Ukraine: non-military aspects (August 2014-December 2015)

[OUTLAW 09]

AP--this is the Russian "death race" I often comment on and yet you seem to think it does not exist. I pointed out exactly six months ago when they went into the Crimea---this is the single point of failure and it came far faster than I even thought possible using the oil info from then COUPLED with a US strategic reserve oil sale that no one paid attention to that started the oil price slide.

At 90 per barrel Russia is losing per day 40-55M USDs at the 90 range---they have repeated different figures they need for their yearly budget---they ranged from 96 to 114---but never at 89.

This is a more powerful force to destabilize Putin than anything @andersostlund: Urals Crude (Russian Oil) at $89.53.
pic.twitter.com/V5yWVMwlJv

[OUTLAW 09]

IMO currently Putin is "trapped" in both his own UW strategy and the so so military results on the ground since the Russian troops marched in and might in the face of a not so frozen environment go for a full victory ie the Odessa land corridor meaning since I am losing my own economy over eastern Ukraine--- the price to be paid by the West and the Ukraine is now a full annexation of eastern Ukraine as that constitutes a "victory in my eyes" and I can "sell" that to the Russian population.

Military troop and equipment movements by the Russia Army has picked up inside the Ukraine and more and newer Russia equipment is now being seen for the first time outside Russia.

And the constant mercenary shellings have not stopped.

[OUTLAW 09]

AP---the core problem you have is the same as many western media outlets have---they fully do not understand both the Ukrainian mindset and the new Russian UW military strategy.

QUOTE: ABC today stated on one of their morning news shows and via twitter---they do not understand why there is so much fighting over the Donetsk airport---"it has no strategic and or military importance" UNQUOTE:

That about sums up the US Obama strategy as well for Russia and Central Europe.

[AmericanPride]

Kaur,

Thanks for sharing those articles. In particular:

This memo views the Donbas insurrection as primarily a homegrown phenomenon. It argues that political factors—state fragmentation, violent regime change, and the government’s low coercive capacity—combined with popular emotions specific to the region—resentment and fear—played a crucial role in launching the armed secessionist movement there.

In early April, 46 percent in the Donetsk region and 33 percent in the Luhansk region viewed disarming illegal radical groups as the main step in maintaining the country’s unity. Instead, the government authorized transforming them into semi-private militia battalions tasked with fighting separatists in the east. This made the desire for protection more salient and led locals to support or join their own town militias

Still, as this analysis suggests, merely suppressing the insurgency by force without addressing its deeper internal causes is unlikely to make the Donbas a less troublesome and volatile part of Ukraine.

Once the process of fragmentation begins - when groups are divided and alienated from one another - it's difficult to stop. When Yatsenyuk came into power, he was more concerned with pushing through his policy agenda than rebuilding the Ukrainian polity. Even with Poroshenko in the presidency, the Prime Minister, as far as Ukrainian domestic politics are concerned, represents the strongest obstacle to de-escalation and a settlement.

Outlaw,

It's evident you have no idea what you're talking about when discussing fascism.

So AP---you seem to assume that one's own "ideology" and "personal biases" play WHAT no role in critical thinking and or the decision making process of a leader.

Where did I say that?

a superpower must be as well an economic power and right now I would not rate Russia as a economic powerhouse

That's not necessarily true. First, power is relative, so as long as a superpower's capabilities exceed that of the next rank of powers to a determined degree, it is a 'superpower'. Second, where this threshold is placed will determine whether Russia is a superpower or not. In the qualitative analysis I produced on 15 metrics across 5 domains, Russia ranked #3 after the U.S. and China. This is in large measure due to its military capabilities, but also to some extent the size of its economy.

would have thought Mussolini would have been better as they were true "fascists" long before Hitler-

If you ever bothered reading anything posed to you, you would have noticed that I quoted Mussolini three times.

would have liked you quoting some of the current Russian "fascist" statements of the last six months

Be my guest. Show me where Putin states that violence and perpetual warfare are the prescribed methods for renewing the Russian people.

OR are you stating in your initial comment on the topic Putin is being driven by a "rational logical" western or for that matter eastern emotional tinged decision making processes and his own personal biases and ideology play no role in those decsions?

What in the heck are you talking about?

[AmericanPride]

Outlaw,

It's really not necessary for you to spam the forum. Just FYI.

And again AP you still do not get it for someone constantly commenting.

That statement is ironic.

