Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan

[Ken White]

The notion that the taliban (or for that matter, the Pakistani deep state) want "reconciliation" is a joke. They want victory and they can smell it. One side doesnt know what the fight is and what the aim is..the other side does.

Particularly on that "...one side doesn't know what the fight is..." aspect.

That's been true ever since we decided to 'stay' a while...

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob,

2. We leave and allow whomever is naturally strongest to rise to power. We created an artificial solution, as such will never be legitimate or sustainable. A natural solution must occur, and that will be messy and will not be anything we can or should control. We would then simply be willing to have open relations with whomever prevails as the best way to support our interests there.

Agree with the intent, but I suspect the reality is there will be an Afghan (I suspect that is what you mean by natural) solution. Just because we leave, doesn't mean other State Actors will stop supporting their favorite surrogate. Unfortunately, it is unrealistic to assume the solution to the problems in Afghanistan simply reside in Afghanistan.

[Bob's World]

The notion that the Taliban (or for that matter, the Pakistani deep state) want
"Reconciliation" is a joke. They want victory and they can smell it. One side doesn’t know what the fight is and what the aim is..the other side does.

No single faction can force a solution that is designed to oppress the losers without immediately finding themselves in a COIN campaign of their own. Those who believe that they are somehow exempt from this reality are dreamers.

Of course Pakistan wants their interests to prevail, why should they be any different than us?

Of course the Taliban want total control, why should they be any different than the Northern Alliance?

All of those desires are true and natural and reasonable. They just won't work. The culture and history of Afghanistan has been one of such swings of power, often forced by the intervention of some external power tipping the balance to allow those on the outside to step to the inside. Once inside, the prevailing party then does to the losers what was done to them, and the cycle continues.

All we are currently doing is artificially perpetuating this cycle in favor of a particular side. Any who believe that our current approaches will lead to "democracy" or a "modern Afghan state" or "stability" simply do not understand insurgency, its causes and its cures.

Insurgency is caused by government, and when one produces a certain type of government insurgency is inevitable. By type I mean one that does not treat the entire populace equitably, one that does not ensure that there is justice under the rule of law for the entire populace, one that is not perceived as having the right to govern by the entire populace, and one that does not allow legal vehicles and venues for the populace to shape or address their concerns about governance.


Which brings us back to the two points I made above. We cannot force a solution that is any better or more enduring than what would occur if we simply left. By us forcing a solution that is unacceptable to half we make the US susceptible to acts of transnational terrorism from members of that populace, and increasingly, from individuals around the globe who are sympathetic to that populace (i.e., "homegrown terrorists").

So, we either force the two sides to reconcile and craft some form of shared governance and focus on enforcing trust between the two (rather than enforcing the ability of one side to dominate over the other); or we leave, let it sort out, and work with whomever emerges (regardless of who might have helped them to get there).

Certainly Britain ultimately worked with the US even though France helped us to emerge.

We are too focused on trying to control an outcome, and that is a fool's errand.

[Steve the Planner]

Bill:

It's like debating the CPA's actions in Baghdad. So much water under the damn.

The Afghan solution in 2002 or 2005 may have been remarkably different than what will result in 2013 or 2014 amongst heavily militarized and drug & war-enriched militias.

I still struggle with the demographics of Afghanistan, given the trans-national nature of Pashtuns, and the shear number of displaced Afghans in Pakistan.

Assuming, without benefit of census, that Pashtuns in Afghanistan are 40% of 24 or 26 million, and there are 2-3 million Afghan Pashtuns in Pakistan, aren't they not just a large minority, but, in fact, the majority under a reasonable post-conflict voting pattern which includes refugees abroad. (Further complicated by trans-national fluctuations as with Kurds---are they Turkish or Iranian Kurds brought home to vote?).

The circumstances do not align for the "old ways" of a traditional Loya Jirga of brokering regional/factional differences against a weak, but cordial and accommodating central government ( a veneer for international aid, etc...), but for a combative winner takes all system.

The inherent fears and risks of non-Pashtuns cannot, as in the past, be weighed out by tea, tribute and intermarriage.

The question, between now and 2014 (at the latest), is whether the inherent conflicts can be managed-down to something less brutal and cataclysmic than current trends suggest.

Cordesman and other think tankers have argued to strengthen regions and provinces before the deluge (I mean transition), but that, in many ways, simply reinforces the risks of truly bloody fractures.

This is just plain hard---a real mess with (obviously) continuing next shoes to drop over a potentially long period of time.

Our dwindling ability to influence downstream circumstances (which always happens once departure is expected) just adds to the confusion.

