British COIN (merged thread)

[Red Rat]

No I don't think that is the correct approach.

The size of your operating call-signs should depend on the comparative military competence of your enemy and the location and the degree of mobility of your operational reserve.

Seems the Brit assessment is that of parity of soldiering ability? Surely not.

Poor wording on my part. I think that the British approach is that the size of the grouping depends on the military capability of the opponent and by military capability I mean the effective combat power he is likely to bring to bear in any given engagement.

Then it is the impact of IEDs which requires a number of donkeys on each patrol to carry related 'stuff'.

IEDs have increased the equipment load, both with ECM equipment and differing sets of detection equipment for differing types of IED threats. I think one of the most significant impacts on the load carried is the appetite for risk. As the appetite for risk has decreased the personal load has increased. The appetite for risk is largely articulated by politicians and is related closely to the public support for the conflict.

Then (going back to exchanges I had with Wilf some time ago about) the aim of the patrol activity needs to be carefully assessed. You would have read 18 Platoon by Sydney Jary at Sandhurst (where it was I believe required reading) and learned that even then (between D-Day and VE Day) he (as a young subaltern) questioned the wisdom of patrolling for the sake of patrolling.

I know the book well. Patrolling for the sake of patrolling is bad. It does not feature in British doctrine or training at any level; I am not aware of it happening in practice. All the post operational reports and post incident reports that cross my desk indicate that this is not happening.

Surely the idea of making contact with the Taliban is not once it happens to get rescued by air support or the arrival of vehicles to allow the patrol to pull back into their beau geste fort but rather to maintain the contact (iow fix them) then get a response/reaction team in to kill them?

That is the normal procedure. Of course very often the response team comes in the form of a precision guided munition.

I have suggested that you send out small patrols to make contact while an airborne reaction force is loitering just out of sound range and ready to come in and do the business once the Taliban have given away their position.

That's been done and still happens. Like anything though do it too often and you set a pattern which makes you vulnerable, possible HLSs, fire support locations, interdiction points and overwatch positions are all very often mined or covered by fire. We found that placing snipers out before sending CallSign Tethered Goat out the front gate is highly effective as well.

PS - I have read Skeen's Passing It On, it sits next to Operations In Waziristan 1919-1920 and The Frontier Scouts on my bookshelves