COIN comes home to assist policing

[Bob's World]

Certainly the illegal drug market creates a powerful demand signal that gangs have expanded to fill. Take away that demand signal and gangs will retract accordingly, but still exist.

Many factors surely contribute. Man is social. Look at all of the legal "gangs" like the Elks, VFW, Masons; or bowling and softball leagues, etc, etc, etc.

Mike is right though, that what we may be categorizing as a "gang problem" is really a much deeper problem that the gangs are just a symptom of. Fix the domestic policies that feed this response among young men through "indirect approaches" and one likely makes the challenge of dealing with the gangs that currently emerge from that pool of causation much more manageable. Legalization has to be on the table.

This same logic applies to the US's foreign policy challenge of Violent Extremist Organizations and transnational terrorism. At a tactical level these are "threats" but at a strategic level these are merely symptoms of deeper problems that are rooted in the perceptions of a wide range of foreign populaces. These organizations emerge from populaces that feel provoked by the Western foreign policies that they feel inappropriately shape their respective political and economic situations. One can run a counterterrorism program, much like one can run a counter-gang program, and what one is doing is mitigating the symptoms, while likely at the same time making the provocation of the root causes worse in the execution of said programs.

Less is more. Take a hard look at foreign policies and re-tune them to be less provocative in the world we live in today. We evolve slowly, but we need to come up with a new strategy, a new approach, and announce it to the world and make a major change of course to operationalize the same. We likely would give up little, and potentially could gain much.

I cannot help but look to the Great Britain's strong alliance across the Common Wealth that exists today because Britain wisely opted not to ride a desire for Empire all the way into the ground.

The system developed to contain the Soviets was appropriate enough in its day, but that day is long gone. New approaches must be far less ideologically defined, and much more respective of the sovereignty and rights to self determination of the assorted partner members. We can do this. At home in dealing with criminal gangs, and abroad in dealing with political gangs.

[MikeF]

I would suggest exploring the economic costs of raiding and imprisonment. Below is one cost-prison in the state of Massachusetts.


The Cost to Taxpayers

Overcrowding

• MA prisons are at over 140% of their capacity, with many operating at more than 200% of their intended capacity, and some over 300%.
  
• As of March 2011, there were 11,388 inmates in 18 facilities managed by the Department of Corrections. That number is projected to grow 26% — to almost 14,000 – by 2019.
  
• Parole rates in MA have dropped dramatically, from 58% in 2010 to 35% in 2011.

The Cost to Taxpayers

• It costs about $46,000 a year to house just one inmate in MA, 56% more than the national average.
  
• In 2010, MA spent $514.2 million on prisons, up from $408.6 million in 2001.
  
• Inmates are far more expensive than parolees and those on probation. In 2008, prisons cost an average of $79 per inmate per day, while it costs only $3 to $8 per individual per day to administer parole or probation services.
  
• Massachusetts spends nearly $100 million a year on prisoner health care, nearly double the cost from 2001.

[Fuchs]

A complete study would add the opportunity costs - such as people not working in a real job, not paying taxes.

The same should always be kept in mind regarding military personnel, too.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by MikeF,

I would suggest exploring the economic costs of raiding and imprisonment. Below is one cost-prison in the state of Massachusetts.

Our approach to law enforcement is expensive, but I'm not sure there is a realistic way around this. The article you linked to referenced drug rehab (always good to try, but we haven't experienced much success yet, which makes me wonder if we continue to pursue old drug rehab programs that have record of limited success instead of trying another approach?) and encouraging early parole. It also argued for removing he mandatory sentence times for drug use, which I strongly support. Politicians have in effect took on the role of the Judge and Jury by mandating a minimal sentence for specific crimes (politically popular), instead of allowing the jury and judge to assess the total person and the overall context of the alleged violation, and then determine an appropriate punishment instead of X=Y.

On the other hand, what the article didn't address is the potential impact of not arresting the growing number of gang members. Failure to enforce the law and for the government to protect the population from criminals has its own costs. If you take a position you can always spin the numbers to support it, so we all need to take a step back and look at the problem in a more holistic manner in my opinion.

[jmm99]

I'd like to quote Bob Jones from 2 years ago, FID or COIN? does it matter - Big Difference:

As to last US COIN; as I have stated on other threads I have come to believe that it is most helpful to look at COIN as Governance. COIN is a condition between a governance and its own populace. When you travel to another country to intervene in the relationship between that governance and populace you are either conducting UW or FID (in US doctrinal terms), depending on which side you are there to assist.

Arguably, viewed in this manner, all governance and every populace in every country is at some level of COIN/Insurgency at all times. Most are bumping along in what I would call "Phase 0". It is only when the government loses the bubble on the populace, that some segment of discontent will rise up from the masses to compete with the government for the support of the populace through illegal and typically violent means. This is when one enters Phase I Insurgency and typically needs to bring in military assistance to help move the conditions back down into Phase 0, or within the Civil government's span of control.

