Ganulv posted:That is not my reading of history. The Pashtuns could respect the British, yes there was conflict and a lack of cooperation at times.On the other hand the British had a notoriously uncooperative relationship with the Pashtun.
davidbfpo
If you don’t read the newspaper, you are uninformed; if you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed. – Mark Twain (attributed)
The US will protect others if it sees that action as in its own interest. It's not done out of charity. The idea, for example, that the US protected Saudi Arabia from Iraq and thus the Saudis owe us something is pretty far fetched. The US didn't intervene to protect the Saudi royals, they intervened to assure that all that oil wouldn't be taken over by people who would use it as a weapon against us. We'd do the same thing if Iran threatened to take over additional oil-producing areas. That has nothing to do with protecting anyone but ourselves, any protection extended is purely incidental and a quirk of transient overlapping interests. They know that, so do we. They do throw us a few favors (like buying all their arms from us, though better deals can be had elsewhere), but business is still business.
Comparing the US to classic empires seems a bit silly to me, as the US is not an empire, unless we stretch the definition of "empire" way beyond the breaking point.
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
In some other places, they took the chieftain's land (usually the most fertile around), required everyone to pay taxes and made sure the only way to get cash was to work at low wages on the new plantation.
People who didn't cooperate were beaten, people who resisted were shot.
Yeah, to discuss with traditional elites means a relative lack of involvement.
I actually wonder how profitable the Empire was to the British exchequer. I suspect that much of the profit accrued to private business, while the exchequer carried much of the cost needed to maintain the conditions that were conducive to that business. A rather good deal for the businessmen, of course. It would be interesting to see actual figures on how much was earned from the whole system on the public and private sides, both with and without the opium trade, an enormously profitable enterprise that would tend to skew the overall picture. Has to be remembered as well that the British working class was practically a colonized populace in its own right for much of the imperial period. Colonies provided cheap raw materials and extensive markets; a thoroughly oppressed low-cost manufacturing labor force kept costs down on the home front. Profitable, certainly, but in no sense replicable today... though the Chinese might be in the process of trying!
I think there was often a quite acute sense of being heavily outnumbered, and a belief that any sign of "weakness" or willingness to negotiate might wake the natives up, with awful consequences. Of course the awful consequences arrived anyway. If you read the literature of the day, there was often a great deal of tension between home-front reformers who thought conditions needed to change to avoid revolution (or for humanitarian reasons) and those who saw the "reformers" as unrealistic faint-hearted do-gooders and believed that any change in the system (or their privileges) would be giving the wogs the inch that would lead them to take a mile.
The British Empire in America dealt with a quite unique situation in that those who became rebellious were the colonists, rather than the colonized. Doesn't really compare well to situations in which an empire dealt with a colonized population.
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
Dayuhan, the last quote isn't mine.
The easiest way to look at it is to look at the goods trade balance of the UK in the late 19th century.
The human capital export was no doubt considerable, but that human capital was -once exported- sustained (fed) by foreigners, so this could be treated like migration.
Germany - which only colonised the poor countries which were left by the late 19th century save for Abyssinia - had a clearly negative cost/benefit result. The colonies costed many times as much as they generated income.
We got rid of at least some assholes, though.
Last edited by Fuchs; 07-14-2012 at 10:31 PM.
This is true, and the precedent will be worth considering if any of today's communist states set out to conquer anyone. That remains quite hypothetical at this point.
Not through any doing of ours. If we'd kept Marcos in power any longer, the Communists might well have got in... as in some other places, the guy we thought was keeping the commies out was in fact the best thing that ever happened to them.
Like most choice, it's simple when we make it for ourselves. Make the choice for somebody else, and it gets less simple.
Sounds like a bunch of blustering words that aren't likely to be backed up by action. What's the "or what" that goes with "no go"? What do we do if the Chinese repond (though they probably wouldn't, they don't show much sense of irony) that US military intervention in the Middle East is a "no go"?
