and good subject matter area.
Regards
Mike
The Way Of War
After four years I have finally nailed down a thesis:
The Way Of War
A study of classical strategic theory focusing on Carl Von Clausewitz's, 'On War', and Mao Zedong's interpretation of 'Sun Tzu'. The thesis sets out to test the conceptual framework of what I will call 'the way of war' with specific reference to the contemporary applications of force, and understanding the often oscillating intensity of violence in war.
Good.....
and good subject matter area.
Regards
Mike
Very interesting, may I bug you for more details? The reason I ask is I recently nailed down a similar topic for my thesis, concentrating on regional socio-cultural 'way of war' approaches and how well they explain the behaviour of Islamist violent non-state actors.Originally Posted by Taiko
Slight change to thesis: A study of classical strategic theory focusing on Carl Von Clausewitz's, 'On War', and Mao Zedong's interpretation of 'Sun Tzu'. The thesis sets out to test the conceptual framework of what I will call 'the way of war' with specific reference to the contemporary applications of force, and explaining the often oscillating intensity of violence in war.
Chapters are as follows:
Ch 1: Introduction
Ch 2: Carl Von Clausewitz
Ch 3: Mao Zedong and Sun Tzu
Ch 4: The Way Of War
Ch 5: Nuclear Warfare
Ch 6: High Intensity Warfare
Ch 7: Low Intensity Warfare
Ch 8: Cyber Warfare
Ch 9: Conclusion
Fire away if you want anything specific. I'm fairly busy at the moment and will not be able to start writing until January 2012 if I can get the funding. I'm saving money from an Admin job right now...but I'll try and answer anything here when I can. For now this is more of a suppository for the conceptual framework, and the main reason I posted the thread is that there is no other place I would gladly take feedback from council members as most know a lot more about this subject area than me. Six years and still a noviceVery interesting, may I bug you for more details?
Last edited by Taiko; 06-21-2011 at 11:52 PM.
Question: Why does the level and intensity of violence change within a war and between wars in different time periods?
Within a war: The sides need a breather. Political imperative dictates so.
Between time periods: Political nature of the system in which wars are fought? The 30 Years War was more destructive than the Napoleonic Wars due to the battle for souls? Technology definately has a part to play - it became easier to increase the level of violence.
A bit superficial, but my initial thoughts on your question.
Within a war - this is often shaped by political and social conditions as well as military necessity and/or realities. Violence can taper, as Infanteer mentioned, because both sides need a breather. It can also be because the political leadership of nation X decides to tone down violence to send a signal of some sort. Likewise it can ratchet back up due to domestic pressure on political leaders in response to something that happened (or didn't happen) on the battlefield. The appearance of a "cause" can also cause violence levels to increase (sometimes drastically and quickly).
Between wars I think the same sorts of things apply. Nations exhausted by a major conflict don't seem to have the same stomach for aggression (at least at first), or they may feel that their demands/needs have been met. Political unrest at home can also lead to diminishing violence outside the borders as leaders turn their attention inward. In "ye olden dayes" armies had to be smaller due to logistics limits and obviously couldn't be moved as quickly. This mean that nations or rulers had to "pick their time and place" in a different way than they do now. It's worth considering the impact of social changes on this as well. The rise of communications technology (from printing on) and nation-states and (I think) the dominance of monotheistic religion also play roles.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Thanks for the imput.
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=11715
See post #16 for an outline of what I am trying to pitch for.
another proposed answer to your query...
I have read both Infanteer's and Steve's responses, as well as your post on the linked thread. My answer, I think, is complementary to all the above perspectives, perhaps coming from a slightly different angle. It's a good question, and one that has been bouncing around my head for the last few days since reading your thread.
I would suggest that the intensity of warfare refers to political will, in an explicitly Clausewitzian setting. If the political will is for complete and utter annihilation of another population group, then the violence will be total - witness the devastation visited upon Carthage or on the Eastern Front. If the political objectives desire a new balance of power then the need to co-exist post hostilities requires reduced levels of violence.
Political systems may sometimes topple themselves mid-conflict, which is why 'pauses' sometimes exist or the intensity of violence decreases. If the political system is unable to tolerate an ongoing offensive or military campaign due to materiel losses, economic cost, human cost or even parliamentary support, then policy may change, based on the omnipresent centre of gravity, political sustainability.
