DKI as to the source. De Boer never cites "the rules" that he claims were "stretched". The disconnect in effect between applying "Rule of Law" versus "Laws of War" in irregular warfare was early on picked up by Trinquier, Galula and McCuen. Civil authorities are generally slow to react to an oncoming insurgency - and the peacetime setup often fails.In this climate, soldiers had greater freedom to stretch the rules. The reporting of a significant number of “killed in crossfire” was now accepted, while in the early 1970s Special Branch still treated each death as regular police work.[74]
74. Cohen, 488-89. Barry Cohen, “The War in Rhodesia: A Dissenter’s View,” African Affairs 76 (October 1977).
Ciliers noted that with respect to Rhodesia (pp.220-222 type):
The insurgents engaged in classic "selective violence" against civilians (Cilliers' term - "disciplinary killings"), which is really part of the "political struggle" as a facet of its own violence program. So also, ambushing "normal Police patrols" is more of the "political struggle"; though it also marks the transition to a more militarized phase. If the civil authorities do not adapt by shifting to at least a localized "Laws of War" construct, advantage insurgents.In general, the Rhodesian intelligence community was geared for peace-time operations. Although the insurgent threat was very real, and recognized by Special Branch as such, neither the organisation nor its methods of collecting information was suited to the more specific needs of operational intelligence. ... With the outbreak of armed attacks in late 1972, the Special Branch network of paid informers and police patrols in the North-east came close to total collapse within a matter of weeks. ... The character of the war and Special Branch method of operation within this climate were incompatible. Apart from the fact that the source of paid informants dried up almost immediately owing to a spate of insurgent 'disciplinary killings', the ambushing of normal Police patrols also severely curtailed this source of information. Within a year of the activation of Operation Hurricane it had become evident that the traditional Special Branch intelligence network had run into serious trouble.
DKI as to the sources. Since the quotes resemble Haditha, they are plausible.One soldier probably described the new attitude accurately: “If in doubt, shoot. It kept you alive.” He, for example, opened fire on a hut if he saw an insurgent hiding amidst civilians. Soldiers also disclosed that they shot at unidentified figures running at a distance.[75]
75. Cocks, 93, 97; Wylie, 144, 152. (1) Chris Cocks, Fireforce: One Man’s War in the Rhodesian Light Infantry, 4th ed. (Johannesburg: 30° South Publishers, 2006); (2) Dan Wylie, Dead Leaves: Two Years in the Rhodesian War (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2002)
Whether the practices are within or outside of the various MOUT and SASO tactical doctrines - and also within or outside of the conflicting ROEs - could be a topic for debate. That's a debate I won't presently engage in -
"Some cases shouldn't be settled. ... Some cases shouldn't be brought. ... Some cases shouldn't be debated."
As to Haditha, "best practices COIN" and FM 3-24 clearly made their point. "Hearts and Minds", gentlemen - which I believe our young men should not be sent to die for.
DKI as to the source. A brief word on "insurgents" and "civilians". The measure of "insurgent" may be a person with AK in hand or nearby; with "civilian" being anyone not fitting that measure. That doesn't mean that those "civilians" were all "innocent".Dennison’s war diary gives some idea of the number of civilians killed this way. Between 29 November 1975 and 28 July 1979, his company killed 364 insurgents and captured 39 while killing 170 civilians (the number of wounded civilians is not recorded).[76]
76. Wood, 27, 347. J.R.T. Wood, The War Diaries of André Dennison (Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing Limited, 1989)
DKI as to the source.Interestingly enough, soldiers did not consciously execute government policy when they targeted civilians. The above-mentioned soldier who shot to stay alive thought that higher-ranking officers tried to adhere to the Geneva Conventions while “the troops in the field tended to sneer at the idea.”[77]
77. Cocks, 93.
De Boer here transits from "civilians killed" (in both quotes above this quote) to "civilians targeted". "Killed" and "targeted" are two very different things - which de Boer knows full well as an educated attorney.
As to the GCs (not the APs), the 1949 Geneva Conventions, with the exception of Common Article 3, apply only to armed conflicts of an international character - which the Rhodesian conflict was not. Therefore, in order to discuss the many issues that de Boer asserts, one would have to present the actual rules to which the Rhodesian government and its "higher-ranking officers" adhered - and how the "lower rankers" violated them. De Boer fails completely in that task.
