we agree on most things, we just use different words and angles to get to the same place.
We did work with all those groups successfully and there was some friction, but not to the point of forcing premature withdrawal because of frequent murders. There are reasons for that, reasons within our control, reasons that you alluded to. The practices that resulted in this mess aren't the result of of ineluctable forces of nature, they are the result of human decision making. Humans can change what they decide, even though the military-political culture seems set in stone. For the moment in this conflict, nothing will change, granted. But that doesn't mean this failure can't be used as a wake up call. It must be used as a wake up call because if we get into a tussle with the Red Chinese and haven't changed our ways, things will go poorly.
You mention that we haven't been in Afghanistan for 11 years. No, we have. United States forces have been in Afghanistan for 11 years. That is what the world, and the American people see. We have been there for 11 years. They don't see that we have had 11 different iterations of United States forces, each so different that we in effect went in and pulled out 11 times. Neither do they see that was something that was fully within our control and that we made a conscious decision to be foolish. Now you are right that the set-in-stone culture made that inevitable. But that can be changed.
In my view the professional military has a special responsibility in trying to change that culture. I just started Losing Small Wars and Ledwidge made a comment about the military profession and the legal and medical ones. The comment highlighted to me that the military profession, as practiced in the US now at least at the high levels, isn't up to the professional standards of the docs and lawyers. They must give their best professional advice whether the client/patient wants to hear it or not. IF they don't they can be and sometimes are held accountable. Our high end military doesn't meet or have to meet the same standards of professional behavior. They go along with things they know, or should know, can't work by hiding behind the "can do" attitude or complicated power point presentations about how things aren't really bad. (They're really good, see look at slide 37!) Or they'll shrug their shoulders and say we'll look into it. These murders are a fine example of the incompetence of the high level US military. They have been ramping up for several years and the top US commander when asked why, makes a guess about Ramadan because he doesn't know.
The US military must take a hard look at itself, especially/mainly the stars and multi-stars, figure what is wrong and articulate a way to fix it. That would move them up to the level of professionalism at least of the docs and lawyers. They have to at least be able to tell the patient/client the truth and continue to tell the truth even if the patient doesn't want to hear it. I of course, can't make that happen. I don't know who can or how they can. I just know that if they don't we will have more trouble and maybe really big trouble.
That second quote in your last post: only the first sentence was mine. Where did the rest of it come from?
Absolutely. Your assessment of the relative pricklyness of the people you worked with must be countenanced. But you didn't work with the Moros of 1900. You worked with the Moros of much later. Judging from my reading (from within the safe confines of my US armchair), they weren't the same Moros. And I'm not sure what propensity for multi-generational blood feuds have to do with an argument at a checkpoint that results in two US and one ANSF dead, as happened yesterday.
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