And Libya goes on...

[carl]

Are you referring to the Iranians?

I was thinking of the various Jihadi extremists. I didn't think of the Iranians but maybe they would want to get in on it too.

[Entropy]

If the dictator wins and drives out all the open opposition but does not crush the spirit of the opposition, then an insurgency of some kind might begin. That would require a clandestine organization or assistance to establish one. The people in the region who have the most experience with clandestine organizations are not people we like much but because of their experience, organization and money they might gain a lot power within any continuing anti-dictator resistance. If that happened, then what do we do? (I know there are a lot of ifs there.)

Those are some of the reasons I think this is going to end up like OSW. OSW/ONW had similar mandates - to "protect the population" via the limited means of air power. That is not a mission air power can do very well.

Additionally, if we fail to protect the rebels (as looks increasingly likely), much less enable their rebellion to succeed, we will be reluctant to call it quits for a variety of reasons. In short, what is our "out" if we fail to affect the situation on the ground? IMO, we'll continue to "protect civilians" with an enduring NFZ.

I hope I'm wrong in this, but I don't see many alternatives given the strategy, such as it is, and the limited means assigned to it.

[JMA]

This is more than just a little stretch. There's no obligation to intervene, the U.S. is on a different continent, it has no close relations to the people of Libya.

An intervention is an option, not an ethical obligation.

Yet at the last minute the US chose to extend and expand the UNSC resolution and hijack the efforts of France and Britain?

Of course there was/is no obligation for the US to get involved in Libya just as there was no obligation to get involved in Rwanda.

Not being obligated to get involved does not excuse half-baked or incompetent action if/when they do.

It is the stop-start, wait-go limitation dominated courses of action finally inflicted upon the military by the smart guys in the WH and at State which lead to a less than optimum resolution of the particular problem of the moment (I am trying to be nice here).

To respond to a SNAFU by saying we didn't need to get involved in the first place is plain ridiculous.

[JMA]

I wonder if we will end up in the very odd position of having to help the dictator in some way. An Egyptian commenter at Tom Ricks' blog raised that point.

What admitting defeat before the first shot is fired?

If the dictator wins and drives out all the open opposition but does not crush the spirit of the opposition, then an insurgency of some kind might begin. That would require a clandestine organization or assistance to establish one. The people in the region who have the most experience with clandestine organizations are not people we like much but because of their experience, organization and money they might gain a lot power within any continuing anti-dictator resistance. If that happened, then what do we do? (I know there are a lot of ifs there.)

Steady Carl. Defeating Gaddafi's forces will be a lot easier than people are beginning to think. That they are rolling up a rag-tag militia does not mean they will stand up to an intelligent and skillfully planned and executed air campaign.

Gaddafi will position himself and his assets and forces close to the civilian population in the hope of deterring air strikes or banking on the propaganda coup of civilians killed by US/French/British/other planes.

I am absolutely staggered at the gross incompetence of this process so far.

Like jcustis says, this will be very messy. But, by doing nothing but talk for so long, this is what we signed up for.

Yes that sounds familiar. Another case of grabbing defeat from the jaws of victory. Quite frankly I'm surprised the American people are not taking to the streets...

[carl]

JMA:

I was just wondering what might happen if a lot of "ifs" came to be. It does seem as if there is no real hard core of morale in many of the dictators forces, but then the rebels are a mob. Grounding the dictator's airplanes will have a great effect on the morale of both sides I think, but then the dictators forces have a lot of heavy weapons. Will the Euro airplanes do anything about that? Can they? But then again the dictators forces had a lot of trouble taking a contested city in the past and Benghazi is a big place and contested cities are hard for anybody to take and that supply line is vulnerable. I can't figure it out.

I am inclined to think that it would be best for all concerned at this point if the dictator were to be gone quickly. If he hangs on and a resistance starts that may not end up well not to mention prolonging the uncertainty and suffering.

[davidbfpo]

Reported by the BBC:

French military jets are preventing forces loyal to Libyan leader Col Muammar Gaddafi from attacking the rebel-held city of Benghazi, French President Nicolas Sarkozy says.

