Yemen 2016 onwards: an intractable war?

[AdamG]

The death of Chief Petty Officer William Owens came after a chain of mishaps and misjudgments that plunged the elite commandos into a ferocious 50-minute firefight that also left three others wounded and a $75 million aircraft deliberately destroyed. There are allegations — which the Pentagon acknowledged on Wednesday night are most likely correct — that the mission also killed several civilians, including some children. The dead include, by the account of Al Qaeda’s branch in Yemen, the 8-year-old daughter of Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born Qaeda leader who was killed in a targeted drone strike in 2011.
Mr. Trump on Sunday hailed his first counterterrorism operation as a success, claiming the commandos captured “important intelligence that will assist the U.S. in preventing terrorism against its citizens and people around the world.” A statement by the military’s Central Command on Wednesday night that acknowledged the likelihood of civilian casualties also said that the recovered materials had provided some initial information helpful to counterterrorism analysts. The statement did not provide details.
But the mission’s casualties raise doubts about the months of detailed planning that went into the operation during the Obama administration and whether the right questions were raised before its approval. Typically, the president’s advisers lay out the risks, but Pentagon officials declined to characterize any discussions with Mr. Trump.

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/w...ions.html?_r=0

[OUTLAW 09]

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/w...ions.html?_r=0

Open source survey of @realDonaldTrump's first special forces raid in Yemen

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena...aid-in-yemen/#

[davidbfpo]

From an IISS Strategic Comment on the Yemeni Civil War and from the conclusion, cited in part:

The Saudi government’s military campaign is believed to be costing it US$200 million per day, and Riyadh has yet to see the light at the end of the tunnel. But the campaign is popular at home, which to a degree offsets scepticism about the broad domestic economic restructuring set in motion by Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The Emiratis, for their part, can sustain their effort without much difficulty, and have relatively extensive combat experience from their participation in coalition operations in Afghanistan and Libya. The Houthis do not appear inclined to de-escalate the conflict.

Link (mainly behind a pay wall):http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/...yemen-war-ce22

Plus an overview (contemporary and historical) from Hamid Hussein, our occasional correspondent, on the attachment.

[CrowBat]

From an IISS Strategic Comment on the Yemeni Civil War and from the conclusion, cited in part:Link (mainly behind a pay wall):http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/...yemen-war-ce22

Some nitpicking here:

...In the 1960s, the Saudis fought a brutal war against a 70,000-strong Egyptian expeditionary force deployed by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, with Soviet support, to overthrow the royalist Mutawakkilite government in Yemen and replace it with the left-wing rulers of the Yemen Arab Republic. With overt support from Jordan and covert help from the United Kingdom, the Saudis ultimately repelled the Egyptians...

This is simply nonsense.

For most of that war, the Egyptians had about 40,000 troops deployed in Yemen. It was only for a short while in 1964 they deployed more, and then their logistics system proved barely able of supporting as many. As anybody writing assessments of this kind should know: keeping 70,000 combat troops supplied in a country where there is very little water to find and even less food to buy, and most of roads are under constant insurgent attacks, is anything but easy.

Perhaps more importantly:
- Jordanian 'support' for Saudi 'effort' in Yemen collapsed already in October 1962 - due to defection of 8 pilots (together with one Dove transport and four Hawker Hunter fighter-bombers) to Egypt (for detailed reference see Hawker Hunters at War); while

- actual 'Saudi' effort through most of the war was run by the British, and only financed by the Saudis (for detailed reference see The War that Never Was), and

- a lot of that effort saw Israeli and Rhodesian involvement (in form of provision of transport aircraft that were para-dropping supplies for Royalists inside Yemen).

Whatever, crucial point is: in military sense, Egyptians were not defeated. For them, the war ended with a 'disengagement' similar to that of the USA from Vietnam, in September-October 1967.

Certainly enough, Immediately afterwards, the Royalists launched an offensive on Sana'a, which resulted in a 70-days-long siege. However, during that siege, the Soviets launched their first military intervention in the Middle East ever (that as in November 19679. They delivered MiG-17s, Il-28s and plenty of other arms to the Republicans, helped them lift that siege and push the Royalists away from the capital.

