Initial Officer Selection

[JMA]

Eike Middeldorf et al, "Taktik im Russlandfeldzug" (Tactics in the Russian Campaign), 1956, p. 228

The suitable form for this are Jagdkommandos [literally: hunting commands] in strength of at most 40 to 60 men. They demand a different kind of leaders and fighters than the combat troops demand. The best fighters against gangs were mostly so-called "outsiders", means soldiers in whose personnel reviews often had remarks such as "difficult subordinate".

Somewhat in support in this is the British manual 'Keeping the Peace' Part 2 - Tactics and Training - 1963.

332. Leadership and battle discipline.. Fighting an underground enemy probably requires a higher standard of junior leadership than any other type of warfare yet experienced. ... Command often has to be decentralized and the training of junior commanders must, therefore, be directed towards giving them the ability and confidence to make sound decisions and act on their own initiative.

Which leads onto David's question...

[JMA]

I have assumed this (the need for immediate, unthinking obedience) a valid point. Has this been recognised in contemporary officer selection? Or should it?

Start with Antony Beevor's 'Inside the British Army' - Part 2: To Be An Officer. 1990

...following on from my previous post you need higher quality junior commanders to be able to 'operate in small groups with little or no outside help'.(Keeping the Peace 1963)

What has changed? Nothing. Churning officers out by the hundred to meet the requirements does nothing to improve individual quality.

Now move onto Richard Holmes' 'Acts of War' - pages 316-31

Where do you draw the line on where 'immediate instinctive' (rather than unthinking) obedience to the word of command begins and ends?

Holmes cites 'Crisis in Command' where testimony to the US Senate indicated 254 Vietnam 'combat refusals' in 1971 alone.

So I suggest this is being phrased incorrectly.

The problem with command decisions and subsequent orders is when they fail and waste soldiers lives. The solution to this is not for subordinates to second guess the orders they receive but rather for the quality of officers to be improved. This not happening.

The troopie/the private soldier/the grunt still needs to 'do what he is told' without question. It is the NCOs and the officers who need to get their act together.

[JMA]

It depends.
Sometimes very urgent action is required. In this case the superior needs to have enough trust of his subordinates that they execute asap without much 'thinking'.

Those who need bureaucracy-given authority to enforce such a rapid reaction are likely the same who are not competent enough to convince their subordinates in less urgent situations and demand 'unthinking obedience' on such occasions, too.

So this brings us full circle back to leadership.

Got a delightful book the other day (available through the US Marine Corps Association) called 'Battle Leadership' by Captain Adolf Von Schell. A German officer who served during WW1 and then attended US Staff College in 1930-31 the nine short chapters are based on lectures he gave to the US military over that period (so appears not to be a translation).

He says this on leadership:

To be an officer means to be a leader - to be a leader of troops in battle. It is certainly correct that leaders, like great artists, are born and not made; but even the born artist requires years of hard study and practice before he masters his art. So it is with the military leader; if he is to learn the art of war, he must practice with the tools of that art. (page 93)

[Ken White]

The troopie/the private soldier/the grunt still needs to 'do what he is told' without question. It is the NCOs and the officers who need to get their act together.

I very much agree the latter item is needed.

However, I disagree strongly on the initial statement. Such troopies/private soldiers/grunts will become the NCOs -- rapidly in event of a major conflict where casualties are far heavier that in any of the post 1950 wars -- and you will have institutionalized unthinking response and conditioned the Officers (who may themselves have been rankers at one time, or not ...) to such an attitude.

After learning that was a poor design for modern war in World War II, that's the level to which most armed forces in the west have descended today -- and you want perpetuate that?

[JMA]

I very much agree the latter item is needed.

However, I disagree strongly on the initial statement. Such troopies/private soldiers/grunts will become the NCOs -- rapidly in event of a major conflict where casualties are far heavier that in any of the post 1950 wars -- and you will have institutionalized unthinking response and conditioned the Officers (who may themselves have been rankers at one time, or not ...) to such an attitude.

After learning that was a poor design for modern war in World War II, that's the level to which most armed forces in the west have descended today -- and you want perpetuate that?

OK, lets start with point one. What do you believe the problem is behind the failure to enable junior leaders to act with greater initiative and independence? Followed by, is the selection process (specifically for direct entry officers) suitable to select for the increased requirement for independence and initiative?

Then onto the area of apparent disagreement.

Explain to me if you will what is the degree of flexibility soldiers (at the various levels) should have in obeying orders?

[Fuchs]

There's not enough choice, so not all NCOs / officers can be true leaders. Simply not enough recruits for that.

