Was not this the major thrust of Col Yinglings article?
The very delema Mcmaster finds himself in.
Though I do not think congressional oversite is the best answer because they can only approve or disapprove of what they are shown.
Mason
Welcome to Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) Web Site
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC))
The above is the '95 directive revising the position; it superseded the original from '88, so its no longer available on the DoD Directives page.Pursuant to Section 138(b)(4) of reference (a) and the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense by Section 113 of reference (a), this Directive establishes the position of the ASD(SO/LIC) with the responsibilities, functions, relationships, and authorities, as prescribed herein, and replaces references (b) and (c)......
Was not this the major thrust of Col Yinglings article?
The very delema Mcmaster finds himself in.
Though I do not think congressional oversite is the best answer because they can only approve or disapprove of what they are shown.
Mason
Figures . . . generals (like many people) tend to promote people like themselves. Generally speaking it takes an exceptional leader to promote someone who challenges their view of the world. This of course has the affect of stifling innovation and ensuring that if your army doesn’t know how to fight an enemy it won’t learn quickly.
General Patton was found alive and left this message for the Generals and the Citizens of the United States about Iraq and Terrorism. The part where it says to promote Col. MacMaster was left off for some reason.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xyUX6wV1lBQ
Gee Tom, I got the idea after seeing your Green Beret attack Squirrel with silver chips in his chest
Hey if the Dems got a talking snowman to talk about global warming- Slap could have a talking "attack squirell" that asked: how as president would you shape the armed forces and inter-agency process to meet the threats of the 21st century?
And the response from pretty much any candidate would be..."Gee, mister squirrel, that's a really good question. I've given this particular issue a great deal of thought and consideration during my time in public office. It's great that we have citizens such as yourself who are willing to ask the tough questions of those you would elect to lead this great nation in this time of stress. Thanks so much for sharing it with us and giving me the opportunity to answer. I know that you support our brave men and women in uniform just as much as I do and that your prayers are with them. Next question, please."
Which translates to: "Holy @%($...a talking squirrel! What's his voter demographic? Did Planter's contribute to my campaign? How can I spin this? What the crap is the 'armed forces'? We have forces without arms? Wait...there's a base in my district...ok...support the troops...yeah...next question."
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Rob - saw your comment on the SWJ blog entry and since not all Council members peruse there and comment (hint / hint) I'm reposting here:
Rob,
I've gotten e-mails and read comments that - oh well - all colonels are A++ and it is kind of like luck of the draw on who makes it and who does not. Seems to me that this is peacetime promotion board (like there should even be such an animal) talk. Eventually we will know who made the cut and who did not and hopefully that will shed some light on this BS non-selection.
I've also been told that because SWJ and others have made this an issue we are potentially pissing off the brass and may be hurting COL McMasters' future chances. Many are the same people who say with a straight face "you don't understand the selection process and what the board members were presented". Yea right.
Both are smoke-screens to stifle any debate on WARTIME leadership and the type of commanders this country deserves.
Moreover, I stand by my opinion that this issue seriously affects perceptions - especially those of the junior and mid-level officers dedicated to winning the long war and are at the tipping point on whether to stay or bolt. Many of them looked to McMaster as a glimmer of hope in these most difficult times.
Dave
Fascinating discussion, and one I heard earlier today at work. Personally, i think COL McMaster will make a great G.O. Notice I used "will" not "would". McMaster didn't get picked up BZ for O-7, that does not mean that he "won't" get picked up fo O-7. Regrettably, I believe that McMaster didn't get picked this go round for some of the reasons that were enumerated in earlier posts. That being said, I think that the next promotion board will select him. I think the lesson from this isn't as cut and dry as many view it. It is easy to contend that McMaster as a iconoclastic visionary who has spoken out and been "wronged" by those who continue to subscribe to the vision he has tried to shatter/upset, and perhaps it is that simple, and it would make many of us comfortable in that we "know" the enemy we would face if /when we were to pursue similar arguments. Regrettably, I think McMaster got passed over for something as simple an petty as professional jealousy. Here is a guy who has gotten it right in the last two major conflicts that we have fought, Desert Storm and Iraq. He has shown himself able to understand, adapt, and succeed in two very diverese military situations on top of being a best selling author. McMaster was probably passed over by people on a board who feel more threatened by the actions he has taken over his career, than the speaking of his opinion that he has done. Yeah, "they" might justify their decision based on some of his staements, but they are probably as threatened by his success as anything else. My $.02.