Eventually, the war ended with a cease-fire in 1970 - and with these 'leftist Republicans' in power in Sana'a. I.e. the party fought by the Royalists, supported by the British and financed by the Saudis, was in power. Indeed, for most of the early 1970s, that Republican government was receiving support from the USSR (although, Soviets subsequently began to prefer cooperation with Marxists from Southern Yemen). Therefore, and for all practical purposes, the Saudis lost that war. Worse yet: the British lost it too - and that not only because they were forced to leave Aden/Federation of South Arabia, in 1967, but even more so because:

- The Federation of South Arabia subsequently transformed into the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (i.e. South Yemen, which was a Yemeni variant of North Korea), a staunch Soviet ally until 1990;

- which in turn prompted Saudis to start financing local Islamic fundamentalists, with far-reaching repercussions that should be known to everybody nowadays. With other words, hailing Saudi (i.e. British) effort there is a typically short-sighted way of commenting that war (Yemen Civil War of 1962-1970).

Sigh... and that was just the introduction-paragraph... makes me wonder what other kind of sound conclusions can be expected in the rest of that file...

EDIT: ah, it's a 'pay-to-read' file. Sorry, I strongly doubt it's worth even 5 bucks.

[davidbfpo]

Citing Post 135 in part

Some nitpicking here:
This is simply nonsense.

For most of that war, the Egyptians had about 40,000 troops deployed in Yemen. It was only for a short while in 1964 they deployed more, and then their logistics system proved barely able of supporting as many. As anybody writing assessments of this kind should know: keeping 70,000 combat troops supplied in a country where there is very little water to find and even less food to buy, and most of roads are under constant insurgent attacks, is anything but easy.

Whatever, crucial point is: in military sense, Egyptians were not defeated. For them, the war ended with a 'disengagement' similar to that of the USA from Vietnam, in September-October 1967.

Readers may find an old, closed thread in the Historians arena useful: 'The Egyptian-Yemen War', where there are more references and a SME chimes in:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=2567

[CrowBat]

Oh, that list contains a few 'would be nice to have' publications...

Here a few additional sources of reference:

- ANDERSSON, L., Svenskarna I Jemen (De Tog Flyget Till Medeltiden: Svenskarna i Jemen), (Uppsala, Z-frlaget, 2008)
ISBN 978-91-633-1930-3

- COOPER, T. & Nicolle, D., Arab MiGs, Volume 3 (Houston, Harpia Publishing LLC, 2012)
ISBN 978-0-9825539-9-2

- COOPER, T., Nicolle, D., & Nordeen, L., Arab MiGs, Volume 4 (Houston, Harpia Publishing LLC, 2013)
ISBN 978-0-985455415

- DRESCH, P., A History of Modern Yemen (Cambridge University Press, 2010)
ISBN 0-521-79482X

- FAWZY, Major-General M., The Three-Years War (in Arabic), (Beirut: Dar Mustakbal al-Arabi, 1998)

- FERRIS, J., Soviet Support for Egypts Intervention in Yemen, 1962-1963, Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 10, Number 4, Fall 2008, pp5-36 (Article)

- FLINTHAM, V., Air Wars and Aircraft: A Detailed Record of Air Combat, 1945 to the Present (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1989)
ISBN 0-85368-779-X

- GINDY, F. el-, Egyptian Eagles over the Golan (in Arabic), (Cairo, al-Hayah al-Misriyah al-Ammah lil-Kitab, 1992)

- GREEN, W., and FRICKER, J., The Air Forces of the World (London, MacDonald, 1958)

- HART-DAVIS, D., The War That Never Was: The True Story of the Men Who Fought Britain's Most Secret Battle, (London, Century, 2011)
ISBN 9781846058257

- LARON, G., Stepping Back from the Third World, Soviet Policy toward the United Arab Republic, 1965-1967, Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 12, Number 4, Fall 2010, pp99-118 (Article)

- MENAHIM, Major General K. al-, Egyptian Wars in Modern History (in Arabic), (Beirut: Dar Mustakbal al-Arabi, 1990)