Bob always likes to rattle with bold historical propositions: the US Constitution is the remarkable crowing achievement of COIN. God created COIN as a blessing for his people on Earth, etc...

Isn't this greatly bewildering mess, too, the remarkable product of COIN?

[Bob's World]

Steve, don't be an F-tard. Insurgency is natural, and Man created COIN to attempt to stem this natural process.

One of man's best efforts at COIN is our Constitution. I stand by that assessment. It is preventative and addresses the roots, while most military COIN doctrine and TTPs only seeks to manage or mitigate the symptoms while leaving (protecting even) the roots to flourish and resprout.

You may find that to be "rattling" or prattling. But it is an important, underrepresented perspective all the same.

Cheers!

bob

[omarali50]

Bob, I dont get what is "artificial" about US intervention, but "natural" about Pakistani or Indian or Iranian intervention? Unless you mean that neighbors have a "natural" right to intervene but the distant USA does not? (that debate would lead on to others, as you can well imagine).
The distinction is not about "natural" vs "artificial". Its about knowing what you want and having some sort of plan to get it.
But I dont want to leave you with the impression that I think the ISI not only knows what it wants but that what it wants also makes good sense. I think it makes no sense at all for Pakistanis in general to wish that the US supported Afghan state should collapse into civil war....the blowback and the price paid by Pakistan will be astronomical. It would have made much more sense to use the opportunity afforded by the arrival of the US with big bucks and firepower to fundamentally change course in the region. America may have had its own (sometimes silly, maybe sometimes evil) notions of what it wants, but that doesnt mean it couldnt be used for some good for a change. A different Afghanistan and Pakistan were possible (not easy, but possible). The hardcore rejectionists in the Jihadi party were on the back foot. Their plan for the region was going to lead to endless war and much bigger disasters. It was a plan idiots in GHQ had supported because of their juvenile notions of national identity, Indian-threat, strategic depth and other bull#### (much of the mess can be ascribed to teaching "strategy" to overgrown kids in NDU, with no adult supervision)...they had a chance to change course. Instead, Musharraf and company opted for a "lets put one foot in every boat" strategy and messed it up.
A particular strand (and its only one strand, but a dangerous and deep rooted one) of Muslim separatism and "the ideology of Pakistan" is also involved. The whole complicated mess has other aspects, too numerous to cover in one post...
I can see that our "priors" are very different. All I can do right now is hint at some of the differences. In all such debates, the real differences lie deeper and only become apparent over time with much back and forth. And then too, maybe only to third parties who are not already invested in either position. In short, I have to run. But more later..
Meanwhile, see: http://www.google.com/#hl=en&sugexp=...w=1280&bih=894

and: http://www.google.com/#sclient=psy-a...w=1280&bih=894

[omarali50]

See: http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp...2-9-2011_pg3_2

[Steve the Planner]

Bob, now I get it. God didn't create COIN as a blessing for his people on Earth. It pre-existed God, the big bang and everything else.

So only Chuck Norris could ever defy COIN and live to tell about it?

I was pleasantly surprised to read Rory Stewart's positive report on the emerging situation in Libya (not democracy, but surprisingly free from the chaos, violence and strife of the COIN countries.

His view was that: (1) it was a unique outcome resulting from unique circumstances which, in part, (2) included the domestic and civilian nature of the effort (free from foreign interference on the ground).

He didn't mention anything about the role of COIN. What's up with that?

[Bob's World]

COIN is an operation. A program of activity designed, defined and implemented by governments to deal with a popualce in insurgency.

Insurgency is a dynamic or phenomina. A naturally occuring event when certain conditions exist.

Some people use "COIN" and "Insurgency" interchangably I guess. Explains alot about our challenges in getting our hands on the problem over the past forever.

Frankly, I don't think God much cares one way or the other. He created man to have an independent will, and within that will one finds the essence of insurgency.

[Steve the Planner]

PS: My mistake: Chuck Norris or Ken White.

PPS: Omarali: Bob is a lawyer, so you can't contest his credibility (except about Pakistan with a Pakistani lawyer). Agree that whatever happens next in Afghanistan will have substantial repercussions and interactions on/with the nuclear neighbors.

