This is true, and the precedent will be worth considering if any of today's communist states set out to conquer anyone. That remains quite hypothetical at this point.
Not through any doing of ours. If we'd kept Marcos in power any longer, the Communists might well have got in... as in some other places, the guy we thought was keeping the commies out was in fact the best thing that ever happened to them.
Like most choice, it's simple when we make it for ourselves. Make the choice for somebody else, and it gets less simple.
Sounds like a bunch of blustering words that aren't likely to be backed up by action. What's the "or what" that goes with "no go"? What do we do if the Chinese repond (though they probably wouldn't, they don't show much sense of irony) that US military intervention in the Middle East is a "no go"?
Supposing you do say this, what do you expect to be the result? You know, of course, that they will have to come up with an aggressive, even belligerent response. No choice there, to do anything else would be to look weak in the eyes of their own people and their neighbors. Probably they won't actually attack anyone, since they really don't want to do that... so maybe fire off some missile tests, big naval exercises too close to others, harass a few ships... then we go back to the status quo ante. So what have you achieved, other than to make yourself feel good? You've empowered the most militarist factions on the Chinese side and made it a little easier for them to build some nationalism and a sense of oppression among their own people, which as always will garner support for their government (about the only thing that will get Chinese to support their government is criticism of that government by the US)... so I suppose you could feel good about that, if you really want to.
I realize that you fear and loathe communists in general and Chinese communists in particular. My point, which I may be communicating badly, is that fear and loathing are neither a policy nor a strategy, nor do they get us any closer to a policy or a strategy... like most strong emotions, they make a poor basis for policy and strategy.
Have you been paying attention to Chinese internal affairs at all? The signs of stress are easy enough to see. Yes, the crackdowns are still brutal, and getting more frequent. That brutality is not a sign of strength. If a police state is strong, they don't have to crack down, because nobody dares to challenge them.
We want the Chinese people to be mad at their government. Their government wants them to be mad at us. How does it help us to make it easier for the Chinese government to evoke the response they want?
A response based on subjective and emotional conclusions is more likely to be maladroit. You think the Chinese are evil murdering criminals. A lot of people feel the same way about us... after all, we initiated a bloody war on very shaky grounds that many people see as an outright grab for oil resources. Of course in your opinion they are wrong and you are right, we're not really evil murdering criminals and they really are. Others have other opinions. Much of foreign affairs is recognizing and managing perception, and while your perceptions may be shared on the home front, trumpeting them overseas is as likely to harm our cause as to help it.
You could try a less panicked tone. I disagree with RCJ all the time, can't recall ever suspecting him of panic.
Does chest-thumping bluster help maintain the status quo? Sounds a debatable proposition...
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