If you say soOriginally Posted by Red Rat
There would have been a time when soldiers went in search of action and joined the SAS. From 2006 (or so) onwards they got action on their rotations with their respective units so that motivation would have fallen away.The SF take the cream, but they do not take all the cream. One of the problems they have had since 2005 is recruiting.
I agree that not all the cream goes to the SAS as they are really quite a small unit in terms of operators. There are soldiers who are excellent who are not suited to 'cloak and dagger' operations but excel in more conventional settings (like proven in the Falklands).
You can take my word for it (with the exaggeration on the number of officers in an SAS troop) they are what we would term 'top-heavy' in terms of NCOs (which they will say is warranted by the work they do).I do not know enough about troop structure to comment. But I know that the Military Police have a heavier rank structure then a line infantry company. I think it depends on the level of independence you intend to give them. SF and RMP work in smaller discrete groupings, we do not expect our infantry to do so.
Back to Sydney Jary (in 18 Platoon) who when sent on patrol would take his sgt, a corporal and if necessary a bren gun team. It is true that seldom a gash troopie would be taken on a recce, standing or fighting patrol when the numbers were small.
But as we have seen the numbers for these Afghanistan ops are not always small (like at Wardak). It is these ops where larger numbers are employed that I question the use of the SAS in the role of bayonets.
For example At Chimoio (Op Dingo) the SAS called up everyone they could to fill four Daks (96 men) and the RLI made up the numbers with 88 on the target by parachute or heliborne and a mortar section and others at the helicopter admin area (meaning effectively more RLI on the op than SAS). It had to be seen as a SAS op you see because they were in a pissing contest with the Selous Scouts (who had pulled off the wildly successful Nyadzonya raid where the first 1,000 kill count had been achieved) and they wanted to better it. It needs to be said that the SAS were well equipped for these operations but should they not have been locating targets for an Air Force / RLI strike-force to take out? And been concentrating (as they did later) on going after the external leadership in Lusaka and Maputo? The difference though was that unlike in Afghanistan there was a battalion of infantry who were permanently deployed on operations and probably more combat experienced than the SAS themselves - being the RLI.
They would say that wouldn't theyI suspect that the SF would say that they are only used on high end tasks. That is not to say that these are necessarily beyond the abilities of line infantry, certainly not appropriately trained infantry, but they are the high end tasks.(apologies to Mandy Rice Davies)
Fish and chip units looking up at the SAS tend to be left in awe at whatever they do and hang onto every word they say. It is not for the SAS to decide what is a high end task (whatever that means) but rather to find itself tasked to carry out specific tasks... but then you will find they don't fall under the local Bde for operations.
That risk word again. The question must be asked why the risk on carrying out these type of operations is so great that only the SAS can attempt them. I doubt it is based on operational complexity but rather more on unavailability of units capable of carrying out reasonably standard operations by day or night with the competence arising from experience.Depends on risk involved and effect achieved and must be placed within the campaign context. AT the moment the SF are being used to pursue a Counter-Terrorism campaign and the remainder a COIN campaign as part of an overarching campaign plan.
You are attempting to defend the indefensible now. Six months on operations every two years with personnel changes thrown in offers minimal continuity.I disagree. My fundamental issue with short tours in a COIN context is that it does not allow the relationships to be built up and proper understanding to be gained. It is more inefficient then ineffective. Units deploying in to theatre are well equipped, trained and have a very good feel for the ground. They are not entering blind and they do have residual experience of the Theatre. Even 14 Army and Slimn rotated units in and out of the line.
Every level needs continuity. Currently with the short tours Brit forces are always playing catch-up to the Taliban (especially as it appears so few Taliban are being killed thesedays). It is quite possible that in years to come the Brit forces will be mentored by the ANA and not the other way around.
Out of theatre training is better than a poke in the eye with a sharp stick but quite honestly pretty close to valueless especially if it requires the unit to deploy away from home base in the process. Advance parties during a two yearly six month rotation is like the man with one eye being king in the land of the blind. Better than a kick in the ass but not significant enough to allow the whole unit to hit the ground running on arrival in theatre.Except his unit will have been training for 9 months prior to deployment, will have pax in theatre on deployment (advance elements go 6-8 weeks ahead of main body) and the request will have been made 12 months in advance when unit tasks are allocated and CONOPS looked at.
You are starting to resort to jargon. There is no question that there is a weakness in operations at platoon level among Brit forces in Afghanistan as the majority lack the operational continuity and recent experience to acquit themselves with distinction. Their frame of reference is a comparison with other '6-month wonder units' and this is why they are in jaw dropping awe of what the SAS do. I am not going on about what they currently do but rather what the SAS currently do that they (the line infantry) should be doing as a standard part of a COIN company/platoon/section/fire-team skill set. You will never get the rotating line infantry up to the required standard as long as the tours are short.If this was to happen it would have happened in 2004-2008 in Iraq; but it didn't. Line infantry were given the skill set (which until then only the SF had possessed) to enable them to carry out the tasks at the tactical level; they still retain this skill set and still carry out these tasks at a tactical level in Afghanistan. You seem to think that line infantry do not carry out tactical level raids, strikes, arrest operations etc - but they do.
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