Norfolk--Originally Posted by Norfolk
While I don't necessarily agree with your rankings (probably because I never heard of many of the names you posted), that last paragraph-- above-- is as cogent a piece of analysis as I have ever read. Beautifully done.
Best wishes,
Fred.
Thanks Fred.Now you actually walked, talked, and worked with a Great General, DePuy. What, according to your observations, were the outstanding traits of Great Generalship that DePuy himself had?
Norfolk--Thanks Fred.
DePuy was the most remarkable soldier I ever served with, and that includes George Joulwan, who was my CO when I was a young 1LT with the 1/30, 3rd Inf. Div., in Schweinfurt, Germany. Whatever I am today, I owe to my parents, my school, and George Joulwan, so you can see how high I hold DePuy. (Joulwan, incidentally, was NATO CG and led the forces into Bosnia.) Joulwan was also with me in Vietnam, same division (1st) when we served together under DePuy for the second time.
As a teacher-- BG CO in Germany-- he was a patient man with young LTs, teaching them his methods, teaching them-- us-- how to be good officers. At the same time, he brooked no excuses and forced you to take responsibility for what you did. If you erred, you always had the opportunity to explain, and either he or his well-taught officers always took the time to show you how to get it right. He was a strict disciplinarian and enforced his ideas and his methods, his formations, his timing, etc. We used the "traveling," the "traveling overwatch," and the "bounding overwatch," techniques until we could taste them, and woe betide he who wouldn't learn! We also used his fire-and-maneuver techniques until they became second nature and even the lowest private was so embued with DePuy's tactics, that they scoffed at anything else. As you can imagine, we were probably the only unit in USAREUR to use this stuff and the morale in the battle group was sky-high because we felt we were something different and because DePuy always emphasized the necessity of saving lives.
When we went on field exercises, there was a constant emphasis on the use of assets. On a small unit level, it was our introduction to "combined arms." Again, God help the man who moved his men to the "attack" without first exploring the availability and use of mortars, artillery, air, and any other mechanism that would save a single life.
This translated into the same atmosphere in Vietnam. I was RA, but had bad eyes so I couldn't remain in the infantry. I lucked out after my 2-year obligation to a combat branch, and was transferred in TC, and got an interview job at NATO as a 1LT. You talk about cloud nine... ! When my tour was up, I went to Ft. (Useless) Eustis, school, a battalion S-3 job, company CO, then Vietnam. In Vietnam I took over the truck company in the S&T Battalion (the only one a division has). That's when I ran into Joulwan again, several NCOs I knew in the 1/30 and a couple of the officers from there, as well. It almost seemed DepUy had orchestrated the whole thing: could he have? All his own boys? I don't know, but it certainly seemed that way.
I wrote a manual for the division on convoy operations when I was there and I ran the first so-called infiltration convoy of the war, from Lai Khe to the old French Michelin rubber plantation at An Loc, a 7-day affair, if memory serves me correctly. And Depuy was his old smoke-bringing self. He was aided by another hell-raiser, his ADC 2-3, Jim Hollingsworth (there's a great blurb about Hollingsworth in Cornelius Ryan's The Last Battle). The main difference was that the teaching-gloves were now off and guys who couldn't cut it or who screwed up real bad were quickly gone. This was no longer CPXs and FTXs. This was "Charlie," the NVA, and dirty pool. DePuy wanted no excuses, no nonsense, none of the "corporate" charts showing casualties and captured rifles, none of that stuff. He wanted results. Operations were brilliantly planned and he used massive air assets, heliborne operations for everything, speed, stealth, surprise, and massive firepower. He had so many attachments I think the division at one time numbered more than 25,000 troops. Again: mortars instead of men. Then send in the troops. I would be given convoy instructions by the DTO. (They only used us as decoys to flush Charlie out; virtually everything was re-supplied by air.) I would always ask who was providing road security. The inevitable answer was, ARVN. My reply was always the same. "Negative, sir." It would then immediately go back to Hollingsworth or DePuy and I got US troops (most of the time George Joulwan; he musta loved that!).
