Ken--

You are quite right when you argue that Iraq is not (fill in the blank). It does, however, bear some similarities to a war of national liberation - see Abu Buckwheat/Malcom Nance's fine work on the Iraqi insurgents. It also has elements of of religious fanaticism, jihadist conquest, and state sponsored "terrorism." Thus, as you point out, some of Galula's et. al. lessons are relevant, some are not. I suspect that we would disagree on how much of previous learning is relevant and sometimes on which lessons, but that is arguing details. Yet, in most cases, what we are looking at and need to consider carefully, is how long standing tactics are adapted to new situations and technology, and recombined in different ways. The new is often found in the recombination and adaptation rather than in some "new generation of warfare." If this line of reaoning is correct, then reading Galula, Trinquier, Thompson, Kitson, Callwell, and the USMC 1940, etc. is valuable as sources of COIN adaptation.

The other issue you raise is that of organizational learning. We have known for generations that the war isn't over until a liberated or successor government is in place and capable of exercising sovereignty over its national territory. That was the reason General Marshall developed the Civil Affairs/Military Government capability during WWII along with plans to implement both liberations and occupations. Yet, even Marshall felt this was not a military function and his plan called for that capability to be transferred lock,stock, and barrel, to State Dept after the fighting ended. As we all know, it never happened. Fast forward to planning for Panama in 1988 and 89. Gneral Woerner planned for the post fighting period which he believed was the most important part of his plan. General Thurman accepted that resposnibility and implemented the plan with adaptation (of course). In planning for Iraq, General Franks felt he had dodged the bullet when OSD took responsibility for the occupation - planning and execution - and Franks went so far as to remind Wolfowitz of that decision. Given all the prior experience and the existence of relevant doctrine, I fail to see how senior commanders like Franks and senior DOD officials like Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith could have ignored it all. But, then, I guess I remain too optimistic about the human race. Still, I strongly believe that we should be able to find ways to instituionalize organizational learning that will make it more difficult for human stupidity to screw things up.

JohnT