DKI as to the source.Another soldier explained how troops beat up uncooperative civilians to extract information. Such treatment was actually illegal, and usually ineffective, but often happened.[78]
78. Warren, 39-40. Charlie Warren, At the Going Down of the Sun . . . (Zanj Press, 2006).
DKI as to the source. There is a difference in rules vice an internal insurgency (CA 3 based at the time); and a cross-border operation (an aspect of the Law of Neutrality - my post on Ashley Deeks' article). Not to say that either set of rules provide an open hunting license on "civilians".An instructor also told Rhodesian Light Infantry recruits that if a civilian saw him on a cross-border operation, he would kill the person so there was less risk of compromising the mission. He would never do this in Rhodesia, because there, “the Rule of Law applied.”[79]
79. Croukamp, 410. Dennis Croukamp, The Bush War in Rhodesia: The Extraordinary Combat Memoir of a Rhodesian Reconnaissance Specialist (Boulder: Paladin Press, 2007).
No source given.Given this notion among soldiers that the killing of civilians was illegal, we cannot explain the large number of persons killed in crossfires as government policy. It was probably another manifestation of Rhodesian soldiers embracing a punitive approach toward counterinsurgency and taking it one step further than (they thought) was allowed, by showing little regard for civilian lives.
To the extent that this work of art purports to be either a piece of legal scholarship - or a legal brief - in regard to the Rhodesian "rules of engagement", it flunks. I am no more enlightened after reading it, than I was before reading it.
It may or may not hold up as an attorney's "Statement of Facts" (one should expect that to be biased; as also legal scholarship - or a legal brief - will be biased) - that depends on what its sources actually say; and how accurate they are.
Regards
Mike
Last edited by jmm99; 01-26-2012 at 10:45 PM.
Your kind words are always welcome.
Regards
Mike
Cilliers, Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia (complete pdf and sections) is here.
Last edited by jmm99; 01-27-2012 at 02:40 AM.
I've sometimes wondered why JMA keeps referring to "gooks" in Rhodesia. The comments in the linked forum thread are instructive on this account.CT's but I have more choice words for them - a good gook is a dead gook - period. We just didnt shoot enough of them.(Not without trying). We should have cleaned out miles of the country side -the whole bang shoot. If you aid, host or support a gook you are dead was my motto even if you were a minor.
The way these guys operated in indoctrinating everyone meant that anyone old enough to carry a gun was a threat. [comment on p.2 of linked thread]
GOOKS - CHARLIE'S - Whatever you want to call the bastards! - New Rhodesian Forum
Cilliers is much quoted as his work is one of the few published on the Rhodesian War. Produced in 1985 it is a bit dated and the final book in the JRT Wood trilogy is awaited with great anticipation. (Due in two years I believe)
For the 'soundbite' generation I would suggest (Doc) JRT Wood's chapter in the book 'Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare' - Marston & Malkasian
The 6,500 word chapter - Countering the Chimurenga - is a very succinct explanation of the Rhodesian War in its political context and is a must read for those with any interest in the subject.
Yes Ken the content is nonsense but I remain horrified that a university (any university) can accept that drivel as being an acceptable thesis.
That's OK for you I suppose but... by publishing that piece of garbage the Military Review legitimised the content of the article which will now become an acceptable source to be quoted from - afterall it has been published in the Military Review - and conferred (by implication) upon this 'person' the status of an expert on Rhodesia. It makes me want to throw up.I don't agree that the article necessarily reflects badly on Military Review. They publish a lot of articles of real merit and as many with no merit with an almost equal number of mediocrities. I think that sort of goes with the mission of the magazine. Been my observation over 50 plus years that about a third of the magazine on average has some worth and I've found that others agree -- where we sometimes differ is on which articles were worthwhile...
The Military Review certainly has a lot to answer for.
Thank you for your comments Mike.
I would be interested on hearing further comment relating to the construction of this 'thesis' from an academic point of view.
