Originally Posted by tequila
I was just reading that. Steve and I often agree to disagree but I think he's right here. In fact, I made a similar argument about "splitting the difference" in our initial approach to Iraq in a study published earlier this year:
The United States could have approached Iraq in one of three ways: as a liberated nation, quickly creating a transitional Iraqi government and giving it sovereignty; as a defeated nation which would have required a massive and long-term occupation like that of Germany and Japan after World War II; or as a failed state which could have been addressed by passing control to the United Nations. Each would have had political disadvantages or significant costs, but each would have avoided entangling the United States in a protracted counterinsurgency campaign. By splitting the difference among them rather than committing to one, the United States became a half-hearted occupier, inspiring armed resistance without deterring it.
This, I think, illustrates an enduring problem with American strategy. Our entire political culture and ethos is based on finding compromise between diverse positions. In domestic politics, that works. In strategy, it often does not.
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