The issue is thus not the choice who becomes a superior, but who is being allocated to a (small) unit command which requires a lot of leadership instead of management (many officer jobs are about being staff working bees or about being a liaison+responsibility-bearer).

A natural leader should be recognised and if acceptable with his other traits be employed in a combat or engineer unit or in a rotten unit that needs repair - not be mis-used as staff working bee or lead a repair shop, for example.

This does of course require that combat troops get priority for quality personnel (and thus prestige advantage) over support and staff units.


A stupid private on the major's office phone may be a nuisance and require training even for simple jobs - a stupid infantryman may kill his squad through stupidity.

[Ken White]

OK, lets start with point one. What do you believe the problem is behind the failure to enable junior leaders to act with greater initiative and independence?

Lack of trust. That is engendered by two things, the relative youth with thus presumed nominally poor judgmental skills thereunto pertaining and / or inadequate training. It is my belief that a significant improvement in training is possible, affordable and can be effective in alleviating concerns about youth and judgement. Another approach -- or, better, a complementary one -- is to improve personnel selection, psychological assessment and management by leaving people in units longer so that trust can be developed by exposure; the current common practice of excessive rotations of personnel (the US is the worst offender but others have the problem to a lesser extent) is detrimental to unit cohesion and the critical -- really critical -- building of trust.

Followed by, is the selection process (specifically for direct entry officers) suitable to select for the increased requirement for independence and initiative?

No. Fuchs comment, discussed below is one reason. Essentially, there is legislative and societal pressure to not do this to avoid any hint of discrimination. I know...

Explain to me if you will what is the degree of flexibility soldiers (at the various levels) should have in obeying orders?

That answer to the question you asked is almost none at entry progressing to a great deal as trust is earned as shown by promotions. If Officer are accorded the luxury of questioning an order and being forced to resign or comply after due discussion, the only issue for other ranks should be the length of discussion. Concomitant with this is that promotions should be on merit and not as is today normal throughout western armies based on a reward for doing a good job. A method of pecuniary or other awards for doing a good job at any level should be totally separated from promotions to higher rank which must be rigidly merit based (good luck with that in any Democratic nation...).

The question you should have asked, based on your statement: "The troopie/the private soldier/the grunt still needs to 'do what he is told' without question." and my response to that should have been "Explain to me if you will what is the degree of flexibility soldiers (at the various levels) should have?"

Obeying isn't the issue, obedience is necessary but "without question" is questionable.

In training and in peacetime or less than full bore conflict, Troops should be encouraged to ask questions (which annoys the hell out of insecure NCOs and Officers ) simply because they will learn more and faster if they do so. I've watched a lot of Armies around the world at work. In all of them, the good units had NCOs and Officers who encouraged questions and who went to great pains to tell their Troops WHY they were doing certain things. The rationale is that if a Troopie gets used to one explaining things in a way that makes sense, he learns that there's a method to what often seems to be madness and that his superiors are not mental midgets then, when there is not time for questions, he will just act -- and do so with decent judgement. The NCOs and Officers also learn who will ask the best -- and the dumbest -- questions. It's a two way learning exercise and everyone and the unit benefit.

Fuchs:

There's not enough choice, so not all NCOs / officers can be true leaders. Simply not enough recruits for that.

That can often be true, will be true in major war but in peace or given small wars, there can be more choice. Most Armies are reluctant to exercise that choice due to societal, statutory or other constraints. Still, your statement has broad and great applicability. There are two solutions to that, fewer Officers and NCOs (most Armies have too many of both) and separation of rewards system from promotion systems -- too many Officers and NCOs rise to Peter Principle levels merely by sticking around long enough to get promoted. Seniority in point of time in service or time in grade exists because of the inability to be more selective in who gets promoted in peacetime. there are many ways to get around that...

The issue is thus not the choice who becomes a superior, but who is being allocated to a (small) unit command which requires a lot of leadership instead of management (many officer jobs are about being staff working bees or about being a liaison+responsibility-bearer).

A natural leader should be recognised and if acceptable with his other traits be employed in a combat or engineer unit or in a rotten unit that needs repair - not be mis-used as staff working bee or lead a repair shop, for example.

This does of course require that combat troops get priority for quality personnel (and thus prestige advantage) over support and staff units.

A stupid private on the major's office phone may be a nuisance and require training even for simple jobs - a stupid infantryman may kill his squad through stupidity.

Yes!

[ganulv]

The NCOs and Officers also learn who will ask the best -- and the dumbest -- questions. It's a two way learning exercise and everyone and the unit benefit.

