At least you tried, Slap.

I believe it's obvious even to crows on my roof, that the actual overall objective of the US military action in Iraq and Syria is 'maintaining status quo'. And that's the essence of the problem on hand.

Obama seems to be hell or bent on proving himself a 'true US president'. So much so, he's blindly insisting on keeping everything in the Middle East the way it was (before he was elected, for example): the GCC should keep their oppressive dictatorships and Assadists should remain in control of Syria; the artificial Franco-British creation of Iraq should remain intact; Kurds shouldn't get their state, and Iran should be kept out of at least Iraq (plus not go nuclear).... With other words: all the reasons and major sources of extremism should remain in place, but extremism should be 'bombed into stone age'...?

The next problem any theoretician of air power should have with this operation is that Obama is - in typical US-fashion - insistent on ripping things out of their context too. Namely, the stated goal of this 'USA & Friends Co KG Ltd GesmbH SA' operation should be the 'destruction of the Daesh'. Therefore, the military aspect of this enterprise should be run entirely unrelated to all the other things that are going on in Syria, and especially about zillion of all imaginable interests (but those of the US)?

Frankly: while I can very well imagine... no, sorry: while I know very well indeed, that there are plenty of idiots in the DC thinking this is a good idea...

...is there anybody around this forum seriously thinking this is going to work?

But hey: that's the 'starting point' of this military operation.

Little wonder then, the first results of its military part have resulted in a qualified mess. Trying to keep things really short, the way this campaign is waged - a creepily slow start, pin-prick attacks against few targets strewn all over Syria, etc., etc.... to me this seems somebody there has a giant problem because his/her checklist is not applicable for this situation: elements necessary for the force to work the way it was designed, equipped and trained are not in place; 'Ring 1' type of targets are out of reach because... was it the intel that lacks the info or whatever other reason? ... so, somebody there has got to improvise and decided to start with 'Ring 2' type of targets - because they are the most obvious...?

But wait, it's getting better: the few attacks on the Daesh are publicised the most. However, when I count them, attacks on the JAN are (or were, so far) more numerous. Not to talk about those on the Ahrar: this group has already decided to scatter and dive into anonymity....

Fantastic: attack the wrong party, a 'lil bit, so the others know they are in danger and have time to go hiding...

... sigh...

Sorry mate, but I think I'll stop asking you for anything here: I really don't know whether I should cry or laugh at this tragicomedy...

The only thing I'm sure is that I'll not learn anything about methods of applying modern-day air power from this example: only all possible ways about how NOT to do it (which, as so often, is bringing me back to that Churchill's, 'you can always depend on Americans to do the right thing, after exhausting all the alternatives').