Sharing may be the essence of stability, but stability may not be everybody's preferred outcome. I very much doubt that sharing power with the Karzai government is on any of the Taliban agendas, except as a transitory step toward full control.
Of course it's not our problem. We can walk away. This will be chalked up as defeat, especially if (as is likely) the Taliban win and AQ resettle, but we've survived that before and we'll survive it again. In some ways that most pragmatic outcome would be to impose something resembling a negotiated solution for just long enough to declare victory and bolt, knowing full well that it will collapse... but of course that will be pretty transparent.
No such thing has happened in Mindanao.
If we leave with tail between legs, what are we supposed to offer to a new government that will produce a renunciation of AQ. What's to stop them from doing exactly what the Pakistanis are doing now: accepting the deal, taking whatever we offer, and not delivering on their end of the deal?
I would not count on being able to negotiate the Taliban into renouncing AQ,
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