I’ve seen that process any number of times but hadn’t ever seen it articulated. Danke!

[Ulenspiegel]

JMA wrote:

Got a delightful book the other day (available through the US Marine Corps Association) called 'Battle Leadership' by Captain Adolf Von Schell. A German officer who served during WW1 and then attended US Staff College in 1930-31 the nine short chapters are based on lectures he gave to the US military over that period (so appears not to be a translation).

IIRC von Schell was there as student, his instructors recognized his qualities and hard earned practical experience and allowed him to give lectures. This is dicussed in "Command Culture" from Joerg Muth.

[JMA]

JMA wrote:

IIRC von Schell was there as student, his instructors recognized his qualities and hard earned practical experience and allowed him to give lectures. This is dicussed in "Command Culture" from Joerg Muth.

Such discussion always takes place on such courses where students draw on the experiences of others. With the arrogance of today's youth probably less likely to happen these days though, sadly.

The lectures in the Von Schell book were however (I quote):

Most of the lectures contained in this volume were delivered either to the students of the Advanced and Company Officers' Classes or to the officers of the 29th Infantry.

[JMA]

The question you should have asked, based on your statement: "The troopie/the private soldier/the grunt still needs to 'do what he is told' without question." and my response to that should have been "Explain to me if you will what is the degree of flexibility soldiers (at the various levels) should have?"

...and I would ask you to define what you mean by flexibility in that context.

Obeying isn't the issue, obedience is necessary but "without question" is questionable.

My context for my original statement is the only one that really matters... combat.

If I give the command (which I did often enough) ... 'Prepare to assault' I would not have tolerated it (if it had happened) had some troopie asked/suggested/questioned/whatever: 'Excuse me sir, don't you think we should rather pull back to a safe distance and call in an airstrike then all go back to base for tea?'

Battle orders at that level must be carried out without hesitation and without question... even today.

I do, however, recall reading of a US company commander refusing to take his company into the attack citing the lack of fire support planned while knowing that additional fire support was indeed available. Not sure of the wording of that exchange (if it did indeed happen) but I sympathise. In the Brit tradition in such a situation one would request the oder to attack with a lack of fire support in writing as this avoids any counter accusation of insubordination. Know of a few instances where that happened in my war.

Out of combat a young officer should rarely issue orders without first discussing matters with his platoon sergeant (or in certain circumstances his company commander). In my three years as a operational (at war) Troop (platoon) commander it would be inconceivable to think that I ever issued orders for base routine/training/etc (other than in actual combat) without first discussing this with my sergeant. (And before the troopies were informed it is likely that the sergeant would have prepared the corporals and as such the troopies would have an idea of what was coming before the order group) So what is there for some troopie to question? If I have failed to elucidate my orders/instructions clearly a troopie may seek clarity but not question.

In training and in peacetime or less than full bore conflict, Troops should be encouraged to ask questions (which annoys the hell out of insecure NCOs and Officers ) simply because they will learn more and faster if they do so. I've watched a lot of Armies around the world at work. In all of them, the good units had NCOs and Officers who encouraged questions and who went to great pains to tell their Troops WHY they were doing certain things. The rationale is that if a Troopie gets used to one explaining things in a way that makes sense, he learns that there's a method to what often seems to be madness and that his superiors are not mental midgets then, when there is not time for questions, he will just act -- and do so with decent judgement. The NCOs and Officers also learn who will ask the best -- and the dumbest -- questions. It's a two way learning exercise and everyone and the unit benefit.

Maybe its semantics.

As I have stated above I am happy for anyone to seek clarity but not to question. The difference is obvious... and maybe can be discussed as a separate issue.

Finally, if you have a situation where officers and NCOs are issuing 'questionable' orders then you have the wrong guys in the job. Fire them!

In the Afghanistan thread a year or more ago when I suggested that seats on every flight out (back to the UK or Stateside) should have seats reserved for officers/NCOs who have been relieved (fired) I received the indignant response that in the US you don't fire people you reassign them. Maybe there lies the problem?

[JMA]

Lack of trust. That is engendered by two things, the relative youth with thus presumed nominally poor judgmental skills thereunto pertaining and / or inadequate training. It is my belief that a significant improvement in training is possible, affordable and can be effective in alleviating concerns about youth and judgement. Another approach -- or, better, a complementary one -- is to improve personnel selection, psychological assessment and management by leaving people in units longer so that trust can be developed by exposure; the current common practice of excessive rotations of personnel (the US is the worst offender but others have the problem to a lesser extent) is detrimental to unit cohesion and the critical -- really critical -- building of trust.

