Africa's Commandos - new book on the RLI

[JMA]

The Crippled Eagles



The Crippled Eagles was the informal name of a group of American expatriates that fought with the Rhodesian Security Forces during the Rhodesian Bush War. The name and emblem came from author Robin Moore who offered a house in Salisbury as a meeting place for the Americans who served in all units of the Security Forces, but never had their own unit. The name of "Crippled Eagle" and badge was meant to symbolize their abandonment by the US government.

KIA in the service of Rhodesia

John Alan Coey..............Corporal.....725702....July 19, 1975
George William Clarke......Trooper......728197....May 15, 1977
Richard L. Biederman.......Sergeant....726685....December 6, 1977
Frank P. Battaglia...........Trooper......728515....March 6, 1978
Joseph Patrick Byrne.......Trooper......728721....October 26, 1978
Stephen Michael Dwyer...Trooper......729803....July 16, 1979
Hugh John McCall...........Sergeant....727941....July 16, 1979

"When we landed on the shore and saw the foreign heather,
We knew that some would fall and would stay there forever,
I will go, I will go."

...and still they went and joined the battle. RIP brave friends.

[JMA]

... all 11 of them, 2nd hand, all but used up from Israel. The Augusta Bell 205A. The technicians kept them in the air and operational.



Note: exhaust venting upwards for heat to be dissipated by the rotors as a defence against SAM-7 heat seeking missiles. It worked.

[JMA]

a young stick on Fire Force with its 'catch' for the day at an LZ waiting for uplift:

[JMA]

...let's roll

[JMA]

Extract of article by Simon Willar from the book:

Notes:
goose = girlfriend
joust = contact
Ek se = I say (Afrikaans)
RTV = Rhodesian TV
frantan = Rhodesian version of napalm

The first bush trip was in Kariba and within a few hours I realised I was, without doubt, in the RLI. A gentleman by the name of Felix Haneman, probably the most promoted and demoted corporal in the battalion, introduced himself to me and proudly showed me a pink and white pair of panties. These belong to my goose eks, wanna sniff? (In a later bush-trip in Mount Darwin, Felix was seen attempting to have his way with a non-consenting chicken but enough of that right now). After politely declining his kind pantie offer, I was promptly asked for a $5 loan, the real reason for his introduction, which remains unpaid to this day. Later in the evening, another character offered to swop me four little red tablets for a Lion Ale (he had reached his bar limit) and when I asked him if they were vitamins, he soon lost interest in me.

A South African corporal, Danny van Heerden, sat next to me one night at the boiler fire and offered advice, In a joust eks, you just need to keep your cool and your kop (head) down. If you dont youll get f***d up. If you dont listen to your corp, youll get f***d up, if you dont look after your gat (rifle), youll get f***d up, if you dont go and buy me a dop (drink) right now my china, youll get f***d up. Yup, I had arrived in the RLI, ekse.

Lieutenant (Lt) Nigel Theron, our troop officer, later KIA, asked me a few days later how I was settling in and could see by the look on my face that I had been exposed to some of the commandos most colourful characters. Just remember one thing Willar, its those guys who will save your ass one day and theyll do it without blinking or even giving it a second thought. He was right, I was in safe and experienced hands and the quirky behaviour was more than likely just stress releaseexcept for Felix!

It was Fire Force that defined the RLI. To a newcomer, it was not dissimilar to Combat! the TV war soap on RTV; only it was more intense, with more action and was gut-wrenchingly real. No matter who you were, when your stick was dropped on the ground, you became part of a well-oiled machine. You had to, or youd get f***d up as Danny the sage had said.

It is difficult to describe the heightened sense of collective awareness experienced when on the ground in a Fire Force scene almost like a pride of lions on a hunt. You just seem to know exactly what the others are thinking and anticipating and dont need to really talk to one another; everything flows naturally. It is truly a unique psychology.