- NICOLLE, D., 'Arabian Texans: T-6s, Harvards etc. With Middle East Air Arms', AirEnthusiast Magazine, No.97, January/February 2002

- NORDEEN, L., and Nicolle, D., Phoenix over the Nile (Washington, Smithsonian, 1996)
ISBN 1-56098-826-3

- OKASHA, Maj-Gen M., Conflict in the Sky: the Egyptian-Israeli Wars, 1948-1967, (Cairo: Ministry of Defence, 1976)

- PIVKA, O. v., Armies of the Middle East (Leicester, Blackfriars Press Ltd., 1979)

- PUCIK, M., Vvoz zbran a pecilnej techniky do zujmovch krajn bvalej ČSSR v sedemdesiatych rokoch, Apolgia magazine (exact volume unknown)

- SCHMIDT, D. A., Yemen: The Unknown War (London, The Bodley Head Ltd. 1968)
SBN 370-00411-6

- STAFRACE, C., Arab Air Forces (Carrollton, Squadron/Signal Publications Inc.)
ISBN 0-89747-326-4

- VYHLIDAL, M., Československ pomoc při vstavbě vojenskho kolstv v arabskm světě v letech 1948 1989 (in Czech), (Brno, Filozoficka fakulta Masarykovy University, 2010. 100 s. Magisterska diplomova prace/thesis, 2010)

- ZDEK, P. and Sieber, K, Československo a Blzk vchod v letech 19481989, stav mezinrodnch vztahů, (Prague, 2009)
ISBN 978-80-86506-76-0

http://www.radfanhunters.co.uk/

Following developments in Yemen since, say, 2004, is a little bit harder - or at least I found it that way: found no serious studies of military developments, only plenty of usual MSM articles.

Namely, I'm currently working on a volume covering aerial warfare - and then primarily operational deployment history of (in chronological order) Egyptian, Saudi, North Yemeni, South Yemeni, and then the united Yemeni air forces - in Yemen between 1962 and 2015. To a significant level based on interviews with Egyptian, Yemeni and Saudi participants, this is to be published by Helion, later this year.

[AdamG]

What happened the night a U.S. commando was killed in combat, the first such death of Trump's presidency
http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/...cid=spartandhp

[CrowBat]

Plus an overview (contemporary and historical) from Hamid Hussein, our occasional correspondent, on the attachment.

A review of this one:

Contrary to what Mr. Hamid wrote, the Yemeni crisis did not emerge when 'Shi'a backed Houthi rebels took control of large swaths of the territory' (i.e. in 2014-2015): it began already back in 2004.

The story began in 1990, when Saudis expulsed about 1 million of Yemeni guest-workers because of what they (and the USA) perceived as Saleh's support for Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Now, these 1 million of Yemenis came back home around the same time few other things happened, too. Between others,

- a) several thousands of Yemenis that fought in Afghanistan came back home;

- b) the first Zaidi generation grew up in a country that was no Imamate/Mutawakkilite Kingdom, and

- c) a number of Zaidi scholars returned from religious studies in Sudan and the UAE (not from Iran, as usually explained).

Put together: there was suddenly plenty of youngsters around, who realized they can read and write, can travel, can see that other countries were coming forward at a much faster pace than Yemen, and that something is badly wrong with their own state (until 1994 this was North Yemen, and under the control of President Saleh already since 1978). The same youngsters also realized that plenty of stuff taught to them about Islam by tribal leaders and preachers were simply wrong.

A combined result of all of this was that traditional tribal organization of the Zaidi society began falling apart (that of the Sunnis, i.e. the 'Shafi' as the Sunnis are called in Yemen was already in complete disorder since earlier times): instead of tribes, ideologically-motivated groups began to dominate. That's how 'Houthis' - a family that was entirely unimportant at earlier times - became something like 'important'.

Now, Zaidis happen to live in the part of Yemen where trade with arms is a part of everyday life - just like trade with groceries, wheat, cattle etc. But, when Saleh learned about Houthis 'buying weapons', he flipped out (primarily out of concern about a possible 'armed uprising', and although there was never a trace of Houthis preparing something of that kind) and did a major mistake: he launched a military attack on Houthis, in 2004.