[Bob's World]

Bob, I dont get what is "artificial" about US intervention, but "natural" about Pakistani or Indian or Iranian intervention? Unless you mean that neighbors have a "natural" right to intervene but the distant USA does not? (that debate would lead on to others, as you can well imagine).
The distinction is not about "natural" vs "artificial". Its about knowing what you want and having some sort of plan to get it.
But I dont want to leave you with the impression that I think the ISI not only knows what it wants but that what it wants also makes good sense. I think it makes no sense at all for Pakistanis in general to wish that the US supported Afghan state should collapse into civil war....the blowback and the price paid by Pakistan will be astronomical. It would have made much more sense to use the opportunity afforded by the arrival of the US with big bucks and firepower to fundamentally change course in the region. America may have had its own (sometimes silly, maybe sometimes evil) notions of what it wants, but that doesnt mean it couldnt be used for some good for a change. A different Afghanistan and Pakistan were possible (not easy, but possible). The hardcore rejectionists in the Jihadi party were on the back foot. Their plan for the region was going to lead to endless war and much bigger disasters. It was a plan idiots in GHQ had supported because of their juvenile notions of national identity, Indian-threat, strategic depth and other bull#### (much of the mess can be ascribed to teaching "strategy" to overgrown kids in NDU, with no adult supervision)...they had a chance to change course. Instead, Musharraf and company opted for a "lets put one foot in every boat" strategy and messed it up.
A particular strand (and its only one strand, but a dangerous and deep rooted one) of Muslim separatism and "the ideology of Pakistan" is also involved. The whole complicated mess has other aspects, too numerous to cover in one post...
I can see that our "priors" are very different. All I can do right now is hint at some of the differences. In all such debates, the real differences lie deeper and only become apparent over time with much back and forth. And then too, maybe only to third parties who are not already invested in either position. In short, I have to run. But more later..
Meanwhile, see: http://www.google.com/#hl=en&sugexp=...w=1280&bih=894

and: http://www.google.com/#sclient=psy-a...w=1280&bih=894

I did not mean to imply that any intervention is natural, only that insurgency is. If the Pakistanis intervene to force an artificial solution (which they certainly will attempt to do) it to will be an artificial solution of their proxies act to freeze out the populaces currently represented by GIRoA/Northern Alliance. But then it will be Pakistan's problem to maintain, and not ours.

We win by taking a neutral position and working with whomever it is that happens to prevail. Remember why we are in Afghanistan, it is not to make Karzai and his friends and family rich and famous (though we have), it was to prevent AQ from using the region as a safe haven to attack American interests from. We can work that through any government. The populaces of that region tolerate Arabs, but have little inclination (beyond a Pashtunwali duty to protect a guest) to put their own interests at risk to support organizations such as AQ.

We've just gotten ourselves sucked into this internal power struggle, and we are not well served by working to sort out any particular side prevailing over another. Such advocacy makes us a target of the opposition, regardless of which side we pick. Better to pick neither and to work with either.

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

Suggest you review the BBC videos: "Secret Iraq." Good source is Musings on Iraq blog.

Show the perspective of Iraqis to the events that unfolded: Abu Ghraib, Fallujah, and the emergence of domestic opposition to US occupation (the same foreign troops issues at play in Afghanistan).

It is neither a pretty, simplistic, or heroic tale from an Iraqi perspective, with ample pretexts, justifications and drivers to legitimize opposition activities.

I suggest that the complete after action analysis of all this stuff (the second and third drafts of history) will cast substantially more gray on the black and white versions of the first drafts.

History, at some point, will tell whether COIN, whatever it actually is deciphered as, did, or did not, help to address the underlying problems it was targeted at.

Same in Afghanistan:We have, perhaps, been sucked into an internal power struggle (your words) in which the current parties we back are greatly enriching themselves, but win by ultimately aligning ourselves with which ever party prevails (most likely Pashtun, and possibly via Pak-backed Taliban), so long as they keep AQ at bay.

It just doesn't sound like the COIN Manual to me. Wouldn't even know how to identify the target to be shot/bribed/be-hearted.

[davidbfpo]

Steve the Planner stated in Post 144:

Assuming, without benefit of census, that Pashtuns in Afghanistan are 40% of 24 or 26 million, and there are 2-3 million Afghan Pashtuns in Pakistan...

My understanding, based on UN reports and other sources, is that many of the Afghan refugees - who remained in Pakistan and Iran - returned to Afghanistan, largely facilitated by the UN and others.

The large Afghan refugee suburbs of Peshawar pre-2001 I believe have shrunk; those who migrated further afield, notably to Karachi and gained employment did not return. Afghans incidentally dominate the road haulage industry.

A good number of the initial Afghan refugee population in Pakistan, after the Soviet invasion, were not Pashtun, they came later when rural and mountain Pashtun populations fled the Soviet-Afghan onslaught.

[Dayuhan]

No single faction can force a solution that is designed to oppress the losers without immediately finding themselves in a COIN campaign of their own. Those who believe that they are somehow exempt from this reality are dreamers.