I was in two minds whether to quote his first paragraph or his final sentence (and decided on the latter). I note you zeroed right in on the 'problem in the first paragraph. Let's look at that then:
Rules of engagement?In the 1970s, a bloody insurgency took place in Rhodesia, now present-day Zimbabwe. African insurgents faced a settler-state determined to keep power in white hands. the government adopted a punitive and enemy-centric counterinsurgency strategy. Many Rhodesian soldiers embraced the punitive approach to such an extent that they overextended the rules of engagement. Although the Rhodesian Bush War took place in its unique historical context, it should also serve as a warning for commanders of troops currently engaged in enemy-centric “anti-terrorism” operations.
I never heard the term until I saw the movie of that name 20 years after the end of the Rhodesian war.
It should be obvious that you can't over extend what you don't have.
I suggest the problem these youngsters (20 something) have when looking back at a war which happened 30 years plus a go is that they judge actions against current norms. Quite clearly de Boer is not (or rather was not at the time he wrote this) mature enough to address this issue. Surely the arrogance of youth should be tempered by the guidance of his thesis Supervisor?
Then ... damn it ... the Military Review goes and puts his name up in lights.
...then perhaps the other hackneyed cliche of the period is the continued regurgitation of the left-wing liberal line so loved by the 'progressive' university types of the 70's (some around here I seem to recall) that:
Again I suggest a quick read of JRT Wood's - Countering the Chimurenga - from the book Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare will help these poor misguided souls understand the political dynamics of that time.African insurgents faced a settler-state determined to keep power in white hands.
...but then again if all whites in Rhodesia were not rabid diehard racists (who were not clinging to power but attempting to ensure a controlled transition to majority rule) then how would these same left-wing academics be able to continue to accept that every white down to infants were legitimate targets for rape and murder by the 'glorious' forces of liberation?
So among the photos in the first post on Rhodesian "gooks" (GOOKS, CHARLIE'S etc.) linked above, there is Chinx ("Comrade Chinx Chingaira") leading the ZANLA Ideological Choir. Jesus, you couldn't make this $hit up...or something.
Mr. Chinx is also mentioned in connection with something called the Borrowdale dance (wikipedia) among other things.
Incidentally, I went to school with a Rhodesian guy who's family had relocated to Chiang Mai. Funny guy. He ended up going to Duke, initially declaring it "the happiest place on earth" (more or less). He and the other Rhodesian and S. African kids were quite close with the African exchange students (from Ethiopia and Congo, if I recall correctly). It's a small world after all.
'Gook' was a great name which we adopted from the yanks (from Vietnam). It was good in that it replaced the tendency of earlier times to use the 'N' or 'K' words which given that the majority of men under arms on the government side Rhodesia were Black was inappropriate. While 'gook' may have had racial connotations in Vietnam it was a neutral word in Rhodesia.
"May have", huh? You're quite the diplomat when you choose to be, JMA. Well, I won't argue with you... It's nice that you spared the gentle readers here the actual use of the 'N' or 'K' words (whatever those might be). Unfortunate racial connotations, perhaps. We can all be thankful that we have the "great name", Gook, as a harmless substitute. Awesome. I'm liking this new thoughtful persona of yours. Keep up the good work.
Ironically, the Ethiopian guy, who was the son of teachers, suggested (perhaps mischievously) that I might be a fascist because I listened to Motorhead; a band that, according to him, indirectly glorified Nazi ideology. And this was after I'd given him a pair of Malaysian Army camouflage fatigues that he'd borrowed and seemed reluctant to part with! Kids today...or yesterday in this case. Nice guy, 'tho.
Gotta go, it's Gook New Year, rotsa chinks to see...
They took this stuff very seriously ... then they could as the UN fed them so they had lots of time to fill. Clever guy this Chinx... he found a comfy little niche surrounded by women and far away from combat.
Oh yes, the UN. When the recruits crossed the border to go for training they were registered as refugees and as such increased the numbers of 'refugees' the UN provided with food, shelter etc etc. So when we hit gook camps the UN were able to confirm that Rhodesian forces had attacked a registered refugee camp. Clever move. The Scandinavian countries provided much of the food to these 'refugees' (they knew who was getting the food).
This happens all the time.Incidentally, I went to school with a Rhodesian guy who's family had relocated to Chiang Mai. Funny guy. He ended up going to Duke, initially declaring it "the happiest place on earth" (more or less). He and the other Rhodesian and S. African kids were quite close with the African exchange students (from Ethiopia and Congo, if I recall correctly). It's a small world after all.