Sure, this attack was successful in so far that it bagged the first Houthi leader. However, it broke all the fundamental rules of the traditional Yemeni conflict, foremost between which is extensive use of fierce semantics prior to the armed conflict, in order to actually prevent an armed conflict. That's what Yemenis used to consider as 'civilised' and 'diplomatic' behaviour. With other words: Yemenis used to threaten, insult etc. each other, much more than they used to kill each other.

However, through such an action, Saleh presented himself as a 'wild barbarian' to most of youngster Houthis - and this in addition to already presenting himself as 'ruling with support from Saudis and corrupt merchants'. Even then, the Houthis didn't give up trying: in 2005, their new leader spent two months in Sana'a, trying to meet Saleh. Without success: Saleh ignored him completely - and thus definitely created an impression of himself as somebody with whom there can be no negotiations. That is what not only prompted Houthis to really launch an armed uprising, but also drove thousands of other Zaidis into their group, and then resulted in so-called 'Six Sa'ada Wars'. Fought 2004-2010, all of these resulted in severe defeats of the government. Eventually, Saleh was left with little other choice but to depend on the militia of the Moslem-Brotherhood-connected Islah Party to keep the Houthis from marching on Sana'a.

Then came 2011, and Saleh was forced (primarily by the Saudis, and primarily through defection of Islah-Party-dominated parts of the military) to resign. In his place, the Saudis installed their puppet Hadi, who had absolutely no political base, nor widespread support (indeed: Hadi was unknown to majority of the Yemeni population). Nevertheless, Hadi then completely reorganized the military, ripping it apart in the process. So much so that his decisions caused a series of mutinies (nearly a half of the Yemeni Army was on the streets through most of 2012 and early 2013). Ignoring all the criticism, and against better advice, he then also embarked on reorganizing Yemen into a federation of six Provinces.

Just as the latter decision caused the next political crisis, in mid-2014, Saudis also stopped supporting the Moslem Brotherhood, i.e. declared it a terrorist organization. Now, Saudis did so for reasons related to developments in Egypt. However, their decision resulted in cancellation of all the support for Yemeni MBs too - although these, through the Islah Party - were something like the sole (even if reluctant) supporters of the Hadi's government.

Unsurprisingly, the Saudi decision back-fired: left without money, the Islah Party militia couldn't keep the Houthis in check any more, while the military was already in a state of chaos, plus deeply split between the Islah- and Saleh-supporters. With other words: it didn't fight either. Houthis thus found their way into Sana'a wide open.

This was anything but a 'disastrous move' by the Houthis (equalling them with the 'Zaidi Shia' minority is, sorry, dilletantic; there are still at least as many Zaidis fighting against Houthis, as those that joined them): it was perfectly logical. After all, Houthis had their own designs, one of which was to remove that incompetent, Saudi-supported corrupt gang ruling from Sana'a. With their primary enemies out of the way and in a state of chaos, why not take over de-facto without a fight? Who wouldn't do what they did?

Author's insistence on use of expressions like 'Zaidi Shi'a minority' and/or 'Shi'a rebel movement' is entirely wrong in place. Not only are there still at least as many Zaidis fighting against Houthis (i.e. it is wrong to equal Houthis to all of Zaidis), but there are also plenty of Shafis (Sunnis) fighting for Houthis, or at least for those Saleh-loyal army units that sided with Houthis.

With other words, it's entirely wrong to consider this war a purely sectarian conflict between Zaidis and everybody else; it is also wrong to call it a 'proxy war' between 'Iran-supported Shi'a' and 'Saudi-supported elements of Yemeni society', too: large segments of the Yemeni-parts of the coalition fighting against Houthi/Saleh are Salafists, Marxists, Southern Separatists, tribes that lost ground due to Houthi attacks etc., etc., etc. - simply 'plenty of people' who are not the least eager to fight 'for Saudis' or even 'for Hadi', but are fighting for their own designs.

And if anybody made a 'disastrous move', then the Saudis. Not one of their 'moves' regarding Yemen since 1962 was a sound decision, and their decision to launch a military intervention in 2015 was no exception from that rule: all were short-sighted, and only destabilizing Yemen ever more. Now they've managed to throw the country into such a chaos that it's unlikely to recover for another 15-20 years.