1. All BZ promotions are "select-in". Therefore nobody gets "passed over" BZ.
2. ALL GO promotions are "select-in", so once again, nobody gets "passed over".
3. All GO promotions are subject to political push and pull. As long as you're in the zone, there's hope.
I've seen several "tombstone" promotions to BG turn into amazing GO careers. It ain't over til it's over.
Hey Dave,
I don't have a problem with the GOs - most I've met have been pretty amazing people. Most have been people who I've admired for shouldering a great deal of responsibility and carrying it far better then I could hope.Moreover, I stand by my opinion that this issue seriously affects perceptions - especially those of the junior and mid-level officers dedicated to winning the long war and are at the tipping point on whether to stay or bolt. Many of them looked to McMaster as a glimmer of hope in these most difficult times
It is the system that I think needs to be brought in line. I've said before that we are both bureaucratic and conservative and that makes change very difficult. I guess that could be seen by some as a good thing if you believe that by sacrificing getting it too far right, you can avoid getting it too far wrong. However I think that taking a planning maxim and applying it too leadership selection is a poor choice.
We've spent an awful lot of money talking about building leaders that reflect the attributes of $20 words, but when it comes down to it I personally don't see much happening that reflects investment in human capital. Sure we see ACS talk, and some others, but most of it comes with a pretty heavy price tag. I've not seen much in the way of "new". When I read that COL McMasters had been passed over ( and I think this was not his BZ, but his first look - RTK could say for sure) it sort of hit me. The first time I got that feeling was when I looked at a BN CMD slate and saw some guys I would not want to follow slated in MTO&E CMD slots and some I'd follow anywhere in TDA alternates (& yes TDAs need good folks too) - it hit me then that there is no real HR strategy that identifies the very best people to do the most important things - which is when I made some decisions about what was most important to me - after all if these incredible leaders had sacrificed so much only to be put at the bottom of the pile I was not going to ask my family to sacrifice the ways theirs had. I'd always believed that the only place such a large organization can really look after its people is at the lower tactical levels (BDE & below), at the higher levels it more akin to see a hole fill a hole, but then I knew it as gospel. Sometimes we put round pegs in round holes on purpose, but mostly when that happens it seems to be luck.
I'm not sure we can really excel by perpetuating this system. We struggle to come up with good ideas such as revamping the OER system, or rearranging the money, but in the end there are "must do's" that trump the "need to do's" that we just can't get past. This leaves the good ideas with no real staying power, and after awhile they just come across as another hollow slogan. I know people can be petty, but I think COL McMaster's case is more representative of a system that cannot consistently identify and promote excellence.
What I have not figured out is if it can be fixed. It may not be a problem, it might be a condition. The only way I can see us fixing this problem is to make recruiting and retaining the most talented people and their families the priority. This means everything from the list of incentives that DAGGER 6 had listed to questioning our system of promotion at all levels. In another post somebody had mentioned the issues with LTs, CPTs and MAJs. If its a condition, then its a whole nother ball game, and will take some real external efforts to change - like LTC Yingling's thoughts.
I'm sort of past wondering about how this sort of thing applies to me as I've already made up my mind, but I do worry about allot of kids I've led, and I'm even wondering about what kind of Army my own kids will inherit. We had an interesting conversation the other night about who in America is willing to serve. We better be thinking about that one real hard, or one day we're going to wake up and "the next greatest generation" is going to say "hey why don't you take a turn on the wall for awile."
