Initial Officer Selection

[JMA]

The question you should have asked, based on your statement: "The troopie/the private soldier/the grunt still needs to 'do what he is told' without question." and my response to that should have been "Explain to me if you will what is the degree of flexibility soldiers (at the various levels) should have?"

...and I would ask you to define what you mean by flexibility in that context.

Obeying isn't the issue, obedience is necessary but "without question" is questionable.

My context for my original statement is the only one that really matters... combat.

If I give the command (which I did often enough) ... 'Prepare to assault' I would not have tolerated it (if it had happened) had some troopie asked/suggested/questioned/whatever: 'Excuse me sir, don't you think we should rather pull back to a safe distance and call in an airstrike then all go back to base for tea?'

Battle orders at that level must be carried out without hesitation and without question... even today.

I do, however, recall reading of a US company commander refusing to take his company into the attack citing the lack of fire support planned while knowing that additional fire support was indeed available. Not sure of the wording of that exchange (if it did indeed happen) but I sympathise. In the Brit tradition in such a situation one would request the oder to attack with a lack of fire support in writing as this avoids any counter accusation of insubordination. Know of a few instances where that happened in my war.

Out of combat a young officer should rarely issue orders without first discussing matters with his platoon sergeant (or in certain circumstances his company commander). In my three years as a operational (at war) Troop (platoon) commander it would be inconceivable to think that I ever issued orders for base routine/training/etc (other than in actual combat) without first discussing this with my sergeant. (And before the troopies were informed it is likely that the sergeant would have prepared the corporals and as such the troopies would have an idea of what was coming before the order group) So what is there for some troopie to question? If I have failed to elucidate my orders/instructions clearly a troopie may seek clarity but not question.

In training and in peacetime or less than full bore conflict, Troops should be encouraged to ask questions (which annoys the hell out of insecure NCOs and Officers ) simply because they will learn more and faster if they do so. I've watched a lot of Armies around the world at work. In all of them, the good units had NCOs and Officers who encouraged questions and who went to great pains to tell their Troops WHY they were doing certain things. The rationale is that if a Troopie gets used to one explaining things in a way that makes sense, he learns that there's a method to what often seems to be madness and that his superiors are not mental midgets then, when there is not time for questions, he will just act -- and do so with decent judgement. The NCOs and Officers also learn who will ask the best -- and the dumbest -- questions. It's a two way learning exercise and everyone and the unit benefit.

Maybe its semantics.

As I have stated above I am happy for anyone to seek clarity but not to question. The difference is obvious... and maybe can be discussed as a separate issue.

Finally, if you have a situation where officers and NCOs are issuing 'questionable' orders then you have the wrong guys in the job. Fire them!

In the Afghanistan thread a year or more ago when I suggested that seats on every flight out (back to the UK or Stateside) should have seats reserved for officers/NCOs who have been relieved (fired) I received the indignant response that in the US you don't fire people you reassign them. Maybe there lies the problem?

[Ken White]

...and I would ask you to define what you mean by flexibility in that context.

Flexibility was your word, not mine. You asked: "Explain to me if you will what is the degree of flexibility soldiers (at the various levels) should have in obeying orders?" As I wrote, obedience is not an issue or in question IMO -- as to an answer to your question as nearly as it applies, he should have the flexibility to ask questions. How much is dependent upon the circumstances and the people involved; some kids should be encouraged to ask questions, some should be discouraged. Many questions in training , few to none in combat. The old "depends on the situation" applies, as always...

My context for my original statement is the only one that really matters... combat.

I thought that's what we were discussing, combat or training for it. That last is when the questions should be encouraged, if that occurs and decent answers are given, then there will be no questions in combat...

...I would not have tolerated it (if it had happened) had some troopie asked/suggested/questioned/whatever: 'Excuse me sir, don't you think we should rather pull back to a safe distance and call in an airstrike then all go back to base for tea?'

Nor should you, nor would I or would I even suggest that -- nor would most anyone else suggest it and I doubt many if any Troops would ask that -- other than to pull your leg, which I suspect happened a bit...

Out of combat a young officer should rarely issue orders without first discussing matters with his platoon sergeant (And before the troopies were informed it is likely that the sergeant would have prepared the corporals and as such the troopies would have an idea of what was coming before the order group {{ * }}) So what is there for some troopie to question? If I have failed to elucidate my orders/instructions clearly a troopie may seek clarity but not question.

I don't disagree with any of that, nor did I suggest anything to the contrary. It's during that {{ * }} time (as well as in all training) that questions should be encouraged. If you were successful and I suppose you were, then your NCOs did that -- whether you approved or knew or not.

As I have stated above I am happy for anyone to seek clarity but not to question. The difference is obvious... and maybe can be discussed as a separate issue.