This is the crucial point, and something that should finally be mentioned by somebody in the public. Without realizing, accepting and admitting this mistake, Saudis can pay another dozen of billions to various of their advisers around the world, and still nothing is going to change.

[OUTLAW 09]

Is now CENTCOM attempting to protect the WH NSC who announced their planned raid into Yemen was a great success generating intelligence that was important....NOT the utter failure that many are pointing to.....
U.S. Central Command
✔
@CENTCOM
#alQaeda bomb making video captured in Jan. 28 raid on #AQAP operations/logistics hub in #Arabian Peninsula

http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-R...aid-in-yemen/#

BUT WAIT...from 2003 until 2010 QJBR...then AQI..then IS and the other mainline Iraqi Sunni insurgent groups....IAI....AAS...to al Duri's Naqshbandi Sufi Order PUBLISHED literally tens of such IED bomb making videos and pamphlets in pdf format....AND no one seemed to have minded....TO INCLUDE videos on how to make explosives......

NOW a single video makes headlines..why is that?????

[CrowBat]

Why? Because author of that release knows nothing about earlier cases.

***********

But wait: the pah-ty only just began...

Yemeni officials say warships shell al Qaeda positions, U.S. denies involvement

...
The naval attacks appear to be part of an intensifying campaign against one of the most active branches of the Islamist militant network.
"Ships fired several missiles towards the al-Maraqisha mountains, where al Qaeda elements are based. The ships are widely believed to be Americans," said one official, who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the matter.

"We have received no information on the outcome of the shelling."
...

The al-Maraqisha mountains are a key al Qaeda stronghold in southern Yemen. Militants took refuge there last year after Yemeni government forces, backed by Arab coalition aircraft, drove them from the cities of Zinjibar and Jaar.
...

U.S. Warships Target al-Qaeda Stronghold in Abyan

An al-Qaeda stronghold in Yemen’s Abyan province was targeted on Thursday most likely by U.S. warships, four days after a U.S. operation against the organization in central Yemen, tribal sources said.
...

al-Qaeda spreads again in three towns of Abyan province

A Yemeni official and tribal sources said that fighters of al-Qaeda fighters have taken control again in three towns in the Abyan province south of the country.
The security official said that the withdrawal of the security forces from these areas was a protest following the delayed payment of salaries, which facilitated the entry of fighters into Lauder, Shukrah and Aked areas in Abyan.
The official added that the security forces are suffering from a shortage of resources, especially weapons, to confront the enemies. Sources said that al-Qaeda fighters set up checkpoints on the streets in Lauder and blew up two security buildings using explosives.

This comes as warships, believed to be American, bombed strongholds of al-Qaeda in the mountainous area south of the country.
The source confirmed that the ships fired several missiles towards al-Marakichah mountain where al-Qaeda elements are stationed.
...

At the same time, seems this UAE-YNA operation in Mocha is continuing in direction of Hodeida. At least Hadi is promising there will be no ceasefire before that crucial port is captured (and... cough & sigh... 'last venue of'...cough...'Iranian arms smuggling for Houthis is cut off'... sorry, always suffering bronchitis and asthma attacks at that point...).

[CrowBat]

Damn coughing... missed this one because of it:

US sends Navy destroyer to Yemen

...The United States has placed a Navy destroyer off the coast of Yemen to protect waterways from Houthi militia aligned with Iran, two US officials said on Friday, amid heightened tension between Washington and Tehran.

The USS Cole arrived in the vicinity of the Bab al-Mandab Strait off southwestern Yemen where it will carry out patrols including escorting vessels, the officials said, speaking on condition of anonymity.
...

Remember USS Cole...? Yup, that's how the part of the AQ story in the conscience of most of the public began, back in 2001.

Though, if Cole is really there 'to protect waterways from Houthi militia aligned with Iran', then the US should better fire 90% of personnel of something like 17 different intelligence agencies (and about 50 different associated private intelligence companies working for these). Pronto. Namely, in such case the US intel does not know that the Houthi/Saleh coalition fired all of its stocks of C.801s dry.