When the will for total destruction of another population is present as a political goal the violence will be absolute. When that political will decreases in intensity the level of violence, too, reduces. After all, states go to war with the intent of a better peace, so the means exerted will relate to their view and conception of the end-state.
This would explain why states involved in a civil war may often resort to extreme levels of violence as they do not expect to have to rehabilitate or coexist alongside the opposing political order. It would also explain why limitations are placed on even the most high-risk operations, such as the employment of gas in WW2 or nuclear weapons in the Cold War campaigns, as both sides intended to work with and not annihilate the opposing populations.
Perhaps I am rephrasing your question. I don't believe that the intensity of violence differs between time periods, but rather due to the objectives of politics. The trend for political systems to emphasise stability and the maintenance of a balance of power may have moved away from absolutes in conquest and destruction towards less costly and less permanent measures, and it is this phenomenon that is now observed in reduced levels and intensity of violence in warfare.
'...the gods of war are capricious, and boldness often brings better results than reason would predict.'
Donald Kagan
If the aim is to objectively test the conceptual framework of warfare then two of your proposed chapter headings should be revised. As synthesized by RADM J. C. Wylie in Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control - Chapters 2 and 3 would be better headed Sequential – Carl von .... , and Cumulative - Mao .... Sun Tzu.
J. C. Wylie
Ha, and here I was thinking I was the only person who had read and still uses Wylie. His work really opened up and leveled the conceptual playing field for me when I was working on the model! In fact, I would probably recommend that anyone interested in this theory read Echevarria II, and Wylie first before opening CvC. I primarily use Wylie's work in the introduction and chapter four when dealing with the specifics of defining strategy and war.
The study is on war (the strategic use of force to gain a political objective), not warfare, the goal being to develop a general explanatory theory of the level and intensity of violence in war. So the theory has to be very broad gauged to not only cover a considerable time period, but plausably explain why the level and intensity within war can be so drastic. From the death of a thousands cuts via insurgencies to total annihilation via nuclear war. CvC provides the best and most broadest/stable base to work from in developing a theoretical model, however, Mao/ST provide a more complex and narrower political framework that fits neatly within CvC. Mao read both works and has some interesting insights into understanding the shift from theory to practice. While I was originally only going to focus on CvC, including Mao/ST adds another explanatory layer that further enables the user of the model to drill down into the various "modes of warfare" for the relevant data.conceptual framework of warfare
Thank you for your suggestions on chapter titles, the ones I have are place holders at the moment.
That is one conclusion I am currently investigating. "Intensity in violence" can be a slippery concept to define. For example, in understanding the intensity of violence of a nuclear war, concepts such as space and time shift/change dramatically when compared to the level and intensity of violence in even World War Two. This in itself has an impact on politics/strategy etc. As Echevarria II has correctly stated, when we are looking at this concepts, and the many variables involved, CvC establishes the fact that there is a feedback loop between then all, so it is very important to be careful in how you approach understanding/analyzing/explaining the causal relationships between all of the variables at play. Easy to say, very very hard to do!I don't believe that the intensity of violence differs between time periods, but rather due to the objectives of politics. The trend for political systems to emphasise stability and the maintenance of a balance of power may have moved away from absolutes in conquest and destruction towards less costly and less permanent measures, and it is this phenomenon that is now observed in reduced levels and intensity of violence in warfare.
Last edited by Taiko; 07-27-2011 at 01:41 AM.
Of note, I bumped into an interesting article in the RUSI journal discussing "intensity" and critiquing its utility.
Christopher Bellamy (1998): If you cant stand the heat ... new concepts of conflict intensity, The RUSI Journal, 143:1, 25-31
You're institution should allow you online access to the RUSI archives through informaworld. If not, PM me an email address and I'll send you a copy if you wish.
That whole idea only works because of the real reason:
The culminating point of attack.
This is being driven by superiority of defence over offence AND the overextension of logistics.
Two sides deciding to recover for a while is the requirement for a temporary reduction of intensity (beyond mere movement of forces for a new attack at another location). This wouldn't work if offence was superior to defence.
I'm having trouble trying to find a date as reference for my thesis. When was the exact day and time that the Europeans defeated the 'Native Americans'?