Note the Rafale or Mirage recce aircraft are flying from Eastern France.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12795971

BBC also report Italy has indicated the NATO Naples HQ will be used.

[Tukhachevskii]

The problem is in part that it's not sure an intervention will improve the situation - it could also worsen it. UN intervention has extended the Bosnian civil war, for example.

There's reason for mistrusting the usual suspects of military interventions and their ability to aim at military targets only.

There's also a considerable potential for misuse in UNSC resolutions, as evidenced by the U.S. lie that a UNSC resolution somehow legalised OIF although that was an entirely new and counter-factual view for all but two UNSC seat owners.

Finally, keep in mind how the U.S. misused its Iraq NFZ (originating in a cease-fire agreement for a war that had lost its legitimacy when Kuwait was liberated) to bully Iraq for a decade and for no good reason (the Southern NFZ made no sense any more, the Northern one could have been patrolled from the safety of Kurd-controlled territory) without any potential for trouble.

And then there's the strange idea of "self defense" of certain air force's pilots, who fly at 20,000 ft in a Mach 2 jet and claim to have bombed a wedding in "self defense" because they saw muzzle fire.


Obviously, there are many concerns that are not fit for a press release.

I need the exact text on the UN website quick, the news are -as usual- totally useless because they don't offer any of the important details of the resolution.

...but I'll post them anyway...

With all this talk of no-fly zones and what not I am reminded of an Armenian legend I once heard (somewhere, but I forget). In it a young man on a typical hero-quest confronts the giant Azrail. After a brief but reassuringly fantastical fight he slays the giant, chops of his head and then cleaves the head in twain. The two halves of Azrail’s head then plead to be chopped into quarters. Our young hero declines the request knowing that the third blow would restore Azrail. The motto? One must be sure that in attacking one’s enemy we don’t strengthen him.

Ghaddafi has made a number of pronouncements, many of which seem deranged to our all too rationalist mindsets. “He’s mad!”, we say. “Absolutely loopy”, we proclaim. But is he? One of the claims that his has put forward is that internal events in Libya are being manipulated by outside forces. Fair enough. Arab’s love a good conspiracy theory. But there’s no proof because the revolt has, thus far, been indigenous. But what happens if we (UK & US) do, in fact, establish a no-fly zone (say)? And what happens if even one loyalist aircraft makes it into the air and is then shot down? Or even, G-d forbid, he manages to shoot down one of ours? Well, now, that’s a different kettle of fish ain’t it?

I love a good punch up as much as the next fella. But only if I can comfortable predict the outcome (and can live with it). I’m much more averse to getting into a fight that could rapidly escalate beyond whatever my limited goals may have been (usually at any rate though the older I get the more I find myself hankering after a good fight). That simple legalistic act of reinforcing a (hopefully) internationally sanctioned regime could snowball and prolong Ghaddafi if not undercut the revolt. But therein lies my problem. US and American journalists and the media in general (along with the chattering classes) have taken to describing the “revolt” in Libya as a “national” one (let’s call that the underlying tacit premise). In fact, it’s nothing of the sort. It’s inchoate, unstructured and largely leaderless. The revolt snowballed from its original local insurrection to a national conflagration but that doesn’t mean that all Libyans are of one mind about why they’re doing what they’re doing. In 1917 the Russian Revolution didn’t necessarily have to end in a Bolshevik seizure of power, but it did (indeed, they subsequently re-narrated history to record the revolution as Bolshevik through and through). Indeed, Allied intervention during the Russian Civil war helped to strengthen the Reds especially after the Whites’ legitimacy was undercut by association with the Allies and vice verse. Alternative outcomes were always possible. And they are in Libya too.