I had just turned 19 when I experienced my first contact on a Fire Force bush trip in Mount Darwin. The unmistakable triple thud of the K-Cars 20mm cannon and G-Cars orbiting overhead, angry bursts of fire from MAG gunners and the acrid smell of frantan in the air, made for a glorious baptism of fire. This was it: just another day at the office for the RLI. Lt Nigel Theron was barking orders at us whilst we were under heavy RPD fire coming from a small densely vegetated outcrop and within 15 minutes we had taken out two of the three gooks with the other lying wounded on the ground. I had never seen a dead body before and recall being horrified. Six months earlier I had been sitting in a school classroom just as horrified at the final maths exam paper put in front of me. Its either you or them, simple as that. They dont give a f**k about you and you dont give a f**k about them, thats the deal, dont give it a second thought, Danny Danielson, all of 20 years old matter of factly said and to underline his detachment, he instructed me to check them for skins (money) and watches, I need a watch he said.

[JMA]

Confidence building:

[JMA]

Painting by John Wynne Hopkins:

[JMA]

Extract from the book and article by Don Price:

Principles of tracking - essential skills required to make a good tracker

1. Fitness - mental and physical stamina
A tracker is often required to be up-front and in the first line of fire. In order to do this time and time again, he must possess both mental and physical stamina. The enemy will always be some distance ahead and it is essential to make up this time and close the gap; the faster the gap is closed the quicker the enemy is engaged so peak physical fitness is vital.

2. Unusually keen eyesight and attention to detail
A good tracker usually has very good eyesight and picks up small details that the normal person might overlook. He notices things that are unusual to the situation – a broken twig, a piece of bent grass etc. Eyes have muscles and like other muscles in the body need constant exercise to achieve ultimate performance.

3. Common sense and good judgement
A tracker must show good common sense and judgment as he moves along the tracks. For example, by reading the lay of the land a tracker may anticipate a dry stream up ahead, so could move forward quickly and relocate the tracks which might save valuable time in closing with the enemy. On the other hand if the tracks appear to be slowing down he may want to speak to the controller and check out the area ahead to avoid ambush and so on.

4. Patience
Patience is extremely important as the enemy often employs anti-tracking techniques to confuse the tracker. An impatient tracker or soldier can easily ruin a follow-up very quickly if he cannot at times slow things down in order to read and appreciate the signs ahead. A ‘gung-ho, go-get-em’ type will inevitably ruin a good follow-up. Relocating lost spoor is a slow, methodical and deliberate process which can be very frustrating and annoying to an aggressive leader. Remember the old saying, “Slowly, slowly catch a monkey.” How true this is especially in tracking. Patience, displayed by both trackers, command and control alike, are prerequisites to successful tracking operations.

5. Aggression and motivation
By its very definition, tracking means aggressive and meaningful pursuit. Its very success depends on the ability to pursue, close with and destroy the enemy. A follow-up has a beginning, a middle and an end, and the end must be pursuant with your goals. The point is that without an aggressive spirit, the tracker may as well pack up and go home. As far as a good tracker is concerned, motivation must be a driving force that sees no barrier to operational success. The strange thing about tracking is that better results are always attained by better-motivated people.

6. Good working knowledge of conditions and terrain
An attribute of a good tracker is being able to fit into the terrain in which he is operating. Ahead of time a tracker should familiarize himself with the lay of the land, know where the main water-points are, the distribution of roads in the area, the type of terrain, wooded, open, populated with game, humans and so on. If a tracker is flown into a new and strange surrounding he must find out about the area before tackling the task. A local tribesman, for example, may be a useful addition to the follow-up group if he is sympathetic and friendly. The lesson here is simple: trackers must have a complete and accurate knowledge of the area they are expected to operate in. In his book The Neutral Jungle, Spencer Chapman wrote, “The jungle may be neutral, but it will certainly assist the tracker and give him a definite edge if he is able to manipulate the environment to his advantage.”