The major points are differentiating "COIN" from UW and FID; and also the introduction of a Phase 0 to "COIN".

Graphically, Phase 0 (and the normative Phases 1-3 of Mao) looked like this to Bob (12-17-2009):



More generally, I looked at it using different terms, as so (12-17-2009):



My small green "Rule of Law" triangle (under the red "Violence" line) corresponds to Bob's Phase 0 "COIN". The larger blue "Laws of War" area corresponds to Bob's Phases 1-3 "COIN". As Slap points out, TTPs "legal" in a "Laws of War" context are not necessarily "legal" in a "Rule of Law" context.

In terms of the nuts and bolts of it, Bill Moore has pointed up a few basic rules (whether the situation be FID, UW or "COIN") to support the overall concept of Be flexible, be realistic (12-06-2009).

Regards

Mike

[MikeF]

Our approach to law enforcement is expensive, but I'm not sure there is a realistic way around this.

At some point, our law enforcement efforts will become too expensive, and we're going to have to ask if we willing to lose our civil liberties when drones are flying over the skies and we're using social network analysis to map out the human terrain- which goes against our constitution.

It also argued for removing he mandatory sentence times for drug use, which I strongly support. Politicians have in effect took on the role of the Judge and Jury by mandating a minimal sentence for specific crimes (politically popular), instead of allowing the jury and judge to assess the total person and the overall context of the alleged violation, and then determine an appropriate punishment instead of X=Y.

Concur. We need to empower local leaders. The bureaucracy is not the answer.

On the other hand, what the article didn't address is the potential impact of not arresting the growing number of gang members. Failure to enforce the law and for the government to protect the population from criminals has its own costs. If you take a position you can always spin the numbers to support it, so we all need to take a step back and look at the problem in a more holistic manner in my opinion.

For a holistic manner, I would submit that it's not simply a police or governance problem. Rather, it's a community problem.

If the police are taking ownership to "fix" it, then that decision absolves the local leaders, families, churches, NGOs, etc from having to step up and be good citizens.

It's similar to some parents who drop their kids off at school expecting the teachers to have sole responsibility for educating their child. They outsource their responsibilities and do not take the time to work with their children on homework and during the summer.

[Bob's World]

What we enforce is a fuzzy thing in the best of times. In less than a year of county budget crunch, we went from charging drug residue in a simple glass tube crack/meth pipe as a felony possession, to a misdemeanor, to a mere violation. Such is politics.

Can we afford our current war on drugs, with indirect costs that far exceed the extremely high direct costs? I don't think so. We can come up with smarter policies to mitigate the down side of legalized drugs that will be well funded by the legal revenues from the sale and taxation of the same.

Morality is shaped by what we can afford to feel indignant about.

[socal1200r]

Watched a very interesting movie last night, called "Bloody Sunday", directed by Paul Greengrass from 2002. It's about the killings of numerous unarmed Irish civil rights protestors by British army troops on Jan 30, 1972. Now I can't tell if it's entirely objective, but it does raise some very interesting points, that are still applicable today, maybe even more so.

The most obvious one is the military is not trained for the law enforcement mission. They can secure an area for the police-types to come in and do what they're trained for, but the military, for the most part, should not be charged with doing what is primarily a law enforcement mission (rounding up suspects, effecting arrests, searches and seizures, etc). In this movie, some members of 1 Para are so keyed up, they don't view these protestors as fellow citizens, but as hooligans who are responsible for the deaths of fellow troops, and are bent on revenge.

Another obvious paradigm that is clearly shown is, "the best laid plan never survives initial contact with the enemy." There's a scene where the staff shows some higher-level officer the placement of their troops, the route of march of the protestors, what they anticipate the protestors actions will be, what their reactions will be, etc. Although it may have looked great on the wall in the command post, once events started to unfold, it quickly got out of hand.

Some other TTPs that came into play are unity of command, maintaining good SA and discipline, and good comms. A lot has been mentioned about the Brits' experience with the "Troubles" in Northern Ireland, as a good source of lessons learned regarding COIN, strategic comms, etc. There's a scene at the end, where the member of Parliament who was the main organizer makes a statement that the British govt has just handed the IRA their biggest victory. This is a great example of the superior force losing the battle of the narrative.

All in all, a very well done movie, with lots of good discussion points relevant to today's operational environment.

[davidbfpo]

The title of a 'Wired' article on an issue that lingers around and irregularly returns, as seen in:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=15971

The article has information I'd not seen before on the scale of this largesse, if not greed:

the Fairmount Police Department. It serves 7,000 people in northern Georgia and received 17,145 items from the military. The cops in Issaquah, Washington, a town of 30,000 people, acquired more than 37,000 pieces of gear.

