Thus, the key to maintaining resolve and preventing the insurgent from discouraging the electorate is to ensure that the conflict loses media traction. In theory, this is possible because the great majority of the electorate cannot or will not handle more than a few political issues at a time. If the media considers other issues more important than the counterinsurgency, then the problem is solved: issues dominate public attention, the counterinsurgency disappears from the political agenda, the electorate slips into indifference, and the government can sustain its resolve indefinitely. Of course, this scenario runs counter to the usual government reaction when popular support for the conflict decreases which is to start a media campaign to promote the counterinsurgency.
did this guy write the blog-gag?

I cannot help but feel a sense of deja vu, given that this author is Belgian. This policy was exactly how King Leopold managed to establish the Congo as his own private money-making venture and portray it as a charitable "loss" until Western authors--notably Conrad--exposed it for what it was.

As for the limit on troops in El Salvador limiting news coverage on the war there, he is in my opinion sorely mistaken because it did nothing of the sort. The news media was all over that story and it stayed that way. Bill Meara was there; he could comment on this one.

Best

Tom