Slapout,
The problem with systems approaches, including Warden, is that systems are incredibly resilient and once untethered from their known foundations (i.e. assumptions), respond (and escalate) in unpredictable ways. Systems usually are not destroyed outright but instead adapt to changing circumstances. And even when systems appear to be destroyed, they manifest or express themselves in surprising forms. This necessarily results in repeated reciprocal escalatory actions that quickly test (or break) the parameters of the political object defining the conflict.
We (the U.S.) should be considering how to bring the conflict to a close (read: the exit strategy) rather than embarking on open-ended campaigns with limited results and unpredictable end-states. The U.S. counter-terrorism strategy is very effective at killing terrorists (and those in their immediate vicinity) but not so much in reducing the long-term threat of terrorism. This is the percent increase from 2006 to 2012 in terrorist attacks per country from Global Terrorism Database:
Afghanistan: 420.21% (282 to 1,467)
Iraq: 71.80% (837 to 1,438)
Syria: 17,500% (1 to 176)
Yemen: 6,140% (5 to 307)
How will exclusive use of air power reverse this trend?
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