DePuy was also very big on base-camp perimeter patrols and in the year I was there, our huge camp was not hit once, rather remarkable for 1966-1967. Once in a while I was allowed to attend a division staff meeting during an operation. Maps were used; the charts disappeared. He hated them. And the division was the most professional organization I have ever served in, again, with extremely high morale. The man was indefatiguable, all over the place, and I must say, many careers were ruined by him, Hollingsworth, and the ADC 1-4, Deane (or Dean, I can't remember which any more). And I will say this, with all deference to other units: we were always pulling guys out of hot water: Tropic Lightning, the Old Reliables, a couple of those LIBs. I constantly ran convoys to other divisions, yet no one ever ran them to us.
I don't ever remember us taking severe casualties and our operations were always kept reasonably quiet despite the ARVN "support." DePuy was an attrition general, but he defined it in a way that was different from what most think: "... we continued to hope that we could inflict such losses on the VC or the NVA that it would be more than they would be able to take. That's the alternative to cutting the trail. That's an attrition war." Many think it's the other way around. He was also the innovator of the "search and destroy" operation and never believed in letting the enemy off the hook. He always had something going on. I think if I had to pick one thing, however, about his tactics, it would be surprise. The enemy that faced the 1st Inf. Div. when Bill DePuy commanded it, was never given a breather, was always looking around him, was always off balance, never knowing where the next battalion was going to land, where the next attack was coming from. DePuy was a master at it.
Another thing I really liked about him was he was not afraid to admit his mistakes. That's a very rare quality, even in the "duty-honor-country" society of the military.
So that's it. You will love the C&GS stuff on his papers, especially chapters 24-28. The first ones are good, as well. They're the ones that give you his squad and platoon tactics. Great stuff. I wonder if we use them today. Boy, oh boy! did they make sense. Try moving a platoon that way instead of the old, 1962 Ft. Benning madness.
Best wishes,
Fred.
Enough with the tone. No one is copping out and I certainly don't have to explain myself to you. Yes The governor's dispute is in Lords's book. And the quote did come from the book. I would not have stated so otherwise.Don't cop out just yet, Tom. I'm no monument to justice or reading anything I dispute out of context. I didn't take it from Lord's book. I took from the link I posted. The first quote may have originated from your book but why does it state the governor apparently did not approve the order? Was that in Lord's book as well?
Over the top again. I revere the defenders of the Alamo and took my wife there this year. Drop it.Like you stated earlier. This will go no where. But please don't talk out loud about the subject while in the Alamo and for God's sake, remember to take your hat off before you go inside.
Tom
Excuse me? My tone has been no different than yours. You just like to bug out. All I did was grab you by the tail and pulled you back. Like you stated earlier. This is more about disagreement than anger. I took your advice and used your own company language. It is not my fault you took offense. Lets do this. Lets just ignore each other in the future starting now.
"But suppose everybody on our side felt that way?"
"Then I'd certainly be a damned fool to feel any other way. Wouldn't I?"
Having just finished Cray's biography of George C. Marshall (and thus now an unimpeachable authority) I'm surprised to see few mentions of him on this thread.
I also noticed this about MacArthur, who people were arguing about a page or so ago. While other controversial generals get some positive mentions in other people's biographies (Patton being the one that comes to mind most readily), I have never seen a biography of another WWII-era figure that puts MacArthur in a good light. He was trashed in the Marshall biography, same with McCullogh's "Truman," not especially well regarded in the few Patton biographies I've read (along with Patton himself sometimes), and pretty well lambasted in E.B. Potter's "Nimitz," if memory serves.
I know the man had his moments of brilliance (Inchon), but his combat record doesn't seem to compare to Patton's, who had some of the similar negative characteristics.
Thoughts?
Matt
"Give a good leader very little and he will succeed. Give a mediocrity a great deal and he will fail." - General George C. Marshall
I think two of the biggest differences between the two is that Patton understood and paid attention to the chain of command (even though he might have complained about it) and could admit when he made a mistake. MacArthur didn't deal well with either. IMO, anyhow.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Here are just a few reasons for folks not being a MacArthur Fan
1. He got jumped 2 grades before the start of WWI --Major to Colonel--probably watered off a few folks he jumpeed over (Remember General Alexander M. Haig anyone?)
2. Critical of how Pershing fought WWI
3. As Superintendent, USMA, he was responsible for major changes in how the place ran and what it taught--Anmyone who knoews anything about USMA knows that change is not well-loerated by its past graduates, nor is the person who makes the changes happen. (An old saying is "The Corps has . . .")