While I agree in principle, we used different strokes, I never objected to questions or suggestions -- some Privates can come up with amazingly good ideas if one just listens.

I received the indignant response that in the US you don't fire people you reassign them. Maybe there lies the problem?

I recall the exchange. I do not recall any indignation directed at you or the suggestion, rather a resigned 'we don't do it that way.' Whether we should or not is another story...

For counterinsurgency warfare you are looking for characteristics in officers which better equip them for the type of 'decentralised' warfare. They specifically require independence of thought and spirit and initiative to operate outside direct control. If officers who display these characteristics are grouped in units which are deployed into such a theatre then the best result will be achieved.

It makes no difference how good, how capable they are or how they are grouped. If they are not trusted, they will not be allowed by their superiors to exercise much independence. The obvious flip side is, as I wrote, better training promotes more trust. As I've written many times, our training is marginal and Congress and the senior leadership of the US Army are not much interested in improving it a great deal. Bad cess to them and you and I can complain about it but that won't fix the problem.

It is little wonder that 'counterinsurgency' has developed a bad name because the stuff produced off a Henry Ford type production line gets rotated through these war theatres in rapid succession whether they suit the requirements of the type of warfare or not.

That's partly true but there are other negative factors. It's simply an idea whose time has past. You were on the cusp as that era passed. Enjoy your memories but don't grouse at others who are precluded from doing many things you and I could do.

[wm]

...It makes no difference how good, how capable they are or how they are grouped. If they are not trusted, they will not be allowed by their superiors to exercise much independence. The obvious flip side is, as I wrote, better training promotes more trust.

While I do not disagree that better training promotes trust, I submit that trust is rather hard to practice when those outside the chain of command, but who hold the purse strings, force military leaders to micromanage for a variety of reasons.
Case in point: at least one US 4-star general (CG, USAMC) (probably several others that included the CJCS and the VCJCS, the CENTCOM Cdr, and the CSA) getting daily reports by bumper number on the status of uparmoring Humvees in Iraq/Kuwait. Possible reason: some zealous reporters' stories on GI inventiveness in concocting ballistic protection for Humvee passengers, a vehicle never envisoned as an armored personnel carrier, and the knee jerk response by certain elected officials and their staffs to such stories.

The following from Bob's World latest post

There is no putting the genie of high tech capabilities that have resulted in nannie cam leadership of late back in the bottle, but we need to make damn sure we are building a force that is ready to be just as effective when someone takes that genie away, bottle and all.

is just the latest variation on a theme. I seem to recall Bn Cdrs micromanaging platoon-level fights in VN from their helicopters. With that kind of background informing the leadership development of the mentors of much of today's military senior leadership, is it any wonder that the best we might hope for from the current crop of seniors is something like a Reaganesque "trust but verify"?

I can only speak to the American military, based on my experience. One hopes that other nations' militaries are not equally "blessed" with such trust and oversight.

[Ken White]

While I do not disagree that better training promotes trust, I submit that trust is rather hard to practice when those outside the chain of command... the knee jerk response by certain elected officials and their staffs to such stories.

Sadly true and an indictment of the media and the Congress but not so much those Leaders who were forced into such a position. That story, in variations, is all too common. It's also worldwide though we have over developed it here in the US.

I seem to recall Bn Cdrs micromanaging platoon-level fights in VN from their helicopters. With that kind of background informing the leadership development of the mentors of much of today's military senior leadership, is it any wonder that the best we might hope for from the current crop of seniors is something like a Reaganesque "trust but verify"?

Goes back further than that. Tales of Patton and even Bradley visiting the Troops and getting over directive abound. It got kicked up a notch in Korea after the mess settled down into trench warfare; too many senior Commanders (and their Staffs...) with too little to do could visit and 'engineer success.' Sad.

In Viet Nam the trend was excacerbated by the fact of major shortfalls in Captains and Senior NCOs in 67-68 -- those Bn Cdrs learned 2LTs and brand new SGTs would do anything you asked but didn't know much and so need a lot of supervision...

The trend and tendency was / is reinforced by the type of low intensity warfare in VN and today; gives the senior folks with too little to do a chance to piddle. That's particularly bothersome in an Army that prides itself on 'zero defects' like performance and staying busy. It's also all too easy with today's Comm and surveillance assets...

It, as Bob says, is not going away and is likely to get worse before it gets better. The saving factor is that such foolishness cannot be practiced in a major, high intensity rapidly moving conflict and we can learn to do it right -- after unnecessarily killing too many people and firing the nervous...

I can only speak to the American military, based on my experience. One hopes that other nations' militaries are not equally "blessed" with such trust and oversight.

Based on my observation, it's endemic worldwide, the more democratic the nation, the worse the problem...

[JMA]

I don't disagree with any of that, nor did I suggest anything to the contrary.