A Rhodesian who went to Sandhurst (2 years at that time) recalled that in the first part of the first year the Africans from Nigeria/Ghana etc shunned him for being a Rhodesian but certainly by the end of the first year they had befriended him on the basis that "at least you understand Africans". He made some great friends through to the end of the course and they wrote each other for years thereafter.
I had a similar experience working in Mozambique (with expatriate yanks and Brits). The locals used to come to me with their problems because as they said, "You are very 'cheeky' but at least you understand our problems."
In 1980 (after the shooting stopped) we had a gook (aka ZANLA Liaison Officer) at the Brigade HQ where I was a staff officer (this was in the days when brigades were commanded by a brigadier and run by a few majors and a handful of captains).
Comrade Crispin was palmed off onto me and the Int Offr (a SAS Captain) for a daily liaison briefing. The Brits on the Monitoring Force told us that Crispin had the status of a full colonel and should be treated as such ...( you have to hand it to the Brits... they have a sense of humour).
Anyway things were quite boring after the war so we started to booby trap his chair using practice detonators (things about the size of a match head which used to go pop instead of bang). Every time we heard the 'pop' we would shout 'GOTSHA'. Crispin never saw the funny side and reported me to the Brits for misusing explosives. No sense of humour at all.
Then one day comrade Crispin confronted me on the use of the word 'gooks' which we continued to use during our briefings. "Why you call us gooks, what exactly is a gook?" So I told him that a 'gook' was the polite name for a !$£%&*!"£$£%*&^$£"!%$^&£**$£"!%$. He was not amused and reported me to the Brits for having a bad attitude.
But despite all this comrade Crispin and I were big mates When ever a shipment of canned fish from those ever so caring Scandinavians arrived he would always present me with a carton. I suspect that he realised that despite all their huffing and puffing the Brits were really nothing more than paper tigers and if he wanted to get anything done it would have to be through me. It was fun while it lasted.
Last edited by JMA; 01-27-2012 at 08:55 AM.
Anyone who sez "gook" is a racist. Anyone who doesn't say "gook" is a well-disciplined racist!
All joking aside, in Asia it's been my experience that people don't really have a sense of humour about the gook/chink banter. Nine times out of ten you might get just a dirty look, but there's always a chance some overly-sensitive soul will whip out a paint-stripper or some such and slice your throat open.
I'm at my philosophical best when watching a glorious African sunset with a copius supply of bitterly cold chibulis (beers) readily to hand. What a pleasure!
There were no takers for a discussion on Marlantes. Pity, it is a good point of departure for a good in-depth discussion.
My current preoccupation is the Military Review, however. Had a browse of past editions since the shock of last week.
Remember Matthew Ridgeway encouraging young officers to read, read, read and also do you remember the birth of the current requirement for all officers to have an academic degree by the time they reach captain?
So now the US Army finds itself with millions of men of which thousands (maybe hundreds of thousands) hold degrees and they are still unable to produce a six issue per year magazine of some cerebral quality. Probably a case of not enough submissions or not enough submissions of quality? There has got to be a problem somewhere, yes?
So they are scraping the barrel for content. Whatever the reason is, it is quite astounding.
So really Ridgeway was only half right. If reading leads to thinking then yes, but only if it results in a proven and demonstrable improvement in the thinking/analytical/interpretive/practical skills of the officer corps.
I have never been a believer in reading lists (especially those provided by individuals - on the basis of "See what I have been reading (aren't I a clever boy)."
I would say, "OK so you read that what did you learn." (Believe me I have been tempted here ... but being the sensitive soul that I am I have refrained from such comment lest my best intentions be interpreted as being provocative).
Back to Marlantes. Here we have a Vietnam veteran with a nice cluster of bravery medals (Navy Cross, Bronze Star etc) who has written about what those who have not been in combat (Grossman, Keegan, Holmes, Bourke etc) have written about speculatively.
Surely with Iraq and Afghanistan behind the US military there must now be literally thousands of officers (and other ranks) who are able to talk about combat/killing/fear/courage/etc/etc from personal experience?