For counterinsurgency warfare you are looking for characteristics in officers which better equip them for the type of 'decentralised' warfare. They specifically require independence of thought and spirit and initiative to operate outside direct control. If officers who display these characteristics are grouped in units which are deployed into such a theatre then the best result will be achieved.

It is little wonder that 'counterinsurgency' has developed a bad name because the stuff produced off a Henry Ford type production line gets rotated through these war theatres in rapid succession whether they suit the requirements of the type of warfare or not.

Interestingly Von Schell detected (back in 1930) the US obsession with training and courses at the expense of experience gained in command over time. I quote Von Schell (circa 1930-31):

Service with troops [for the US officer] is no more than an interlude in this constant change between teaching and being taught.

If this is still remotely true then one can see where the problem lies. As I said of the Brits in Afghanistan they will not/would not let the specific requirements of waging war in Afghanistan get in the way of their bureaucratic and sometimes statutory systems. Little wonder they are about to lose two wars back-to-back.

[Ken White]

...and I would ask you to define what you mean by flexibility in that context.

Flexibility was your word, not mine. You asked: "Explain to me if you will what is the degree of flexibility soldiers (at the various levels) should have in obeying orders?" As I wrote, obedience is not an issue or in question IMO -- as to an answer to your question as nearly as it applies, he should have the flexibility to ask questions. How much is dependent upon the circumstances and the people involved; some kids should be encouraged to ask questions, some should be discouraged. Many questions in training , few to none in combat. The old "depends on the situation" applies, as always...

My context for my original statement is the only one that really matters... combat.

I thought that's what we were discussing, combat or training for it. That last is when the questions should be encouraged, if that occurs and decent answers are given, then there will be no questions in combat...

...I would not have tolerated it (if it had happened) had some troopie asked/suggested/questioned/whatever: 'Excuse me sir, don't you think we should rather pull back to a safe distance and call in an airstrike then all go back to base for tea?'

Nor should you, nor would I or would I even suggest that -- nor would most anyone else suggest it and I doubt many if any Troops would ask that -- other than to pull your leg, which I suspect happened a bit...

Out of combat a young officer should rarely issue orders without first discussing matters with his platoon sergeant (And before the troopies were informed it is likely that the sergeant would have prepared the corporals and as such the troopies would have an idea of what was coming before the order group {{ * }}) So what is there for some troopie to question? If I have failed to elucidate my orders/instructions clearly a troopie may seek clarity but not question.

I don't disagree with any of that, nor did I suggest anything to the contrary. It's during that {{ * }} time (as well as in all training) that questions should be encouraged. If you were successful and I suppose you were, then your NCOs did that -- whether you approved or knew or not.

As I have stated above I am happy for anyone to seek clarity but not to question. The difference is obvious... and maybe can be discussed as a separate issue.

While I agree in principle, we used different strokes, I never objected to questions or suggestions -- some Privates can come up with amazingly good ideas if one just listens.

I received the indignant response that in the US you don't fire people you reassign them. Maybe there lies the problem?

I recall the exchange. I do not recall any indignation directed at you or the suggestion, rather a resigned 'we don't do it that way.' Whether we should or not is another story...

For counterinsurgency warfare you are looking for characteristics in officers which better equip them for the type of 'decentralised' warfare. They specifically require independence of thought and spirit and initiative to operate outside direct control. If officers who display these characteristics are grouped in units which are deployed into such a theatre then the best result will be achieved.

It makes no difference how good, how capable they are or how they are grouped. If they are not trusted, they will not be allowed by their superiors to exercise much independence. The obvious flip side is, as I wrote, better training promotes more trust. As I've written many times, our training is marginal and Congress and the senior leadership of the US Army are not much interested in improving it a great deal. Bad cess to them and you and I can complain about it but that won't fix the problem.

It is little wonder that 'counterinsurgency' has developed a bad name because the stuff produced off a Henry Ford type production line gets rotated through these war theatres in rapid succession whether they suit the requirements of the type of warfare or not.

That's partly true but there are other negative factors. It's simply an idea whose time has past. You were on the cusp as that era passed. Enjoy your memories but don't grouse at others who are precluded from doing many things you and I could do.

[Ulenspiegel]

Interestingly Von Schell detected (back in 1930) the US obsession with training and courses at the expense of experience gained in command over time. I quote Von Schell (circa 1930-31):
Service with troops [for the US officer] is no more than an interlude in this constant change between teaching and being taught.

