into AFG if it had deemed it worthwhile.

[Bob's World]

Btw, Pakistan is a ManPADS producer and the ISI could easily have slipped some of them into AFG if it had deemed it worthwhile.

As I said, weak states are easily deterred from such behavior. Pakistan has interests that it leverages the Taliban to service. But it has interests it leverages its relationship with the US to service as well. They will not lightly make the decision to bite that hand. They rationalize their support of the Taliban, I suspect, as being exempt from being a bite of the US hand. After all, we don't need to be in Afghanistan by their estimation, but they do.

Weapons captured by Libyan freedom fighters and sold to AQ are another story altogether. Such weapons are outside the state system, and thereby outside the system of state deterrence.

I don't figure that Libya would have highend systems, but I do not know what equally vulnerable states with much closer relationships to the US might have.

[Pete]

From the Sunday Telegraph, London, March 6, 2011, story available here:

When the helicopter touched down outside Benghazi in the early hours of Friday morning, the SAS troops on board knew they were entering a volatile situation.

Tasked with escorting a diplomat to meet rebel Libyan forces and assessing the humanitarian situation on the ground, they did not, however, expect a hostile reception.

With the British Government openly rejecting Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and already in dialogue with opposition leaders, it should have been an uncontroversial visit.

[TROUFION]

Ok I am not a democracy zealot but hear this out. The best option (in my opinion) in Libiya is to, with UN and NATO backing, support a local solution to bring about a rapid end to the violence. The rebels may not want overt Western outside assistance but could they say the same for overt Eygptian assitance? Fellow democrats coming to the aid of neighbors desiring freedom and democracy, what could be better. A brigade of armor, some SF, naval and air assets and Eygpt comes in as the cavalry to the rescue of beleaguered democracy craving patriots. With UN and NATO backing, old MQ would be crushed quickly. While some would say Eygpt's military has its hands full with protecting its own house I'd argue this would be the 'right' thing to do and would solidify the Eygptians as true democrats and the Eygptian Military as the protectors of the people. -T

[M-A Lagrange]

Ok I am not a democracy zealot but hear this out. The best option (in my opinion) in Libiya is to, with UN and NATO backing, support a local solution to bring about a rapid end to the violence.

Not a bad idea but arranged peace, especially under UN supervision are seeds for later conflict (cf Ivory Coast, Sudan...).
I believe there is a need for a bigger stand up from the democracies. Also, what ever are the relations between insurgents and AQ, the more we leave them alone, the more they will turn to alternative solutions.
A back up would be certainly interpreted as a come back to ingerence and colonialism by G but who does really care?
We are messing around everytime we do nothing and sending the wrong signal. If we want to "promote peace and a world based on dialog" then we have to back up people who do stand up against their oppressor. Otherwise, we just say: freedom is just for those who obei to us.
In the actual climat in Africa (Cause Libya is an African country) there is strong need to draw a line.
The question is who to interviene not should I stay or should I go.

With UN and NATO backing, old MQ would be crushed quickly. While some would say Eygpt's military has its hands full with protecting its own house I'd argue this would be the 'right' thing to do and would solidify the Eygptians as true democrats and the Eygptian Military as the protectors of the people.

Looks like a starting point to me.

[CrowBat]

Crow:

Of those fighters and stores, how many are in Tripoli and under control?

In and around Tripoli, the regime should have an equivalent of three brigades (5th, 32nd and one called Kuwelidi al-Hamidi). Large parts of these are busy assaulting az-Zawiya since four or five days.

In Tripoli there is also Mitiga AB, where much of the LARAF is currently concentrated, including at least a squadron of MiG-23s, remnants of Mirage F.1ED squadron, and several transport and helicopter units (including a squadron each of Mi-8s, Mi-24s and CH-47Cs, plus one unit equipped with An-26s; then one "police" squadron flying A.109s and a unit equipped with UAVs). It appears they moved most of operational G-2/J-21s and SF.260s from Misurata to this place as well.

However, this is not only about "what's in Tripoli": as mentioned above, the regime still controls two huge air bases in central Libya (Syrte and Hun), with immense underground depots in between. They have one squadron each of Su-22s, Su-24s (between 3 and 5 aircraft), Mi-24s, and Mi-8s there at least, plus another brigade of ground forces.

Yet another Army brigade is active between Misurata and Beni Wallid (it attacked Misurata yesterday, but lost an equivalent of a company in the process).

The ballance of forces under regime's control (those on the eastern side of Tripoli, plus those along the border to Tunisia and Algeria) equal to another brigade.

In that whole scenario, what are the critical points than can be targeted?

Provided you're talking about theoretical targets for air strikes by the West or neighbours or a coalition of the both....IMHO, in the current situation there would be four major targets:

- Bab Azizzia barracks in Tripoli
- Syrte AB (to keep the LARAF there grounded)
- concentration of regime troops besieging az-Zawiya (the latter is also of major humanitarian concern, IMHO)
- Mitiga AB (to keep the LARAF grounded in the West too).

I declare myself a "democracy zealot", and consider this a popular, mass uprising of internal and secular forces in Libya. Their protests were initially peaceful: they turned viollent due to a brutal and merciless reaction from the regime. Right now, only the regime could stop the fighting, which it clearly refuses to do, since that would mean it would give up: the choice the rebels are facing is to stop fighting and get slaughtered if they do, or die while attempting to bring the regime to fall.

My conclusion is that - regardless what the rebels say - the regime has to get hit in a most massive fashion possible, and be forced to give up.