As I suggested earlier it may all be in the semantics.

I tend to shy away from the word 'questions' because it may be construed as order being 'questioned'.

There is a big difference between in combat and during training for combat.

During training there is plenty of time to discuss the reasons behind actions with all ranks. Certainly in the time I spent training officers I encouraged them to think/analyze/etc... in fact if they did not have an opinion on the matter under discussion I considered them to be (intellectually) limited.

In fact when you are training for a war into which you will be hurled in a matter of months or less it tends to focus the attention. It is in this period of training for war that you allow troops to seek clarity, to discuss drills and tactics and reach a level where they understand what is expected of them and the possible tactical options that they will be required to take part in. (note: no use of the word 'question'.)

Once you cock your weapon and head out the time for seeking clarity is over. You just do as you are damn well told.

[Ken White]

As I suggested earlier it may all be in the semantics.

Not that (3), I agree with that. It's a feature of this discussion.

I tend to shy away from the word 'questions' because it may be construed as order being 'questioned'.

See? That's just being finicky and over semantically involved.

There is a big difference between in combat and during training for combat.

That (1). The difference should be as slight as one can make it. I agree with the rest of that thought. Particularly this:

It is in this period of training for war that you allow troops to seek clarity, to discuss drills and tactics and reach a level where they understand what is expected of them and the possible tactical options that they will be required to take part in.

However, this is a reversion to semantics:

(note: no use of the word 'question'.)

We each had / have a choice, I never object to questions, the more nervous types often do.

Once you cock your weapon and head out the time for seeking clarity is over. You just do as you are damn well told.

That (2). I certainly did not always do that and I rather doubt you did either. That, frankly is dangerous and just wrong. Things change and you have to adapt. You cannot ask for thinking Officers and NCOs -- and other ranks -- on the one hand then ask for robot like total compliance on the other; you can't have it both ways (I'd also note we're back to that trust thingy... ).

In 1966 in Viet Nam, I was unfortunately * attached to Dave Hackworth, then an Acting Bn Cdr, at one time. He gave me a mission using the Platoon of which I was the acting PL and I said "Yes, Sir" then went about it in a totally different manner than the way he had over directed be employed. He was afterwards quite torqued but couldn't say or do much but grumble because we had been successful and had no casualties. Aside from that incident I have many, many times disregarded orders, in peace and in combat, and done so with variations from very slight to totally ignoring and turning off my radio. I strongly encourage anyone who thinks to do the same. YMMV.

* He blustered and boasted a lot, bluffed -- poorly -- a lot...

[JMA]

In 1966 in Viet Nam, I was unfortunately * attached to Dave Hackworth, then an Acting Bn Cdr, at one time. He gave me a mission using the Platoon of which I was the acting PL and I said "Yes, Sir" then went about it in a totally different manner than the way he had over directed be employed. He was afterwards quite torqued but couldn't say or do much but grumble because we had been successful and had no casualties. Aside from that incident I have many, many times disregarded orders, in peace and in combat, and done so with variations from very slight to totally ignoring and turning off my radio. I strongly encourage anyone who thinks to do the same. YMMV.

I'm not sure I fully understand what you are meaning here (and the circumstances where a bn comd issues patrol orders directly to a platoon - where was your coy comd?)

Are you saying that a Bn Comd gave orders for a patrol more than the mission (being what to do) and instructed on the execution (how to do it) as well?

I can't think of circumstances where that would be required or advisable other than where the platoon commander is an absolute greenhorn or in an 'in contact' defensive setting where the movement tolerances are extremely tight.

The guiding principle in issuing such orders is to tell the patrol comd what to do (the mission) but not how to do it (the execution).

What I learned at the feet of the masters and adopted myself was to brief a patrol commander on his task (mission) then tell him to go away and plan his patrol but before he issued orders to come back to me and run the outline plan past me. In this way I could get a feel for the competence of the commander while at the same time being able to influence the conduct to some degree (while knowing that once the patrol commander was on his own he could do almost as he pleased regardless of what I had said).

This is how the men are separated from the boys. The more competent officers/NCOs tend to be given all the more testing patrol tasks while the junior ones or those about which there are some doubts get given the routine stuff.

As stated I never deviated from my orders because I was never told how to do it but suggest that where patrol comds find themselves in such a situation where they deviate from the orders on how to do it the troopies don't need to know this is happening. The last thing one needs, as it is bad for discipline, is for a general belief to develop that orders are negotiable where all junior officers and NCOs believe that they can decide which orders to follow and which to ignore.

[Ken White]

I'm not sure I fully understand what you are meaning here (and the circumstances where a bn comd issues patrol orders directly to a platoon - where was your coy comd?)