Last edited by Rob Thornton; 07-29-2007 at 01:42 AM.
Rob raises some excellent issues, as usual. We need to be concerned and do all we can to ensure that the system (and we ALL hate HRC/PERSCOM/MILPERCEN/OPO) is responsive to the needs of the Army and to the wonderful soldiers/officers who make it up.
Nonetheless, I was struck with a feeling of Deja Vu when I read Rob's last post.
In 1987 (OK some of you weren't born yet), YG 1966 had just finished the War College and one of thier members asked rhetorically if there was enough talent left to see the Army through the difficult years to come. The thesis was that YG 66 had been decimated in Viet Nam (it hadn't), had suffered a huge exodus in response to an unpopular war, and had experienced a larger than normal exit on it's 20th anniversary (i.e. first opportunity to retire). Rick Atkinson would later study that portion of the YG coming from USMA, but some brilliant GO asked a coupla us to look and see if the Army had lost all its senior talent, using YG 66 as a case study.
On the one hand, we were stifled in our attempts because we couldn't get access to personal/personnel records necessary. Once an officer retires, his/her records are off limits unless you have the moral equivalent of a warrant. While the anecdotal evidence, in deed, pointed toward a hollow leadership structure on its way to the top, the numbers we were able to get did not support the supposed crisis. Within the active duty crowd, there was unbelievable talent available -- dedicated folks willing and able to take the reins of the Army. The Gulf War sort of bore out that the YG that got repreatedly "screwed" after VN were more than capable of leading the Army they had helped re-create in the aftermath.
I just don't know how to systemitize that.
Then there's what I call the Sports Illustrated effect.
As others have alluded above, the Army doesn't like to reward officers it considers "special". Ditto, there's a certain pride in being un-educated. (Not the same as being stupid). I was commanding my third company while yo-yo was off getting his masters. The last good book I read was 100-5 (3-0). You all know the syndrome.
Quite apart from that is the SI effect. I never wanted my favorite athlete to be on the cover of Sports Illustrated in the Pre=season. Same for my team getting ranked number one. The SI effect is that anyone singled out as outstanding incurs some sort of debillitating malady that keeps them from presaged glory. Can't explain why.
Go Twins.
I'm brand new to this forum and agree with most of the posts, especially Old Eagle's post of selected versus passed-over. To add to the discussion COL McMaster's predesssor at 3 ACR was COL Dave Teeples who was on the FY07 BG ACC list. Additionally, some food for thought, is that there are individuals that remember who "rocks the boat." McMaster while in Iraq tried to relieve his aviation squadron commander, but he was reinstated. Who chaired the BG board? Plus, there is the legacy of McMaster working for Macgregor. My $0.02. Glad to be aboard and look forward to future dialogues.
Here is the latest from the DoD.
New Joint Qualification System Enhances Officer Management
The Department of Defense announced today the details of a new joint qualification system (JQS), which will help to identify military personnel who possess the abilities needed to achieve success in the joint/interagency environment. This new program will allow DoD to better incorporate an officer's joint experiences and qualifications into assignment, promotion and development decisions.
Inherent in this new system is the ability to recognize the skills that aid U.S. military efforts to respond to national security threats, as well as interagency, combat operations and humanitarian crises at home and abroad. A four-level system serves to enhance the tenets of jointness set forth in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) of 1986 and will be implemented for all services on Oct. 1, 2007.
While officers may still earn designation as a Joint Qualified Officer, formerly known as a Joint Specialty Officer, by completing the requisite joint professional military education and a standard-joint duty assignment, officers may also earn qualifications by accumulating equivalent levels of joint experience, education, and training. The experience-based system awards points in tracking the progression through successive qualification levels, while accounting for the intensity, environment, and duration/frequency of each joint activity.
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