Maybe through the teachings of Grossman they believe that it must be terrible to have to kill an enemy soldier and not having nightmares about having blown away someone who desperately needed and deserved to be killed indicates that they have a real, not psychological, but psychiatric problem they dare not share with anyone. Maybe that they experienced no/little/minimal fear response to close combat as opposed to what Grossman suggests they should have maybe indicates that they have a very big psychiatric problem they dare not share with anyone. I could go on.
Heavens above Vietnam was 40 years ago and Marlantes comes in from the cold only now. I hope we don't have to wait 40 years for the latest crop of combat exposed soldiers to lay it all out. Now there is something meaningful for the Military Review to get involved with (instead of allowing itself to be use as a platform for the publication of a sub-standard pseudo academic excuse for a thesis.)
Last edited by JMA; 01-28-2012 at 12:44 PM.
JMA: You mentioned in another conversation that you were not acquainted, when in RLI service, with the term "rules of engagement". I don't question that, as such, since our own current FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, does not use the term "rules of engagement" once.
Of course, FM 27-10 is full of ROEs for different situations - as have been US service regulations and doctrinal publications since the 1863 Lieber Code (which is mostly ROEs). In both the US and UK, the ROEs have come under different names from before WWI - e.g., U.S. War Dept. Doc. No. 467, Rules of Land Warfare (1914), and J.W Spaight, War Rights on Land (1911).
So, unless Rhodesia was a rara avis in British colonial terms, it should have had "field service regulations" (including "rules of engagement") for both its police and military services. De Boer's sin was not one of illogic, as such - though, of course, one cannot over-extend or violate rules that do not exist. His sin was in not researching to find the rules that probably did exist for both military and police. If he couldn't find such rules, then he should have said so - and altered his conclusions.
Of course, just because written rules exist does not mean that everyone is aware of them (much less that people are really trained in them). So far as ROEs are concerned, I think Spaight's joke is on point (and perhaps not really much of a joke today):
cited here (in a prior conversation with you)...... for an ambitious subaltern who wishes to be known vaguely as an author and, at the same time, not to be troubled with undue inquiry into the claim upon which his title rests, there can be no better subject than the International Law of War. For it is a quasi-military subject in which no one in the army or out of it, is very deeply interested, which everyone very contentedly takes on trust, and which may be written about without one person in ten thousand being able to tell whether the writing is adequate or not.
As to MR, I think the discussion here justifies the article's publication. I also could name a half-dozen writers who would say the article is just great - based on their own articles re: "war crimes", etc.
As an aside, I went back to Bruce Hoffman's 1991 RAND piece on Rhodesia. His Appendix C, Cross-Border Raids, summarizes several dozen raids in Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Angola. A study of those raids (if there is more available factually than Hoffman's brief summaries) seems presently material in light of the loosening of restrictions by two US administrations on those direct actions.
---------------------
Another topic - briefly. Going into what soldiers call their enemies is not going to be useful here. I don't need an education on what those terms mean. If you want to know where I stand, I stand with Randall Kennedy (my gosh, JMM agrees with a Princeton, Oxford, Yale Law grad, who teaches at Harvard Law). If you want to know where he stands, buy and read his book. I'd suggest termination of "gook" posts.
Regards
Mike
Cheers!
Given that less than 1% of the US population serves in the military, and less than perhaps 10% of that particular demographic will publish in such a magazine:
- How deep & wide is the talent pool of concern?
- How many who are serving/have served *really* read/tabbed/marked-up/used the fm's?
- Of those that bother to read them how many *really* believe that fm's have all/some/any of the answers?
- If one's paper shows that one is thinking outside the box by using 'non-approved references' (i.e. not fm's or the reference of the day) or questioning the status quo how long until the 'career light' starts blinking?
Pity, some of them are quite interesting, useful, and dare i say influential...and keep in mind that some reading lists of late include blogs.
It could be further argued that blog's (to include swj), are a 'new' form of books and periodicals which are not subject to the control of [insert whatever form of detested regulatory framework here - burn in hell SOPA] and can potentially be a better place to learn about/find a balanced/nuanced understanding of what one is looking for than in some 'status-quo-sponsored' periodicals...
Now, about that clever thing...one could limit one's discussions to fellow readers and continue to avoid (or worse) the social climbers...
PS - Like Backwards, and JMM, I am not a fan of the name calling thing either
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