Many of the people now revolting against Ghaddafi have no real agenda (grievances are, analytically speaking, a different thing entirely). I am concerned that should we get involved in the mix then we merely begin to sow doubts in the minds of many Libyans currently buoyed along and drunk with their own success that, in fact, maybe they are being manipulated by “foreign” powers (Ghaddafi maybe a bastard but he’s their bastard). That may result in Thermidor and the defection of the many back over to Ghaddafi (impossible perhaps, but not beyond the pale; stranger stuff has happened in the Middle East). That doubt is what keeps Ghaddafi’s chances even (in his own mind that is). Intervening, then, even if only in the form of a no-fly zone, may help prolong (though probably not restore) Azrail/Ghaddafi and may have knock on effects elsewhere. Of course if he gets some loot and a plane ticket to a safe haven...well, who knows? (I’ve heard Libyan planes have been flying to Greece, don’t know what to make of it but I doubt Gaddafi would flee to a NATO country. OTOH, I ‘ve herd that Bylo/Russian/Ukrainian arms smugglers operate in Greece with ties to North Africa though they usually ship via Cyprus and Malta, then again Malta’s crawling with NATO naval units...ahhhh speculation, speculation).


My problem with no-fly zones and other interventions against sovereign states (whatever their internal situation) is that domestic forces inevitably want to mould international affairs to suit domestic purposes. I hope Obama doesn’t try and end his presidency with a foreign policy “flourish” that only gets the rest of us into another quagmire (Europe is, after all, closer to Libya than the US is). Cameron may be just as, if not more, foolhardy in wanting to appear “hard” to an electorate that, frankly, reviles him. Military action serves policy and we’ve not done too good a job at formulating policy appropriate for the Middle East. Besides, who ever heard of a limited intervention that remained limited? The risk of blowback or unintentional consequences (sod’s law) are too great. Better, IMO, to let the situation proceed according to its own logic. This may even be to our advantage in that it may stand as a warning to other restive populaces in the region that change (though a wonderful slogan for American politicians and their British acolytes) isn’t always the panacea it appears to be (remember Kant? Order of whatever kind is preferable to chaos. There’s even an Islamic version somewhere.). And although the circumstances and context is different for all countries it may act as a breaking mechanism for a “domino effect” that threatens to snowball out of control (how’s that for mixed metaphors). Of course, if we can pull off any military actions with some finesse (a tall order I know), then we may even be able to send a signal to states we do want to see change in (i.e., Saudi Arabia & Iran, but then again, in the last case the dangers are similar). Just thought I’d put those thoughts out there, off the cuff though they may be.

[JMA]

JMA:

I was just wondering what might happen if a lot of "ifs" came to be. It does seem as if there is no real hard core of morale in many of the dictators forces, but then the rebels are a mob. Grounding the dictator's airplanes will have a great effect on the morale of both sides I think, but then the dictators forces have a lot of heavy weapons. Will the Euro airplanes do anything about that? Can they? But then again the dictators forces had a lot of trouble taking a contested city in the past and Benghazi is a big place and contested cities are hard for anybody to take and that supply line is vulnerable. I can't figure it out.

I am inclined to think that it would be best for all concerned at this point if the dictator were to be gone quickly. If he hangs on and a resistance starts that may not end up well not to mention prolonging the uncertainty and suffering.

Carl, lets start here:

"In planning any operation, it is vital to remember and constantly repeat to oneself two things: 'In war, nothing is impossible provided you use audacity,' and 'Do not take counsel of your fears." - General George S. Patton

If your planning and preparation has been carried out with professional skill then you must not allow the "ifs" to test your resolve. If you falter you can imagine that the fainted hearted around here will be totally freaked out.

2-3 weeks ago was the time for the targeted cruise missile with Gaddafi's name on it. So yes it will be more difficult from now on. But lets be absolutely honest the delay and the subsequent difficulties have been caused by the dithering of Obama and Clinton. Direct any anger and frustration in that direction.

[Presley Cannady]

Yes, there is no polling data, but I trust myself to conclude the uprising in Libya is definitely no "al-Qaida-launched insurgency" aiming at establishing some "Qaliphate", as claimed by the regime and some of the media in the West. The essence is the same like that behind the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, as well as unrests in Algeria, Bahrain, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere - i.e. the economy, human rights and power-sharing, not religion.