Think slowly and ask the simple question --WHY did the Ukrainians keep pushing?

See AP---actually being "suckered in" was fine for Putin

Now more twists and turns in your conspiracy theory. First, you say the Russians master-minded the whole operation since before the Maiden. Then you say the Ukrainians actually 'suckered in' the Russians. Now you're stating that the Russians actually wanted to be 'suckered in'. Come on. You are giving both the Russians and Ukrainians far more credit for competency than either of them deserve.

[OUTLAW 09]

See AP--again you go and state things that somehow do not quite jell.

1. Russian decision making has nothing to do with Putin's ideology and or personal biases

2. you somehow have never quite answered exactly what phase of the Russian UW strategy they are in

3. and you definitely do not fully understand the day to day grind on the ground in the Ukraine.

Let's see how you handle this particular article released as a Research Draft from The Royal Institute for International Affairs--now AP it is 24 pages long--can you read before at least attempting to negate any and everything these days.

Since you have never worked with Russian Staff officers and thus never would fully understand that they do nothing without a plan and or authority to do something--YOU would have sensed that 1) the Russians are in fact working a strategic political warfare game with the Ukraine and the US/EU/NATO 2) sense you never read their new military UW strategy in support of the political warfare THEN you would have never sensed and or known about a long term strategy that is driving Putin and this plan is always in the background.

BUT when one does not read this not much else comes forward in terms of ideas and or critical thoughts.

TRUELY take the time and fully understand this particular Research as it fills the final gap between the Russian political war being supported by a Russian military UW strategy.

BASICALLY up to now SWJ has not talked about Russia strategic strategy, nor has western media nor for that matter most of the European/US leadership and or media--not many have even known about "Veritkal"--it has been there for awhile in the open source world just was no paid attention to.

AP--read it and then tell me how it fits into their new UW military strategy---the water in the glass is very clear and even you should be able to understand it.

This is the glove to the military hand.

By the way have blogged often with the author on just this subject---and by the way the "suckered in" you should get use to as more is coming out over the next few weeks.

You really do need to expand your horizons a tad--


Defibrillating the Vertikal? Putin and Russian Grand Strategy
07 October 2014

Project: Russia and Eurasia Programme, Russia's Strategic Overhaul

http://www.chathamhouse.org/publicat....hpO2XDzu.dpuf

Introduction

The Ukraine crisis has provoked a discussion in Western policy and academic communities about Russian strategy as observers attempt to work out what the Russian leadership might do next. Are Russian actions the result of a coherent and consistent agenda? Is Russian strategy, as some Western interviewers recently asked of Putin himself, on ‘a path of dialogue, or expansion and conquest’?1

This paper explores the question of whether there is a Russian ‘grand strategy’, but approaches it from a different angle from that of the current debate indicated above, which usually equates strategy with long-term policy or goals. Instead, here the focus is on strategy as the creation of power, and the paper examines the link between the Russian leadership’s consistent but increasingly obvious commitment to strategic planning and its ability to have those plans implemented.

The paper begins with a brief overview of the current debate about Russian strategy, before turning to draw on the wider strategic studies literature to sketch a working definition of ‘grand strategy’. This is important given the apparent confusion regarding what ‘strategy’ means. It then outlines the
evolution of a three-stage strategic overhaul that has taken place under Vladimir Putin since 2000. The paper then focuses on some of the problems in the plans that are affecting their implementation, before concluding by looking at the range of measures being undertaken by the Russian leadership to address these problems.

Although the paper offers a tentative answer to the question of whether there is a Russian ‘grand strategy’, its main intention is to look beyond the Ukraine crisis, important though it is, to emphasize the commitment of the Russian leadership to strategic planning, despite its inherent difficulties, and to unpack the vertikal of power, the political mechanism through which the plans
are formulated and implemented. Indeed, the paper argues that the vertikal is, in effect, synonymous with strategy – and it does not work except through direct ‘manual control’ from the top leaders.

The paper concludes, therefore, by suggesting there is a political idea, but not yet a grand strategy – though Putin’s efforts to ‘defibrillate’ the vertikal, most notably through the use of ‘para-institutional’ organizations, suggest the intention of the leadership to establish one.

So again AP--Putin does not use "ideology" and personal biases to make his decisions?---come on AP think.

[OUTLAW 09]

AP--since you do not like the concept of "being suckered in" ask yourself this simple question.

