Rifle squad composition

[jcustis]

Also, I think someone earlier on this thread mentioned that the USMC found that removing one of the 3 LMGs from each rifle squad could not be compensated for in practice even with MMGs at higher levels. An LMG can is easier to keep supplied with ammo under fire (no-one has to get up and run off to a vehicle or to company HQ to get more MMG ammo in the midst of a squad/section fire-fight, not unless the entire squad is running out,and then elements behind should be bringing that ammo up), and an LMG is rather easier to handle in an assault than an MMG. If one of your fire teams is wiped out, the MG Team may be hard pressed to provide suppressive fire and ammo resupply and its own local security while the other goes into the assault.

Hmmm, an interesting point. Where does it leave us when we consider this type of "team" organization? It was definitely a different type of fight, but a COIN/small wars type of fight nonetheless:

Each stop had four soldiers. One was the commander, with a radio, a FN FAL, 100 rounds (7.62 × 51 mm NATO), several types of grenade. One was the machine gunner, with a FN MAG machine-gun and carrying 400 rounds. The other two were riflemen with a FN and 100 rounds, grenades, rifle grenades and medical equipment. By 1979 one of these two was issued a radio.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhodesian_Light_Infantry

[Norfolk]

Hmmm, an interesting point. Where does it leave us when we consider this type of "team" organization? It was definitely a different type of fight, but a COIN/small wars type of fight nonetheless:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhodesian_Light_Infantry

Actually jcustis, I rather like that team organization. This is very similar to what a lot of SAS patrols used in the Falklands (exchanging SLRs for M-16s mind you). With 3 riflemen (granted, armed with SLR battle rifles rather than assault rifles, but the Rhodesians sure knew how to use them), that team was fully prepared for close-combat; if it had a grenade launcher though, that would clearly be reduced. Also, the FN rifle isn't exactly ideal for said because of its length, but still doable. The only big problem is ammo resupply for the MAG; well, that, and the lack of a grenade launcher, although I believe the Rhodesians still carried the requisite cups for rifle grenade (indirect to 150m). The Rhodesians (I think) tended to fight very light, so carrying a lot of MAG ammo might have been rather less of a problem, especially given that the Bush War was not over-all a high-intensity one, like NATO Armies have to prepare for (theoretically at least). That said, there's an important counter-example to that.

The WWII panzergrenadier squad (initially 12 men, plus 2 drivers, eventually 9 men with 1 driver) carried a pair of MG-34s or (later on) MG-42s. The Germans emphasized "effect over cover". Well, with two MG-42s per squad, you pretty much had all the cover you could ever want. In the attack, the Sqaud Leader would control both GPMG teams while the Assistant Squad Leader would lead the assault. The Germans did not use Fire Teams per se, nor even Battle Drills. Granted, the panzergrenadiers (theroretically) had either half-tracks or trucks with them, but ammo resupply must have been quite the challenge. So far as I know, there's not a standard rifle squad on earth that surpasses the firepower of the WWII panzergrenadier squad. But in its days of offensive successes, it doctrinally had 12 men; during the later defensive portions of the war, it was doctrinally down to 8-9 men.

There's a part of me that would very much prefer to have at least a pair of MAGS (maybe 3) per squad, and be done with the Minimi or any future AR. But I'm not sure that the ammo carry/resupply situation, never mind the unwieldiness of the MAG in CQB, could be satisfactorily overcome. Yet the Germans appear to have done so (from what info is available anyway). I think MCWL should maybe ditch MERS and test out a Rifle Squad with M-240s instead of M-249s. That would be interesting.

[jcustis]

The interesting this about firepower in a future distributed operations squad is that it does rely on fighting light, as the Rhodesians did. Lightening the load is one of the objectives clearly laid out on the document you graciously provided Norfolk (I had not seen that one before).

At 700 rds carried across a stick, that's close to what you might get out of an attached MG team anyway, and if the riflemen of a current squad are carrying extra belts, it's the age old problem of getting it to the team(s) or moving it once it's been dropped off. Similar issue with mortar rounds.

If I remember correctly, indirect firepower was achieved by the Rhodies through the use of rifle grenades, and Marine Gunner Eby wrote an excellent piece for the Marine Corps Gazette some years back that pushed for a rifle grenade capability. They've got bulk to them, but you're talking about a capability for all of the riflemen, not just you're M203 owners. I think better range and casualty radius were touted in the article as well. I don't believe accuracy is comparable though, but I'd have to research that a bit.

[Norfolk]

The interesting this about firepower in a future distributed operations squad is that it does rely on fighting light, as the Rhodesians did. Lightening the load is one of the objectives clearly laid out on the document you graciously provided Norfolk (I had not seen that one before).

At 700 rds carried across a stick, that's close to what you might get out of an attached MG team anyway, and if the riflemen of a current squad are carrying extra belts, it's the age old problem of getting it to the team(s) or moving it once it's been dropped off. Similar issue with mortar rounds.

If I remember correctly, indirect firepower was achieved by the Rhodies through the use of rifle grenades, and Marine Gunner Eby wrote an excellent piece for the Marine Corps Gazette some years back that pushed for a rifle grenade capability. They've got bulk to them, but you're talking about a capability for all of the riflemen, not just you're M203 owners. I think better range and casualty radius were touted in the article as well. I don't believe accuracy is comparable though, but I'd have to research that a bit.

What really bothers me most about the DO platoon organization isn't just cutting the USMC rifle squad back to 12 men; it's all the "C2". Out of the 12 man squad, there are just two 4-man Fire Teams, and an entire 4-man Command and Control Team (albeit fully-armed). And if that's not sick enough, then the Rifle Platoon HQ has no less than eight men in it, in two 4-man C2 Teams, one led by the Platoon Leader, and the other led by the Platoon Sergeant.

As for the matter of grenade launchers and rifle grenades, I wonder if bringing rifle grenades back and replacing the actual grenade launchers with an RPG-type rocket launcher wouldn't be a better way to go; but then that would make it that much more difficult to mark targets and lay smoke...hmmm.

[jcustis]

After acratching my head, it looks like the three additions to the Plt HQ (riflemen) came from cutting them out of the squad organization. While this is a doctrinal change that cements things, it reflects the likely reality of having a highly-trained linguist handler, data communications Marine, and even perhaps a mini-UAV operator.

These types of personnel are a personnel tax out of the organization, and in current operations there could be considerable shuffling going on to deal with the added equipment/roles.

I think "Squad C2" is a misnomer, because each of those fireteams are likely to be in a solid fight during distributed operations. The squad leader essentially becomes the TL for a team as well, so that sort of makes sense.

If the Corps continues to follow the fighter-leader concept as well as guiding/flowing off of the base unit in assaults, then it also makes some sense to simply incorporate the SL into a team structure. That is, so long as the SL is unot encumbered with a heavy reporting requirement to adjacent or higher headquarters. Who fights that team them? Does it fight as a 3-man element?

As peculiar as this all seems, I suspect it reflects the reality of what is happening in Iraq right now. There are probably a number of troops who are not stepping across the line of departure as straight trigger pullers, but rather as what I call enablers (like an RTO or UAV operator). This doctrinal structure seems to address this reality and make it a standing organization. It is still peculiar though without knowing all the brainstorming that went on behind the scenes.