Supposing you do say this, what do you expect to be the result? You know, of course, that they will have to come up with an aggressive, even belligerent response. No choice there, to do anything else would be to look weak in the eyes of their own people and their neighbors. Probably they won't actually attack anyone, since they really don't want to do that... so maybe fire off some missile tests, big naval exercises too close to others, harass a few ships... then we go back to the status quo ante. So what have you achieved, other than to make yourself feel good? You've empowered the most militarist factions on the Chinese side and made it a little easier for them to build some nationalism and a sense of oppression among their own people, which as always will garner support for their government (about the only thing that will get Chinese to support their government is criticism of that government by the US)... so I suppose you could feel good about that, if you really want to.
I realize that you fear and loathe communists in general and Chinese communists in particular. My point, which I may be communicating badly, is that fear and loathing are neither a policy nor a strategy, nor do they get us any closer to a policy or a strategy... like most strong emotions, they make a poor basis for policy and strategy.
Have you been paying attention to Chinese internal affairs at all? The signs of stress are easy enough to see. Yes, the crackdowns are still brutal, and getting more frequent. That brutality is not a sign of strength. If a police state is strong, they don't have to crack down, because nobody dares to challenge them.
We want the Chinese people to be mad at their government. Their government wants them to be mad at us. How does it help us to make it easier for the Chinese government to evoke the response they want?
A response based on subjective and emotional conclusions is more likely to be maladroit. You think the Chinese are evil murdering criminals. A lot of people feel the same way about us... after all, we initiated a bloody war on very shaky grounds that many people see as an outright grab for oil resources. Of course in your opinion they are wrong and you are right, we're not really evil murdering criminals and they really are. Others have other opinions. Much of foreign affairs is recognizing and managing perception, and while your perceptions may be shared on the home front, trumpeting them overseas is as likely to harm our cause as to help it.
You could try a less panicked tone. I disagree with RCJ all the time, can't recall ever suspecting him of panic.
Does chest-thumping bluster help maintain the status quo? Sounds a debatable proposition...
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
Yes, in some places at some times there was a simple oppressor/oppressed relationship. But not everywhere always was the Belgian Congo. I’m not trying to be an apologist for colonialism, I’m trying to point out that things weren’t as simple as Whiggish and post-colonial partisans would have us believe.
It sounds like more work over the long haul than lining people up against a wall, but I’ll take your word for it.
Last edited by ganulv; 07-14-2012 at 11:04 PM.
If you don’t read the newspaper, you are uninformed; if you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed. – Mark Twain (attributed)
What you don't seem to recognize is that the Chinese have also been forced to modify the system enormously in order to achieve the economic success they've had. The long-term impact of those changes is difficult to assess at this point, but the populace has achieved a level of connectedness, awareness, and capacity that certainly raises doubts about the ability of the state to maintain long term control. Certainly they can do it as long as the cash rolls in at ever increasing levels, but that looks ever more doubtful.
The Red Army was around when the Soviet Union fell. The worst nightmare of the dictator is not the day when the white-hatted liberators from afar show up to overthrow them, it's the day when their own army decides that they suck and it's time to get rid of them.
You missed the point quite spectacularly, it seems. Would you say that, for example, overthrowing Mohammed Mossadegh because the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company said he was a commie was a good idea, or that it worked out well for us in the long run? Did getting rid of popular leaders like Lumumba and Allende build our influence in the developing world? Did supporting corrupt, inept, and doomed figures like a Batista, a Somoza, a Marcos impair or assist the spread of communism? The credibility the left long enjoyed in the developing world didn't stem from what they could or did do when they took power. They recognized and seized, before us, the moral high ground and historical momentum of opposition to failing colonial powers at corrupt dictatorships. We let them do it, and played into their hands, a strategy supported by those who shared your fear and loathing for the communists. The issue is not whether that fear and loathing were justified in the abstract, the issue is whether they did or did not produce effective policy.
I've seen the arguments. They are not convincing, unless you really want to be convinced.