Of course Pakistan wants their interests to prevail, why should they be any different than us?

Of course the Taliban want total control, why should they be any different than the Northern Alliance?

It is possible - indeed likely - that the Pakistanis and the Taliban understand that their preferred outcome will involve a COIN campaign, and that they find this acceptable.

All of those desires are true and natural and reasonable. They just won't work.

That depends on how you define work. If you assume that any given party wants to break the cycle, then no, it won't work. If they accept the cycle as a given and believe that they can sustain their turn on top, then it works for them, and that's what matters.

Insurgency is caused by government, and when one produces a certain type of government insurgency is inevitable. By type I mean one that does not treat the entire populace equitably, one that does not ensure that there is justice under the rule of law for the entire populace, one that is not perceived as having the right to govern by the entire populace, and one that does not allow legal vehicles and venues for the populace to shape or address their concerns about governance.

When you say "when one produces a certain type of government insurgency is inevitable", you have to look at who "one" is. If we are producing a government in Afghanistan, insurgency is inevitable no matter what we produce. Acceptability to "the entire populace" is easy to say, but in many circumstances impossible to achieve, especially when various parts of the populace all see "we rule" as the only acceptable form of governance.

So, we either force the two sides to reconcile and craft some form of shared governance and focus on enforcing trust between the two (rather than enforcing the ability of one side to dominate over the other); or we leave, let it sort out, and work with whomever emerges (regardless of who might have helped them to get there).

This is the corner we've painted ourselves into. Reconciliation and trust cannot be achieved under duress. All we could force would be a brief facade... that might be enough to buy us a marginally credible exit point, but we shouldn't delude ourselves into thinking it would last, or that our exit would force reconciliation.

If we just leave, most of the world will perceive that as defeat. We can probably live with that, and we'll probably have to, sooner or later.

We are too focused on trying to control an outcome, and that is a fool's errand.

Well, yes, but focusing on trying to "force the two sides to reconcile" or on "enforcing trust" is also trying to control an outcome, and possibly even more a fool's errand, as we have no capacity to force anyone to reconcile or trust.

We win by taking a neutral position and working with whomever it is that happens to prevail.

Neutrality is like virginity: once you lose it, you can't get it back. We lost our neutrality in Afghanistan a long time ago and we have not even a shred of credibility as neutral mediator.

We've just gotten ourselves sucked into this internal power struggle, and we are not well served by working to sort out any particular side prevailing over another. Such advocacy makes us a target of the opposition, regardless of which side we pick. Better to pick neither and to work with either.

We weren't sucked into it, we created it, when we chose to install and maintain a Government in Afghanistan.

[omarali50]

Now that the #### has hit the fan, what next? I want to throw out some over-the-top options (I can think of no "not-over-the-top" options):

1. Pakistan cries uncle (Sam). Goes after "Haqqani network" or some such and the US expresses satisfaction.
Doesnt look very likely. As far as I can tell, the generals really believe the US is on the verge of collapse and they know what they are doing. And who knows, it may not be the best outcome for the US, since it means they have to stay in Afghanistan, take care of Pakistan's endless "needs" and somehow translate this tactical victory into a lasting peace..not easily done. Why would we expect that the same people who failed to figure out things for 10 years suddenly have a plan?

2. The US finds it has overplayed its hand. Tries to arrange some suitable propaganda and expresses satisfaction with whatever Pakistan pretends to do. Gets the hell out. Fast. Throws up a smokescreen of made-up stories and tries to change the subject.
Not easily carried off, and there is no conceivable way in which Kiyani sahib can arrange for the various taliban and haqqanis and whatnot to permit an "honorable exit". The Mujahideen will want their pound of flesh and want people hanging from rope ladders as helicopters take off from the embassy. That may well stick in the craw of American politicians and officers (unless the casualty count reaches Vietnam levels and we are nowhere close to that point). So this too seems unlikely.

3. The US carries out some symbolic action against Pakistan. Pakistan pretends to explode in fury. Zardari is kicked out as a result and "patriotic officers" take over. Then both sides feel honor has been satisfied and go back to the status quo ante. But what does that change in the long run?

Seems hard to believe, but 3 looks the most likely of 3 unbelievably difficult options. And all three seem unsatisfactory.

I have no idea what comes next.

[Levi]

Here's what I have thought for a while.

1. The U.S. withdraws, whenever and however. Makes no difference IMO if it is announced or not.

2. Whoever is the largest and best supplied force in country starts taking ground. Maybe the Taliban, I don't know who has the most capable force after we leave.

3. Pakistan has internal problems, and the legitimate government is controlled by any party with a Taliban or like minded leadership. I think voted in.

