Originally Posted by
JMA
To train your average line infantry platoon members in COIN tactics is pretty simple... but to expect them (down to private soldier level) to develop all the cultural, civil and psyops skills (which may comprise a successful COIN strategy) is plain insanity. The soldiers (in the main) were not selected for their intellectual and analytical skills but rather to be a trigger man in a killing machine (which is what an infantry platoon should be).
Agreed.
Originally Posted by
JMA
Certainly the sections/squads and platoons must be drilled in COIN tactics as much (if not more) than in conventional warfare but it is the officers and (to a lesser extent) the senior NCOs who need to be educated in the complexity of COIN strategy implementation (to gain an understanding of their part in the 'big picture'). The higher up the rank structure you go the more detailed the training in these aspects should be.
Agreed. And the tactics will be different and evolve for each conflict.
Originally Posted by
JMA
So perhaps if Mumford is suggesting that all the training in the world is irrelevant if the strategic context is wrong or inappropriate or (if the strategy is effective) not fully understood with its tactical adaption requirements at battalion, company and platoon level then I support what he says.
I don't think this is what he is saying. My reading of this was that he was disagreeing with the UK Army's wish to retain the ability to fight combined arms manoeuvre warfare at battlegroup and brigade level; an ability that has been severely degraded by the focus on Afghanistan. This capability he sees as not required for COIN. My argument is:
What is required is a technical mastery of your trade (gained through combined arms manoeuvre training) combined with an education system for our officers and SNCOs that is both broad and deep so that they have the knowledge set to apply their technical skills in a COIN environment. Training enables you to do what you do, education enables you to understand the context in which you are operating and therefore to better understand how to apply your technical skills in that environment.
It is also very difficult to train for COIN generically, especially commanders, int staff and civil affairs. This is because COIN progresses relatively slowly compared to combined arms manoeuvre (you are unlikely to win a COIN campaign in a two or even four week exercise) and because you need to understand the human terrain and interact with it. This latter element is difficult to replicate generically and in training. Technical skills (platoon attacks, patrolling, C-IED, using a military decision making process, conducting company attacks) are much easier to train and provide a transferrable skill set to COIN campaigns. Educating for COIN is however is a relatively simple matter. The aim here is to give individuals a broad based theoretical and historical knowledge of COIN together with a working knowedge of the social sciences in order that they can understand the context in which they may have to operate and deliver new solutions (quickly) to new problems.
Combined Arms Manoeuvre is a very difficult technical ability to master and it becomes exponentially more difficult to master as you progress in size from company to battalion to brigade to division to corps. If you lose it it is very difficult to get it back. As a capability it is required at sub-unit, battalion and possibly brigade level in a COIN environment. Even at a higher level in Iraq we (the Brits) noted that the ability of the US to comprehend and execute Corps level operations, flexing combat power across Iraq was highly effective. More salutory for us was that because in part we no longer operate at that level in the British Army we could not tap into that ability to flex assets to us; it was beyond the comprehension of our staff. So there is still a requirement to train for Combined Arms Manoeuvre because it is pertinent to COIN campaigns, let alone the fact that if we lose it it is very difficult to regain.
So train for Combined Arms Manoeuvre and educate for COIN.
As for Mumfords assertion that COIN demands a different set of characteristics and leadership skills from regular warfare I would go further. Every conflict has different characteristics and will demand different characteristics from its commanders and so every conflict will either see commanders adapt or fail. It is not a COIN versus Combined Arms Manoeuvre issue, it is a 'this conflict' versus 'that conflict' issue.
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