If you mean this:
that seems to me far too general to be of any real use.Well there is a long history of how to do it successfully. Among the things to do are speak up when they behave badly. Don't hold them to a lower international standard of behavior because they grouse about how badly they been treated. Stop thinking they are ten feet tall. They screw up more than most and they aren't fearless. That is bluster. They get scared just like everybody else. Remember what Grant learned at the Battle of Belmont (I think it was the Battle of Belmont). Don't let them shove around allies just because people inside the beltway are feeling windy. Don't fool yourself into thinking we can get them to like us short of complete surrender. They will propagandize their people as they please no matter what we do. It is easy to lie when you control the media completely. The most important thing though is to realize communism is a pernicious evil system that has resulted in more human death and suffering than any other. There is no good in that system, only greater and lesser degrees of evil. Realize to that they lie almost always and about everything. All those economic numbers they put out shouldn't be trusted.
Actually there's considerable evidence that it's happening, if you choose to look. Of course things are never simple... the Chinese populace is anything but happy about the rampant corruption, growing inequality, and crude brutality of the state. On the other hand they recognize that the state as currently constituted has made China strong and a power to be reckoned with for the first time in centuries, and despite their dislike for the internal workings of that state, there's a real national pride that goes with that status. The state will play that card to the extent that we can. Helping them play it is not in our interest.
That sounds kind of like the occasional paranoia induced by the observation that the stealth jet the Chinese are testing is bigger than the stealth jet the US is testing.
One factor that caused the Soviet Union to fall was their insistence on pursuing an arms race they really had no need to be in. That was a stupid decision on their part, a consequence of the knee-jerk thinking that holds that if they have x, we must have y, or x to the third power. That wasn't us hurting them, that was them hurting themselves. It would be most ironic if we turned around and did the same thing to ourselves...
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
The US did this fairly effectively in the Philippines, their only true imperial venture.
This is true, but one also must note that "the empire business" wasn't always appropriate to powers that set out on it. US imperial profit in the Philippines, for example, was heavily constrained by political pressure from domestic agro-industrial interests who did not want to face competition from cheaper goods imported from a colony. US beet sugar producers successfully campaigned for land ownership restrictions aimed at preventing the development of a cane sugar industry in the Philippines, and domestic producers of corn and soybean oil successfully lobbied to restrict entry of coconut oil. A british cotton farmer in India or Egypt didn't have to worry about domestic competitors in Bognor Regis agitating for tariffs on goods coming in from the colonies.
The textbook colonial economic arrangement never emerged in the Philippines largely because the role of the colony was already being filled domestically by the American west and south, which had more political clout. The US really had little compelling economic motivation to colonize; the motivation was primarily political, a desire to be a world power and play the game with the big (European) players.
Of course post-WW2 that changed, but the world had changed with it and traditional empire was no longer a practical or economically viable construct. Neocolonialism proved awkward as well...
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
Those are critical points. The Romans did extend that and their empire lasted a long time. One of the things Alaric was upset about is he didn't get the rank in the Roman Army he wanted. I read an article once that said the strongest motivation for various North African takfiri killer's antipathy toward France was they were hurt that France wasn't more accepting of them.
If you really want the empire to last, maybe you have to treat it like a club and allow anybody who wants to join and abide by the rules, to join.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
Geesh Dayuhan, you just can't leave a simple thing be simple can you. It was just a simple observation that when picking calibres for tank main guns, the Soviet powers that seemed to fixate on having a gun 10 mm bigger than the primary gun of the west's tanks, rather than looking at things like range, accuracy, penetration etc.
And the J-20 is way bigger than the F-35, approx 70' x 42' vs. 51' x 35'.
I have to get used to be called panic stricken if my concerns differ from yours. I guess I'll have to get used to being called paranoid too.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
Is it way better? Oh right, we don't know. We must still be very very afraid because... well, because we must. How else can we justify bankrupting ourselves to defend against the threat?
Different is different. Panic-stricken is panic-stricken. Paranoid is paranoid. Three different things, though the second two go well together.
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
True...And I think you just responded to your own comment...Only true empires that mastered the "empire" business get true empire benefits.
Carl:Not only Police States, we aren't a police state -- yet -- and we excel at and indeed need to whip up trouble with foreigners for pretty much that reason...Whipping trouble with foreigners is time honored way for police states to distract their people from internal problems. To go along with that it is time honored for some of those foreigners to say if we just avoid making them mad at us that effort will fail. I am skeptical of that.