4. India prepares for the worst, and masses troops on the border of where ever that one place they are always fighting about is. You know where I mean.

5. So, constant internal strife in Afghanistan bleeds over into Pakistan, destabilizing the region. Maybe it goes nuclear with India.

[omarali50]

I wrote this comment on the New Yorker website, but it seems relevant here:
I dont think US policymakers have (even now) a sufficient notion of what the problem is, a solution therefore seems unlikely.
In a different world, the US would admit it is in over its head and would pull out very quickly and let the locals and various regional powers fight it out. it will be extremely nasty in the region, but at least the US will not be directly involved...
Since it is actually unlikely that the US is ready to just pull out and leave the entire region to its own devices (what kind of worldcop would do that?), the most likely thing is that we will see more of the same. GHQ understands the US better than the US understands GHQ
Unless some miracle has happened, it is the US that is likely to find itself being frustrated and blundering from friend to enemy to friend with no good plan either way Making loud noises (the current accusations would normally constitute an act of war) while searching for a way to get out without humiliation. Pakistan will hurt even more, but the elite will find new sources of cash (China? Saudi Arabia?...not as generous and careless with money as Uncle Sam, but good enough for bad times) and will not suffer too much (poor people will suffer horribly, but who cares about them?). Eventually, the elite will also go down (or escape to the big bad United States), probably complaining about Zionist-Hindu-American plots until someone pries the microphone from their cold dead hands..but it will be an unpleasant mess and a long drawn out death, not a clean and clear "endgame". Too pessimistic?

Levi, I think the main casualties of an early US withdrawal will be US self-esteem and Pakistan's well being. India can get pulled in, but if they are really smart about it (OK, thats not the most likely course they will take) then they can survive with relatively little damage. There is no way Pakistan can make it out safely once the US leaves.

[Steve the Planner]

Omar:

Interested in your comment that there is no way pakistan makes it out safely.

Care to elaborate?

[Bob's World]

Levi, I think the main casualties of an early US withdrawal will be US self-esteem and Pakistan's well being. India can get pulled in, but if they are really smart about it (OK, thats not the most likely course they will take) then they can survive with relatively little damage. There is no way Pakistan can make it out safely once the US leaves.

I do think the US worries about its image if perceived to have left on any terms other than our own. I wish we were equally concerned about how our current course of operations affects our reputation. Like the nature of the threat in that region, like the vitalness of our interests in that region, we also over estimate the damage to our reputation. We need to reassess.

As to Pakistan, this is a country that has grown increasingly unstable during and DUE TO the past 10 years of US operations in AF/PAK. We blame all of the instability on the "bad guys," but we are not just distilled water poured into this complex system. We are a large and powerful foreign agent inserted into the mix, and most of the disruption is reasonably attributed to our actions, regardless of how well intended. I think that Pakistan will quickly settle back into a reasonably stable country, with the government largely focusing once again on the Indus valley and leaving those in the mountains once again to their own traditional self-governance. It is a system that has worked reasonably well historically and certainly will again once everyone stops stirring the pot with Western ideas of "exercising sovereignty," etc.

Iran and Pakistan will always exercise a great deal of influence into Afghanistan, how can that not be so with the populaces that they share? How can that not be so with the traditional expectation and reality that the government does not intrude much into a populace that has few expectations of government, and leaves the populace to be largely self-governed at the local level through local processes of religious, tribal, family, and village leadership? This is not a bad thing. Afghanistan is not America, and efforts to make it a "Little America" are misguided.

[ganulv]

Pakistan will hurt even more, but the elite will find new sources of cash (China? Saudi Arabia?...not as generous and careless with money as Uncle Sam, but good enough for bad times) and will not suffer too much (poor people will suffer horribly, but who cares about them?). Eventually, the elite will also go down (or escape to the big bad United States), probably complaining about Zionist-Hindu-American plots until someone pries the microphone from their cold dead hands..but it will be an unpleasant mess and a long drawn out death, not a clean and clear "endgame". Too pessimistic?

Levi, I think the main casualties of an early US withdrawal will be US self-esteem and Pakistan's well being. India can get pulled in, but if they are really smart about it (OK, thats not the most likely course they will take) then they can survive with relatively little damage. There is no way Pakistan can make it out safely once the US leaves.

The notion that there are any real threats to the rule of the Pakistani nepocracy not originating with the Union Government strikes me as unlikely and perhaps as wishful thinking. There are domestic tensions to be managed to be sure, but that kind of chaos isn’t necessarily bad for entrenched political types (see contemporary America, United States of). To echo Steve’s question, care to elaborate?