Would the US have stated this today If the Russian military had not crossed into eastern Ukraine?

US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Derek Chollet has said that the United States is designing a program that may eventually lead to providing lethal assistance to the Ukrainian government.

AND yes AP--even the Russian FM took notice of the announcement--so again would it have been said before Russian troops entered the Ukraine--not really is the answer.

© REUTERS/ Gleb Garanich

US Arms Supplies to Ukraine Would Harm Peaceful Settlement: Moscow

Potential US deliveries of lethal weaponry to Kiev would undermine agreements on the peaceful resolution of the current crisis in eastern Ukraine, the Russian Foreign Ministry said Thursday.

AP--do you know what agreement the Russian FM is alluding to as even the Minsk 1 and 2 have not been implemented as they are stated--no ceasefire fully functioning, no OSCE inspectors on all Russian crossing points, no OSCE drones in the air over the buffer zones, no buffer zones, no finished POW exchange, no Russian troops verified as totally leaving, and absolutely no Russian mercenaries have left the Ukraine.

So again WHAT agreements are functioning as they were signed is the Russian FM talking about?

But again the Russian FM seems to be confused about "the agreements".

17:21 Lavrov says some problems exist in fulfillment of Minsk accords but general trend is positive (Part 2)

[mirhond]

Domestic Sources of the Donbas Insurgency by Serhiy Kudelia

Finally, you are citing something that makes sence, not just Ukromedia bull$#!t.

The armed conflict in Donbas resulted from a complex interplay of structural and agency-based variables. Monocausal explanations pointing to Russia as the sole culprit miss crucial domestic drivers of the insurrection.

That was my point from the very beginning of this thread, successfully ignored by allmost everyone here.

[kaur]

mirhond, and now read Umland's answer.

+ Golt's article why Russia is not capable repeat Crimea scenario in Donbas region.

http://www.newtimes.ru/articles/detail/87767/

AP, Kudelia explained.

Group Emotions

While structural theories may point to variables that create an opportunity for armed resistance, they do not specify the exact mechanisms that push people to fight. As political scientist Roger Petersen notes, “structural change produces information that is processed into beliefs that in turn create emotions and tendencies toward certain actions.”[7] He suggests three instrumental emotions—fear, resentment, and hatred—that help to explain the beginning of ethnic conflicts. Hatred requires a prior history of conflict and long-standing animosity between ethnic groups, which has not been pronounced in Ukraine. Resentment and fear, by contrast, bear direct relevance to the Donbas conflict.

Did you read from Umland's answer?

Both the extensive public and the heated academic discussions around the Right Sector were, not the least, responses to the media hysteria that Russia’s TV propaganda channels created around Yarosh & Co. At some point, the Right Sector was almost as many times mentioned on Kremlin-controlled television, as Russia’s ruling United Russia party. What, in spite of such attention, Both the extensive public and the heated academic discussions around the Right Sector were, not the least, responses to the media hysteria that Russia’s TV propaganda channels created around Yarosh & Co. At some point, the Right Sector was almost as many times mentioned on Kremlin-controlled television, as Russia’s ruling United Russia party. What, in spite of such attention, remained largely unmentioned, in Russian and Western reporting, was that significant parts of the Right Sector’s early leadership came from Southern and Eastern Ukraine, and that some of the local organizations using the label “Right Sector” partially and even predominantly communicate in Russian language. This does not nullify the problematic or even disgusting political views that many (but apparently not all) members of the Right Sector seem to hold. Yet, the apparently significant participation of russophones in the Right Sector does not fit the popular image of an existential conflict between Ukraine’s Russian-speaking East and Ukrainian-speking West. Arguably, it was the Kremlin’s horror image of an allegedly genocidal and ethnocentrist Right Sector, an integral part of Moscow’s “hybrid” or “non-linear war” against Ukraine, rather than the really existing Right Sector that played its role in the spread of fear among many russophones in the Donbas and Crimea. To see this factor as a solely domestic source of the insurgency would be wrong.

Did you read this report how Russia managed the situation?

https://nllp.jallc.nato.int/IKS/Shar...%20Ukraine.pdf

[AmericanPride]

Kaur,

In the social sciences it is not always possible to "specify the exact mechanisms that push people to fight" - did Russian information operations contribute 80% and ethnic group emotions produce the remaining 20%? Who is to say? I do disagree that the source of the insurgency in Ukraine is "solely domestic" - but Ukraine's problems were a pre-existing condition before Russian intervention; hence Moscow's ability to leverage it to their advantage. Russia in large part bears the majority responsibility for escalating the conflict, but how much for actually starting it? The previous election cycles and political turmoil illustrate exactly where the cleavages in Ukrainian stability existed.

