So far the Chinese approach has been to extract as much and as fast as possible with little effort to meddle in what passes for governance and no effort at all to solve any problems that aren't their own. That may of course change, if investments are threatened. When that happens, the Chinese may do what the Westerners have traditionally not done: weigh the value of the investment against the cost of "peace and security actions", which of course have less to do with peace or security than with securing investments, not necessarily the same thing.
Depending on the results of that assessment, they may be smart enough to write investments off and walk away, or they may choose to jump into the grinder. If they make the latter choice, we can all sit around here and watch the Chinese mess up a small war. I am confident that they can do that every bit as well as their Western predecessors. I expect that engagement in "peace and security actions" in Africa, or elsewhere outside China, will be far more a liability than an asset to China.
An ironic prediction, given the rather intense interest of so many Chinese in learning English and establishing any pied a terre they can outside China. Given the depth and breadth of China's domestic issues, the image of the all conquering Chinese juggernaut doesn't really hold up very well. The rest of the world is as likely to face the problem of a Chinese implosion (which would be a big problem) as it is to have to manage Chinese dominance.
Probably straying onto the territory of the "China's Expanding Role..." thread, but so it goes.
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