Isn't picking the rosier of a set of scenarios based nothing more than "trusting yourself" the very definition of whistling in the dark? It's presently impossible to estimate the contribution of religious fanaticism in any of these squabbles, though it is abundantly evident that Islamists stood to benefit--and did, if for no other reason than prisoner releases--in both Egypt and Tunisia. In Egypt, it remains to be seen how Islamists deal with a military leadership historically more hostile to their interests than Mubarak. In Tunisia, where's the downside at all for Ghannouchi and the like?

But if we're going to boiling it down to instinct, then I trust myself to conclude that an Islamic radical with a rifle beats a latte sipping university student with a Facebook wall nine times out of ten.

[Ken White]

If your planning and preparation has been carried out with professional skill then you must not allow the "ifs" to test your resolve.

Yes.

Note the photo below. Aakrotitiri on 16 March. That aircraft flying above those AWACS didn't just get there...

If you falter you can imagine that the fainted hearted around here will be totally freaked out.

I doubt that the hearted -- faint or stout -- on a discussion board have much effect on anything.

2-3 weeks ago was the time for the targeted cruise missile with Gaddafi's name on it.

That shows appalling ignorance or malice. individuals are not that easy to target.

...the delay and the subsequent difficulties have been caused by the dithering of Obama and Clinton. Direct any anger and frustration in that direction.

Why be angry? To prove one can be? How righteous. Pity the world doesn't operate the way some wish. Others are thankful it does not...

[M-A Lagrange]

May I remind that it's not like if G had never been defeated in the past by wetern armies.
The French did defeat him in Chad before.
So yes it's gonna be messy but mainly because West took its time...

[davidbfpo]

Ken,

You cited:

Note the photo below. Akrotiri on 16 March. That aircraft flying above those AWACS didn't just get there.

IIRC such US strategic recce aircraft are a regular presence, if not almost permanent, at RAF Akrotiri and usually tasked to Middle East duties. The base is a Sovereign UK base, since 1960 under a long standing treaty with Cyprus; see:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAF_Akrotiri).

[davidbfpo]

BBC News features a Pentagon press briefing and has referred to a twenty cruise missile strike on Libyan air defences, primarily in the west. Fired primarily by the US and a UK submarine.

Link to summary, not press briefing:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12796972

Note a SWJ thread refers to twenty Libyans targets hit by 110 cruise missiles.

[SWJ Blog]

Operation 'Odyssey Dawn' begins against Libya

Entry Excerpt:

United States and British warships launched at least 110 land-attack cruise missiles against 20 Libyan air defense targets. Admiral Samuel Locklear, USN, abaord USS Mt. Whitney, is in command of the combined joint task force.

The BBC also reports that Western aircraft bombed targets in Tripoli. This follows an attack on Libyan armored vehicles near Benghazi by a French aircraft. According to NBC News, there are no U.S. aircraft over Libya.

Nothing follows.



--------
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[Ken White]

IIRC such US strategic recce aircraft are a regular presence, if not almost permanent, at RAF Akrotiri and usually tasked to Middle East duties. The base is a Sovereign UK base, since 1960 under a long standing treaty with Cyprus; see:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAF_Akrotiri).

Been there -- as a transient -- he may also have been in transit but the quite strong probability is that he wasn't. A lot of such aircraft, EP3s and EC-135s and similar birds, EC-130s, even the WB-57 now and then; and the U2s like the one in the picture are there often. Almost based, as you say and they do work the ME -- and North Africa -- from there. And Sigonella. And Solenzera. And Athens. Even Incirlik. Which base depends on what's going on where. The numbers rise and fall with the mood and activity of the day and the where varies for the same reason....

[Dayuhan]

The moment to have acted on a low risk - high return basis has passed.

That's only true if you calculate risk and return purely with respect to Libya, which the US is not in a position to do.

The last thing the US wants at the moment is to be seen as eager to intervene in the affairs of another oil-producing Muslim country. Intervention while the rebels were ascendant would have been efficient in terms of impact on the Libyan rebellion, but it would have created the overwhelming impression that the US was trying to take control of the rebellion and the aftermath for its own oil-addicted purposes, which are universally presumed to be nefarious. Whether its true or not is irrelevant, all of the ME and much of the US and Europe would have bought the narrative.