[mirhond]

mirhond, and now read Umland's answer.

5. Kudelia’s mentioning of the local uprisings in Western and Central Ukraine, during the Euromaidan, as events previewing the armed insurgency in the Donbas shortly later is relevant, but may be misunderstood too. As with the putatively triggering function of the Euromaidan violence in Kyiv, the line of continuity between the revolutionary seizures of governmental buildings in Central and Western Ukraine, and the armed insurgency in the Donbas is only partial, if not spurious. The earlier take-overs of administrations were directed against one particular Ukrainian political regime and not against the Ukrainian state. They did not lead to large death tolls, and used physical violence only to a relatively limited degree. The Donbas insurgency may have, in its early phase, copied the events further west. But, in distinction, it became soon directed against the Ukrainian state as such, and quickly informed by the use of increasingly heavy guns.

This quotation shows that author has no idea what he is talking about. He is clearly ignorant of the early events of Donbass uprising, when angry mobs shout "Berkut! Berkut!" and kicked the asses of "right sector" visitors. No point to read article after this, because reader have to agree by default that bunch of oligarchs and their useful idiots on Maidan who hijacked the state have more solid legal standing. One have to prove it, in the first place.

[kaur]

AP, if you consider the arrival of Russian cossacks and FSB guy Strelkov/Girkin from Crimea and read this, what do you think?

Many terrorist factions care about the level of popular support they enjoy within a population they claim to represent. Empirically, this level of support can either rise or fall in the aftermath of a campaign of terrorist violence. Under what circumstances is the use of terror an effective tactic for mobilizing political support for an extremist group? This paper models a scenario in which an extremist faction considers attacking a government in the hopes of provoking a counterterror response that will radicalize the population, increasing the extremists' support at the expense of a more moderate faction. In our scenario, such radicalization can result either from the economic damage caused by counterterror operations or by the way in which such operations change the
population's assessment of the government's motivations. We demonstrate that such attempts at mobilizing public support can be, but need not be, successful, discuss factors that make both the initiation of a terror campaign and successful mobilization more or less likely, and relate our results to several empirical cases.

http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politic...propaganda.pdf

Using this pretext Russian media continued propaganda campaign against Kiev. Despite this Strelkov/Girkin complained that there is not enough locals to fight against Kiev in May. Propaganda by deed among locals didn't work? Russian volunteers started to arrive to make bigger mess. By the middle of August they were pushed back. Kiev started use monopoly of force Kudelia complained about? August 18 Girkin disappeared from Russian news. Russian battalion tactical groups arrived and spoiled this enforcement attempt.

Here is article about media analysis of Russian biggest media sources. First graphic shows how term federalization = «Федерализация» has diminished. Second one is about Right Sector= «Правый сектор».

http://znak.com/moscow/articles/25-08-19-42/102822.html

How Strelkov/Girkin disappeared from Russian news.

https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?f...3236270&type=1

[AmericanPride]

Kaur,

I agree that Russia has been active in agitating discontent and escalation in Donbas. The real question is when was this decision made. Outlaw strongly argues that Russia has manipulated these events from even before the Maiden. I don't think that's the case. Aside from stopping several Ukrainian Army convoys, the initial 'revolt' in the east was largely peaceful. And it's worth noting that Russia ignored their referendums for Russian annexation even though Russia formally annexed Crimea immediately prior.

[kaur]

AP, Putin spoke to FSB leaders in February 2012. Putin's integration project is Eurasian Union. In the end of November 2013 Maidan square said no to his project.

The president warned that against the attempts to slow down the integration work on the post-Soviet space can be used a variety of enforcement mechanisms, including the so-called soft power.

http://izvestia.ru/news/544959

[AmericanPride]

Kaur,

Regional integration was also a project of Yeltsin and Gorbachev. Really, you could trace the ebb and flow of Russian desire for European integration as far back as Peter the Great. The alarmists today like to cast the Eurasian Union as the rebirth of the USSR, but that is not the case. Yes - historically and today views itself as a major power. Why is that alarming? So it should not be surprising that Russian elites also see their country as having an important role in regional and global affairs. Regional integration is the trend on all the continents.

