David,

KingJaja,

Thank you for your "on the ground" points.

I do wonder if however strong parts of Nigeria are reported here, such as the reforms made in Lagos and the emergence of a middle class, that the country is fundamentally vulnerable. The first historical example that came to mind was Yugoslavia, a federation held together by Tito in the communist era, which fell apart quickly and we know what followed then.

Some of those who worked in Nigeria before Boko Haram's return to the fore assert they advised their embassies that danger was ahead, only to be told no it was not.

A tactical question regarding the Nigerian state security institutions, given your remarks on the military. Would it make sense to create a new para-military force for the duration of the emergency, deployed in the north only?

Plus such possible innovations as a forensic laboratory in the Punjab, Pakistan, see post 440:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...t=8689&page=22
13 Hours Ago 01:46 AM
1. For some reason, Boko Haram hasn't extended beyond the border established between Northern & Southern Nigeria established by Lugard. This makes some people suspect that there are some political undertones to Boko Haram - i.e. "their Northern sponsors" don't want "their business interests in Southern Nigeria to be affected".

2. Beyond that, Nigeria looks a lot more like two countries - large swathes of the North and Middle Belt are in crisis, but it has had very little impact on the price of food in the Lagos - I live in Lagos.

3. So foreign embassies aren't too bothered about their citizen's safety in Lagos - where an overwhelming majority on expatriates go or the Niger Delta (where the rest go - risks are manageable there, kidnappers want money).

4. About the "middle class", yes it exists - but is very fragile & unemployment is a massive challenge right now. It is worse than Spain or Greece.

5. Nigeria could go the way of Yugoslavia, there are fundamental disagreements between the Northern and Southern elite over issues such as land use, resource control, devolution of powers and the internal architecture of the Nigerian state. The North wants things pretty as much as they are, but the South wants fundamental changes.

6. The North - or at least key parts of it, is likely to be 20 years behind the South. Literacy & immunization rates are appalling, investment is declining - many Southern businessmen (a key part of the Northern economy) are closing shop & moving their businesses down South. In addition, there is a massive migration of Northerners down South to seek employment/opportunities.

7. Many analysts miss this out - there's also a class struggle going on in the North & Boko Haram in some way, is an expression of this class struggle. The Northern elite, which governed Nigeria for 35 plus years did very little to improve human capital in the North - they preferred to keep the feudal system (perfected by Lugard) intact.

8. So we might be seeing some manifestation of Robert Kaplan's "revenge of the poor" in Northern Nigeria - local elite will be challenged by the underclasses & the elite will transfer this blame to the center in Abuja - & that narrative will be eagerly gobbled up by most Western analysts.

9. Southerners will watch these events & find it difficult to make head or tail out of them - since the language of Islam will be used - it will be seen as a threat to their existence. Already fraying bonds will weaken.

10. Northern Nigeria is at the weakest point ever - since Nigeria's independence. And if they don't win the next elections & the generation that took over Nigeria in 1966 gradually die out - all bets are off.

11. Nigeria cannot continue as presently constituted - but the political elite are well practiced in the art of "muddling through" situations - I'm not sure they can pull this off, even the army looks a lot weaker than it was in the past.