In 2011 alone, more than 700,000 items were transferred to police departments for a total value of $500 million.

Citing a former Seattle PD chief:

.. having small local police departments go around with tanks and military gear has “a chilling effect on any effort to strengthen the relationship” between the community and the cops. And that’s not the only danger. “There’s no justification for them having that kind of equipment, for one obvious reason, and that is if they have it, they will find a way to use it. And if they use it they will misuse it altogether too many times,” said Stamper.

Link:http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012...tary-gear/all/

[SWJ Blog]

Countering Criminal Street Gangs: Lessons from the Counterinsurgent Battlespace

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[bourbon]

The Mass State Police C3 Policing Project in Springfield was featured on 60 Minutes last week:

Counterinsurgency Cops: Military tactics fight street crime. CBS News 60 Minutes, 5 May 2013.

[bourbon]

Police clicking into crimes using new software - Harvard students’ software seeks to help police dismantle networks, by Aaron Lester. The Boston Globe, 18 March 2013.

Called Nucleik, the software is being tested by Gregorczyk and his gang unit. Nucleik is the brainchild of three Harvard University engineering students who hatched it as a class project for a professor with friends in law enforcement. The students were struck by how little technology was used by police to organize all the information they gather in their surveillance of gangs.

“We’re seeing these guys fighting crime everyday, putting their lives on the line everyday, but they’re not doing it with the right tools,” said Scott Crouch, cofounder of Nucleik.

So they set about to create a single platform for multiple uses, whether as a mobile app used in the field for street-level info or as a powerful desktop tool that could sift through mountains of data. The Springfield gang unit has been trying out the first version of Nucleik since mid-summer.

“Normally you’d need probably five pieces of software to do all of this and it would take hours. Now with one software, it takes minutes,” said Crouch.

The MSP C3 Policing Project has worked Harvard bioengineering professor Major Kit Parker, who enlisted his design engineering class to help tackle project related problems. One output from that was a set of software tools designed to support C3 Policing – with the help of Harvard's innovation lab, the students who originally developed the tools have launched a start-up called Nucleik.

[JohnBertetto]

I am currently working on a similar software package. Dynamic SNA, geospatial and spatio-temporal, and social media analysis.

[davidbfpo]

John B.,

I recommend you look through the Social Media thread, especially for the latest posts on SNA in London:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5954

[SWJ Blog]

Counter-Gang Strategy: Adapted COIN in Policing Criminal Street Gangs

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[SWJ Blog]

Counter-Gang Strategy: Adapted COIN in Policing Criminal Street Gangs

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[davidbfpo]

SWC Member & CPD officer John Bertetto's latest offering 'Counter-Gang Strategy, Part 1, Creating guiding principles through lessons learned in the fight against gangs & terror':http://www.lawofficer.com/article/ta...trategy-part-i

The editor's note:

This article is the first of two in a series adapted from the author's longer works, "Countering Criminal Street Gangs: Lessons from the Counterinsurgent Battlespace" and "Counter-Gang Strategy: Adapted COIN in Policing Criminal Street Gangs."

For a complete description of the principles and strategy described, visit the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board Executive website atwww.iletsbei.com/forum

[davidbfpo]

A short PBS video (7 mins):

A report from the Center for Investigative Reporting and KQED delves into a wide-scale surveillance system being developed for police forces. How can the trade off between safety and privacy be negotiated as technology gets more and more sophisticated?

Link with a transcript:http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/new-p...vacy-concerns/

The system originated from a counter-IED tactic in Iraq, so the clarity of the images has been reduced, so for example a number plate cannot be read. The system is more of a pointer after the event to look at other CCTV. That might explain why no-one has purchased it.

[davidbfpo]

Within a short article reviewing the growth of the DHS In New Mexico. centred around Albuquerque, are some comments by Tom Ridge, ex-DHS head, which I have not seen before:

The last thing in the world you want is a Department of Homeland Security involved in a day-to-day basis with traditional and state and local law enforcement. It’s not their role or their function, unless it’s related to terrorist activity.

On "fusion centres":

I think fusion centers are a great idea. I think the proliferation of fusion centers makes no sense. My vision then was to start with building fusion centers that covered four or five states for all hazards, natural weather events and law enforcement sharing. They’ve gone much beyond that. It would be foolish to build that capacity and limit it exclusively to dealing with terrorism..

APD's deputy responded the rejected the notion that DHS has become too involved in local policing:

I don’t believe they are taking on too active of a role. We are collaborating with HSI as a force multiplier and we are sharing resources.

Link:http://www.abqjournal.com/390807/new...uparmored.html

[SWJ Blog]

Community Policing in a ‘War on Terror’ Environment: More Difficult, More Vital

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