7. Stealth
Being able to move silently is what keeps you alive and a good tracker should be able to move quietly through the bush, gliding along without making much noise, using silent signals to communicate with his group of men. These signals should be practised until all the members fully understand the language, at least enough to communicate all the situations and reactions they are likely to be confronted with on a follow-up. A tracker’s kit and equipment needs to be designed and adjusted for the task: good footwear in the form of lightweight boots are essential as hard sled shoes crunch on leaves and twigs; water-bottles must be full so as not to make a sloshing noise; webbing snug and well fitting so as not to hamper the tracker if he suddenly has to run, dive, roll etc. All these things must be considered.

8. Tactical awareness
Always be alert. Know your enemy and know yourself. By this I mean appreciate your own capabilities, work on your weaknesses and understand the enemy you are hunting and tracking. The essential elements of trust, training, tactics and testing go a long way in attaining full tactical awareness which will enable you to do the right thing in the right place at the right time with the right tactics, to the right people, with the right effect, for the right reason. Remember, ‘Know your enemy, know yourself.’

[JMA]

As phase two of Op Dingo the ZANLA base at Tembue, 220km inside Mozambique across Lake Cabora Basa was attacked. Rare photos of the Daks (C-47) on the way in, over the target as the air stikes went in and low level across the lake on the way home. Another good day at the office for the air force, the SAS and the RLI.

[JMA]

As with tradition Training Officers for recruits were normally ex-sergeant majors commissioned for the purpose given their background and experience in what is needed in terms of the skills required at this level of soldiering. As the war progressed and the manpower demands intensified up to 50% of the RLI comprised conscripted National Servicemen (NS) who had volunteered to serve with the RLI. Those attending recruit training in Training Troop were a mixture of regulars and NS on the same courses. Here is a comment (extract from the book) by the last Training Officer, Major Peter Cooper:

National servicemen

As with most youngsters called up to serve in the army, these were a cross-section of reluctant conscripts and eager Rhodesian school leavers. One thing they all had in common was the tender age of 18 and a lack of military experience. With the pressures on availability of manpower in the Rhodesian war effort these troops were often pushed into operational duty within days of their passing out from training, without time for familiarization or adaptation to operational conditions and many became casualties, sometimes on their first deployment. This became a cause of great concern to those involved in training and the contact report, the individual’s records and the training programme would be examined to see if any cause could be found as to why this should happen. In one case it emerged that a man’s reaction when confronted by a live enemy had been fatally hesitant before firing. A culture of safe weapon handling, instilled during training, had perhaps caused a split-second delay before taking the decision to kill another person, a fatal uncertainty that no amount of quick-kill shooting or pop-up targets on jungle lanes could overcome until the man had become accustomed to such situations. Recruits needed time to ‘learn the ropes’ from the older, more experienced men in their troops, themselves recruits not too long before, and in time they would become familiar with operational conditions. In due course most of the national servicemen became good troopers and junior NCOs, some receiving commendations in the field.

It should be noted that all recruits in the RLI were trickle fed in the operational sub-units which in turn allowed them to be placed with experienced troopies and NCOs on the ratio of no more than one in a 4-man stick.

As a personal note I would add that the hesitation to shoot a human for the first time probably has less to do with inbred safety considerations through training than a natural hesitation to shoot to kill an fellow human being.

[Kiwigrunt]

Originally Posted by JMA

As a personal note I would add that the hesitation to shoot a human for the first time probably has less to do with inbred safety considerations through training than a natural hesitation to shoot to kill an fellow human being.

A third disjunct may need to be added to that equation nowadays; fear of legal repercussion. Whether perceived or real (context dependent), it may become that deeply ingrained that it leads to hesitation.

[JMA]

Originally Posted by Kiwigrunt

A third disjunct may need to be added to that equation nowadays; fear of legal repercussion. Whether perceived or real (context dependent), it may become that deeply ingrained that it leads to hesitation.

Nowadays certainly ... then no - after the state of emergency was promulgated.

Post #14 above is an extract from a National Serviceman's account of his first contact. It is a credit to the training team in the RLI that when ever reports of KIA/WIA of recently trained troopies were received they did a lot of soul-searching to see if there were associated training problems.