The next evolution in regional economic integration will be building connections between these organizations. As far back as the 1950s, the Soviet Union proposed an architecture that would have integrated the USSR into the European structure, but this was rejected by the U.S., U.K., and France. Similar overtures have been floated in the years since but have not picked up traction largely because of mutual distrust. What's interesting is that the fragmentation of the international system through the proliferation of nation-states since World War II has not actually reversed the centuries long process of regional economic integration. How long can the U.S. and Russia sustain confrontation with one another while globalization is busy building connections between peoples and economies?

So where does Ukraine fit in all of this? What's usually underappreciated is the balancing act of Yanukovych. If he was such a henchmen of Moscow, why didn't he seek integration sooner? For his own political survival, neutrality was the only feasible option. He could accept Western integration (which he preferred at first) but it came at a high cost through austerity and reform, which would wipe out his domestic base. That's why he eventually rejected it, prompting the Maiden. The country's pending default is what forced the issue. He needed cash. And he needed that cash with the least amount of strings attached.

Outlaw has this elaborate conspiracy theory about Russia master-minding the war. But the reality is that the war was largely an accident; the outcome of a series of reciprocal actions in a system with no way to defuse security problems. War is a process, not an event, and a cycle of decisions, actions, and counter-actions quickly led to escalation. Only after the Russians realized that they were losing their influence (when Yanukovych was thrown out of office) did they move to seize Crimea and agitate in Donbas (Russia had 20+ years to move against an independent Ukraine if they desired annexation; why wait this long, at the moment of most desperation, if that's the goal?). As soon as he came to power, Yatsenyuk said he was on a 'suicide run' to push through economic reform. That reform was the selling off of state assets to private owners and EU membership, and blocking Russian influence. Of course Moscow freaked out. Ukraine was the breadbasket of the Russian Empire and there are alot of material and intangible interests tied up in it. This was never about ethnic Russians or their liberty and culture. It's always been about money and power.

[mirhond]

http://www.0629.com.ua/news/638908?PageSpeed=noscript

Ukrainian soldier in Mariupol' gathering "aid" from the drivers on a road.

[kaur]

AP, I'm slow and didn't get the point of your last post.

You asked

I agree that Russia has been active in agitating discontent and escalation in Donbas. The real question is when was this decision made.

I cited Putin's speech in FSB in February 2012.

The president warned that against the attempts to slow down the integration work on the post-Soviet space can be used a variety of enforcement mechanisms, including the so-called soft power.

Was this just a threat or was there already plan? Was the come back of this guy the beginning of planning?

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24178947
http://www.interpretermag.com/kremli...ransdniestria/

Fact is that in Ukraine the Putin's red line was crossed by Maidan in the end of November. The rest we have followed since then.

[AmericanPride]

Was this just a threat or was there already plan?

A plan for what? I think it's obvious the Russians had a plan - but when was the plan activated? And what was its scope? Was a contingency plan in response to the Maiden, et al? Or was it something more proactive and sinister?

Fact is that in Ukraine the Putin's red line was crossed by Maidan in the end of November.

I concur.

[OUTLAW 09]

There is a decision point coming for the Russian leadership on whether to go full in and take the remaining portions of New Russia and grab the Odessa land corridor to the Crimea---14 Oct.

This is the date the Rada set to vote on the change in the non aligned status of the Ukraine--which now has the votes for change---this is a Russian red line as stated on 26 Sept in the UN by their FM.

Russian troop build ups continuing in the areas necessary to push forward and new modern Russian equipment not seen outside Russia is now in the Ukraine.

This will indicate if Putin wants further destruction of his economy in the name of New Russia or is he willing to admit that the new Russian UW strategy has failed in the Ukraine?

That UW strategy is built on a military victory.

[mirhond]

Russia had 20+ years to move against an independent Ukraine if they desired annexation; why wait this long, at the moment of most desperation, if that's the goal?

That's simple: Russian military has been degrading untill recent years, but now it regained some strength, organization and popular support, while Ukrainian (which was second to Russian after collapse of USSR) allmost fall to neglect and disrepair - that's why it had troubles destroying a few thousands of lightly armed insurgents. So crackpot theorists have a point - after Maidan Ukraine is ideal place for covert ops and small war.

Ukrainian politics

http://podrobnosti.ua/video/power/20...09/997320.html

Interview with Rada deputy Igor Skosar' who bought his office for 6 mln. $