South China Sea and China (2011-2017)

[carl]

This citation echoes something I've said repeatedly here:

This is why a blustering US response with implicit threats (that we aren't prepared to back) and an implicit demand that the Chines back down are such a bad idea. The Chinese will have to respond in kind: it's politically impossible for them to be seen backing down. At the same time, we push about the only button that can get the Chinese populace to rally behind their government. Where's the advantage in that?

Realistically, this problem isn't going away any time soon, and there's no immediate policy that's going to change the situation on the water. Saber-rattling bluster won't help and will probably make things worse. That doesn't mean anyone has to walk away and concede the issue, it just means there's no quick easy solution.

You do say that all the time. But I always reply that the Red Chinese gov whipped up most of that sentiment and, being the masters of a very strong police state, they can tone it down.

One man's blustering response is another man's reasoned statement that things will be only allowed to go so far. We have to make sure that the line is clear and if that results in a hysterical reaction by the populace (I don't think it would) then that is what will be. And it will be mostly because a captive population has been relentlessly propagandized since 1949.

You are right that there is not quick easy solution.

Not so easy to confront a fishing fleet with a submarine.

Not so easy, unless you surface and night and blast them with machine gun fire then disappear. The Vietnamese will play as rough as anybody I'll bet. But there are better ways than using a sub, though I bet the sub guys can come up with all sorts of fun ways to use the boat.

I read something not long ago expressing concern over a proliferation of submarines in the SCS and the practicality of their use. Apparently the depth of the water confines operations to fairly limited spaces and there was concern over collisions and unplanned encounters. I'll try to find it again, it sounded plausible but I don't know enough about submarines to have an opinion.

Good observation. I don't know about the actual conditions in the South China Sea either but the physical configuration of the place makes a big difference. I did read that some people opined that the Vietnamese erred by buying Kilos because they are fairly large and the French Scorpene (?) would have been a better choice because it was smaller.

But in any event those Kilos seem to cause the Red Chinese some concern.

What the Vietnamese are doing that works as an economic area denial strategy is installing a network of shore-based SSMs and SAMs that cover waters in the EEZ. I personally think the Philippines should adopt that strategy rather than pouring huge sums into ships and aircraft that would probably not survive the first day of an actual conflict, but WTFDIK?

I didn't know the Vietnamese were doing that. It seems sensible. There will have to be some kind of aircraft flying about out there though. There has to be a recon capability to give those missiles targets.