Interestingly in September 1966 - which was before the state of emergency - the RLI had its first contact of the insurgency - on Op Yodel - about which Trevor Desfountain a troop commander at the time has this to say:

Because no state of emergency had yet been promulgated, civil law was followed and the surviving members of the terrorist group were eventually charged with illegal entry into the country and being in possession of weapons of war with the intent of causing acts of treason and/or terrorism. An attorney was appointed to defend them. I was subpoenaed to attend the High Court on a charge of murder. The Attorney-General of Rhodesia was appointed to defend me for and on behalf of the State and I was acquitted on a plea of self-defence.

There you go then, thats the British system for you.

[JMA]

This advice seems simple enough, right?



Ok, now this is what could happen if you ignored the advice:



and...

[JMA]

... extract from the book:

However, when I think back on my time in the RLI it’s not the training or the contacts with our erstwhile enemy or the parachuting or the patrolling or the hunger or the tiredness or the fear or the elation or the stench of death that comes immediately to mind. No, it’s the unique camaraderie, the esprit de corps, and the often mischievous humour that spring to mind. Someone once described being a combat soldier as 10% pure terror and 90% utter boredom. I think it’s true and I know that when you take an energetic bunch of young men, men who have experienced the excitement of combat and the high of surviving a life-or-death situation, they will find ways to fill that bit of the 90% that isn’t devoted to cleaning weapons, training, eating and sleeping with robust ways to amuse themselves. Here, as with its fighting prowess, the RLI was without peer.

[JMA]

... a practice jump at the bottom of a airfield in the op area.

[JMA]

Mommy's lil darling...



I wrote in another thread in 2010:

It did not take me long to figure out that the means of springing an ambush by tapping the LMG gunner on the shoulder then relying on the accuracy of a bunch of riflemen to make the kills was a pretty bad option.

Rhodesia had it own home-made claymores the mini and the maxi which we used to a lesser extent until the South Africans coped the US M18A1 (or equivalent of the early 70s) and the R1M1 became available to Rhodesian forces.

I was sent along to the introduction demonstrations which was mainly attended by the SAS. The SAS at the time were mainly doing daylight ambushes in Mozambique so were quite happy to position and aim the claymores perpendicular to the path/track and position the ambush party 50 metres from the path. The RLI and all other forces when ambushing did so internally and at night and with 4 man groups/sticks/call-signs.

At night even with an African full moon there was no chance of seeing anything from 50m off the path (we had no night vision equipment). So I adapted the "recommended" siting of the mines as per the image below (which became official policy in the army).

A few notes:

1. By positioning the claymores at 45 degrees from the path the ambush group can get closer to the path to see and then finish off what may survive.

2. Use of paces rather than metres is practical for field work.

3. With a 4 man stick the commander faces forward and has the clacker/initiator, one rifleman faces backwards, the other rifleman and the LMG gunner face down the two directions of the path (beyond the killing ground) with the LMG on the most likely approach side to engage those not caught in the killing ground and discourage any thought of their interfering or any heroics. (Even with two claymores we used Cordex initiated by one clacker.)

4. Additional claymores could be daisy chained outwards with the use of Cordtex (det cord) to include more of the insurgents in the fun.

5. The detail above makes no mention of the clacker (as initiator) as a number of the other units were using the older stuff (minis and maxis) which did not come with a clacker.

6. I set a demonstration using 50 paces of hessian cloth (burlap) at 6 foot high stretched taught between wooden posts. Then fired the claymores as per the detail above one at a time. After firing the first one troopies marked each of the 700 pellet strikes on the hessian with one colour of blackboard chalk. Then I got them to fire the second one and marked the strikes with a different colour chalk. I then positioned a troopie in the killing ground and had two others position at the two claymore detonation points. In this manner we were able to figure out how many strikes an insurgent would receive from either or or both claymores. No survivors in the 40 pace killing ground using two claymores.

7. The siting of the ambush must take into account ground levels, vegetation and rocks and things which may shield areas of the killing ground from hits and in addition and importantly obstacles which would interfere with the explosive gass flow and thus upset the predictable pellet spread.