[TROUFION]

MA Lagrange-

I think you may have misunderstood me a little. I was not thinking 'arranged peace' I was thinking more along the lines of Libiyan Democracy and freedom garaunteed by Eygptian force of arms. In other words Eygpt with an UN mandate intervenes forcefully and takes out Mummaur. Then helps stabilize the country. If we want democracy to succeed this would be a good option. Far better than US forces going to help. -T

[Fuchs]

In and around Tripoli, the regime should have an equivalent of three brigades (5th, 32nd and one called Kuwelidi al-Hamidi). Large parts of these are busy assaulting az-Zawiya since four or five days.

Judging by news reports, I'd rather suspect a small battalion equivalent is skirmishing near that city. A multi-brigade assault would produce other results.

[Presley Cannady]

Judging by news reports, I'd rather suspect a small battalion equivalent is skirmishing near that city. A multi-brigade assault would produce other results.

Three brigade equivalents would be just north of a third of the whole army prior to the unrest. I doubt Qaddafi can manage the capital and holding onto the West and have enough strength left over to do much more than wave the bloody shirt in the East. Not yet, at least.

[Presley Cannady]

I declare myself a "democracy zealot", and consider this a popular, mass uprising of internal and secular forces in Libya.

The secular assumption smacks of whistling in the dark due to the absence of polling data to the contrary--or whatosever, for that matter.

[BushrangerCZ]

just read on news that SAS CPT got arrested in Lybia by insurgents, and released some hours later...
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...detainees.html

[Rex Brynen]

My conclusion is that - regardless what the rebels say - the regime has to get hit in a most massive fashion possible, and be forced to give up.

..which, given Chinese and Russian opposition in the UNSC, and a general Western reluctance to get involved in another military adventure in the Middle East, isn't going to occur--unless Qaddafi does something particularly heinous (and it is reported on TV).

Given that, the question becomes what are the array of policy instruments short of a bombing campaign (and short of a no-fly zone) that members of the international community have available to them--and will they make much difference?

[carl]

The old shoulder-fired ManPADS systems should both be susceptible to standard countermeasures (flares, IR dazzlers) and have a weak punch (later Russian-made ManPADS have a substantially enlarged warhead).

The warhead size of a shoulder fired anti-aircraft missile doesn't make much difference if your target is a small ISR airplane. The kinetic energy of the hit will almost certainly be enough to destroy the airplane. We use a lot of small manned ISR airplanes.

The SA-24 is a very good missile. Venezuela operates those and so far, as far as I know, jolly Ceasar has hung onto the ones he has. If a missile like that got out, we would have a very hard time keeping all those ISR assets flying.

Those missiles will eventually get out so we should probably start thinking about what we will do when they do.

[Bob's World]

I argue the rebel's best bet is to avoid some grand decisive victory. George Washington damn near lost the revolution several time pitting rebel weakness against governmental strength. Mao, Giap, and many others have learned this lesson as well. It also gives the rebels less credibility in the international community and court of public opinion.

Better to strike where the government is absent or weak; to create an appearance of rebel gains in the media that may in fact be inconsequential on the ground. The average western observer doesn't know a Benghazi from a Tripoli anyways. "Spread the court" in basketball jargon and force the government to split its forces or hunker down in defense. Time is on the rebel's side. ID critical aspects of day to day life for the government and disrupt them, while avoiding to the degree possible bringing hardship onto the general populace

Meanwhile to merely wait and see who wins is the worst coa for the west. If Qaddafi wins, he will repay the lack of support in kind. If the rebels win without the west's help, they are all the more likely to lean toward AQ, MB and other Islamist UW groups who have been working this populace hard for years.

There is no need to launch an air campaign against Libyan government forces, but certainly we should be postured to make that a credible threat to lend support to messages encouraging the military to either remain neutral or switch sides. Mercenaries fight for pay, locking down as much of the government's money and messaging the same may have some effect there. Some degree of UW should also be on the table as an option, be it direct or indirect, physical or virtual, CIA or SF.

Maybe that super PSYOP guy from LTG Caldwell's staff can work some mindbender stuff up as well now that he is no longer employed brainwashing congressional delegates in Kabul...

[Rex Brynen]

Better to strike where the government is absent or weak; to create an appearance of rebel gains in the media that may in fact be inconsequential on the ground. The average western observer doesn't know a Benghazi from a Tripoli anyways. "Spread the court" in basketball jargon and force the government to split its forces or hunker down in defense. Time is on the rebel's side. ID critical aspects of day to day life for the government and disrupt them, while avoiding to the degree possible bringing hardship onto the general populace

In many ways, Libya doesn't have much of a "hinterland" -- 95% of the population lives along the coastal strip (parts of which itself are barely inhabited), and most of the country is desert where it is both difficult to sustain a rebel force and where no one much cares if they do. Three quarters of the population live in urban areas.

Inevitably, 90% of the fighting in this civil war is likely to occur within 10km of the coast.

It is important that places like Misurata don't completely fall--at the moment they both block government LoC and force Qaddafi to divide his forces.

[Bob's World]

Agreed. Darnah might be interesting to watch as well. Libya was the #2 source of foreign fighter to Iraq (behind Saudi Arabia) to support AQ; but by far had the highest % per capita, with most coming from Darnah.

[Stan]

Cut AQ out of the picture, or at least be in position to compete to buy up such missiles as they enter the marketplace.

We've been actively doing that although we don't come right out and say we'll buy MANPADs.

I'll leave the price tag out for now.

[Rex Brynen]

Agreed. Darnah might be interesting to watch as well. Libya was the #2 source of foreign fighter to Iraq (behind Saudi Arabia) to support AQ; but by far had the highest % per capita, with most coming from Darnah.

The Battle of Darnah (1805) was also the first land battle fought on foreign soil by US forces after the Revolutionary War.