4. He was politically connected to Teddy Roosevelt
5. He was not politically connected to FDR
6. He was a general's kid (his father was a 3 star)
7. He served on the Bily Mitchell court martial panel
8. Medal of honor for service on Bataan (I have no idea what the citation
says).
9. He spent a lot of his career in the Pacific theater.
10. He is the only American military officer ever to be appointed Field Marshall (even if it was in the Philippine Army.)
11. CSA during the Depression, disbanded the "Reserve" Army of Vets
How are those for starters?
I have always been led to believe that the two greatest American field or fighting generals of WWII were MacArthur (and subsequently into Korea) and Patton. MacArthur for his island-hopping strategy that drove the Japanese crazy and Patton for obvious reasons, not the least of which was his turn toward Bastogne, considered by some I had read to have been the greatest maneuver of any major American field force of the war. (I often wonder if any of those writers had studied the German panzer generals before being so awed.)
I am aware of the monumental egos involved, but I have never known that shortcoming as counting when considering a man's generalship. I am not sure charming personalities matter when one looks for a warrior who can lead his men to victory. Attila and Genghis come to mind. Of course that begs the question, did they win strictly out of numbers, reputation, and fear, or was it generalship? Probably a combination of both. I would guess we wouldn't have gotten too het-up if MacArthur had chopped his way through a few Japanese civilians to get at his enemy, and Dresden, 1945, speaks for itself. What would we be saying about Patton if that particular gem was his brainchild?
I don't know; I think for my money, I will stick with what I learned a long time ago: MacArthur and Patton wear the medals of great generalship for America during WWII. I will maintain that Bill DePuy assumed their mantle when the American people had done with them, and now we thirst for the new love-hate relationship. Maybe David Patraeus will be fortunate/unfortunate enough to step into that role. He seems to be just clever enough-- by half-- to "write the book," "assume the role," and keep just enough of his political powder dry to figure out what to do next.
It seems odd though. Much of that "book" I seem to recall having read in Special Forces school back in the early 60's. Déjà vu all over again.
Best wishes,
Fred.
Agrred Fred. Patton and MacArthur were certainly the most brilliant of the US Army's operational-level commanders during the Second World War, and while MacArthur may not have been a popular man (or even Patton for that matter), a fair number of people at least did recognize MacArthur's brilliance. I think perhaps the major difference in generalship between MacArthur and Patton was Patton's more or less consitent brilliance, while MacArthur had moments of brilliance between rather more pedestrian performances. Granted, even Patton had difficulty fighting through the hedgrows in Normandy, but so did everyone else. Patton's consistent performance left much less room for critics to denigrate his generalship than MacArthur's; but MacArthur remains a great general.
Brilliance aside, while I think Patton was also perhaps the most consistently competent of the US Army operational-level (rather than tactical-level) commanders, I think that Kruger and Simpson rate not too far behind. Especially given that Kruger had to deal with MacArthur's personality, and Simpson had to deal with Montgomery's (almost remarkable accomplishments in themselves); nevertheless, Kruger helped pulled off the Phillipines, and Simpson handled two rather difficult situations with great skill: holding the north shoulder of the "Bulge", and crossing the Rhine with almost (and relative) ease, given the circumstances. What Kruger and Simpson may have lacked in sheer brilliance, they made up for in consistent competency and few if any mistakes in particular.
If you want to tout WWII Allied Generals with "consistent competency," I suspect you need to include Patch and Lucian Truscott Jr.. The old 7th Army is the only force to successfully cross the Vosges in an opposed offensive operation. Even though they faced some of the dregs of the Wehrmacht, they also faced some fairly competent Panzer units and a crack Mountain Division as well during that campaign. The use of tailoring to achieve effective force mixes for the various terrrain in the Vosges area was masterful, IMO. This is the kind of thing I would expect from a great general--build and maintain cohesive units, train subordinates well on combined arms operations, give them the resources they need to win, then stand back and let them succeed.
Patch was also a significant leader in the Pacific (Formed the Americal Divison, later the overall commander on Guadalcanal) before moving to the European Theater. I cannot recall any other Allied General who has a similar claim to fame, but I look forward to being corrected if I am wrong.
Posting Permissions
Bookmarks