8. At the initial demonstration we saw the effect of the 3.2mm (1/8 inch) steel ball on ballistic clay and the holes made were equivalent to the cavitation effect on soft tissue. Awesome.

9. For a time I was flown out to all ambushes sprung using a claymore to asses the effect. Again Awesome. (In one case where a less than perfect siting of the mine had happened the lead scout got one pellet in the back. First we found his weapon, a few steps later the sling bad he was carrying then his jacket (he pulled off on the run) with one hole with a little blood then him with a bloodied shirt. Must have made 30 metres before he ran out of luck.)

10. In this way and in a millisecond every living thing in the killing ground pays the ultimate sacrifice. This is the way to wage war.

The mini-claymore was a home made Rhodesian weapon. Smaller and lighter was carried on a scale of one per rifleman when on patrols to allow a 4-man stick to protect itself at night when in an LUP (lying-up-place)

[JMA]

... and those who flew them.

So it was... Hi Ho Hi Ho , Its Off To Work We Go!

[JMA]

... we talk of a locally produced weapon which could cut a man in half... the "ploughshare":

...On one patrol we located large insurgent camps and set up explosive ploughshares on the paths leading into the camp. This device was the RLI’s improvized version of the claymore mine. It was a plough disc with plastic explosives packed on the convex side and plaster of Paris mixed with stones on the concave side. The device was triggered by a battery-operated electric detonator/clothes peg switch and a camouflaged trip-wire laid across the path to catch any unsuspecting terrorist returning to the camp.

As we said... "you shall pass this way but once..."

[JMA]

... the Grey's Scouts was a mounted infantry unit who were coming into their own at the end of the war when operating in the 'flat lands' of the West and south-east. Who can forget the running contact over a few days - the gooks were doing all the running - where they and 2 RAR 'bagged' over 100 with minimal air support.


Troopie carrying a heavy barrel FN with 30 round magazine.

[JMA]

... there was also the "Quick kill" shooting method:

Whilst formal range classification shoots with all platoon weapons was a prerequisite for all recruits before he could be passed out of Training Troop, this did not necessarily define good shooting in bush engagements. A method of shooting was practised in dense bush at battlecamp at close quarters was termed the ‘quick kill’ method.

This type of shooting had been well demonstrated and practised on platoon weapons instructor’s courses. The principles for this were: rifle brought into the centre of the body, the arms used as an extension of the rifle, both eyes open and the shottist practised until he completely recognized his master eye to ensure alignment with the target.

I recall some hilarity as we first began to teach the recruits and some really far misses. By the end of the initial training they were able with both rifle and MAG to consistently hit the kill zone on Fig.11 man-sized targets at close quarters. Today’s combat pistol competitors employ a very similar technique.

Another type of bush live training employed at the battle camp was the transitional shoot sometimes referred to as the ‘Drake’ shoot. This method of shooting was to combat the human tendencies to:

* Fire high, brought about by regular firing on a range where the targets are naturally higher than the firer, even up to six feet higher than the firer. In reality the terrorist may present an outline no higher than twelve inches.

* The failure to fire at likely enemy cover which could have fatal consequences if the enemy snivelling behind cover is not hit. He waits until the sweep line passes him and engages friendly forces from the back. The high velocity and force of a NATO 7.62mm round will smash through most natural cover.

* There is also the tendency for everyone to fire at the same patch of likely cover and not engage cover in their own arc of responsibility. This creates the same threat as above because one or more of the enemy are unscathed by the cover fire.

Therefore we demonstrated and practised with the recruits with the purpose of:

* Firing low, no higher than nine to twelve inches above the estimated ground level. (This was also critical to successful ambush operations at night and engaging a dug-in enemy which was often the case on external raids.)
Select and fire into likely enemy fire positions remembering to relate his fieldcraft to his shooting.

* Fire at the enemy within his own particular arc of view and not to be tempted to fire at the same obvious targets already being engaged by other members of his team.

...