But let's be fair, at the beginning of this thread you critizised suggestions to let officers spend more time with enlisted men. However, v.Schell is talking about a generation of Reichswehr officers, who had exactly to do this. :-)

Another point is that the German officers were taught in a different way and were taught different aspects of their profession, so Muth in "Command Culture" for example found these differences more important when he compares teaching and learning at the Hauptkadettenanstalt vs. Westpoint and at the institutions/courses for staff officer training.

On the other hand, the lack of understanding on the German side when it comes to non-military aspects of strategy and a better performance of their US couterparts may have been the other side of the coin.

IMHO here Erich Ludendorff is a very good example, as high officer (GM) still leading from front, very good staff officer, but no real feeling for economic impact of US war participation.

[JMA]

But let's be fair, at the beginning of this thread you critizised suggestions to let officers spend more time with enlisted men.

I did?

[Bob's World]

Perhaps in the next conflict, when a savvy enemey kicks the plug out of the wall on all of the cyber/space-based capabilities, leader reliance so heavily to maintian 24/7 audio/visual contact with small units much of this will change.

Things have "progressed" much in a very short time. When a handful of ODAs linked up with the Egyptian Ranger Brigade (first unit to arrive) in a sparse bit of desert just south of Western Kuwait, my communications requirement was to make one morse code HF contact per day (and that was more a matter of SOP than necessity). That was September 1990. Our mission was "simple": Make contact with Arab forces closing in country and build a coalition. I saw the Major rarely, and BN CDR came out once or twice. I relied on my men, and my men relied on me. We figured it out.

There is no putting the genie of high tech capabilities that have resulted in nannie cam leadership of late back in the bottle, but we need to make damn sure we are building a force that is ready to be just as effective when someone takes that genie away, bottle and all.

[Fuchs]

IMHO here Erich Ludendorff is a very good example, as high officer (GM) still leading from front, very good staff officer, but no real feeling for economic impact of US war participation.

Are you sure? That's the "total war" (including "total mobilization" of people and economy) guy. He must have changed a lot between 18 and 35...

[Ulenspiegel]

Are you sure? That's the "total war" (including "total mobilization" of people and economy) guy. He must have changed a lot between 18 and 35...

He did not understand the discrepancies in manpower and industrial production of Imperial Germany and USA and their impact, at least according to some of his remarks in 1917.

To be a proponent of a total war in the sense of total mobilization does not necessarily require the ability to correctly access the resources of your enemy.

One could add that most German generals were at best only reactive when it came to economic mobilization, usually the #### had already hit the fan when their mobilization started.

[Ulenspiegel]

I did?

Starting with post ~95 you criticised some suggestions as too time-consuming, esp. the very long time an officer of the Reichwehr would stay in the ranks of Leutnant/Oberleutnant in the time 1919-1932.

This allowed them to gain a lot of theoretical knowledge, gave them the opportunity to learn how to teach, and the time to train with the troops, usually at least one stint in a different branch.

Haupmann v. Schell refers to this generation of officers, when he made the statement you cite, therefore, my confusion.

[wm]

...It makes no difference how good, how capable they are or how they are grouped. If they are not trusted, they will not be allowed by their superiors to exercise much independence. The obvious flip side is, as I wrote, better training promotes more trust.

While I do not disagree that better training promotes trust, I submit that trust is rather hard to practice when those outside the chain of command, but who hold the purse strings, force military leaders to micromanage for a variety of reasons.
Case in point: at least one US 4-star general (CG, USAMC) (probably several others that included the CJCS and the VCJCS, the CENTCOM Cdr, and the CSA) getting daily reports by bumper number on the status of uparmoring Humvees in Iraq/Kuwait. Possible reason: some zealous reporters' stories on GI inventiveness in concocting ballistic protection for Humvee passengers, a vehicle never envisoned as an armored personnel carrier, and the knee jerk response by certain elected officials and their staffs to such stories.

The following from Bob's World latest post

There is no putting the genie of high tech capabilities that have resulted in nannie cam leadership of late back in the bottle, but we need to make damn sure we are building a force that is ready to be just as effective when someone takes that genie away, bottle and all.

is just the latest variation on a theme. I seem to recall Bn Cdrs micromanaging platoon-level fights in VN from their helicopters. With that kind of background informing the leadership development of the mentors of much of today's military senior leadership, is it any wonder that the best we might hope for from the current crop of seniors is something like a Reaganesque "trust but verify"?

I can only speak to the American military, based on my experience. One hopes that other nations' militaries are not equally "blessed" with such trust and oversight.