Take a look at most of our excursions since WW II and you'll see they generally start in economic downturns and the party incumbent in the WH is either in trouble or trying to avoid some...That's more a function of less sophisticated engineering, metallurgy and production, it's primarily to achieve nearly the same effect as the smaller, more efficient western weapons and ammunition. They also have long produced weapons with a slightly larger caliber so they can use captured ammo stocks (poorly and inaccurately but usable...) while the reverse is not true. Their 82mm mortar versus the German (and NATO) 81mm for example, the 115mm tank versus the 105mm tank guns, 125 vs. 120 etc., the 152mm Howitzer versus the Czech and German 150mm. The 120mm Gun though was purely a function of trying to equal the capability of the German 105mm. ..It was just a simple observation that when picking calibres for tank main guns, the Soviet powers that seemed to fixate on having a gun 10 mm bigger than the primary gun of the west's tanks, rather than looking at things like range, accuracy, penetration etc.And the more comparable F-22 of which there are far more than there are J-20s (and of which we have the capability of producing many more. Yes, I know the line is 'closed.') measures 62x44 -- and yet again, much, much better western engines, more refined techniques and metallurgy account for the only slightly smaller size.And the J-20 is way bigger than the F-35, approx 70' x 42' vs. 51' x 35'.Well, I don't think you're panic stricken. Over concerned perhaps but that's probably attributable to philosophic and opinion differences. Mildly paranoid a bit, perhaps -- but who isn't about something or other...I have to get used to be called panic stricken if my concerns differ from yours. I guess I'll have to get used to being called paranoid too.
OTOH, it sometimes appears you think others are unconcerned about potential problems because they offer differing thoughts and opinions. That's probably as big a misperception as your being panic stricken could be.
Particularly the scene found here
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
Their 152 mm gun-howitzers were actually superior to German WW2 heavy howitzers. The small difference in calibre was more about metric vs other measurement system and history than anything else. Many official "150" mm howitzers of the era were in fact 149.1 mm pieces.
The only 120 mm guns used by Russians were IIRC WWI vintage guns. The calibre was a popular calibre pre-WWI and the Russians imported the design.
Their 122 mm gun has a similarly old history, being a traditional calibre and not really related to a competition with 105 mm.
122 mm is actually a superior calibre in comparison to 105 mm if you don't need light weight. 149-155 mm is relatively if you desire smoke or frag effect, yet 122 mm is much better than 105 mm for ICM and blast effect and achieves good range more easily than 105 mm (less V0, less barrel wear).
As of today I'd prefer a new 122 mm SPG over a 155 mm SPG because range isn't that important and most countries banned DPICM.
Ken, at the risk of incurring your ire, I'll buy that with regard to mortars but not tank guns. No way. If you just look at a 105 round meant to be fired from a rifled gun vs. a 115 round meant to be fired from a smoothbore gun it just doesn't seem like there is any way. You'll have to provide some references before I'll accept that.
The thing about exactly 10 mm was a point, IIRC, raised by the authors of the book I read.
http://www.amazon.com/Soviet-Russian...tillery+design
What works for guns doesn't work for airplanes. For your comparison to be valid the aircraft would have to be designed for the same mission and requirements. The Red Chinese haven't told us how the J-20 will be used or what its design requirements are but I strongly doubt they mirror those of the F-22. Those guys aren't stupid and the configuration of that airplane was mostly driven by what the requirements are. Less sophisticated material would only have something to do with it, not everything. That thing has an awful lot of internal volume.
Once a line is closed, that's basically it. You ain't going to get it going again in anything less than years and beaucoup bucks. The people all scatter to the four winds. The suppliers all are doing something else and their tooling may be gone. Their people are scattered to the four winds. That line isn't coming back
Last edited by carl; 07-16-2012 at 07:32 PM.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
Sorry for the late response. It probably wouldn't pass Kant's standard but I would regard that as a......... moral thing
Major Kong on moral riightness and stuff!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9CRRVZqrRl0
Last edited by slapout9; 07-16-2012 at 07:59 PM. Reason: stuff
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