It seems that “all over the map” is your new
de jour critique. Could it be that the famous “but wait” is being retired? Certainly the numerous exaggerated ellipses aren’t in danger of disappearing, are they?
I can only assume that the lingering sting of the yellow card is behind the recent flurry of
ad hominem.
Which part of my reply to you had nothing to do with either the Syria thread in general, or your original comment(s) in particular?
The Americans and Russians have "fathered" a Kurdish state as much as the Iranians fathered a Houthi one in Yemen. The Syrian Kurds only became local allies of the Coalition because they had mostly stayed out of the Syrian Civil War and fought primarily against Daesh. The Syrian Kurds filled the vacuum left by Assad’s intelligent withdrawal from indefensible areas of Syria: Sunni Arab areas in the east and center, and Kurdish areas in the north. For all of the ideological and organizational ties between the PKK and PYD, I have seen no evidence of YPG fighters and/or arms crossing into Turkey. Thus far, the YPG seems to be biding its time: avoiding confronting Turkey, and staying focused on consolidating "Rojava" and preserving ties with the U.S. Lastly, the political arrangements of “Rojava” do leave something to be desired, however, there is a significant degree of local governance, including by non-Kurds and non-Muslims,
Donbas is a drain for Russia. It is useful as a spoiler like Transnistria, but will not be annexed in the way of South Ossetia or Abkhazia, much less like Crimea, which was absorbed as a federal subject.
For the operations in Donbas, Russia created ad hoc BTGs from elements of units across the length and breadth of Russia. This was not so much to spread the combat experience around, but because of readiness issues, as Philip Karber detailed in his ORBAT to CSIS in 2014. Then, Russia deployed elements of these BTGs to Syria to participate in pro-Assad offensives. These developments, as well as the rather meaningless reactivation of old armored divisions, seems to corroborate the constant refrain from Austin Bay and James Dunnigan from StrategyPage, who have argued that Russia only has around 100,000 well-trained and equipped ground troops, and these include regular forces and special forces, as well as paramilitary units in the new National Guard that were formerly under the MOI. Various contributors at SWC have also kept track of the various transfers between the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets as well as the naval presence in the Mediterranean.
Mercenaries played a key role in U.S.-led occupations od Afghanistan and Iraq, but the bribed degenerates in Donbas aside, Russia has yet to field a comparable mercenary force to the U.S. (more than 100,000) or Iran (more than 30,000). Note that estimates of U.S. contractors deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq during the 2006-2010 period ranged from 130,000 to 160,000 according to the Congressional Research Service. By comparison, there are perhaps 200 to 400 Russian mercenaries in Syria.
Assad is safe from being overrun but is far from being able to retake the country. Despite facing only one serious adversary, the FSA, no active threat from the YPG or Daesh, and infighting between Daesh, HTS and the FSA. Obviously 30,000 to 40,000 foreign regulars and irregulars combined with a ~100,000-strong Syrian NDF are not enough to defeat the FSA despite their numerical superiority on paper...
I’m glad that the two of you have put bromance before differences of opinion. It demonstrates a high degree of emotional maturity and puts your relationship on a solid footing…
Firstly, you have claimed that Russia “now” has “permanent bases” in Syria, ostensibly including the naval base at Tartus, the leased airbase at Hmeymim and two SIGINT facilities.
However, Tartus is not a base but a “Material-Technical Support Point” per Russia’s MOD, or a glorified dock with only:
- One concrete jetty used as a pier
- Two pontoon bridges that serve as piers
- One mooring jetty
- One drydock
Nor is the Russian Navy’s reactivated 5th Squadron based at Tartus, as the facility is incapable of hosting Russia’s major warships. Years of dredging and other work is required before the Russian Navy can take full advantage of its extended lease.
As for Hmeymim, it has no hardened aircraft shelters that NATO airbases do, and hosts less aircraft and personnel than nearby NATO airbases.
Secondly, you have claimed that Russia’s “bases” threaten NATO’s “southern flank”, presumably Turkey. How? Russia has air and naval bases in Crimea that can accomplish that. Sure, Hmeymim would shave ~160 miles off a round-trip to the far end of Turkish airspace, but is this a strategic factor?
Thirdly, you have referred to Russian A2/AD bubbles threatening Israel and NATO. Yet these bubbles have only a handful of SAMs, including one S-300 and one S-400, and have no anti-ship capabilities.
Fourth, Russia’s efforts to support a relatively minor intervention in Syria has demonstrated what dire straits Russian logistics are in. The only Russian “surges” of note have been when Russia used strategic bombers to conduct strike missions. Even the Kuznetsov’s campaign resulted in more of its aircraft being lost to accidents than the enemy, and most of its air operations being conducted from Hmeymim.
On all these points, CrowBat has stated contrary opinions to yours…
A2/AD also involves anti-ship capabilities in maritime areas, which Russia has not deployed in Syria. Russian defenses failed to deter or stop various Israeli airstrikes, the presence of U.S. naval forces off Syria and the recent TLAM strike on Shayrat. ‘Nuff said.
Then how did the U.S. and U.K. manage the airlift to West Berlin? They had no capability to lift the blockade by conventional force, the U.S. nuclear force was small and unready, and Soviet intelligence had penetrated the highest levels of both governments at that time. The “quarantine” of Cuba also involved serious risk-taking on the part of the U.S., as it did not have the conventional capability to neutralize the ballistic missile sites on Cuba without resorting to nuclear weapons.
Violence will continue until 30% or more of the fighting-age males are incarcerated, killed or incapacitated by injury.
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