By delaying the US supports the narrative that it sees intervention as a last resort, not a default response (a last resort is what it reasonably should be), that it is reluctant to intervene, and that it does not seek a leadership position that would promote post-intervention control. If we can back out after the early stages and leave it to the Europeans, so much the better.

All that is rough on the Libyans, but we didn't tell them to rebel or encourage them, and they didn't ask our permission or approval. As oft stated here, there's no obligation on our part... and the reality, harsh though it may be, is that dismantling the Bush-era image of the US as aggressive, eager, arrogant intervenor in the affairs of Muslims is more important to US interests than removing Gadhafi.

[jmm99]

Resolution 1973 (2011):

p.2:
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,....

Chapter VII provides the broadest legal scope for military action under the UN Charter - "peace enforcement". For example, the UNSC resolution and consequent actions by UN forces in Korea (1950 et seq) were taken under Chapter VII.

p.3:
Protection of civilians

4. Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council;.....

This authorization goes well beyond a "NFZ" - and is part of the multi-barreled approach taken by this resolution. As we have seen, "all necessary measures" allows assertion of very broad measures indeed.

However, those are limited - perhaps - by the language "excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory." We shall see whether "occupation" is parsed to mean physical occupation, as opposed to legal occupation. The two concepts of "occupation" are different.

In any event, we (USAians) are being informed by this resolution, and current events, that the Obama administration is following the playbook of Harry Truman and Bill Clinton.

Regards

Mike

[tequila]

Of note:

Gaddafi Regime Tried to Recruit Me - IWPR

Interesting story by IWPR on how Gaddafi's regime in Tripoli is passing out weapons to anyone in the capital willing to defend the regime, including criminals and teenagers. These are for his internal security forces rather than his frontline forces facing the rebels, but I can't imagine this regime having much staying power if the momentum swings against it.

[Rex Brynen]

Ghaddafi has made a number of pronouncements, many of which seem deranged to our all too rationalist mindsets. “He’s mad!”, we say. “Absolutely loopy”, we proclaim. But is he?

Yes, absolutely he is. That doesn't make him less dangerous, or entirely irrational, but he's quite crazy.

But there’s no proof because the revolt has, thus far, been indigenous. But what happens if we (UK & US) do, in fact, establish a no-fly zone (say)? And what happens if even one loyalist aircraft makes it into the air and is then shot down? Or even, G-d forbid, he manages to shoot down one of ours? Well, now, that’s a different kettle of fish ain’t it?

I don't doubt most Libyans would be cheering if a loyalist plane was shot down by the UK or France--if anything, they seem rather annoyed we haven't done it yet. I certainly think coalition public opinion can withstand losing a Western plane.

That simple legalistic act of reinforcing a (hopefully) internationally sanctioned regime could snowball and prolong Ghaddafi if not undercut the revolt.

It is hard to see how it could prolong Qaddafi. He was clearly within a week or two of winning. Certainly it may take the rebels a long time to unseat him. And we don't know what a post-Qaddafi regime will look like. But everyone knows that, especially those who took the decision to authorize military force.

It’s inchoate, unstructured and largely leaderless. The revolt snowballed from its original local insurrection to a national conflagration but that doesn’t mean that all Libyans are of one mind about why they’re doing what they’re doing.

Actually, I would have said the media and the chattering classes have been amply clear on this.

[Rex Brynen]

By delaying the US supports the narrative that it sees intervention as a last resort, not a default response (a last resort is what it reasonably should be), that it is reluctant to intervene, and that it does not seek a leadership position that would promote post-intervention control. If we can back out after the early stages and leave it to the Europeans, so much the better.

Exactly right. The diplomatic situation made earlier action impossible (and it must be said that the French and British showed considerable political determination in changing that).

Complaining that something should have been done sooner when it wasn't politically possible to do anything sooner is rather pointless.