No idea if you are being cheeky with your question, but the event of 29 December 1890 at Wounded Knee is often given as the close of the Indian Wars. But keeping in mind that treaties were negotiated on a nation-to-nation basis, Red Cloud’s War ended at best in a draw for the federal government and the ancestors of the Seminole and Miccosukee nations currently located within the boundaries of Florida never signed any treaty related to cessation of the Seminole Wars.
If you don’t read the newspaper, you are uninformed; if you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed. – Mark Twain (attributed)
Hey Taiko, old friend ....
I'm not being cheeky (
Except that, of course, if one wants to be very accurate, the last encounter of the "Indian Wars" was won by the Indians. The Indians in question being a group of "Nobbies" (Anishinabe - Minnesota Ojibwe) under Bugonegijig (aka Bugonaygeshi). The location was Sugar Point (Leech Lake), Minnesota. The date was 5 Oct 1898 (in the afternoon), when a US officer and 5 troopers (3rd Inf. Reg.) were killed, and a number wounded - Indian casualties, none.
A settlement was made and full clemency was granted by Pres. McKinley in Jan 1899.
Some refs: Wiki, from the report to the Secretary of the Interior:
The Battle of Sugar Point : a re-examination; and The last Indian uprising in the United States.The Indians were prompted to their outbreak by the wrongs committed against them and chafed under unfair treatment. They now will go back to their homes and live peaceably if the whites will treat them fairly, which is very likely, as the whites were thoroughly impressed with the stand taken by the Indians. In this respect the outbreak has taught them a lesson.
Ironically, the Ojibwe have worn Army Blue since the Civil War (e.g., K Coy, 1st Michigan Sharpshooters, was mostly Ottawa, but included Ojibwe), in living black & white:
Best for your thesis.
Regards
Mike
Back on deck for the 'Asia-Pacific Century', I volunteer to go on point
Question: What impact has the compression of time and space had on the level and intensity of violence during and between wars in the past/present/future.
Last edited by Taiko; 01-05-2013 at 02:22 AM. Reason: Reflection.
"compression of time and space"?Back on deck for the Asia-Pacific Century. I volunteer to go on point
Question: What impact has the compression of time and space had on the level and intensity of violence during and between wars in the past/present/future.
Are you talking about space travel or warfare?
Primarily warfare at the operational level, specifically the time/space/assets it takes to break the will of the opposing forces to fight eg: cabinet warfare->napoleonic warfare->nuclear warfare->sub-state warfare etc.
Space is a little more difficult to define, eg: cyberspace, sub-orbital space, all the way down to geographical space (urban/rural) and how our understanding/conceptualization of time/space has changed as a part of the history of war and warfare.
I'm in the process of understanding/explaining how/if this compression of time and space has any impact on the level and intensity of violence during and between wars:
- Warfare defined as the use of violence/force to break the will of an opponent to fight/resist.
- the role of social-media/cyber-space in Syria or Burma for example.
- World War 2 Vs the Cold War in understanding the effects of the compression of time and space on the level and intensity of violence.
- WOT (Iraq/Afghan) sub-state warfare is almost the inverse of the Cold War's compression of time and space.
- Cyber/Sub-orbital space warfare is the most prominent, in so far as it does not require the physical presence of armed forces and the potential effect is instantaneous (based on future projections on the possible lethality of both cyber/sub-orbital warfare in 20-30 years time).
- Cyber/Sub-orbital space warfare almost looks like it has the potential to be a evolution in siege warfare if you take Nth Korea, China or Iran as an example.
I've finished my theoretical model/general theory on explaining why the level and intensity of violence oscillates during and between wars. Now I'm trying to get a better grasp on warfare as it is today and a 20-30 year future projection on how warfare will change. Thus far in my research the compression and utilization of time and space is starting to become the prime candidate for being the most significant dependent variable on warfare for the foreseeable future.
Last edited by Taiko; 01-05-2013 at 05:44 AM.
I'm still not sure I know what you mean, and my time is short now.
I advise you to read
"Blitzkrieg: The Myth of Blitz"
by (then) Captain Thomas T. Smith
Infantry (Journal) July/August 1990
It should be accessible online. In worst case PM me, I obviously have a copy.
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