In reverse order, The Platoon was a Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon which did reconnaissance and surveillance missions as well as some limited economy of force actions. Only one per Battalion, assigned to Headquarters Company (which does not exercise tactical command). It is one of three tactical Platoons (Recon, Antitank, Mortar) which operate independently and directly under Bn Control. They are generally placed under Operational Control of other Bns only rarely; this was one of those rare times. Indeed, during seven years in such platoons in three units, that was one of only two times, both quite brief, such detachment was experienced.

I was given an over prescriptive order for a reconnaissance and an economy of force mission combined. Mission was not a particular problem but the 'how I think this should be done' way it was couched, engendered in large part due to that trust issue; he didn't know me or the capability of the Platoon, I didn't know him (that happens often in large Armies that rotate people frequently) was IMO the wrong approach, likely to result in failure and with a chance of own casualties. So, rather than get in an argument I would lose, I just said "Yes, Sir" and went ahead and did it my way.

Are you saying that a Bn Comd gave orders for a patrol more than the mission (being what to do) and instructed on the execution (how to do it) as well?

Exactly. Most would never do that, Hackworth, OTOH, was a legend in his own mind...

I can't think of circumstances where that would be required or advisable other than where the platoon commander is an absolute greenhorn or in an 'in contact' defensive setting where the movement tolerances are extremely tight.

I agree -- even given a cross attachment where neither person knows the other and the competence of the tasked organization is not known, it's rare but it does happen.

What I learned at the feet of the masters and adopted myself was to brief a patrol commander on his task (mission) then tell him to go away and plan his patrol but before he issued orders to come back to me and run the outline plan past me. In this way I could get a feel for the competence of the commander while at the same time being able to influence the conduct to some degree (while knowing that once the patrol commander was on his own he could do almost as he pleased regardless of what I had said).\

That's the way it's done ordinarily. For this particular mission, there was a time problem and that's why we were doing it instead of his own Reconnaissance Platoon. Which might've had a problem doing it in any event, that platoon had been combined with that Battalion's Antitank Platoon into what they called the 'Recondo' Platoon, it was, in essence a junior rifle company and was used as such and thus did not do reconnaissance missions often.

As stated I never deviated from my orders because I was never told how to do it

Well, good for you. Everyone should be so lucky. It is indeed a rare circumstance to be told 'how' but it does happen.

,,,but suggest that where patrol comds find themselves in such a situation where they deviate from the orders on how to do it the troopies don't need to know this is happening. The last thing one needs, as it is bad for discipline, is for a general belief to develop that orders are negotiable where all junior officers and NCOs believe that they can decide which orders to follow and which to ignore.

We can disagree on that with a situation dependent caveat (that approach is sometimes needed, more often not. The Troops aren't stupid...). I always had more confidence in myself, in the other NCOs and the Troops than that. In my experience that vaguely martinetish attitude certainly exists and is in fact too prevalent but everyone doesn't operate that way. Fortunately IMO.

[JMA]

In reverse order, The Platoon was a Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon which did reconnaissance and surveillance missions as well as some limited economy of force actions. Only one per Battalion, assigned to Headquarters Company (which does not exercise tactical command). It is one of three tactical Platoons (Recon, Antitank, Mortar) which operate independently and directly under Bn Control.

Yes of course that is the standard battalion arrangement.

They are generally placed under Operational Control of other Bns only rarely; this was one of those rare times. Indeed, during seven years in such platoons in three units, that was one of only two times, both quite brief, such detachment was experienced.

Yes not normal for standard infantry but SF would be used to be being tasked to 'answer a question' through recce just about anywhere (but would certainly not be told how to do it).

I was given an over prescriptive order for a reconnaissance and an economy of force mission combined. Mission was not a particular problem but the 'how I think this should be done' way it was couched, engendered in large part due to that trust issue; he didn't know me or the capability of the Platoon, I didn't know him (that happens often in large Armies that rotate people frequently) was IMO the wrong approach, likely to result in failure and with a chance of own casualties. So, rather than get in an argument I would lose, I just said "Yes, Sir" and went ahead and did it my way.

OK

It is indeed a rare circumstance to be told 'how' but it does happen.We can disagree on that with a situation dependent caveat (that approach is sometimes needed, more often not. The Troops aren't stupid...). I always had more confidence in myself, in the other NCOs and the Troops than that. In my experience that vaguely martinetish attitude certainly exists and is in fact too prevalent but everyone doesn't operate that way. Fortunately IMO.

Yes the troopies may get an idea of what is happening... I agree they are not all stupid, but I suggest it is a test of character for the patrol comd to resist the temptation to 'wave a flag' saying look what I'm doing. I'm flipping the Bn Comd.

Now moving along to the combat refusals in Vietnam. I assume there were valid reasons for these? If not how did this cancer start and spread?